Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
Locked
User avatar
mescal
Member
Posts: 1415
Joined: 30 Mar 2008, 15:46
Location: France, EUR

Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#46

Post by mescal » 16 Jan 2009, 01:15

Such an attack would not help Japan win the war, unless, they had decided to fight a protracted war instead of a short one.
- Obviously true from a 2009 hindsight point of view but not nearly so clear from a 1941 Japanese PoV, I think.
I would say that it's from a 1941 Japanese perspective that the "why" is clear.

At first glance, if IJN wants to defeat the USN, it's not a bad thing to prevent or delay reinforcement after the first strike (Pearl Harbor).
However, defeating the USN was not in IJN's agenda.
The Pearl Harbor strike was designed to weaken the USN enough so that it cannot interfer with the invasion of south Pacific area, and especially the Philippines.
Once the Pacific Fleet heavy units are out of the picture, all USN are out. The Atlantic units have no way to arrive in time(i.e. before the Japanese have captured bases) in the Philippines or Dutch East Indies, Panama canal or not (at that time it was thought to be foolish to attack enemy-held land bases with a fleet).

Put in another way, once the Pacific Fleet power projection disappear, the Atlantic Fleet power projection is not an adequate substitute, since the target is out of its reach (in the 6-months of the planned war).

So the "why" may have been, from an IJN staff officer : why disobey doctrine to invest resources (even if it's few resources) to attack an objective of little to no value in the current context ?



It's a detail, but I think that there would have been a strong probability (from IJN's staff point of view) that the seaplane tender bringing the Mavis will not make it back home.
Olivier

User avatar
Simon K
Member
Posts: 1425
Joined: 19 Jul 2008, 20:25
Location: London U.K

Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#47

Post by Simon K » 16 Jan 2009, 01:27

Think its time to reexamine the Oahu thread in the light of this

As IJA/IJN shipping and amphibious capacity is at full stretch with operations already planned,[*] Ignore the PIs - let them wither on the vine via IJN blockade,bombing etc, and devote the saved resource to a full blown attack on THI.

The attack on Malaya should also go ahead, with the assault on the DEI also essential. Cant see the point of attacking the PIs where a far more attractive strategic target - THIs, are not neutralised.

[*]Information kindly provided at thread "KB And other IJA landing operations" - this has to be analysed further however.


This with the Panama "outrage" and the capture of Midway, Wake and Guam is more likely to realise initial Japanese war aims. Maybe Mr. Yamamoto will go to Washington after all. 8O
Last edited by Simon K on 16 Jan 2009, 03:19, edited 1 time in total.


glenn239
Member
Posts: 5862
Joined: 29 Apr 2005, 02:20
Location: Ontario, Canada

Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#48

Post by glenn239 » 16 Jan 2009, 01:44

I believe that Glen239 (and I hope that he will correct me on this if I am mistaken here) wanted to discuss just the 'hows' here rather than getting everyone lost in the 'whys' of invading Hawaii, yet again.
The thread was muchly about the ‘how’, and only a little bit of ‘why’ tacked on at the start. The main strategic point was that taking Hawaii would either facilitate making of a separate peace with individual enemies, or (failing that) to improve Japan’s strategic position into the latter part of the middle of the war. Generally speaking, in war you go straight for the main opponent's juggular as soon as possible.
While I admit this discussion has been an interesting read. To me, in it not so much "Alternate History" as opposed to a "Fleet Problem" or tactical exercise, as there is no history behind it. No plausible motivation for the Japanese to undertake such an attack has been given. Such an attack would not help Japan win the war, unless, they had decided to fight a protracted war instead of a short one.
I’d suggested to Rob that what he is proposing was a separate combat command attached to the 4th Fleet, with a mission profile specializing in diversionary attacks in the Americas. That it might be interesting to flesh out this unit more, in terms of OOB and mission objectives.

