Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

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Tim Smith
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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#61

Post by Tim Smith » 17 Jan 2009, 14:03

This 'cheap and cheerful' Panama Canal Raid makes sense in terms of Japanese aims and doctrine in 1941. It should be viewed as an extension to the Pearl Harbour Raid.

The idea behind the Pearl Harbour Raid was to delay US fleet response to Japanese invasions in the Pacific. It's not a knock-out blow, it's a delaying tactic, aimed to buy time. Putting the Panama Canal out of action for even two or three months buys just a bit more time, delaying reinforcement of the Pacific Fleet by the Atlantic Fleet for two months.

These two months are critical for the Japanese, as they invade Guam, Wake, the Philippines, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and Burma. The Japanese carrier fleet has to support most of these invasions. And the Japanese carrier fleet can't easily support ground invasions and counter any moves by the US fleet at the same time. Even Kido Butai can only do one thing at a time (unless it weakens itself by dividing into two parts, and look what happened at Midway when the Japanese did just that.)

Also, remember that the Pearl Harbour Raid itself was more successful than the Japanese had expected. If the raid had been less successful, only putting two or three US battleships out of action instead of six, then the Panama Canal strike represented here makes even more sense, because in that event an early US naval counterstrike becomes more likely once reinforcements from the Atlantic have arrived.

This Panama Canal strike is a low-risk option too. Losing three Mavis flying boats makes no difference to the balance of power in the Pacific. And the launching seaplane tender Chitose is only at very low risk because the Mavis flying boats have extremely long range, and can be launched many hundreds of miles away from the target, unlike Kido Butai's carrier planes. Chitose is one ship alone in the vast expanse of the Pacific, the Americans have almost no chance of finding her.

And for anyone thinking about the extreme success of American PBY recon planes in the Battle of Midway, remember that the Americans knew exactly when and where to look, they knew the entire Japanese plan. That wouldn't be the case here!

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#62

Post by glenn239 » 17 Jan 2009, 16:34

Me, in an ATL setting, Kido-Butai heads to Rabaul to refuel and rearm.
The Australians might not have enough oil to fill them up, so the IJN better phone their order to Melbourne ahead of time.
The problem with the "Jugular" is identifying what, exactly, it is.
In this case it is the center of mass for the United States Navy in the Pacific Ocean.


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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#63

Post by robdab » 18 Jan 2009, 05:45

Takao, you replied to me with,

@ robdab
Such an attack would not help Japan win the war, unless, they had decided to fight a protracted war instead of a short one. - Obviously true from a 2009 hindsight point of view but not nearly so clear from a 1941 Japanese PoV, I think.
It is not hindsight, the Japanese themselves had no strategic plans if the US did not cave in after the first year of war.

I was under the impression that the Japanese strategic plan was to defend their Co-Prosperity Sphere from the string of recently captured islands of the Pacific ? IIRC they intended to make the US counter-attacks so expensive in lives that the soft Americans would become discouraged and give up the fight. Recognition of Japan's new ownership of the NEI oil fields would follow. Not much of a plan but that was the OTL one AFAIK.

The quote from Admiral Yamamoto himself in 1940: "I can run wild for six months … after that, I have no expectation of success." Proves that they had had no clear cut strategy if the US did not sue for Peace early on.

That quote proves nothing of the sort that you suggest. It merely shows that Yamamato did not share the expectation of most of Japan's other government and military leaders in America being soft and unwilling/unable to fight long and hard.
The only gain for the Japanese is that they extend the travel time of ships moving from the Pacific to the Atlantic. - And vice- versa. At the paltry cost of just 3 IJN flyingboats, what is wrong with that exactly, from a December 1941 Japanese PoV ?
Personally, your not thinking BIG enough. Me, in an ATL setting, Kido-Butai heads to Rabaul to refuel and rearm, and then sorties for Panama. 6 carriers should be able to do enough damage to keep the Panama Canal from being used for years. With a length of only 50 miles, everything is well within range of the Japanese planes attack radius.

There are at least 4 big problems with your BIG thinking:

The first being that none of the weaponry carried by the Kido Butai (with the POSSIBLE exception of the few 800kg AP bombs already used up at Pearl Harbor) could seriously damage the Panama Canal beyond draining the water already vulnerable to my 3 ATL Mavis flyingboats. Why send an entire airfleet into harm's way when one single tender and 3 submarines will do the same job instead ? Even those 800 kg bombs would have to hit the exact same target point, repeatedly, to have even a faint hope of draining more of the Canal's operational water reserves. Not likely IMO.

Second, many more rare and valuable IJN fleet oilers would have to be sent eastwards to fuel such a KB attack on Panama. Oilers which the Japanese did NOT have in the OTL. Glenn239's magnum opus on the ATL Invasion of Oahu does suggest where/how additional fleet oilers might indeed have been obtained by the IJN but you have yet to suggest any such source.

Third, your BIG plan relies on the hindsight of your 2009 knowledge of the real locations of the American aircraft carriers at that time. In the OTL the Japanese believed (incorrectly) that there were 5, not just 3, American carriers operating in the Pacific Ocean then. Since none were even spotted at Oahu by the Japanese on Dec.7'41, your plan would have to account for the possibility of running into 5 US fleet carriers, supported by numerous USAAF land based warplanes with just 6 KB carriers. The Canal's AA defences would be at their maximum several days after the PH attacks, not in undeployed peacetime status as they would be in the case of my ATL flyingboat attacks.

