Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

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robdab
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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#76

Post by robdab » 19 Jan 2009, 21:47

mescal, an interesting reposte,

I think that you will have to add some training time to the travel time ... there is no way that a 21-knots BB travels from Norfolk to San Diego at a sustained 20-knot speed - Agreed. When I typed that I was thinking of the transfer westwards of the carriers and the new fast battleships of the Atlantic fleet, not of the older slower 3 New Mexico class etc. previously transfered from the Pacific to the Atlantic in May 1941. A full listing of the USN warships so transfered can be seen at page #57 of http://books.google.ca/books?id=K9q22l1 ... t#PPA57,M1 They would take longer to transit back to the Pacific. I am also guilty of assuming that those Atlantic Fleet heavies were just parked at Norflok on Dec.7'41, without checking to see where any of them really were located on that Sunday morning. The wide Atlantic is a big place afterall and transit travel times could thus be increased.

For example, in the OTL Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Maryland + Colorado were quickly back in service. - Here you assume the OTL results while my ATL Panama attack is set in Glenn239's AH world where the Japanese ALSO begin an invasion of Oahu on Dec.7'41. It that ATL world, those US battleships would still be sitting in the Pearl Harbor mud, under seige and unsalvaged. Thus they would NOT be available to join with their Atlantic Fleet sisters in any counter-attack on Hawaii.

The (3) New Mexicos joined from the Atlantic Fleet in February 1942. - Returned from the Atlantic to the Pacific, which they left in May 1941 IIRC, would be a better choice of wording. They would thus still be familiiar with Pacific Fleet procedures as well as knowing Atlantic Fleet operational styles. Do you have evidence that the two seperate USN fleets used greatly differing procedures ?

However, you do not have a 7-BBs operational fleet, as the 4 "Pacific" BBs belonged to 3 different BatDivs and he 'Atlantic' BBs belonged to a fourth. Even if you can probably easily make the 4 Pacific ships cooperate as they were used to train together, you will need some more training time to have a smooth cooperation with the 3 BBs arriving from Atlantic, which had not in the previous months trained with the Pacific Fleet procedures.
North Carolina could also have joined, but since it was a fast battleship, its integration in the battle line would perhaps be a wate of resource.
- For reasons already explained, I would disagree. The 5 Atlantic battleships (IIRC the South Dakota was also available in the Atlantic then) could further polish their battle skills while travelling between Norfolk and San Diego with any US battleships that did manage to escape from Hawaii joining in for some limited drills between San Diego and Honolulu. In the ATL world that I suggest, those "heavy hitters" would be in a RUSH to lift an ongoing Japanese siege of Hawaii but of course, would ONLY close on the Hawaiian Islands AFTER the US carriers were successful in driving the Kido Butai's 6 flight decks from the scene AND in suppressing all newly land based Japanese warplanes from their satelite island airfields. Considering the new Japanese OTL tactic of operating all 6 China war experienced carriers together for mutual protection vs. the usual US approach of keeping each combat green carrier TF seperate, I'd not bet on the success of the American carrier groups who'd have little time to train together.

at that time it was thought to be foolish to attack enemy-held land bases with a fleet - Why then did the OTL Japanese attack Pearl Harbor with their Kido Butai ?
It was not well accepted in the IJN general staff. Yamamoto had a lot of difficulties to have the operation running
Would he be able to make another raid accepted ?
- My ATL Panama attack requires only one more seaplane tender and a tanker, not even an oiler, just a tanker, and 3 Mavis of course. The 3 submarines were already a part of the KB's units.

The warships, fast as they can be in theory, actually need an awful lot of time to travel from a point A to a point B if you require them to be battle-ready at point B, especially if those units are not singletons but organized as a fleet.
I have no hard data regarding the Atlantic Fleet BBs, but I recently read a lot of records of movements of ww2 cruisers, and you're always amazed at the time spent by those ships in training / transit / refuel / refit / port calls ...
I'm almost sure the situation is still worse for BBs. I think that's because, when you're about to meet the enemy, unless there is a vital threat, any admiral prefers to commit only perfectly fit ships.
- I'd agree completely, in a perfect world BUT in this ATL there would be considerable domestic political pressure on the USN (which had already failed to adequitely defend either Hawaii or Panama), to "get their fingers out" and counter-attack QUICKLY. Keep in mind that almost 500,000 US citizens would be threatened with imminent capture on those beseiged Hawaiian Islands.

Would you like to be "in FDR's shoes" while he explained to the numerous family members of those 500,000 just why they wouldn't be "home for Christmas" in 1941 ? I'd have to wonder just how many millions of votes that would cost he and his party in the next election ? Can you say, "change of government" ?
robdab wrote: So the "why" may have been, from an IJN staff officer : why disobey doctrine to invest resources (even if it's few resources) to attack an objective of little to no value in the current context ? - As previously discussed, knocking out the Panama Canal delays USN reinforcements for any Hawaiian Islands counter-attacks.
But the delay in US counterattack, which means strategic freedom of movement for Japan is obtained by the Pearl Harbor strike. Closing Panama adds only an insignificant delay. - But prior to Dec.7'41 the Japanese could NOT know how the Oahu attack would turn out. They could plan carefully and hope but only doing it would reveal the true results. If closing the Panama Canal at the cost of 3 Mavis delays a USN counter-attack on Hawaii for just long enough that the Japanese take US 500,000 hostages, who tells the American voters that such is "insignificant" ?

I think that you confuse the difference between winning a purely battle victory and winning a war by convincing your enemy that the fight cannot be won. In hindsight the OTL Japanese were fooish to believe it but AFAIK they truely thought that they could fight the US off for long enough that the Americans would agree to an early ceasefire and give them the NEI's oilfields. Invading Oahu and raiding Panama would be thought of in Japan as additional ways to sap the American's will to fight. Actually capturing the strongest US Pacific base, while the US Pacific Fleet was actually "at home" would be expected to be a HUGE "body blow" to the American will to fight, from a 1941 Japanese PoV anyway.