User avatar
Simon K
Member
Posts: 1425
Joined: 19 Jul 2008, 20:25
Location: London U.K

Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#49

Post by Simon K » 16 Jan 2009, 02:11

Glenn I am glad that you seem to support the idea of bypassing Luzon as indicated in your introductory posting, and using that resource in an attack on the HIs.

Just working my way through your truly impressive Operational Plan. Great work.

robdab
Member
Posts: 814
Joined: 30 Mar 2007, 16:45
Location: Canada

Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#50

Post by robdab » 16 Jan 2009, 08:35

mescal, welcome aboard !

Once the Pacific Fleet heavy units are out of the picture, all USN are out. The Atlantic units have no way to arrive in time - I'm not clear on why you feel his to be the case ? If the Panama Canal remains functional, to travel the 6,000 +/- miles between Norfolk and San Diego at an average speed of only 20 knots takes but 12 days. After a 2-3 stopover there, the USN's Atlantic Fleet replacements for a Japanese destroyed Pacific Fleet would be at Oahu in another 5 days. Just under 3 weeks in total.

(i.e. before the Japanese have captured bases) in the Philippines or Dutch East Indies, Panama canal or not - You rely on 2009 hindsight to reach this conclusion. The 1941 ATL Japanese planning a Panama strike and a Hawaiian invasion could not then have known just how fast or successful the OTL Japanese invasions would really be. IIRC the OTL Japanese were very pleasantly surprised and did manage to speed up their next stage plans based on their faster than expected successes.

at that time it was thought to be foolish to attack enemy-held land bases with a fleet - Why then did the OTL Japanese attack Pearl Harbor with their Kido Butai ?

Put in another way, once the Pacific Fleet power projection disappear, the Atlantic Fleet power projection is not an adequate substitute, since the target is out of its reach (in the 6-months of the planned war). - You have yet to convince me that this would have been the case unless Hawaii was captured by the Japanese.

So the "why" may have been, from an IJN staff officer : why disobey doctrine to invest resources (even if it's few resources) to attack an objective of little to no value in the current context ? - As previously discussed, knocking out the Panama Canal delays USN reinforcements for any Hawaiian Islands counter-attacks.

If for no other reason than to shake the faith of the American people in the war leadership provided by FDR. A political crisis in Washington might slow early US responses to the new Pacific War, at a cost of just 3 flyingboats.

It's a detail, but I think that there would have been a strong probability (from IJN's staff point of view) that the seaplane tender bringing the Mavis will not make it back home. - Based on what exactly ?

User avatar
Simon K
Member
Posts: 1425
Joined: 19 Jul 2008, 20:25
Location: London U.K

Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#51

Post by Simon K » 16 Jan 2009, 08:42

If all this sufficiently hits the fan, it is even possible that a large proportion of the British battlefleet may even be sent in the OTL "crisis" of January to the Pacific. Churchillian desperation tinged with the "Grand Gesture"? To San Diego? Singapore?

If the PC was lost, a strong paralell with the distance the Imperial Baltic fleet travelled in 1904 - 5, but hopefully with a better outcome.

robdab
Member
Posts: 814
Joined: 30 Mar 2007, 16:45
Location: Canada

Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#52

Post by robdab » 16 Jan 2009, 08:51

Simon K,

Just working my way through your truly impressive [Invasion Oahu] Operational Plan. Great work. - I agree with your comment and while I look forward to participating in further detailed discussions on Glenn239's AH plan for an invasion of the Hawaiian Islands in December of 1941( and other strategic possibilities), I would like to request that you begin another "What IF" thread in order to do so.

I would much prefer that my ATL Panama scenario not be buried under another much larger Hawaii discussion and that other readers still interested in exploring my Panama creation not have to sift thru many only loosely related postings on Oahu in order to do so.

Many thanks for your consideration.

User avatar
Simon K
Member
Posts: 1425
Joined: 19 Jul 2008, 20:25
Location: London U.K

Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#53

Post by Simon K » 16 Jan 2009, 08:54

No that is fine. Thanks for opening up this fascinating vista. It would be good to have a "fresh start" if G is in agreement re: the HI.