And fourth, being almost 10,000 miles from home/repair in the case of heavy damages being received.


Now concerning the 40% jump in Panama Canal traffic. What is the break down of shipping? Was it all East-West traffic, West-East traffic, the majority headed East-West, or the majority West-East? How much of the shipping traffic was bound for the US and how much was from the US headed to other countries? How much was not related to the US at all? What was the average yearly increase in shipping traffic from 1935-41. A lot more analysis is needed to give the "40% increase in shipping traffic" real meaning in this argument. While, I did say it was faster, I did not say it was cheaper. Rail rates were 2 to 4 times higher than shipping rates in 1940. However, I will concede that a great burden would be placed on the US road and rail transportation nets to make for any losses. Most likely, only military necessities and other high priority cargo would be sent by road/rail. The rest would have to go the long way around South America.

Asking questions is always easier than actually providing answers, isn't it ? At least you concede the point that I was trying to make.
Do you really think it would have been politically acceptable for FDR to simply ignore the over 500,000 American citizens (including those isolated on Guam, Wake, Midway and the Philippines) who would have been in Japanese hands after the fall of an ATL Hawaii to the IJA & IJN ? .
In light of the OTL American reaction to the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, I just can't see that myself. ]

At least you admit the use of hindsight now. How would the Japanese planners know of those OTL American reactions over the next 4 years, in 1941 ?
The ATL 1941 Japanese PoV would likely have expected that those 1/2 million new 'bargaining chips' and Hawaii itself, might have been traded back to gain permanent US acceptance of both Japan's new ownership of the NEI's oil fields and her 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' in general.
Yeah, the "bargaining chips" argument gave me a good laugh in the Pearl Harbor thread too. By the way, in the OTL we DID abandon Guam, Wake, and the Philippines; so, why should adding Hawaii to the list make any more difference.


Because the American had already promised independance to the Philipines in 3 years. The PIs would NEVER become a US state and were not viewed in that light by the Americasn voter. Because there just weren't anywhere near those numbers of US citizens on Wake, Guam, Midway or the PIs. We are talking thousands of people, not the hundreds of thousands on the Hawaiian Islands. Which were home to the wives and children of many of the US military men serving there too.

But still...In the OTL in retribution for the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Bataan Death March, we sank Japan's Navy, destroyed Japan's Air Force, burned the majority of their cities to the ground, and then, when they did not surrender, proceeded to drop two atomic bombs on them. Now, do you really think that by Japan butchering, or otherwise bringing harm to the civilians of Hawaii, the US will A.) Just give up. or B.) Make Japan the 49th State? Ok, so maybe the war will end in '46 or '47 and not 1945.

All of these points are pure hindsight. The Japanese planners considering their 1941/2 strategy could NOT know and with their over-confidence, would NOT expect, those kinds of results from the Americans.
But, then again, all this hinges on a total about face of the Japanese military away from their "attack" mentality, to a more comprehensive strategy for war. - How can ADDING another ATL attack on the Panama Canal to the OTL possibly be interpreted as, "a total about face of the Japanese military away from their "attack" mentality" ???
Because, to the Japanese, there was nothing of military importance there. It was a logistical target not a military one. For instance, if the aircraft carriers and battleships were not stationed at Pearl Harbor, would Japan still have attacked there? They attacked ONLY targets of military value: Ships, airbases, and barracks. They made no attempts to hit the OBVIOUS oil tanks or dockyard facilities. Even though they had 350+ aircraft in two waves, but could not spare 5, 10, or 20 to hit the tank farm. For that matter, they did not attack the submarine base at Pearl either. Now, if logistical targets were sufficiently high up the target chain to justify your proposed attack, then surely, the Japanese would have devoted, at least, some attention to said logistical targets at Pearl. This they did not do.

Might I point out to you that the entire list of reasons for the Japanese going to war in the Pacific were logistical ones. Their Empire's NEEDS for OIL, rubber, steel, tin, rice etc. etc. They may not have appreciated enemy logistics at the tactical level in the OTL but they sure had a firm grasp on their own strategic logistical requirements. I don't see it as much of a point of departure for them to have developed an ATL appreciation for tactical level American logistics.

To conclude, while I really do like your plan and appreciate the effort you put into it. Unless your ATL has Japan changing its attitude away from strictly military targets and proceeds to take a more pragmatic path that would include logistical targets, I don't see this event taking place.

So, if I understand you correctly, you cite the fact that such a raid didn't happen, as proof that such a raid didn't happen. This is hardly a great breakthru since I can hardly argue against the historical record. No such Panama raid ever occured.

However, my Panama scenario has been labeled from it's start as an ATL. Any alternative history begins with the assumption has some historical fact(s) have been plausibly altered from their original and historical course(s). In my case I had assumed the Point of Departure to be based in Glenn239's Invasion of Hawaii ATL. If you should choose yet another alternative background which ONLY alters the Japanese PoV on American logistics then I fear that such a Panama raid as I have proposed would still occur. Japanese air attacks planned to destroy the PH oil supplies could be countered by the simple expedient of anchoring American civilian tankers inside of Pearl Harbor. IIRC the Americans had a early wartime pool of 547 civilian tankers of various sizes to draw apon. An ATL raid which shut down the Panama Canal would greatly increase ther transit time of any such US tankers coming from the Atlantic.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#64

Post by Alaric » 18 Jan 2009, 06:27

Tim Smith wrote:This 'cheap and cheerful' Panama Canal Raid makes sense in terms of Japanese aims and doctrine in 1941. It should be viewed as an extension to the Pearl Harbour Raid.