It's a detail, but I think that there would have been a strong probability (from IJN's staff point of view) that the seaplane tender bringing the Mavis will not make it back home. - Based on what exactly ?
Mostly the distance to travel back to friendly territory, and the probability that there was a US cruiser or two lurking in the area. But I may well be wrong on this.
- Keep in mind that my ATL Chitose will still be escorted by 3 IJN submarines for the journey back to friendly Japanese waters and that she carries some mix of Mavis and single engined seaplanes. While not having much anti-warship capability and being subject to recovery mishaps in rougher sea states, those floating warplanes could scout far around the Chitose, her tanker and those 3 IJN submarines in order to detect any lurking US avengers well before they charged into gun or torpedo range.

Globally, I still find your scenario very interesting, and I think it may improve Japan's situation (even if it's by a narrow margin, but since the cost is very low ....) - Glad to know that you think that it has some merit.

I'm only playing devil's advocate because it does not integrate 1941 IJN doctrine. - Understood and I agree that it is somewhat 'iffy" in terms of their OTL doctrine. Ultimately they DIDN'T do it so I have a hard time proving the case. That is why my Panama scenario is labelled as an ATL one. Something in the OTL has to change to make it easily possible but the change/resources needed are small enough that I believe it to be a quite plausible one.

I'd be interested in your response to Glenn239's point that the Japanese bombed the logistics warehouses of the US base at Cavite in the PIs.

And to the fact that the Japanese invaded and captured Hong Kong which had essentially no offensive weaponry located there. Sure, it was a valuable facility that might have have been used against Japan but then, so was the Panama Canal.

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Alaric
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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#77

Post by Alaric » 20 Jan 2009, 01:43

Robdab,

I came across this link looking up something else, and wanted to ask if you thought it might present any problem with your ATL scenario. USS Trenton (CL-11) was anchored at Balboa, Panama Canal Zone, Pacific side, when the attack on Pearl Harbor happened. http://www.ww2pacific.com/notpearl.html (skip down to South East Pacific, South America heading). Do you see any circumstance where Trenton's presence might have caused any problems for the 3 Mavis's? I'm certain she wouldn't have had radar, here are some photos of her but unfortuneately the one's from the 1940's can't be enlarged (broken link when you click on them). The one showing her in Pearl Harbor in 1939 shows no radar of course. http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-u ... t/cl11.htm If the Mavis's took a different route back out to the Pacific after the attack on Gatun Dam then she wouldn't even be able to offer AA fire. Getting underway to search for the Chitose even in conjuction with an aerial search would likely be fruitless and possibly get her sunk by one of the 3 submarines. :oops:


robdab
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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#78

Post by robdab » 20 Jan 2009, 02:37

Sid Guttridge, Welcome back for another "kick at the proverbial cat" ! Lots of research done this time too. Excellent.

The first and main objection to the operation is that, if compromised, it would alert US forces everywhere and very possibly modify the outcome at Pearl Harbour. The Japanese would first have to decide whether such a speculative risk to their primary objective – the annihilation of the US Pacific Fleet – was worth it. - Sure but the OTL Japanese attack was already the biggest risk of that discovery. If somehow intercepted or spotted then my ATL Chitose is "hiding in plain sight". Until late on the afternoon of Dec.6'41 she wouldn't be doing anything except her previously publicized voyage towards Argentina. Her numerous single engined floatplane scout aircraft should be able to report any threats to her long before those threats could catch a glimpse of an "off course" Chitose. Even if somehow spotted after dark in Galapagos waters she could claim "engine trouble" or "a burst crewman's appendix emergency" etc.etc. until she determined the threat level. If great then she says "sorry" and turns around to go back home, with no harm, no foul being done. If minor then she and her 3 SS escorts might very well decide to use force to deal with the threat. Long distance communication with 1941 radio gear was not nearly as reliable as the satelite phones of today make it.

As the voyage of the Chitose would be flagged up publicly in advance, the US might choose to alert its defences in Panama. After all, it had already stopped the passage of Japanese merchant ships through the canal in July 1941 through fear of sabotage, so it was clearly sensitive to the Japanese threat. - Possibly but with my ATL Chitose scheduled to pass by so far away from Panama, why would they do so ? Sure, American RDF posts might track her position based on her regular daily radio broadcast but they would have no way to know that at some point those broadcasts were taken over by an IJN submarine now carrying the Chitose's regular radio operator, on her originally published course. "Hiding in plain sight" using the same radio deception methods used by the OTL KB prior to their attack on Pearl Harbor.

Argentina first had to be persuaded to buy the Mavis. In December 1941 it was still high on the list of countries allocated Lend Lease by the USA. Indeed, after Brazil, it had the second highest allocation in Latin America and, amongst many other requirements, wanted eight US PBY-5 Catalinas to replace the US P2Y-3As it had in service. Lend-Lease offered aircraft at about one third the normal price. To undercut that, the Japanese would have to offer a suspiciously sweet deal that would probably have to cover numerous other items on Argentina’s wish-list as well. _ IIRC the source that I listed mentioned that a barter trading deal had been set-up between Japan and Argentina in 1940 so no cash need have changed hands at all. And what better way for Argentia to extract a lower priced deal from the eager Americans than to show them that there was another "player" available that was wiling to provide modern military equipment ?

You obviouslt intend to take this to a level of detail that I had not anticipated nor researched but such is my own responsibility for raising the point in the first place. I am grateful for the challenge however so please, carry on ...

Why would the Mavises plausibly be delivered by sea? They were presumably being marketed as long range maritime reconnaissance types. The US, the Italians, the French and Germans all had scheduled air services to Latin America, the latter three across the Atlantic. The US had scheduled trans-Pacific flyingboat flights. The US had apparently not banned overflights by Japanese aircraft as the proposed record-breaking Tokyo-New York-Buenos Aires flight by the Tachikawa Ki-77 indicates. The US P2Y-3As had been delivered to Argentina by air in the mid 1930s. Would not the delivery of the Mavises by sea be inherently suspicious, besides calling into question their performance? - Perhaps my logic at the time is best illustrated by analogy ? If you were to go out tomorrow and purchase a new Volkswagon "Beetle" automobile, would you prefer that it be driven to you all the way from it's factory, in Mexico, on it's own 4 rubber tires or would you prefer that it arrive in brand new and unworn condition on the back of a car transport truck, after a long railwaycar ride ? In my own case, I would choose the later delivery method but "your mileage may vary". Would such an arrival by transport truck cause you to doubt the ability of that car to carry both you and your family members safely "down the road" or would you think a wise choice instead ?