Please allow me to contribute to this thread however. (If I have anything useful to contribute)

So far your plan is watertight (unlike the PC would have been)

Simon

User avatar
Robert Rojas
In memoriam
Posts: 2658
Joined: 19 Nov 2002, 05:29
Location: Pleasant Hill, California - U.S.A.
Contact:

RE: One If By Land And Two If By Sea.

#54

Post by Robert Rojas » 16 Jan 2009, 09:36

Greetings to both cousin Robdab and the community as a whole. Well sir, your bold and audacious plan as articulated within your introductory posting of Sunday - January 11, 2009 - 8:59pm notwithstanding, old Uncle Bob would like to build upon brother L.W.D.'s cautionary installment of Tuesday - January 13, 2009 - 1:36am. Given the undeclared naval war being fought out on the Atlantic Ocean between the United States of America and National Socialist Germany, I tend to concur with brother L.W.D.'s assertion that there would be a greater degree of security awareness by the armed forces of the United States of America over ANY potential threat presented to the Panama Canal Zone not by the warlords of Dai Nihon, but by the minions of Adolph Hitler. Apart from German submariner activity in the Caribbean Sea, one cannot discount the possibility of German "Q" ship activity in the vicinty of the Pacific Ocean approaches to the Panama Canal Zone. With these twin seaborne threats being kept in mind, one would rationally think that the United States Army would have that new British invention called RADAR watching BOTH sides of the Panama Canal Zone. Now, if the United States Army is watching for a potential German naval threat emanating from the Pacific Ocean, then what reasonable chance would your theoretical Galapagos Island gambit mounted by the Imperial Japanese Navy have against the very same "vigilant" defenses? It's just some sobering food for thought. Well, that's my initial Yankee two cents worth on this controversial topic of interest - for now anyway. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day up in your corner of Anglophonic speaking Canada - EH!?

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob :idea: :|

Sid Guttridge
Member
Posts: 10158
Joined: 12 Jun 2008, 12:19

Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#55

Post by Sid Guttridge » 16 Jan 2009, 13:15

Hi robdab,

I haven't previously been attacked for opening with an apology. Does politeness offend you?

Is it a problem if I repeat anything? Surely another opinion uninfluenced by previous posts may have merits if it independently reinforces them?

And yes, "a few minutes of reading and pointing a mouse really" was "too much for me to ask of" me on this occasion. I use a library terminal with strict time limitations and sometimes it is impossible to read through several pages of posts and make my own contribution.

Perhaps your next post to me will address the substance of my post. Was there nothing in it you wish to take issue with?

Sid.

User avatar
Tim Smith
Member
Posts: 6177
Joined: 19 Aug 2002, 13:15
Location: UK

Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#56

Post by Tim Smith » 16 Jan 2009, 15:20

Simon K wrote:If all this sufficiently hits the fan, it is even possible that a large proportion of the British battlefleet may even be sent in the OTL "crisis" of January to the Pacific. Churchillian desperation tinged with the "Grand Gesture"? To San Diego? Singapore?
Unlikely. The British were preoccupied with defending the Indian Ocean. The Pacific was America's field of operations.

Note: This doesn't apply to the Australian and New Zealand navies, who are interested in the Pacific as its their home.

User avatar
phylo_roadking
Member
Posts: 17488
Joined: 01 May 2006, 00:31
Location: Belfast

Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#57

Post by phylo_roadking » 16 Jan 2009, 16:30

Through the summer of 1941 the Dominion governments of Australia and New Zealand were ALREADY causing problems regarding the posting of their naval units too far from home, and weakening the Indian Ocean patrol as Uboats penetrated there, and German commerce raiders were sniffing around the South Atlantic and South Pacific...

robdab
Member
Posts: 814
Joined: 30 Mar 2007, 16:45
Location: Canada

Re: RE: One If By Land And Two If By Sea.