The idea behind the Pearl Harbour Raid was to delay US fleet response to Japanese invasions in the Pacific. It's not a knock-out blow, it's a delaying tactic, aimed to buy time. Putting the Panama Canal out of action for even two or three months buys just a bit more time, delaying reinforcement of the Pacific Fleet by the Atlantic Fleet for two months.

These two months are critical for the Japanese, as they invade Guam, Wake, the Philippines, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and Burma. The Japanese carrier fleet has to support most of these invasions. And the Japanese carrier fleet can't easily support ground invasions and counter any moves by the US fleet at the same time. Even Kido Butai can only do one thing at a time (unless it weakens itself by dividing into two parts, and look what happened at Midway when the Japanese did just that.)

Also, remember that the Pearl Harbour Raid itself was more successful than the Japanese had expected. If the raid had been less successful, only putting two or three US battleships out of action instead of six, then the Panama Canal strike represented here makes even more sense, because in that event an early US naval counterstrike becomes more likely once reinforcements from the Atlantic have arrived.

This Panama Canal strike is a low-risk option too. Losing three Mavis flying boats makes no difference to the balance of power in the Pacific. And the launching seaplane tender Chitose is only at very low risk because the Mavis flying boats have extremely long range, and can be launched many hundreds of miles away from the target, unlike Kido Butai's carrier planes. Chitose is one ship alone in the vast expanse of the Pacific, the Americans have almost no chance of finding her.

And for anyone thinking about the extreme success of American PBY recon planes in the Battle of Midway, remember that the Americans knew exactly when and where to look, they knew the entire Japanese plan. That wouldn't be the case here!

Exactly, this action would be in conjuction with the Pearl Harbor attack and would make a great deal of sense.

I do agree with others that the Japanese made a grave error in not attacking the fuel storage, sub bases and shipyards/drydocks at Pearl with a third wave, or even elements of the second wave, but that's another story for another thread.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#65

Post by Alaric » 18 Jan 2009, 06:33


The Australians might not have enough oil to fill them up, so the IJN better phone their order to Melbourne ahead of time.
I got a laugh from that one. The Japanese didn't land on Rabaul until late January 1942.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#66

Post by Takao » 18 Jan 2009, 08:33

@ Tim Simth,

A Panama Canal raid makes sense in terms of Japanese aims, but not doctrine. It, as I have said before, was a logistical target, and as such, it was of no consequence to Japan's idea of a quick war.

You are correct that the Pearl Harbor raid was an effort to delay US response to Japan's opening moves. And yes, attacking the Panama Canal will delay units of the Atlantic Fleet moving to the Pacific. But, you are using a Western mindset to come to this conclusion. To the overall Japanese military mindset though, if it cannot attack you then it does not matter. This is the point I am trying to get across. It is not just a simple matter of tacking this Panama Canal raid onto a Pearl Harbor attack and call it an ATL. You have to totally revise the whole way the Japanese Navy approaches warfighting.

The two months are not critical for the IJN, unless the Pearl Harbor attack goes sour. It will take at least that long, if not longer just to get over the shock that a Pearl Harbor attack even took place. You can also figure that most, if not all, of the "Top Brass" will be sacked or otherwise replaced. Then, the new command staff will have to adjust to their new positions. You can also figure that most of the naval personnel have absolutely zero combat experience and will undergo a period of heavy training and/or conduct some nuisance raid to get some combat experience quickly and cheaply. Once that has been finished, then the Japanese could expect to see the Americans come out in force. I believe that is the reasoning behind the Yamamoto quote about running wild for six months. He knew that it would take the Americans that long to recover from a successful Pearl Harbor attack.

Yes, the attack on Pearl Harbor was more successful than the Japanese had hoped. But, why was that so? Was it because the sank the American carriers like they expected? No, they failed to sink any American carriers. Was it because they sank more battleships than expected? No, the fully expected to get most, if not all, the battleships. It was more succesful than they had hoped because, the expected losses of 25%-33% of their attacking fleet and, IIRC, 50-100 planes. They lost no ships and only 29 planes.

I would not "bet the farm" on the PBYs. The risk is greater for the Mavis flying boats, especially if their spotted where no Pan Am Clipper should be. The best bet would be to fly as close to the deck as visibility and weather conditions permit. Hopefully, when viewed from above, this would allow them to blend in with the ocean. However, it may have a detrimental effect on the Mavis's fuel consumption, giving it a shorter range.


@ glenn239,

Mea Culpa, I'd been up 30 hours on 2 hours of sleep. Meant Truk, typed Rabaul. At the time, I don't think Truk was the major base it became later in the war. So Kido Butai would probably have to meet up with a third supply train(two went with the fleet to Pearl Harbor and I don't know how empty the fleet's seven original oilers were.) They would have to have waiting were an ammunition ship, as all the "shallow diving" torpedoes had been used up.