The Mavis was also apparently exceptionally vulnerable to fighters, as it lacked self-sealing fuel tanks or armour protection for the crews. They would therefore have been absolutely dependent on secrecy. They could probably not “fight through”. - Yes. As I believe that I previously explained in another posting here, the 3 Japanese Mavis pilots would be expressly trained and ordered to NOT try to "fight their way through" if discovered, at least until the last possible seconds. The secrecy of the Pearl Harbor attacks might very well DEPEND on any one of those 3 aircrews maintaining their Pan-Am bluff for as long as was humanly possible. They would be told that even the humiliation of capture and surrender would earn the gratitude of the Empire and indeed, of the Emperor himself.

I think you may be confusing the large Japanese population in Peru with the small one in Ecuador. The Galapagos Islands were, as you post, Ecuadoran. Ecuador was apparently hostile to Japan at this time: “Japan, indeed, had long been a bug-bear on the Pacific coast and was especially obnoxious in Ecuador because Japanese textiles undercut Ecuadorean. Besides anti-Japanese demonstrations in June, 1940, there had been press campaigns against Japanese competition in both August, 1940, and in April, 1941” (p.121, Latin America and the Second World War, 1939-1942. by R. A. Humphreys.) Thus Ecuadoran hostility was very likely. - I can't claim to have yet put as much research time into this issue as you obviously have but I also don't recall ever claiming that the Ecuadorians would be inviting my ATL Chitose into their Galapagos waters ? "The Galapagos Archipelago consists of 7,880 square km (3,042 sq. miles) of land spread over 45,000 square km (28,000 miles) of ocean ... The group consists of 13 main islands, 6 smaller islands, and 107 rocks and islets." comes from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galapagos_Islands and indicates my belief that it would not have been too difficult for a Japanese seaplane tender to locate a suitably sheltered and hidden anchorage (in case of stormy weather) within that scattered group from which to refuel and launch her 3 Mavis, unmolested. While watched over by a tanker and at least two IJN submarines and her own flock of single engined floatplanes.

Nor were the islands unpopulated. Albermarle Island had a population of 600 and at least three more had populations in the 100s. Their main occupation was fishing, making clandestine maritime activities difficult. There was also a small Ecuadoran naval garrison that was normally sustained by the aviso Eloy Alfaro on monthly visits. Her schedule would have to be ascertained. - As would her usual night time route thru the island group which as I have already posted consisted of "13 main islands, 6 smaller islands, and 107 rocks and islets" that were spread out over some 28,000 sq. miles of ocean. With that large of an area for just one monthly ship to search, I'm not too worried about Ecuadorian discovery just yet.

Attention had also recently been drawn to the islands by the activities of the German raider HSK7 Komet, which had sunk or captured two or three Allied merchantmen near them in mid August 1941. - Do you have proof of any Allied searchers still remaining in the area as late as Decemeber 6'41 or do you attempt to foster doubt thru suggestion alone ?

And then, of course, there is the imponderable weather. “A calm open water takeoff” was by no means guaranteed. - Which is why my initial posting of this thread contained the sentence, "On the evening of Dec.6'41 she (and her 3 IJN submarine escort) would quietly anchor instead in a deserted lee bay somewhere in the numerous Galapagos Islands, which were owned by Ecuador." Just in case the weather demanded a calm lee shore for Mavis takeoffs.

But, if the weather was a factor in the Galapagos, why take the risk of using them anyway? What is wrong with the open sea? Greater secrecy could be traded off for greater dependency on weather conditions. - Uhmm, the possiblity of big winds and bigger waves. Without accurate weather forcasts that far out from Panama, the risk of a sudden unexpected storm would be too great a risk to the entire mission.

The planned 1945 attacks on the canal was to be by submarine-borne aircraft launched from the open sea. - IIRC the I-400 class IJN submarines were intended to use their foredeck mounted catapult to launch their 3 single engined floatplane bombers, one-by-one. Not the open ocean surface beside those surfaced submarines.

Due to the time difference with Hawaii, the approach would have to be in broad daylight. - As did the Pan-Am China Clippers that they would attempt to impersonate. I'd imagine that with mechanical issues, storms and headwinds those Pan-Am flights would not be anything near to always being "on schedule".

With its thin, detached body, the Mavis does not look much like the Pan-American Clippers, even if marked like them. - Considering the persistant rumor that the Mavis's design was based on the Sikorsky S-42 "China Clipper" design I find your assertion to be surprising. My initial posting for this thread contained two photo URLs for comparison by my readers. I think that the two do indeed look much alike. Pan-Am's minimalist marking can be seen there also.

(When were these markings to be applied?) - The main paint job would be factory applied before departure from Japan but the round painted on side windows and small Pan-Am specific markings would only go on once near the Galapagos.

Furthermore, if the Clippers did not normally fly in at the same time as the attack, the very timing would be suspicious. Splitting up into three independent flights triples the likelihood of being spotted because it increases the numbers of observers, so more might be lost than gained by this. It also makes coordination over the target problematical. An early arrival by one might compromise the others. - Au contraire, since China Clippers flew their routes alone, a flock of three flying together would be sure to attract notice. A 2 Clipper rendezvous over an island at the far end of Gatun Lake could be explained to any curious control tower radioman as a meeting to exchange fragile engine repair parts, with the torpedo attack to begin instead as soon as the 3rd arrived.

In fact I still debate with myself on the idea of having each Mavis also carry a rubber raft or two to be filled with waterproof explosives and an IJA demolitions team trained to further disable the water holding abilites of the Panama Canal's water storage lakes. Each fake "China Clipper" could land in an isolated bay and discharge it's "commando team" before taking off again to complete it's twin spillway torpedo run(s). The 3 biggest problems being that AFAIK the early war OTL Japanese didn't use small unit commando tactics below paratrooper battalion size, the risk of damaging a flyingboat on unseen debris (or an alligator/crocodile of which there were plenty of both) and my review of the design drawings of most of the Panama Canal's dikes. None so far seem to be vulnerable to the quantites of explosives that could be placed without very bukly and heavy (& noisey) drilling equipments.