#58

Post by robdab » 16 Jan 2009, 19:04

Robert Rojas, welcome aboard !

Uncle Bob would like to build upon brother L.W.D.'s cautionary installment of Tuesday - January 13, 2009 - 1:36am. Given the undeclared naval war being fought out on the Atlantic Ocean between the United States of America and National Socialist Germany, I tend to concur with brother L.W.D.'s assertion that there would be a greater degree of security awareness by the armed forces of the United States of America over ANY potential threat presented to the Panama Canal Zone not by the warlords of Dai Nihon, but by the minions of Adolph Hitler. Apart from German submariner activity in the Caribbean Sea, one cannot discount the possibility of German "Q" ship activity in the vicinty of the Pacific Ocean approaches to the Panama Canal Zone. With these twin seaborne threats being kept in mind, one would rationally think that the United States Army would have that new British invention called RADAR watching BOTH sides of the Panama Canal Zone.

I believe that my initial thread starting posting addressed your concerns with, "The problems involved in providing a serviceable radar screen to alert the inner defenses of the Canal were less easily solved. Equipment in use at these stations was "inadequate" for early warning and "quite useless" for purposes of controlled interception. Sites had been selected for four British-type radars, the sets to be supplied from Canadian production, but improvement in equipment could not overcome deficiencies of operating personnel. Operators in Panama were largely untrained, had been given no indoctrination in the need for precision standards, and were frequently unenthusiastic about their assignment. Radar crews had made no effort to plot the permanent echoes in their search areas, and therefore could not discriminate between such "echoes" and "live" targets. The combination of inadequate equipment, poor site selection, and untrained operators produced such inefficiency that even the best station in Panama was "far below any acceptable standard of operational utility." The elimination of all the deficiencies noted depended on action by the War Department to provide improved equipment and better trained crews. No complete remedy was available to local commanders.". and it's source

Towards the end of that same initial posting I also included, "Although General Andrews recognized the U-boat campaign as "a definite menace to our war effort," he considered the canal to be "the one real enemy objective" and its protection to be his "paramount mission." Although he was somewhat concerned about the possibility of German surface raiders penetrating [from] the Caribbean, he was more than ever convinced that the principal threat was by carrier-borne aircraft from the Pacific.

The means for detecting an enemy carrier force before it launched its planes and for sighting the enemy planes before they reached the canal were the nerve center of the Panama defenses. Patrol planes, operating at about the 900-mile radius, were depended upon for the initial warning of an enemy's approach. Long-range radar (the SCR-271 and its mobile version, the SCR-270) was relied upon for the detection of enemy planes at distances up to about 150 miles. Still closer-in, the fixed antiaircraft defenses relied upon short-range, height-finding radar (SCR-268) for searchlight and fire control.

AFAIK there were only 12 PBY scouts assigned to search the Pacific to the west of Panama out of the 96 that were estimated to be able to provide a proper long ranged search.

At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack however, serious deficiencies existed in the warning and detection system. There were not enough planes and operating bases to carry out the search as planned. There were only two SCR-271 radars in operation, one at each end of the Canal. Although three additional sets arrived by the end of December and were being installed on the Pacific side of the Isthmus, the work was slowed down by a shortage of trained radar engineers and mechanics.

There were nevertheless certain deficiencies which were not entirely the result of a shortage of equipment and trained men. Tests in Panama repeatedly disclosed that low-flying planes approaching directly over the Bay of Panama were not detected by the radar system. Visiting British experts had noted this characteristic in American sets and attributed it to a basic defect of the equipment, but the Signal Corps insisted that, properly placed and operated by competent crews, the American equipment in this respect was just as good as, if not better than, the British radar. Whatever the cause, the blind spot remained. Furthermore, neither the SCR-270 nor the SCR-271 was designed to show the elevation of the approaching plane, and neither gave a continuous tracking plot. These qualities were indispensable for ground-controlled interception (GCI), which British experience had demonstrated to be the most successful method for conducting an air defense."