Really, the USN's Pacific Fleet is America's "jugular". So, what your saying is that if the US loses her Pacific Fleet, She has lost the war and has no hope of survival. With the Pacific Fleet wiped off the face of the earth, The US has no recourse but to surrender to Japan. Japan has ripped out the US "jugular", ground it into dust, and now the US must roll over and die, so to speak. Of course paying no never mind to the fact that US has recently commissioned 2 new North Carolina battleships and the aircraft carrier USS Hornet, will be commissioning 4 South Dakota class battleships within the next 9 months, has 4 Iowa class battleships building, 4 Essex class carrier that are expected to be commissioned by late '42-early '43, 5 Independence class light carriers expected to be commissioned by mid-1943, and not mentioning the many numerous cruisers, destroyers, and submarines that will shortly be finished.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#67

Post by Takao » 18 Jan 2009, 12:52

@robdab

Digging in and hoping to hang on to what you have is not a strategic plan. It means you have run out any other option, but to hope and pray that you survive the coming onslaught.

As for the 4 big problems
1.) None of Kido Butai's weaponry. So, torpedoes will not work on the lock gates? I thought they would.
After all, the Kido Butai had 100 between the Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu, and Soryu. 40 were used at Pearl, that leaves 60 remaining. If 40 are held in reserve to deal with any US ships that show up, that leaves 20 for use on the locks. That would be divided up 7-6-7 between the three locks or 10 eack for Gatum & Miraflores locks. You have misunderstood my intent. Your delaying the use of the canal for 6 months. I had no intention of attempting to drain Gatum Lake. I was looking to destroy the Locks, hopefully, for a few years at least. I had planned on a protracted fight against my US opponent. Hurt him as much as possible, as often as possible. Thereby, focusing his attention on Japan and rearmament, and not on Lend-Lease and Europe. This would give my German ally his chance to invade England. It was a wargame, and not a true nuts-and-bolts ATL. In short, the strategy worked, to a point. Britain fell, Germany then attacked Russia, and Japan invaded Austraila. In 1944, the US started its slow march across the Pacific with one MASSIVE fleet. The US took until late 1946, but by then, there was nothing I could do to stop him. Even trying to develop Japan's industrial capacity early on, I could not come close to matching the US.

2.) First off, I'm not trying to convince anyone that by sending Kido Butai to destroy the Panama Canal is the 100% correct move for Japan. Neither am I trying to give Harry Turtledove fodder for a new book. If you like my plan, you like my plan. If you don't like it, you don't like it. It's all good. It is just a maneuver I pulled while playing a wargame, and what's a wargame, but alternate history.

3.) Ditch the 2009 knowledge, it was a gamble, plain and simple. I banked that my opponent would be to concerned with Hawaii and defending the West Coast, and he was. I knew how many ships and what class he had total, I did not know if they were in the Atlantic or Pacific.

4.) See 3.)

As for the 40% jump in traffic for the Panama Canal. I asked the questions, because I could not find the answers to those questions. At least I am attempting to find the answers we seek. And since your the one that made the claim, I thought you had better information at hand. I could simply rebut with the fact that from August 1914-July 1915 Traffic jumped a whopping 600%, so what is a paltry 40% increase(we all know the Canal had just opened, so a tremendous increase is expected.) Running queries through several search engines came up with nothing useful. The only bit that showed East-West and West-East shipping traffic tonnages was here, on page 526. http://books.google.ca/books?id=lPgOUea ... ng+traffic
As you can see it is from 1915. Not very useful at all. I am trying to establish what the yearly average increase was. If the average increase was in 5% 1940-41 than a 40% jump in 41-42 is signicant. If the average is 30% in 1940-41 than it is not significant. As for East-West & West-East: was more traffic going to the Pacific or was it going to the Atlantic. AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, during that timeframe, the USN was sending ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic. Could this not possibly have some effect on the 40% jump. That is what I am trying to find out. The USS Yorktown, and the three New Mexico class battleships all moved from the Pacific to the Atlantic during that timeframe. The USS Yorktown and two of the New Mexico class battleships also returned within the given timeframe. As for your point, the only thing I conceded was that it is going to take the civilians a little longer to get their goods.
Do you really think it would have been politically acceptable for FDR to simply ignore the over 500,000 American citizens (including those isolated on Guam, Wake, Midway and the Philippines) who would have been in Japanese hands after the fall of an ATL Hawaii to the IJA & IJN ? .



In light of the OTL American reaction to the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, I just can't see that myself.

At least you admit the use of hindsight now. How would the Japanese planners know of those OTL American reactions over the next 4 years, in 1941 ?
robdab, did you just respond to your own quote? What you highlighted in black is part of your own quote and not from me. Or did you just mistype something?
That is from your post on page 3, dated 15 January, 2009, 21:57 The passage in its entirety
Also, if Pearl Harbor has been lost or its port facilities destroyed, there would be no need for the US Merchant traffic to use the Panama Canal, as all supplies could be brought to the West Coast much faster by railroads. - If everything could have moved faster by US ralways then why did the Panama Canal's ship traffic jump by over 40% between January - March 1941 and January - March 1942 ?

Do you really think it would have been politically acceptable for FDR to simply ignore the over 500,000 American citizens (including those isolated on Guam, Wake, Midway and the Philipines) who would have been in Japanese hands after the fall of an ATL Hawaii to the IJA & IJN ? In light of the OTL American reaction to the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, I just can't see that myself. The ATL 1941 Japanese PoV would likely have expected that those 1/2 million new 'bargining chips' and Hawaii itself, might have been traded back to gain permanent US acceptance of both Japan's new ownership of the NEI's oil fields and her 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' in general.

