@ Borys
I disagree, the Japanese could have done more to inconvenience the USN during the attack on Pearl Harbor by bombing the tank farms and repair facilities. They did not do so, they never even intended to. The US would have been far more inconvenienced without the fuel stocks and repair facilities than the loss of the Panama Canal. Loss of the Panama Canal adds, at most, 2months to travel time. How long would it take the US to rebuild and refill the oil tanks? IIRC, the Japanese figured it would take about a year for the US to recover its offensive capability, so disabling the Panama Canal for six months would not make a difference, as it would be repaired by the time the Japanese expected the first US offensive response.
The Japanese were of the opinion that the US was self-sufficient and could not be defeated logistically, so they never tried attacking US supply lines. As I said before, the Japanese began planning an attack on the Panama Canal in 1942, it was not until the end of 1944, that the submarines to carry out this mission were finally being completed.
Their conduct of submarine warfare was not one of sinking vulnerable enemy commerce, but attacking heavily defended US Task Forces. Further, their neglect of providing valuable ASW resources for their own transports shows how much emphasis they placed on logistics.
The USN would not be inconvenienced for 6 months to a year, but a month-and-a-half to two months, the time it would take to sail from Florida to San Francisco going "Round the Horn." Heck, the USS Oregon(BB-3) did it in 66 days in 1898.
@ robdab
Such an attack would not help Japan win the war, unless, they had decided to fight a protracted war instead of a short one. - Obviously true from a 2009 hindsight point of view but not nearly so clear from a 1941 Japanese PoV, I think.
It is not hindsight, the Japanese themselves had no strategic plans if the US did not cave in after the first year of war. The quote from Admiral Yamamoto himself in 1940: "I can run wild for six months … after that, I have no expectation of success." Proves that they had had no clear cut strategy if the US did not sue for Peace early on.
The only gain for the Japanese is that they extend the travel time of ships moving from the Pacific to the Atlantic. - And vice- versa. At the paltry cost of just 3 IJN flyingboats, what is wrong with that exactly, from a December 1941 Japanese PoV ?
Personally, your not thinking BIG enough. Me, in an ATL setting, Kido-Butai heads to Rabaul to refuel and rearm, and then sorties for Panama. 6 carriers should be able to do enough damage to keep the Panama Canal from being used for years. With a length of only 50 miles, everything is well within range of the Japanese planes attack radius.
I always felt the Indian Ocean Raid was a bust, and the Kido Butai could have been doing something more constructive during this time. Six carriers allows you to have plenty of firepower for destroying the canal, while still retaining plenty of firepower to deal with any US naval forces that might show up.
Now concerning the 40% jump in Panama Canal traffic. What is the break down of shipping? Was it all East-West traffic, West-East traffic, the majority headed East-West, or the majority West-East? How much of the shipping traffic was bound for the US and how much was from the US headed to other countries? How much was not related to the US at all? What was the average yearly increase in shipping traffic from 1935-41. A lot more analysis is needed to give the "40% increase in shipping traffic" real meaning in this argument. While, I did say it was faster, I did not say it was cheaper. Rail rates were 2 to 4 times higher than shipping rates in 1940. However, I will concede that a great burden would be placed on the US road and rail transportation nets to make for any losses. Most likely, only military necessities and other high priority cargo would be sent by road/rail. The rest would have to go the long way around South America.
Do you really think it would have been politically acceptable for FDR to simply ignore the over 500,000 American citizens (including those isolated on Guam, Wake, Midway and the Philippines) who would have been in Japanese hands after the fall of an ATL Hawaii to the IJA & IJN ? In light of the OTL American reaction to the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, I just can't see that myself. The ATL 1941 Japanese PoV would likely have expected that those 1/2 million new 'bargaining chips' and Hawaii itself, might have been traded back to gain permanent US acceptance of both Japan's new ownership of the NEI's oil fields and her 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' in general.