The US defences of the Canal were vulnerable in many areas, but had improved markedly since 1939. For example, the number of anti-aircraft battalions (manned by the coastal artillery, if I remember correctly) had been doubled. The fact that neither you nor I know exactly where they were deployed cannot be taken to mean that the spillway gates were not covered. If you can conceive of attacking them, it is entirely possible that the US command could conceive of defending them. Although not comprehensive, there were naval patrols by SEPAC, regular aerial reconnaissances by Army and Naval aircraft, some radar cover, some fighter defence and some anti-aircraft artillery defence. Certainly they were not fully effective, but any attack could have been tripped up on any one of them. - No doubt. But then I have already presented the official written opinions of the US military on the qualities of the Dec. 1941 defence capabilty in Panama. And summed it up in my first posting for this thread with:

"THUS IT IS REVEALED THAT THE PRIMARY US PACIFIC DEFENSE OF THE PANAMA CANAL IN DECEMBER 1941 RELIED SOLELY ON THEIR MERE HOPE THAT THE JAPANESE WOULD NOT ATTACK THEM ANYTIME SOON !!!"

I see no proof from you yet that this American military opinion is/was incorrect. If their own commanders wrote this then just imagine the real state of those American defenses.

Just as any one of probably a hundred events might have tripped up the OTL Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Yet those OTL Japanese attempted it anyway, to spectacular success. They were adaptable, bold, confident and resourceful, not to mention aggressive. My ATL Panama Japanese would embody the same "we'll do it for the Emperor" attitude.

In this instance, I don’t think the shortage of 37mm AA ammunition would have been very significant. Your scenario foresees only one attack by three rather large, lumbering aircraft, presumably in quick succession. 37mm AA would have been lucky to have a target for a minute. - Other than your unsupported opinion, what proof do you offer that any US AA gunners at all, let alone their AA guns, were deployed in their seats with ammo loaded and ready to fire for that 1 minute, anywhere within range of the Gatun Spillway or of the probable torpedo release points out over Gatun Lake ?

What would possibly cause US Army gunners to shoot down what apppeared to be peacetime civilian Pan-Am China Clipper flyingboats out over Gatun Lake ? Especially when those Americans have no knowledge that Japan had developed, tested and deployed a shallow water launched torpedo modification ?

Other than a distressing incident involving an Iranian civilian airliner a few years ago out over the Persian Gulf, I was not aware that such deliberate civilian butchery was US military policy either now or back in 1941 ??

And what about all the other calibers? - Since none were mentioned in a derogatory fashion in the American reports that I have already presented then I would imagine them to have workable quantiies of ammunition. Were they alert and ready to fire instantly on civilian targets in peacetime, is not mentioned so I can only guess, no.

In the final analysis, what probably scuppers this operation, besides a complexity that leaves numereous hostages to fortune and the threat its exposure posed to the far more important Pearl Harbour attack, is that it could be foiled by a very cheap, low-tech device – a torpedo net. - In your final analysis that is. As previously mentioned, why would the 1941 Americans install anti-torpedo netting to prevent a torpedo attack in such shallow water ? If they didn't deploy atn to protect their own Pacific Fleet from a devastating attack in it's own home port, several thousnad miles closer to Japan than Panama was, then why would they deploy it at the Gatun Dam ? Other than your own fore-knowledge of my ATL Panama attack proposal that is ? Mention is made of anti-torpedo netting being deployed pre-PH to defend all 4 of the Canal entry lock gates at both the Caribean and Pacific ends of the Canal but there is no mention of similar at Gatun.

I would suggest that the Japanese would have been foolish to risk compromising their attack on the US Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbour in the hope that the USA had not spent a pittance on such a widely used defensive device as a torpedo net at Gatun spillway. This operation is only a starter if (1) there were no torpedo net and (2) the Japanese knew this for a fact. Do we know either ? - Not at this time but I can easily refer you to the method available to the 1941 Japanese for providing both. A look at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/magic/x12-0022.html will show the Panama origin MAGIC intercepts by American intelligence. I do not know if this URL lists all or just some of the intercepts nor what percentage of all such OTL Japanese transmissions from Panama were intercepted. Even without that knowledge however it is quickly apparent that the Japanese operatives on the ground in Panama were very good at their intell gathering tasks and could have easily collected and forwarded to Japan almost any information required. A simple fishing trip to Gatun Lake just a couple of days prior to Dec.7'41 would have revealed the presence of US anti-torpedo netting at the Gatun Dam spillway to Tokyo as well as the locations and readiness status of any American AA defences installed around it.

And remember – absence of evidence for a torpedo net is not evidence of the absence of a torpedo net. The same goes for AAA defences, etc. - I disagree. While you are entitled to your own opinion, you require a ridiculous standard of proof which no ATL could ever hope to satisfy. How can one prove what never happened ? An ATL can only delve into the plausibility or probable likelyhood of an imaginary event.

For confirmation something more reliable and in depth than an internet search is probably necessary. - Why don't you let us all know when you have completed that research ?

So far I've single handed thru the Canal 3 times and have visited many (but certainly not yet all) of it's surviving WW2 facilities. Hot & humid "boots on the ground" and all that. Two research trips to the NARA archives at College Park, Maryland have turned up all sorts of interesting details but such informations are very difficult for my readers here to confirm so I seldom refer to them. URL's can be checked nearly instantly by any and all that can read my discussion board posted scenario on their screen so for their educational speed, that is what I try to use as sources. With acceptance that not all that one reads in print (whether in a book or on a compter monitor), is really true. Many of the more popular books such as Prange's "At Dawn We Slept" on the subject of PH are easily library accessible for many readers, if not already owned. Probably since it was never attacked, such detailed written works on the WW2 defenses of the Panama Canal seem to be more rare but I have found the (CDSG) Coast Defence Study Goup's in-house magazine to be an excellent source of good, hard to find WW2 Panama data. Still, not easy for non-members to confirm though.