In other words, their expected and hoped for, short war.

With my own 2009 hindsight, I don't argue that my ATL Pacific War would ACTUALLY have turned out that way. Just that the 1941 Japanese MIGHT have EXPECTED such a result to my ATL Panama when COMBINED with Glenn239's Oahu plan.
If you did not just respond to your own quote, I need more sleep than I thought. Another 24hrs straight, I am getting to old to keep doing this. Talk to you later, have a good night/morning.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#68

Post by Tim Smith » 18 Jan 2009, 14:05

Takao wrote:@ Tim Simth,
A Panama Canal raid makes sense in terms of Japanese aims, but not doctrine. It, as I have said before, was a logistical target, and as such, it was of no consequence to Japan's idea of a quick war.

You are correct that the Pearl Harbor raid was an effort to delay US response to Japan's opening moves. And yes, attacking the Panama Canal will delay units of the Atlantic Fleet moving to the Pacific. But, you are using a Western mindset to come to this conclusion. To the overall Japanese military mindset though, if it cannot attack you then it does not matter. This is the point I am trying to get across. It is not just a simple matter of tacking this Panama Canal raid onto a Pearl Harbor attack and call it an ATL. You have to totally revise the whole way the Japanese Navy approaches warfighting.
OK, I guess I have to acknowledge that Japanese doctrine was stupid. A Panama Canal Raid could have benefited Japan by doing damage to the US logistical system (just as a Japanese long-range submarine offensive against West Coast merchant shipping (a Japanese 'Happy Time') could also have done damage to that system). But the Japanese were too stupid to realise that the results would have been worthwhile in relation to the effort expended and the probable cost suffered.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#69

Post by Tim Smith » 18 Jan 2009, 14:45

Takao wrote:@ Tim Simth,
The two months are not critical for the IJN, unless the Pearl Harbor attack goes sour. It will take at least that long, if not longer just to get over the shock that a Pearl Harbor attack even took place. You can also figure that most, if not all, of the "Top Brass" will be sacked or otherwise replaced. Then, the new command staff will have to adjust to their new positions. You can also figure that most of the naval personnel have absolutely zero combat experience and will undergo a period of heavy training and/or conduct some nuisance raid to get some combat experience quickly and cheaply. Once that has been finished, then the Japanese could expect to see the Americans come out in force. I believe that is the reasoning behind the Yamamoto quote about running wild for six months. He knew that it would take the Americans that long to recover from a successful Pearl Harbor attack.
I think you are using hindsight here. How could the Japanese know that it would take six months for the US to respond to the Pearl Harbor attack? Would it still take that long if the Pearl Harbor attack was relatively unsuccessful? Would it still take that long if Kido Butai suffered heavy losses in the attack? What if Kido Butai had been spotted en route to Oahu and turned back without attacking? What was the war plan of the US Pacific Fleet if there had been no strike on Pearl Harbor?

I don't think your 'combat experience point is particularly relevant. Both navies were well trained, why isn't that is good enough to fight with.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#70

Post by glenn239 » 18 Jan 2009, 18:00

raid makes sense in terms of Japanese aims, but not doctrine. It, as I have said before, was a logistical target, and as such, it was of no consequence to Japan's idea of a quick war.
IJN planning for the Pearl Harbor Raid intended to attack and destroy the USN’s fleet train if the battle fleet were at sea.
OK, I guess I have to acknowledge that Japanese doctrine was stupid.
Bombers of the 23rd Air Flotilla concentrated a maximum-effort strike on Cavite three days into the war, to knock out American naval logistical capability in the Philippines.
I don't think Truk was the major base it became later in the war.
Kido Butai could have replenished at Truk, but the intention would need to be radioed to Japan ahead of time so that supply ships could meet them there.
Really, the USN's Pacific Fleet is America's "jugular". So, what your saying is that if the US loses her Pacific Fleet, she has lost the war and has no hope of survival.
The Pacific Fleet and Hawaii was the United States center of gravity in the Pacific Basin. By throwing the main opponent out of the Pacific, the secondary opponents (Australia, Netherlands East Indies, Great Britain) become isolated, leaving Japan able to choose freely which was to be the target of her second phase operations without hindrance from the main opponent. For example, if faced with imminent invasion and no prospect of assistance from Britain or the USA, would Australia fight or make a separate peace with Japan?
After all, the Kido Butai had 100 between the Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu, and Soryu. 40 were used at Pearl, that leaves 60 remaining. If 40 are held in reserve to deal with any US ships that show up, that leaves 20 for use on the locks.
Magazine storage held about 240 torpedoes.
I asked the questions, because I could not find the answers to those questions. At least I am attempting to find the answers we seek.
The United States government publishes annual statistical annexes, which will probably contain useful information on this. Check your best local university.

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RE: December 07, 1941: A Day That Nobody Bombed CALIFORNIA.