Yeah, the "bargaining chips" argument gave me a good laugh in the Pearl Harbor thread too. By the way, in the OTL we DID abandon Guam, Wake, and the Philippines; so, why should adding Hawaii to the list make any more difference. But still...In the OTL in retribution for the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Bataan Death March, we sank Japan's Navy, destroyed Japan's Air Force, burned the majority of their cities to the ground, and then, when they did not surrender, proceeded to drop two atomic bombs on them. Now, do you really think that by Japan butchering, or otherwise bringing harm to the civilians of Hawaii, the US will A.) Just give up. or B.) Make Japan the 49th State? Ok, so maybe the war will end in '46 or '47 and not 1945.
But, then again, all this hinges on a total about face of the Japanese military away from their "attack" mentality, to a more comprehensive strategy for war. - How can ADDING another ATL attack on the Panama Canal to the OTL possibly be interpreted as, "a total about face of the Japanese military away from their "attack" mentality" ???
Because, to the Japanese, there was nothing of military importance there. It was a logistical target not a military one. For instance, if the aircraft carriers and battleships were not stationed at Pearl Harbor, would Japan still have attacked there? They attacked ONLY targets of military value: Ships, airbases, and barracks. They made no attempts to hit the OBVIOUS oil tanks or dockyard facilities. Even though they had 350+ aircraft in two waves, but could not spare 5, 10, or 20 to hit the tank farm. For that matter, they did not attack the submarine base at Pearl either. Now, if logistical targets were sufficiently high up the target chain to justify your proposed attack, then surely, the Japanese would have devoted, at least, some attention to said logistical targets at Pearl. This they did not do.
To conclude, while I really do like your plan and appreciate the effort you put into it. Unless your ATL has Japan changing its attitude away from strictly military targets and proceeds to take a more pragmatic path that would include logistical targets, I don't see this event taking place.
@ mescal,
I'm mostly in agreement with you. The US can not just send its Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific en masse. That would leave the Atlantic undefended. They would, an did, send ships to the Pacific as operations permitted. Not to mention, that moves were to get units to defend the West Coast and not for any real offensive purpose. While some may say, that the USS Hornet was used to attack Tokyo. True, but that, as well as, other raids committed against Japanese island holdings were just that, nuisance raids, with no strategic consequence.
Also, I would think the Chitose would survive. The focus of US naval activity would be around the Hawaiian Islands and the US West Coast. Barring a chance encounter with a US cruiser, I think she would make it hoe alright. The Pacific is a mighty big ocean.
@glenn 239,
Depends which general you are speaking to. Along those lines; Generally speaking the "little guy" doesn't pick a fight with the "big guy" unless he is absolutely sure of winning. The entire Japanese war strategy was based on getting the US to cry "Uncle!" without doing any real damage to the continental US. But hey, That was what they thought. I would think, in any time line, you are going to have to hit the continental US, and hit it hard by invasion.
You can either go for the quick kill "jugular", let your opponent wear himself out or overextend himself(Ali's famous "Rope a Dope"), or just pound him into a bloody mess. It all depends on where your strengths and weaknesses lie. The problem with the "Jugular" is identifying what, exactly, it is. Was Pearl Harbor the US jugular. Hardly, the US can live without Hawaii. Maybe, the Pacific Fleet then. Nah, the US can build another one( in fact they already were when Pearl Harbor occurred.) The US "jugular" was its industrial capacity, which Japan could not hit. Japan's, being an island nation, was its merchant shipping and lines of supply, which the US could - and did - hit(and which the Japanese ,ever so thoughtfully, left relatively unprotected for most of the war.)
Now, I am sure there are examples of where "going for the jugular" has worked, but most recent events prove that theory wrong. Usually, going for the jugular results in the nation overextending itself, only to be counterattacked and defeated. No, I don't see Gulf War I as "going for the jugular, bombing Iraq for roughly a month straight and then sending in the ground forces is not "going for the jugular." It is beating him into a bloody mess. Germany in WWI & WWII going for the jugular resulted in failure and ultimate loss. North Korea & UN going for the jugular resulted in failure and ultimate loss. Maybe you could say this about Gulf War II or for the Soviets in Afghanistan, but only if you use the term "win" very loosely.