P.S. According to the book I-400, - Written by ?

The Japanese apparently decided to dive bomb rather than torpedo the Gatun Gates in 1945 because training for accurate torpedo delivery would take too long. - Since you have refered to it more than once, what connections do you see between my 1941 flyingboats attack proposal and a 1945 submarine launched effort ? Four years of war later, with the wastage of Japanese pilots & skills that occured in the OTL, I don't see many resemblances at all. Wouldn't nerve gas bomb attacks on 3 American Atlantic coast cities have been more of an attention grabber for the Japanese at that late date ? A "no nucs for no nerve gas" stand-off might have been suggested ?? Unlikely, I know.

As a matter of interest, is there any record of a successful torpedo strike by a Mavis? - I can't say that I have ever tried to find one. This seems an odd question from a gent that only just asserted, "And remember – absence of evidence for a torpedo net is not evidence of the absence of a torpedo net. The same goes for AAA defences, etc", don't you think ? In your own words, little or no OTL evidence doesn't prove that a Mavis couldn't get the torpedo job done.

P.P.S. What is your purpose in soliciting information on this subject? Are you planning to publish or produce a wargaming scenario? - I can't claim to have devoted much thought to this aspect of ATLs. Glenn239 is known to be working on a wargame expansion version of his "Invasion of Oahu" AH though. If he is successful in that endeavour I would eventually add my ATL Panama scenario as a further expansion of his expansion but I have no board wargaming design or development experience to draw upon in that direction.

At this point in time I post to a subject because this is the way that I best enjoy history & learning. I find that a well researched and thought out challenge to my existing beliefs motivates me to really "dig into" any subject in a way that simply reading a book can never seem to do.
Last edited by robdab on 20 Jan 2009, 06:23, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#79

Post by phylo_roadking » 20 Jan 2009, 03:10

I've been looking around for a while, but I haven't been able to find any record of the H6K4 Mavis actually carrying out a torpedo attack - though it did carry out a number of bombing attacks on the NEI and Rabaul early in 1942...before it was basically withdrawn and relegated to transport roles as it was far too vulnerable to fighters and AA...

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#80

Post by robdab » 20 Jan 2009, 06:03

phylo_roadking,

I've been looking around for a while, but I haven't been able to find any record of the H6K4 Mavis actually carrying out a torpedo attack - though it did carry out a number of bombing attacks on the NEI and Rabaul early in 1942...before it was basically withdrawn and relegated to transport roles as it was far too vulnerable to fighters and AA...

Try http://www.historycentral.com/NAVY/Minelayer/heron.html

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#81

Post by robdab » 20 Jan 2009, 06:06

Alaric, thanks for the question, I think ?

I came across this link looking up something else, and wanted to ask if you thought it might present any problem with your ATL scenario. USS Trenton (CL-11) was anchored at Balboa, Panama Canal Zone, Pacific side, when the attack on Pearl Harbor happened. http://www.ww2pacific.com/notpearl.html (skip down to South East Pacific, South America heading).

IIRC the USS RIchmond, also an Omaha class long ranged scouting light cruiser was also out on Neutrality Patrol down towards Valapriso, Chile at the time.

Do you see any circumstance where Trenton's presence might have caused any problems for the 3 Mavis's ?

Only if the US somehow extended it's Neutrality Patrol from 300 miles off of the South American coasts to 900 miles offshore instead. The USN didn't have enough warships to actually enforce the Atlantic expansions that they did declare, let alone any such southeastern Pacific expansion. ONly that might allow one or both of those US cruisers to meet my ATL Chitose just west of the Galapagos in order to escort her towards Argentina. Of course, that wopuld be even more unlikey since FDR had ordered that the Japanese be given NO opportunity to use any incident as a "causus belli" for declaring war before the US was more ready. A US cruiser intercepting my ATL Chitose, while she was on a well publicized delivery mission on the high seas, might be the very excuse that Japan was looking for, from an American PoV. And so, not at all likely to be allowed by USN "higher up" types. Careers would be at stake.

I'm certain she wouldn't have had radar, here are some photos of her but unfortuneately the one's from the 1940's can't be enlarged (broken link when you click on them). The one showing her in Pearl Harbor in 1939 shows no radar of course. http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-u ... t/cl11.htm If the Mavis's took a different route back out to the Pacific after the attack on Gatun Dam then she wouldn't even be able to offer AA fire. Getting underway to search for the Chitose even in conjuction with an aerial search would likely be fruitless and possibly get her sunk by one of the 3 submarines. :oops:

If such happened, a bonus to the ATL Japanese mission, to be sure.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#82

Post by Sid Guttridge » 20 Jan 2009, 12:43

Hi Robdab,

So, cutting through the verbiage, the proposed speculative raid could have compromised the far more important Pearl Harbour operation, we do not know the state of the proposed target's defences any more than the Japanese apparently did, we don't know if the proposed delivery aircraft was an effective torpedo carrier or not, and the proposed launch site was from hostile neutral territory the nature of whose own naval cover has not been ascertained.

(In this last connection, I note that on 22 November your link gives a Japanese intelligence source as stating, "The naval defense area, patrolled against possible lightning attacks, extends in the north from Salina Cruz on the Tehuantepec Isthmus to Monepene (on ?) the Gulf of Fonseca. The southern limits extend to the air base on the Galapagos Islands." What air base? I didn't know the US had started to build the air base yet, but if the Japanese thought they had this would rather scupper the use of the Galapagos as a launch point for the attack)

I thank you for your invitation to search the internet but, as this is your project, not mine, don't you think it is you who ought to be following up any leads you are given? If you don't take others' contributions to your project seriously and with a little more gentility, how can you expect them to assist you?

I repeat, the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. The fact that we cannot establish the nature of the defences on the spillway gates does not mean there were none. Inadequate intelligence is not a military asset.

This project initially hangs on whether there were torpedo nets on the spillway gates or not. If there were, then this entire convoluted plot is foredoomed to failure, possibly at the cost of compromising the far more important Pearl Harbour attack, and a good number of posters are going to waste time pursuing a mirage.