#71

Post by Robert Rojas » 18 Jan 2009, 20:57

Greetings to both the general readership of this thread and the community as a whole. Well troops, in light of what I've reviewed to date, old Uncle Bob is really beginning to wonder why the warlords of Dai Nihon even considered the United States of America to be a credible military challenger to its imperialist designs for greater Asia. After all, if the United States of America's overall military polices and defense preparations were as Keystone Coppish as this hypothetical creation suggests, then why waste the time and resources to wage war on a clearly incompetent enemy that cannot manage to wipe its own ass without concise instructions and direct supervision? Would it not be far simplier to ignore the United States of America altogether and waltz right into the peninsula of Southeast Asia and the archipelago of the Dutch East Indies with only the ever competent British Commonwealth to worry about? And so it goes. Well ladies and gentlemen, that's my latest and final two Yankee cents worth on this wanting topic of interest. In anycase, I would like to bid ALL of you a copacetic day no matter where you just might happen to find yourselves on Terra Firma.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob :idea: :|

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#72

Post by robdab » 19 Jan 2009, 08:00

Takao,

Digging in and hoping to hang on to what you have is not a strategic plan. It means you have run out any other option, but to hope and pray that you survive the coming onslaught. - I did comment that it wasn't much of a strategic plan but in the OTL that was what the Japanese intended. That apparently was the Japanese way of war.

As for the 4 big problems
1.) None of Kido Butai's weaponry. So, torpedoes will not work on the lock gates? I thought they would.
- Sure they would work on an individual lock gate leaf (the lock gates were installed in mitre pairs as per the photo at http://www.canalmuseum.com/canalphotos/ ... s-014.html ) but that does not at all guarantee that torpedoes would wreck the lock complexes nor that those couldn't be quickly repaired/replaced.

After all, the Kido Butai had 100 between the Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu, and Soryu. 40 were used at Pearl, that leaves 60 remaining. If 40 are held in reserve to deal with any US ships that show up, that leaves 20 for use on the locks. - Not nearly enough. There were 96 gate leafs in regular use in the Panama Canal, with another 4 pairs floating nearby as immediate use spares as per http://www.nps.gov/safr/historyculture/ ... aisson.jpg.

That would be divided up 7-6-7 between the three locks or 10 eack for Gatum & Miraflores locks. You have misunderstood my intent. Your delaying the use of the canal for 6 months. I had no intention of attempting to drain Gatum Lake. I was looking to destroy the Locks, hopefully, for a few years at least. - The lock gates, pictured at http://www.canalmuseum.com/photos/panam ... oto026.htm while under construction
were double skinned with steel plate which could be repaired by welding, fairly quickly. As previously mentioned 4 pairs were kept floating in Panama as fast replacements. Each hollow steel box caisson was fitted with pumps and could be flooded to alter it's height of ride in the water. That ability to flood also meant that a new gate could be raised to float over the lock's hinge pins and then flooded to be quickly lowered over those pivot pins. Because each gate was double skinned and those steel skins were located 7' apart, there is no guarantee that a single torpedo hit will indeed puncture both the skins of any one gate box.

The view at http://www.canalmuseum.com/documents/pa ... ory034.htm shows the double set of lock gates at the head of each lock chamber, the intermeidiate set of lock gates to be used if the transiting vessel was not full sized in order to conseve water and finally, off in the distance the 4th set of gates that ended each chamber. As you can see it could thus take up to 16 torpedo hits, on 8 seperate double skinned gates leafs to render each chamber inoperative. And just because you blow a hole in the outermost gate skin doesn't mean that the next torpedo will shoot straight thru that first hole to hit the second set of gates located some 70' behind the first ...

Not shown in that modern photo was the "swinging bridge" style emergency dam which could be swung out over each lock chamber in order to deploy yet another emergency anti-drainage barrier.

I think that you'd find the Canal a MUCH harder target to actually "destroy" than you think at the moment.

A general explanation of these measures can be read at http://www.czbrats.com/Builders/Bennett/locks1.htm

It is only releasing the dam stored rainwaters that operate the Canal that will prevent it's speedy repair and resumption of operations.

I had planned on a protracted fight against my US opponent. Hurt him as much as possible, as often as possible. Thereby, focusing his attention on Japan and rearmament, and not on Lend-Lease and Europe. This would give my German ally his chance to invade England. It was a wargame, and not a true nuts-and-bolts ATL. - It would have been nice to have mentioned that you were merely recounting a wargame played, rather than suggesting an ATL with some research behind it.

robdab, did you just respond to your own quote? - It seems that you are not the only one who shouldn't respond when tired.

The risk is greater for the Mavis flying boats, especially if their spotted where no Pan Am Clipper should be. The best bet would be to fly as close to the deck as visibility and weather conditions permit. Hopefully, when viewed from above, this would allow them to blend in with the ocean. However, it may have a detrimental effect on the Mavis's fuel consumption, giving it a shorter range. - Why do you feel that my 3 "China Clipper" Mavis flyingboats would be "spotted where no Pan Am Clipper should be" ? The 1938 route map Pan-Am ad seen at http://www.m2com.com/wallpaper/pictures/fc4800.jpg shows Pan-Am clearly covering Panama. To both ends of the Canal in fact. No commercial route had been started to the Galapagos but in 1940 FDR had authorized Pan-Am to begin developing that service and test flights had been made from Panama in 1941. Pan0-Am's China Clippers would not have been an unusual sight in Panama's skies at all. That being the reason that I chose that airline as the best "cover" for my 3 plane ATL raid.
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Glenn239, you reminded us that,

Magazine storage held about 240 torpedoes. - I must point out though that Takeo is correct in that only 60 or so "shallow launch depth" torpedoes were remaining on the KB's carriers after the OTL Pearl Harbor raid which began with only 100 of them available. Since the navigation depth of the Canal was only 45' at maximum (as compared to the 40' average depth within Pearl Harbor) only those 60 could be dropped by aircraft against any of the Panama Canal's lock gates.