Pages #160-166 of: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/I/AAF-I-5.html detail the poor overall situation in Panama: "The vital importance of this phase of Canal defense was revealed in an estimate of enemy capabilities prepared by the Caribbean Defense Command in the latter part of November 1941. Japan was regarded in respect to the Canal itself as the primary potential enemy, and a carrier-based attack from the Pacific was considered "not an improbable feat." Other possibilities were taken into account, but it was concluded that in any event the most important defensive measure was "increasing and thorough reconnaissance and observation of the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone." Existing forces in the area were regarded as sufficient to repel any probable initial attack on the Canal provided they were given "timely warning" of the approach of hostile forces. The inability of defending naval and military air forces to perform the required amount of reconnaissance and to provide the "timely warning" constituted perhaps the chief weakness in the defenses immediately prior to American entry into the war. It was a weakness which was recognized by both Army and Navy commanders, their expressed hope lay in the postponement of attack by an enemy until the defending forces could achieve the proper degree of co-ordination and the necessary equipment for complete coverage of the vast sea frontiers."

THUS IT IS REVEALED THAT THE PRIMARY US PACIFIC DEFENSE OF THE PANAMA CANAL IN DECEMBER 1941 RELIED SOLELY ON THEIR MERE HOPE THAT THE JAPANESE WOULD NOT ATTACK THEM ANYTIME SOON !!!

Just how pathetic was that ?


I'm not sure what else I could add ?

Now, if the United States Army is watching for a potential German naval threat emanating from the Pacific Ocean, then what reasonable chance would your theoretical Galapagos Island gambit mounted by the Imperial Japanese Navy have against the very same "vigilant" defenses? It's just some sobering food for thought. - In light of the evidence that I presented in my thread opening post and have just repeated above, I find it amazing that you could think of the pre-war US defences of Panama as being in any way "vigilant" at all. Perhaps some sobering food should be considered ?

On a related note, the Galapagos Islands were owned and administered by Ecuador (as I also mentioned in my initial posting) on Dec.7'41. The Americans had been discussing building a US airbase there for a couple of years previous but approval had not yet been granted by Ecuador so there would have been NO US Army presence there to be "vigilant".

Well, that's my initial Yankee two cents worth on this controversial topic of interest - for now anyway. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day up in your corner of Anglophonic speaking Canada - EH!? - Damnation, I can never find that big jug of maple syrup when I need it !
Last edited by robdab on 16 Jan 2009, 20:44, edited 1 time in total.

robdab
Member
Posts: 814
Joined: 30 Mar 2007, 16:45
Location: Canada

Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#59

Post by robdab » 16 Jan 2009, 20:41

Sid Guttridge,

I haven't previously been attacked for opening with an apology. Does politeness offend you? - Sorry if I was too aggressive in my first response to you but I find it difficult, after devoting much research and typing time to crafting a scenario, to have people offer opinions without even reading it or the follow-up discussions on same.

Is it a problem if I repeat anything? Surely another opinion uninfluenced by previous posts may have merits if it independently reinforces them? - Just as your library terminal time is limited, so are the minutes that I can steal away from from work and family commitments to respond to the ongoing discussion. If I have to cover the same points twice (or more), it means that another poster (and all of those that take the time to follow along) have to wait for a response to a fresh idea or question. You may not think so but my time is also valuable, to me anyway.

Perhaps your next post to me will address the substance of my post. Was there nothing in it you wish to take issue with? - No need.

I believe that your points were already answered before you posed them here.

To recap:

I would suggest that knocking out the Panama Canal would not have been easy. - It is self-evident that this thread and my entire ATL Panama scenario would suggest that I disagree. At least for a short term knock-out. Could you expand on why it is that you feel this to be the case, with a source or two listed in support ? Simply disagreeing with the entire thrust of this thread does little to further this discussion, wouldn't you agree ? WHY do you feel that it wouldn't have been easy ??