But even if there were no torpedo nets, this merely turns the focus onto all the other variables that individually or cumulatively could foil the attack. The number of inter-dependent ducks to be got in a row to mount this raid is formidable and this is its next major weak point. Its very complexity makes it vulnerable and unlikely. The acronym KISS was not coined for nothing.

But the main objection remains - the Japanese probably had far more to lose by the possible compromising of the Chitose/Mavis raid than they stood to gain by it. Sure Pearl Harbour was already a risk, but this operation would simply add to that risk.

I think it might be more productive to discuss why the Japanese fleet didn't attack the Panama Canal after Pearl Harbour, when it apparently had the run of the Pacific.

Cheers,

Sid.

P.S. I would compliment you on your form of reply. It is a model of clarity in that it highlighlights each point being addressed.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#83

Post by Tim Smith » 21 Jan 2009, 01:05

Sid Guttridge wrote: But even if there were no torpedo nets, this merely turns the focus onto all the other variables that individually or cumulatively could foil the attack. The number of inter-dependent ducks to be got in a row to mount this raid is formidable and this is its next major weak point. Its very complexity makes it vulnerable and unlikely. The acronym KISS was not coined for nothing.
The Imperial Japanese Navy did NOT follow the KISS principle in WW2.

Instead they had a penchant for creating vastly and needlessly over-complicated plans, divided their forces into many separate divisions with the intention of bringing them together in the operations area, were critically dependant on exact timing, and had no provision for anything not going completely as planned.

Witness the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway, and the Battle of Leyte Gulf. All had the above flaws. That's why the Japanese lost all three battles.

So I would say the IJN would have loved this plan - the more complex the better, because complexity is supposed to confuse the simple-minded Americans, who would (in Japanese wargaming theory) react exactly as the Japanese expected, and bumble stupidly into every trap the Japanese laid for them.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#84

Post by Alaric » 21 Jan 2009, 03:16

Other than a distressing incident involving an Iranian civilian airliner a few years ago out over the Persian Gulf, I was not aware that such deliberate civilian butchery was US military policy either now or back in 1941 ??
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20010430/

http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/Northwoods.html

http://www.maryferrell.org/wiki/index.p ... Northwoods

http://www.rense.com/general24/operationnorthwoods.htm

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#85

Post by robdab » 21 Jan 2009, 07:10

Sid Guttridge,

the proposed speculative raid could have compromised the far more important Pearl Harbour operation - The OTL PH attack was a far, far greater risk to the security of the PH attack than my ATL Panama raid would ever be.

we do not know the state of the proposed target's defences any more than the Japanese apparently did - No, not WE at all, just YOU. I've been to the NARA Archives and have made extensive notes on what I believe to be all of the American defenses of the December 1941 Canal. Since I wasn't stationed there in 1941 I will never be 100% sure that all were listed in those Archival Records but OTOH I didn't find any missing gaps in those records, nor empty file boxes as has happened on ocassion with the 1941/2 Hawaii records. Other than 4 rifle armed security sentries on the Gatun Dam, 2 on the road bridge over it's lower spillway and another 2 at the Gatun Powerhouse, there are no archive records of other US Army defenders being stationed there prior to Dec.8'41.

we don't know if the proposed delivery aircraft was an effective torpedo carrier or not, - An irrelevant point when one considers the hours of attack training asked of the OTL Kido Butai aircrews. Had my ATL Mavis attack been ordered I'm sure that those Japanese flyingboat pilots would have have been drilled to a similar level of acccuracy.

and the proposed launch site was from hostile neutral territory the nature of whose own naval cover has not been ascertained. - True enough I suppose but so what ? Remember that the Chitose also carried F1M2 Pete floatplanes that had a sting of their own. There is at least one January 11/42 record of them shooting down a Dutch PBY to be found at http://www.combinedfleet.com/chitosesp_t.htm . My ATL Chitose would be arriving at dusk, then working overnight to fuel and prepare her 3 "China Clippers" for a dawn launch. Not times that peacetime Ecuadorian searchplanes would be likely to be out checking the 28,000 square miles of that island group, in the dark. You attempt to make a mountain out of a molehill by calling on the flimsiest of "maybe" details. What possible reason could the Dec.6'41 Ecuadorians have to be out flying thru the darkness searching for my ATL Chitose, other than your own current knowledge of her ATL mission ? I would suggest that Ecuador's military attentions would be focused on Peru, with which she had just concluded a war as described at http://www.historyguy.com/Ecuador-Peru_War_of_1941.html rather than on the far away Galapagos Islands.

In this last connection, I note that on 22 November your link gives a Japanese intelligence source as stating, "The naval defense area, patrolled against possible lightning attacks, extends in the north from Salina Cruz on the Tehuantepec Isthmus to Monepene (on ?) the Gulf of Fonseca. The southern limits extend to the air base on the Galapagos Islands." What air base? I didn't know the US had started to build the air base yet, but if the Japanese thought they had this would rather scupper the use of the Galapagos as a launch point for the attack - You seem to take every opportunity to attempt to portray the Dec.'41 Japanese military as a group of timid old women, afraid of their own shadows when history shows that they were anything but. The first 6 months of the OTL Pacifc War clearly proved that the Japanese were very aggressive, not at all afraid to die and eager to expand their Empire. One can't make an omlet without cracking a few eggs.

in the OTL, Japanese intell sources on Oahu got the strength of the USAAF there completely wrong before that raid. The KB still attacked aggressively into what they thought were 500 modern and effective USAAF warplanes, PLUS those USN warplanes stationed on their carriers and Hawaiian naval air stations. In light of their oft demonstrated warrior spirit, do you really think that you can prove that my ATL Japanese would have been scared away by a few Ecuadorian searchplanes that might or might not exist (didn't as per http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/waf/america ... f-home.htm ) or the once-a-month supply boat ?