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mescal
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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#73

Post by mescal » 19 Jan 2009, 18:34

robdab wrote:mescal, welcome aboard !

Once the Pacific Fleet heavy units are out of the picture, all USN are out. The Atlantic units have no way to arrive in time - I'm not clear on why you feel his to be the case ? If the Panama Canal remains functional, to travel the 6,000 +/- miles between Norfolk and San Diego at an average speed of only 20 knots takes but 12 days. After a 2-3 stopover there, the USN's Atlantic Fleet replacements for a Japanese destroyed Pacific Fleet would be at Oahu in another 5 days. Just under 3 weeks in total.
I think that you will have to add some training time to the travel time.
For example, in the OTL Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Maryland + Colorado were quickly back in service.
The New Mexicos joined from the Atlantic Fleet in February 1942.
However, you do not have a 7-BBs operational fleet, as the 4 "Pacific" BBs belonged to 3 different BatDivs and he 'Atlantic' BBs belonged to a fourth. Even if you can probably easily make the 4 Pacific ships cooperate as they were used to train together, you will need some more training time to have a smooth cooperation with the 3 BBs arriving from Atlantic, which had not in the previous months trained with the Pacific Fleet procedures.
North Carolina could also have joined, but since it was a fast battleship, its integration in the battle line would perhaps be a wate of resource.

(and there is no way that a 21-knots BB travels from Norfolk to San Diego at a sustained 20-knot speed).

robdab wrote: at that time it was thought to be foolish to attack enemy-held land bases with a fleet - Why then did the OTL Japanese attack Pearl Harbor with their Kido Butai ?
It was not well accepted in the IJN general staff. Yamamoto had a lot of difficulties to have the operation running. Would he be able to make another raid accepted ?
Moreover, the whole strength of Kido Butai was concentrated, and the IJN still expected to lose one third of its carriers in the operation.
robdab wrote: Put in another way, once the Pacific Fleet power projection disappear, the Atlantic Fleet power projection is not an adequate substitute, since the target is out of its reach (in the 6-months of the planned war). - You have yet to convince me that this would have been the case unless Hawaii was captured by the Japanese.
The warships, fast as they can be in theory, actually need an awful lot of time to travel from a point A to a point B if you require them to be battle-ready at point B, especially if those units are not singletons but organized as a fleet.
I have no hard data regarding the Atlantic Fleet BBs, but I recently read a lot of records of movements of ww2 cruisers, and you're always amazed at the time spent by those ships in training / transit / refuel / refit / port calls ...
I'm almost sure the situation is still worse for BBs.
I think that's because, when you're about to meet the enemy, unless there is a vital threat, any admiral prefers to commit only perfectly fit ships.

Sure there are exceptions (for example Yorktown in May 42), but they are only ... exceptions.
robdab wrote: So the "why" may have been, from an IJN staff officer : why disobey doctrine to invest resources (even if it's few resources) to attack an objective of little to no value in the current context ? - As previously discussed, knocking out the Panama Canal delays USN reinforcements for any Hawaiian Islands counter-attacks.
But the delay in US counterattack, which means strategic freedom of movement for Japan is obtained by the Pearl Harbor strike. Closing Panama adds only an insignificant delay.
robdab wrote: It's a detail, but I think that there would have been a strong probability (from IJN's staff point of view) that the seaplane tender bringing the Mavis will not make it back home. - Based on what exactly ?
Mostly the distance to travel back to friendly territory, and the probability that there was a US cruiser or two lurking in the area. But I may well be wrong on this.


Globally, I still find your scenario very interesting, and I think it may improve Japan's situation (even if it's by a narrow margin, but since the cost is very low ....).
I'm only playing devil's advocate because it does not integrate 1941 IJN doctrine.

If you want to make it still greater, you will need to go back further in time and tinker with the development of IJN doctrine in the 1930s.
But I readily admit that it would involve a huge deal of work and i's not even sure to result in a manageable ATL.
Olivier

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#74

Post by Sid Guttridge » 19 Jan 2009, 19:44

Hi robdab,

The first and main objection to the operation is that, if compromised, it would alert US forces everywhere and very possibly modify the outcome at Pearl Harbour. The Japanese would first have to decide whether such a speculative risk to their primary objective – the annihilation of the US Pacific Fleet – was worth it.

As the voyage of the Chitose would be flagged up publicly in advance, the US might choose to alert its defences in Panama. After all, it had already stopped the passage of Japanese merchant ships through the canal in July 1941 through fear of sabotage, so it was clearly sensitive to the Japanese threat.

Argentina first had to be persuaded to buy the Mavis. In December 1941 it was still high on the list of countries allocated Lend Lease by the USA. Indeed, after Brazil, it had the second highest allocation in Latin America and, amongst many other requirements, wanted eight US PBY-5 Catalinas to replace the US P2Y-3As it had in service. Lend-Lease offered aircraft at about one third the normal price. To undercut that, the Japanese would have to offer a suspiciously sweet deal that would probably have to cover numerous other items on Argentina’s wish-list as well.