German, Japanese and US analysts all concluded that the canal was most vulnerable at the Gatun Locks and spillway at the Caribbean end. Thus the defenders were likely to get some minutes warning of an attack from the Pacific. - Your logic escapes me here. If the Caribbean end of the Canal were thought to be the more vulnerable, would not the watches have been redoubled at that end, rather than at the Pacific end ?? BTW the American general in charge at the time disagrees with your opinion as I have already presented in my initial posting and here, above in my just previous response to Robert Rojas. My initial posting also presented, "Certainly the US was aware of the vulnerability of the Gatun Dam spillway to BOMBING as early as 1923 when a training exercise called Fleet Problem I, which is documented at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fleet_P..._note-Wright-1 , pointed that out quite dramatically.

The questions is what, if anything, did they do about it ? I suspect little as the US defenders of Dec.6'41 Panama did NOT know that the Japanese had perfected a shallow drop depth aerial torpedo and thus would not have been likely to protect against such, just as the OTL at Pearl Harbor illustrates. AA guns may have been deployed at the then peacetime Gatun Dam (but I have yet to find any confirmation of that) however they would be placed so as to protect against overhead bombing, not torpedo drops from some distance away, well out over Gatun Lake."


Perhaps rather than just posting a contrary opinion, you might have expanded on exactly why/how/from where/whom it is that you feel that the Americans at the Caribbean end of the Canal (Gatun) would have been likely to have received any such warning from the Pacific side of Panama ? An opinion with just a little bit of research effort presented behind it would be better received than a mere, "No it wasn't" style response that does little to advance the discussion.

The US had already gone to some trouble to defend the Gatun Locks with anti-aircraft artillery, barrage baloons, torpedo netting, etc. - My initial posting presented my comments/sources which detailed the sorry lack of AA ammunition, the lack of barrage balloons etc. etc.on pre-Pacific War Panama.

Had you taken the time to read it.

I look forward to your presentation of sources which show that the Gatun Dam, which is the target of my ATL sceanrio, not the Gatun Locks, was also protected by any such US defences. I have looked long and hard, including two trips to the US Archives at College Park, Maryland but have yet to find any such evidence. That does not mean that such does not exist, it merely confirms that I have not yet found it. Perhaps you have better luck, or more skill/patience ?

If the Gatun Locks were breached, it was thought that it could take at least six months to restore the canal, and possibly two or three times as long. Thus the canal would probably not have been out of action for the duration.- My initial posting is clear that my ATL Canal attack on the Gatun spillway (not on the nearly "bulletproof" Gatun Locks) was never intended to take out the Canal for the duration of the Pacific War. 'Twas always intended by me as very low cost, short termed, "tweaks to the American nose" of sea transport and homeland morale. Nothing more unless Oahu were to be invaded by the Japanese at the same time.

Finally, although it was circuitous and added many weeks to the voyage, Cape Horn remained open. I would suggest that hitting the Panama Canal might have gained Japan some time by slowing US deploments between the Atlantic and Pacific theares, but it would not have stopped them for long. - Was thoroughly covered by my initial posting of, "I'm not suggesting complete or permanent destruction, just a large reduction in the size of vessels able to use that transit shortcut between December 1941 and June +/- 1942. My tiny Japanese ATL attack would attempt to drain the rainwater stored by the Canal system for it's own use during the annual Dec.- April Panama dry season." and several posts after the initial one.