As for "airbases" on the Galapagos, remember than any fishing village wharf with a fuel tank on it is a "base" to a floatplane, seaplane or flyingboat. Pouring a concrete ramp that allows an amphibian aircraft to waddle up out of the water creates an "airbase". If you'll recall that I previously mentioned that FDR had authorized Pan-Am to start developing a civilian Galapagos "base" in 1940, prior to Ecuadorian agreement to the presence of American military aircraft there, I think you have the root cause of that Japanese intell report. The book previewed at http://books.google.com/books?id=G3g0yj ... 0#PPA73,M1 gives a small taste of the "behind the scenes" US maneuvers done at the time that were designed to get Axis run airlines out of Latin and South American countries. I can't prove it yet but would bet that the Japanese agent in Panama who sent that report to Tokyo was assuming that the Pan-Am effort was just a "front" for a future US military controlled airbase. Much as "Air America" was a "front' for the CIA's efforts in Laos during the Vietnam period. Had my ATL Panama raid actually been ordered, I think it e3ntirely likely that gathering additional intell on the Galapagos Islands would have become a Japanese priority, don't you ?

I thank you for your invitation to search the internet - Actually, I wasn't inviting you to search the internet at all. I was hoping that you had access to numerous "other" sources such as a personal library filled with tomes on the wartime histories of the Panama Canal and Latin/South America. It seems that I am to be doomed to living in disappointment ?

but, as this is your project, not mine, don't you think it is you who ought to be following up any leads you are given? - Certainly on any sourced and supported substantive leads but not just every random thought or nitpicking detail that you choose to dispute. The problem being that not much WW2 Panama detail seems to exist on the WWW and I don't have another sailing trip to Panama scheduled until 2010. I'll probably vist the NARA archives again before then but this discussion is going to drag out for years if we have to wait till those estimated dates.

If you don't take others' contributions to your project seriously and with a little more gentility, how can you expect them to assist you? - I don't expect anyone to assist me, at all. I post purely because I am selfishly interested in a topic. If others are also interested in that same topic then I hope that they will jump right in with some well researched and related points but I have litle time for posters who obviously haven't even read my ATL proposal or for those who just post a negative opinion declaration with nothing in support.

I repeat, the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. The fact that we cannot establish the nature of the defences on the spillway gates does not mean there were none. - Please feel free to repeat whatever you want as many times as you want. I remain unconvinced of your view on this point. The fact that YOU cannot establish the nature of the American defences near the Gatun Dam's spillway gates does not mean that there were any at all there, either. I have demonstrated, to myself at least, that there weren't any, save the rifles of 8 likely very bored anti-sabotage sentries.

Inadequate intelligence is not a military asset. -Yet you continue to ignore the OTL MAGIC evidence that plainly indicates that the Japanese had a skilled and effective intell team on the ground in Panama, prior to Dec.7'41, with access to a reliable communications system leading back to Tokyo. As I have asserted several times now, had the ATL Japanese command decided to order a strike on Panama, I see no valid reason why those OTL agents already on Panama, and successfully reporting from there, wouldn't have been able to gather whatever intell was needed for effective Japanese raid planning.

For example, we know from Prange's "ADWS" that Yoshikawa, the busiest Japanese "secret spy" on Oahu was regularly taking tourist sightseeing flights around Oahu to gather intell on American defences there. Do you not think it likely that some intell weenie in Tokyo might have suggested the same thing wrt the Panama Canal had the Japanese decided to invade it ? (Yeah, I know. Next you'll be asking me to prove that there were tourist sightseeing flights operating in 1941 Pabnama.) You continue to insist on proof of events that didn't happen in the OTL history, while refusing to use your imagination and ignoring OTL Japanese methods actually used by them elsewhere.

This project initially hangs on whether there were torpedo nets on the spillway gates or not. If there were, then this entire convoluted plot is foredoomed to failure, possibly at the cost of compromising the far more important Pearl Harbour attack, and a good number of posters are going to waste time pursuing a mirage. - hardly. My last posting in response to you demonstrated that the OTL Japanese agents on Panama had the ability to easily gather that info. I suggest a second method, sightseeing flights as used by OTL Japanese agents on Oahu, in his post. How many more do you expect before you admit that your Gatun anti-torpedo netting point is just a waste of our time and bandwidth ?

But even if there were no torpedo nets, this merely turns the focus onto all the other variables that individually or cumulatively could foil the attack. The number of inter-dependent ducks to be got in a row to mount this raid is formidable and this is its next major weak point. Its very complexity makes it vulnerable and unlikely. The acronym KISS was not coined for nothing. - My ATL scenario is nowhere near as complex as the OTL Pearl Harbor attacks and the Japanese managed to pull those off to great success. The Japanese were warriors, not the "Chicken Littles" that you attempt to portray them as being.

But the main objection remains - the Japanese probably had far more to lose by the possible compromising of the Chitose/Mavis raid than they stood to gain by it. Sure Pearl Harbour was already a risk, but this operation would simply add to that risk. - So what ? War is HELL, isn't it ? What was it about the early WW2 Japanese attacks around the Pacific that makes you think them to be as timid as you suggest ?

I think it might be more productive to discuss why the Japanese fleet didn't attack the Panama Canal after Pearl Harbour, when it apparently had the run of the Pacific. - Please feel free to start another thread and do so.

P.S. I would compliment you on your form of reply. It is a model of clarity in that it highlighlights each point being addressed. - I do what I can, when I can. Sadly, not all of the points made in opposition to my ATL Panama scenario are worth responding to, IMO.
Last edited by robdab on 21 Jan 2009, 07:33, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#86

Post by Simon K » 21 Jan 2009, 07:24

I think it is important to note that this ATL must be seen as part of a much larger picture. That of a sustained Japanese attempt to occupy and neutralise the HIs in Dec 1941.

In conjunction with this, the attack makes much more sense. It is a strategic adjunct of that operation.

Without a HI invasion ATL, the operation rightly, can be observed as having little rationality. However as part of a full blooded scheme to isolate the Pacific to USN reinforcement, even for weeks,it makes sound strategic sense.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#87

Post by robdab » 21 Jan 2009, 09:17

Tim Smith, you wrote,

The Imperial Japanese Navy did NOT follow the KISS principle in WW2. Instead they had a penchant for creating vastly and needlessly over-complicated plans, divided their forces into many separate divisions with the intention of bringing them together in the operations area, were critically dependant on exact timing, ... - and which worked brilliantly for the first 6 months of the Pacific War against Allied defenders constantly kept off-balance.