Why would the Mavises plausibly be delivered by sea? They were presumably being marketed as long range maritime reconnaissance types. The US, the Italians, the French and Germans all had scheduled air services to Latin America, the latter three across the Atlantic. The US had scheduled trans-Pacific flyingboat flights. The US had apparently not banned overflights by Japanese aircraft as the proposed record-breaking Tokyo-New York-Buenos Aires flight by the Tachikawa Ki-77 indicates. The US P2Y-3As had been delivered to Argentina by air in the mid 1930s. Would not the delivery of the Mavises by sea be inherently suspicious, besides calling into question their performance?

The Mavis was also apparently exceptionally vulnerable to fighters, as it lacked self-sealing fuel tanks or armour protection for the crews. They would therefore have been absolutely dependent on secrecy. They could probably not “fight through”.

I think you may be confusing the large Japanese population in Peru with the small one in Ecuador. The Galapagos Islands were, as you post, Ecuadoran. Ecuador was apparently hostile to Japan at this time: “Japan, indeed, had long been a bug-bear on the Pacific coast and was especially obnoxious in Ecuador because Japanese textiles undercut Ecuadorean. Besides anti-Japanese demonstrations in June, 1940, there had been press campaigns against Japanese competition in both August, 1940, and in April, 1941” (p.121, Latin America and the Second World War, 1939-1942. by R. A. Humphreys.) Thus Ecuadoran hostility was very likely.

Nor were the islands unpopulated. Albermarle Island had a population of 600 and at least three more had populations in the 100s. Their main occupation was fishing, making clandestine maritime activities difficult. There was also a small Ecuadoran naval garrison that was normally sustained by the aviso Eloy Alfaro on monthly visits. Her schedule would have to be ascertained.

Attention had also recently been drawn to the islands by the activities of the German raider HSK7 Komet, which had sunk or captured two or three Allied merchantmen near them in mid August 1941.

And then, of course, there is the imponderable weather. “A calm open water takeoff” was by no means guaranteed. But, if the weather was a factor in the Galapagos, why take the risk of using them anyway? What is wrong with the open sea? Greater secrecy could be traded off for greater dependency on weather conditions. The planned 1945 attacks on the canal was to be by submarine-borne aircraft launched from the open sea.

Due to the time difference with Hawaii, the approach would have to be in broad daylight. With its thin, detached body, the Mavis does not look much like the Pan-American Clippers, even if marked like them. (When were these markings to be applied?) Furthermore, if the Clippers did not normally fly in at the same time as the attack, the very timing would be suspicious. Splitting up into three independent flights triples the likelihood of being spotted because it increases the numbers of observers, so more might be lost than gained by this. It also makes coordination over the target problematical. An early arrival by one might compromise the others.

The US defences of the Canal were vulnerable in many areas, but had improved markedly since 1939. For example, the number of anti-aircraft battalions (manned by the coastal artillery, if I remember correctly) had been doubled. The fact that neither you nor I know exactly where they were deployed cannot be taken to mean that the spillway gates were not covered. If you can conceive of attacking them, it is entirely possible that the US command could conceive of defending them. Although not comprehensive, there were naval patrols by SEPAC, regular aerial reconnaissances by Army and Naval aircraft, some radar cover, some fighter defence and some anti-aircraft artillery defence. Certainly they were not fully effective, but any attack could have been tripped up on any one of them.

In this instance, I don’t think the shortage of 37mm AA ammunition would have been very significant. Your scenario foresees only one attack by three rather large, lumbering aircraft, presumably in quick succession. 37mm AA would have been lucky to have a target for a minute. And what about all the other calibers?

In the final analysis, what probably scuppers this operation, besides a complexity that leaves numereous hostages to fortune and the threat its exposure posed to the far more important Pearl Harbour attack, is that it could be foiled by a very cheap, low-tech device – a torpedo net.

I would suggest that the Japanese would have been foolish to risk compromising their attack on the US Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbour in the hope that the USA had not spent a pittance on such a widely used defensive device as a torpedo net at Gatun spillway. This operation is only a starter if (1) there were no torpedo net and (2) the Japanese knew this for a fact.

Do we know either? And remember – absence of evidence for a torpedo net is not evidence of the absence of a torpedo net. The same goes for AAA defences, etc.

For confirmation something more reliable and in depth than an internet search is probably necessary.

Cheers,

Sid.

P.S. According to the book I-400, The Japanese apparently decided to dive bomb rather than torpedo the Gatun Gates in 1945 because training for accurate torpedo delivery would take too long. As a matter of interest, is there any record of a successful torpedo strike by a Mavis?

P.P.S. What is your purpose in soliciting information on this subject? Are you planning to publish or produce a wargaming scenario?

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#75

Post by phylo_roadking » 19 Jan 2009, 21:12

Here's a question...

Do the Japanese actually gain any more from such an attack compared with a one-off, probably suicidal attack on the U.S. Pacific naval yards??? THAT would make them draw in their horns FAR more than any attack on the Canal - for that is merely a logistical/distance problem that has to be worked round...BUT an attack on the Pacific anchorages, no matter if it's a once-off, requires the US to plan for more and build up their defences accordingly, temporarily find "safe" anchorages out of range - a bit like the RN Home Fleet withdrawing to Lough Swilly in WWI - and inhibit their whole Pacific buildup for some time etc.

Which is the better use and loss of a few aircraft? :wink: Making the Americans think their way round a problem for a time...or panicking them for the same length of time???

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