Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

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Tim Smith
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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#91

Post by Tim Smith » 21 Jan 2009, 12:52

robdab wrote:Tim Smith, you wrote,

The Imperial Japanese Navy did NOT follow the KISS principle in WW2. Instead they had a penchant for creating vastly and needlessly over-complicated plans, divided their forces into many separate divisions with the intention of bringing them together in the operations area, were critically dependant on exact timing, ... -
and which worked brilliantly for the first 6 months of the Pacific War against Allied defenders constantly kept off-balance.
No, Imperial Japanese Navy strategy did NOT work brilliantly in the first six months of the Pacific War - only the Pearl Harbor Raid itself. The Japanese Navy then wasted time in the Indian Ocean and bungled both Coral Sea and Midway.

... and had no provision for anything not going completely as planned. -
Not true at all. Several of their island invasions changed beaches at the last minute, some after the leading troops were already ashore and Japanese victory, at minimal cost, still followed, relentlessly.
That is Imperial Japanese ARMY planning, not Imperial Japanese Navy planning. The Army had its own troopships, and planned its own invasions, by itself! The Navy only provided escort, shore bombardment, and air cover.

Witness the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway, and the Battle of Leyte Gulf. All had the above flaws. That's why the Japanese lost all three battles. -
Some would suggest that Japanese defeats only began after the onset of their version of "Victory Disease". They certainly did "kick Allied butt" in every single case (save Wake Island #1 which was quickly corrected by Wake Island #2) all across the Pacific Ocean for the first 6 months of the Pacific War.


No, the Japanese did not 'kick Allied butt' in every single case. The Philippines invasion took three months longer than planned and cost more casualties than anticipated. And that was against an enemy cut off from resupply, and with a great many poor quality troops (the new Philippino Army.) The Battle of Coral Sea was a strategic defeat because the invasion of Port Moresby had to be called off, thus the Japanese failed to conquer New Guinea.

So I would say the IJN would have loved this plan - the more complex the better, because complexity is supposed to confuse the simple-minded Americans, who would (in Japanese wargaming theory) react exactly as the Japanese expected, and bumble stupidly into every trap the Japanese laid for them. -
In it's own simple minded way I believe that this statement holds a great deal of truth wrt the Japanese OTL reality. It was only after the Japanese overran their initial strategic targets and began to improvise in their choises of the next set of strategic objectives, without proper "on the ground recon", without repeated wargaming and against Allied Forces that were finally beginning to "wake up", that defeat began to follow defeat for them. Once they no longer had the luxury of agents in place on the ground for months/years ahead of their attacks, such as they had in the OTL Panama, nor the time for numerous wargaming rehersals, then their shoestring attack planning efforts were no longer "good enough". IMO.
The Japanese often 'cheated' when running their wargames by disqualifying results they didn't like. See 'Shattered Sword' for the Midway example.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#92

Post by LWD » 21 Jan 2009, 13:08

If this is the target it's not an easy one.
google satellite map

*** edit to correct map url ***
Last edited by LWD on 22 Jan 2009, 05:09, edited 1 time in total.


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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#93

Post by robdab » 21 Jan 2009, 15:16

LWD,

If this is the target it's not an easy one.
http://maps.google.com/maps


Was there supposed to be an "on topic" point in your posting of a link to a map of North America ?

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#94

Post by robdab » 21 Jan 2009, 15:45

Tim Smith, you wrote,

No, Imperial Japanese Navy strategy did NOT work brilliantly in the first six months of the Pacific War - only the Pearl Harbor Raid itself. The Japanese Navy then wasted time in the Indian Ocean and bungled both Coral Sea and Midway. - Have you not yet noticed that the Japanese conquored more than a few bits of very important territory during that time period as well ?

That is Imperial Japanese ARMY planning, not Imperial Japanese Navy planning. The Army had its own troopships, and planned its own invasions, by itself! The Navy only provided escort, shore bombardment, and air cover. - I hadn't realized that we were down to "splitting hairs". I'd bet that the branch of service responsible didn't matter much to those killed during the Japanese conquests of all that territory.

No, the Japanese did not 'kick Allied butt' in every single case. The Philippines invasion took three months longer than planned and cost more casualties than anticipated. And that was against an enemy cut off from resupply, and with a great many poor quality troops (the new Philippino Army.) - The Japanese did still become the new owners of the PI, did they not ? That sounds like a win to me.

The Battle of Coral Sea was a strategic defeat because the invasion of Port Moresby had to be called off, thus the Japanese failed to conquer New Guinea. - I doubt that even the victory diseased Japanese planners expected to win every single battle. War is HELL afterall.