... and had no provision for anything not going completely as planned. - Not true at all. Several of their island invasions changed beaches at the last minute, some after the leading troops were already ashore and Japanese victory, at minimal cost, still followed, relentlessly.

Witness the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway, and the Battle of Leyte Gulf. All had the above flaws. That's why the Japanese lost all three battles. - Some would suggest that Japanese defeats only began after the onset of their version of "Victory Disease". They certainly did "kick Allied butt" in every single case (save Wake Island #1 which was quickly corrected by Wake Island #2) all across the Pacific Ocean for the first 6 months of the Pacific War.

So I would say the IJN would have loved this plan - the more complex the better, because complexity is supposed to confuse the simple-minded Americans, who would (in Japanese wargaming theory) react exactly as the Japanese expected, and bumble stupidly into every trap the Japanese laid for them. - In it's own simple minded way I believe that this statement holds a great deal of truth wrt the Japanese OTL reality. It was only after the Japanese overran their initial strategic targets and began to improvise in their choises of the next set of strategic objectives, without proper "on the ground recon", without repeated wargaming and against Allied Forces that were finally beginning to "wake up", that defeat began to follow defeat for them. Once they no longer had the luxury of agents in place on the ground for months/years ahead of their attacks, such as they had in the OTL Panama, nor the time for numerous wargaming rehersals, then their shoestring attack planning efforts were no longer "good enough". IMO.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#88

Post by robdab » 21 Jan 2009, 09:37

Simon K, you wrote,

I think it is important to note that this ATL must be seen as part of a much larger picture. That of a sustained Japanese attempt to occupy and neutralise the HIs in Dec 1941. In conjunction with this, the attack makes much more sense. It is a strategic adjunct of that operation. _ That is certainly the context in which I created this Panama ATL scenario.

Without a HI invasion ATL, the operation rightly, can be observed as having little rationality. - From a 1941 Japanese point of view I don't think that I can agree with this statement at all. At a likely maximum cost of just 3 flyingboats, these ATL Japanese could have dealt a stunning blow to American morale as well as to their confidence in the abilities of their military forces and leadership at the highest levels. Even if combind with just the OTL Pearl Harbor attacks, my ATL Panama scenario delivers an inescapable message to the entire American nation that the Japanese could hit them with devastating BLOWS, ANYWHERE, at ANYTIME, out of a CLEAR BLUE SKY, with NO WARNING and at LITTLE COST.

And most importantly, that FDR could do NOTHING to stop it.

We know now that the Americans would have just hardened their hearts, bought more war bonds and trained more young men but I don't feel that the 1941 Japanese would have predicted any American reaction other than, "lets sit down at a ceasefire discussion table".

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#89

Post by Sid Guttridge » 21 Jan 2009, 12:04

Hi Robdab,

Another potential problem - the west coast route was apparently flown by Panagra, not Pan Am. Panagra was a partly owned subsidiary of Pan Am, but I can find no reference to it using Sikorski S-42s. (It did have an S-43). On the other hand I can find multiple references to S-42s on the Pan Am west coast route to Brazil and Argentina, which did not pass through Panama.

In the book The Struggle for Airways in Latin America by Burden (part of which is available on the internet) there is reference to the west coast route being a land route after an airport was set up at Cali in Colombia. Only the final Cali-Panama hop is shown on the maps as being over the sea.

Are you sure that:

1) Pan Am flew the west coast?

2) That Sikorski S-42s were used by either it or, more likely, Panagra on this route?

3) That the route was flown by seaplanes rather than landplanes?

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#90

Post by Sid Guttridge » 21 Jan 2009, 12:42

Hi Robdadb,

1) As I understand it, your proposed attack on Panama is additional to the Pearl Harbour attack and therefore poses an additional risk.

2) I accept that you have gone beyond the internet sources you link to the best primary source - NARA - and that you are in as good a position to know whether the spillway was defended or not. So, did it have a torpedo net?

3) I am sure the crews would have been trained to the highest standard, but if the aircraft itself was not an effective delivery platform then this might not be enough. Hence my question about the Mavis's actual torpedo-delivery record.

4) Ecuador had no airfield or aircraft on the Galapagos. If any airfield existed it would have been US. If the 22 November message on US defences indicates the Japanese thought that the US did have an airfield on the Galapagos, would this not inhibit the use of them as a base?

5) This is not a question of Japaneses courage and daring, but of practicalities. Would the Japanese have knowingly risked the Pearl Harbour attack by launching a subsidiary operation from somewhere they thought contained a US maritime reconnaissance air base?

6) I do, indeed, have a reasonable library on Latin America, (as my previous post might indicate), but if you continue to be so ill tempered, what is my insentive to be of assistance? You may may be foredooming yourself. At the moment I am contributing despite you, not because of you. Please lighten up. I have no dog in this fight. I am simply testing your hypotheses, which was what I thought you wanted. You must accept that in asking for your hypotheses to be tested there is a danger they may be tested to destruction, and that this can be done without malice.

7) Perhaps the Japanese could have found details of the spillway defences on request. Perhaps not. This is purely speculative. It is one of a large number of ahistorical dominos that have to fall exactly into place for this plan to work. Hence my reference to KISS.

8) Until you are certain there was no torpedo netting, this whole project is purely speculative. If the Japanese intelligence operatives find there was torpedo netting, what then? One has to get this potential obstacle out of the way right from the start.

9) So, the Japanese were warriors? How many non-productive banzai attacks did this attitude provoke? This proposed raid requires fine calculation and a lot of subtlety, not just blind courage. I have no doubt from the historical record that the Japanese could have found volunteers for even the most suicidal mission and had the nerve of command to launch them. That is not at issue here. It is the practicalities and the knock-on risks to the far more important Pearl Harbour attack that are. The Japanese were not mindlessly combative, particularly early in the war.

As a matter of interest, have you had a chance to check out their real contingency plans against the canal? (And before you ask, no I haven't, this is an open question.)

Cheers,

Sid.

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