User avatar
Takao
Member
Posts: 3776
Joined: 10 Mar 2002, 20:27
Location: Reading, Pa

Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#60

Post by Takao » 17 Jan 2009, 09:55

@ Borys
I disagree, the Japanese could have done more to inconvenience the USN during the attack on Pearl Harbor by bombing the tank farms and repair facilities. They did not do so, they never even intended to. The US would have been far more inconvenienced without the fuel stocks and repair facilities than the loss of the Panama Canal. Loss of the Panama Canal adds, at most, 2months to travel time. How long would it take the US to rebuild and refill the oil tanks? IIRC, the Japanese figured it would take about a year for the US to recover its offensive capability, so disabling the Panama Canal for six months would not make a difference, as it would be repaired by the time the Japanese expected the first US offensive response.
The Japanese were of the opinion that the US was self-sufficient and could not be defeated logistically, so they never tried attacking US supply lines. As I said before, the Japanese began planning an attack on the Panama Canal in 1942, it was not until the end of 1944, that the submarines to carry out this mission were finally being completed.

Their conduct of submarine warfare was not one of sinking vulnerable enemy commerce, but attacking heavily defended US Task Forces. Further, their neglect of providing valuable ASW resources for their own transports shows how much emphasis they placed on logistics.

The USN would not be inconvenienced for 6 months to a year, but a month-and-a-half to two months, the time it would take to sail from Florida to San Francisco going "Round the Horn." Heck, the USS Oregon(BB-3) did it in 66 days in 1898.


@ robdab
Such an attack would not help Japan win the war, unless, they had decided to fight a protracted war instead of a short one. - Obviously true from a 2009 hindsight point of view but not nearly so clear from a 1941 Japanese PoV, I think.
It is not hindsight, the Japanese themselves had no strategic plans if the US did not cave in after the first year of war. The quote from Admiral Yamamoto himself in 1940: "I can run wild for six months … after that, I have no expectation of success." Proves that they had had no clear cut strategy if the US did not sue for Peace early on.
The only gain for the Japanese is that they extend the travel time of ships moving from the Pacific to the Atlantic. - And vice- versa. At the paltry cost of just 3 IJN flyingboats, what is wrong with that exactly, from a December 1941 Japanese PoV ?
Personally, your not thinking BIG enough. Me, in an ATL setting, Kido-Butai heads to Rabaul to refuel and rearm, and then sorties for Panama. 6 carriers should be able to do enough damage to keep the Panama Canal from being used for years. With a length of only 50 miles, everything is well within range of the Japanese planes attack radius.

I always felt the Indian Ocean Raid was a bust, and the Kido Butai could have been doing something more constructive during this time. Six carriers allows you to have plenty of firepower for destroying the canal, while still retaining plenty of firepower to deal with any US naval forces that might show up.

Now concerning the 40% jump in Panama Canal traffic. What is the break down of shipping? Was it all East-West traffic, West-East traffic, the majority headed East-West, or the majority West-East? How much of the shipping traffic was bound for the US and how much was from the US headed to other countries? How much was not related to the US at all? What was the average yearly increase in shipping traffic from 1935-41. A lot more analysis is needed to give the "40% increase in shipping traffic" real meaning in this argument. While, I did say it was faster, I did not say it was cheaper. Rail rates were 2 to 4 times higher than shipping rates in 1940. However, I will concede that a great burden would be placed on the US road and rail transportation nets to make for any losses. Most likely, only military necessities and other high priority cargo would be sent by road/rail. The rest would have to go the long way around South America.
Do you really think it would have been politically acceptable for FDR to simply ignore the over 500,000 American citizens (including those isolated on Guam, Wake, Midway and the Philippines) who would have been in Japanese hands after the fall of an ATL Hawaii to the IJA & IJN ? In light of the OTL American reaction to the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, I just can't see that myself. The ATL 1941 Japanese PoV would likely have expected that those 1/2 million new 'bargaining chips' and Hawaii itself, might have been traded back to gain permanent US acceptance of both Japan's new ownership of the NEI's oil fields and her 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' in general.
Yeah, the "bargaining chips" argument gave me a good laugh in the Pearl Harbor thread too. By the way, in the OTL we DID abandon Guam, Wake, and the Philippines; so, why should adding Hawaii to the list make any more difference. But still...In the OTL in retribution for the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Bataan Death March, we sank Japan's Navy, destroyed Japan's Air Force, burned the majority of their cities to the ground, and then, when they did not surrender, proceeded to drop two atomic bombs on them. Now, do you really think that by Japan butchering, or otherwise bringing harm to the civilians of Hawaii, the US will A.) Just give up. or B.) Make Japan the 49th State? Ok, so maybe the war will end in '46 or '47 and not 1945.
But, then again, all this hinges on a total about face of the Japanese military away from their "attack" mentality, to a more comprehensive strategy for war. - How can ADDING another ATL attack on the Panama Canal to the OTL possibly be interpreted as, "a total about face of the Japanese military away from their "attack" mentality" ???
Because, to the Japanese, there was nothing of military importance there. It was a logistical target not a military one. For instance, if the aircraft carriers and battleships were not stationed at Pearl Harbor, would Japan still have attacked there? They attacked ONLY targets of military value: Ships, airbases, and barracks. They made no attempts to hit the OBVIOUS oil tanks or dockyard facilities. Even though they had 350+ aircraft in two waves, but could not spare 5, 10, or 20 to hit the tank farm. For that matter, they did not attack the submarine base at Pearl either. Now, if logistical targets were sufficiently high up the target chain to justify your proposed attack, then surely, the Japanese would have devoted, at least, some attention to said logistical targets at Pearl. This they did not do.

To conclude, while I really do like your plan and appreciate the effort you put into it. Unless your ATL has Japan changing its attitude away from strictly military targets and proceeds to take a more pragmatic path that would include logistical targets, I don't see this event taking place.

@ mescal,
I'm mostly in agreement with you. The US can not just send its Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific en masse. That would leave the Atlantic undefended. They would, an did, send ships to the Pacific as operations permitted. Not to mention, that moves were to get units to defend the West Coast and not for any real offensive purpose. While some may say, that the USS Hornet was used to attack Tokyo. True, but that, as well as, other raids committed against Japanese island holdings were just that, nuisance raids, with no strategic consequence.

Also, I would think the Chitose would survive. The focus of US naval activity would be around the Hawaiian Islands and the US West Coast. Barring a chance encounter with a US cruiser, I think she would make it hoe alright. The Pacific is a mighty big ocean.


@glenn 239,

Depends which general you are speaking to. Along those lines; Generally speaking the "little guy" doesn't pick a fight with the "big guy" unless he is absolutely sure of winning. The entire Japanese war strategy was based on getting the US to cry "Uncle!" without doing any real damage to the continental US. But hey, That was what they thought. I would think, in any time line, you are going to have to hit the continental US, and hit it hard by invasion.


You can either go for the quick kill "jugular", let your opponent wear himself out or overextend himself(Ali's famous "Rope a Dope"), or just pound him into a bloody mess. It all depends on where your strengths and weaknesses lie. The problem with the "Jugular" is identifying what, exactly, it is. Was Pearl Harbor the US jugular. Hardly, the US can live without Hawaii. Maybe, the Pacific Fleet then. Nah, the US can build another one( in fact they already were when Pearl Harbor occurred.) The US "jugular" was its industrial capacity, which Japan could not hit. Japan's, being an island nation, was its merchant shipping and lines of supply, which the US could - and did - hit(and which the Japanese ,ever so thoughtfully, left relatively unprotected for most of the war.)

Now, I am sure there are examples of where "going for the jugular" has worked, but most recent events prove that theory wrong. Usually, going for the jugular results in the nation overextending itself, only to be counterattacked and defeated. No, I don't see Gulf War I as "going for the jugular, bombing Iraq for roughly a month straight and then sending in the ground forces is not "going for the jugular." It is beating him into a bloody mess. Germany in WWI & WWII going for the jugular resulted in failure and ultimate loss. North Korea & UN going for the jugular resulted in failure and ultimate loss. Maybe you could say this about Gulf War II or for the Soviets in Afghanistan, but only if you use the term "win" very loosely.

Locked

Return to “What if”