The Japanese often 'cheated' when running their wargames by disqualifying results they didn't like. See 'Shattered Sword' for the Midway example. - So ? That sure worked well for them before Pearl Harbor and not so well before Midway but the point is, by the very act of wargaming their attack plans, they were collecting the best advise/ideas possible from a wide spectrum of their most experienced military minds.

It is easy for you to "armchair quarterback" the Japanese strategic wartime decision making process with the full hindsight of 67 years but you need to remember that the Japanese of the day were doing it live, in realtime, with no "instant replay" feature being available.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#95

Post by Tim Smith » 21 Jan 2009, 16:13

robdab,

The Japanese did expect to 'win' Coral Sea. So much so, that they very nearly sent Kaga on her own instead of Shokaku and Zuikaku together for their covering force.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#96

Post by mescal » 21 Jan 2009, 16:31

Hello,

(regarding the link : I think that google maps breaks/does don recognize the link and centers the map at its default value.)

back on topic :

First, in my previous post, I forgot somewhere along the way that we were in the framework of ATL defined by glenn239's Oahu thread.

robdab wrote: I'd be interested in your response to Glenn239's point that the Japanese bombed the logistics warehouses of the US base at Cavite in the PIs.
These were indeed logistic targets, but, with the invasion just about to begin, they were also tactically useful targets. It's some kind f "almost direct" support to the landing, not an attack which will have far-reaching indirect effects as would the destruction of Oahu's tank farm or Panama Canal have.
I think it's Takao who wrote that in the japanese military doctrine "if it's not a gun, it's not a target" or something like that. I'm more along the line

robdab wrote:
And to the fact that the Japanese invaded and captured Hong Kong which had essentially no offensive weaponry located there. Sure, it was a valuable facility that might have have been used against Japan but then, so was the Panama Canal.
I think the capture of Hong Kong was far more an IJA demand than an IJN one, because it was mostly related to the war in China (and I know too little on the war in China to assess the value of Hong Kong).
What IJN can find here are facilities for her own use, and a convenient harbor on the South China Sea.



I think that Japan military leadersip often confused tactical and operationnal level as well as operationnal and strategic level in this war (and also strategy and grand strategy) ...
In a word, during at least the first part of the war, they always "thought one level too low", at least when compared to the USA.

to give a few examples :
* OTL PH was envisionned as an operational-level ('sink the bulk of the heavies there to prevent a counterstrike'), whereas it should have been envisioned as a strategic blow ('destroy the fighting capacity of the USN in the Pacific' -- hence the debate on the PH infrastructre and a "third wave" aimed at it )
[I know that Japan had not the resources to deal such a blow, but then they should have given up or looked for something different rather than keep a badly specified plan]
* the 'decisive battle' was an operational solution to a problem which was by nature strategic.
* Operation C (indian ocean raid) was done by IJN single operational offensive tool to fulfill mere tactical purpose
* they secured their raw material supply through a strategic planning, whereas such life-or-death problem should have been addressed by grand strategy.
* it's dangerous to go pump oil in the Dutch East Indies with an unbeaten foe on your flank
* tactical skill (of aircrew, ship commanders ...) were often substitute for clean operational planning
* the use of parts of Kido Butai for tactical purpose before their operational role is complete (Midway)
....

(on a sidenote, it's interesting to note that Germany made the same mistakes -- even if in 1940 Manstein's operational solution to a strategic problem worked to perfection)

But I think I'm moving off topic. There is a lot more to tell about it, and i'm not completely satisfied with my theorie on it, but I will probably open another topic as soon as I have a little more time.



Anyway, what I wanted to point is that Panama Raid was strategic in its mere design, whereas, whatever the intent, PH was operational. So in the OTL, what you get is some kind of monstrosity and ill-designed operation.
Now, IF we are in an attempt to invade Oahu, which then makes the PH operation really strategic, THEN the joint strike has much more meaning.

However, to make it really strategic, I would really prefer to commit Kido Butai as a whole, pounding all the infrastructure (locomotive, railways, dredges ...) and the warehouses where the materials for repairs were stocked.
But if it's not possible, a small invest cannot be too bad.
Olivier

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#97

Post by robdab » 21 Jan 2009, 16:37

Sid, in response to your micro-questioning,

Are you sure that: - On some mornings I'm not even sure of my own name.

1) Pan Am flew the west coast?
2) That Sikorski S-42s were used by either it or, more likely, Panagra on this route?
3) That the route was flown by seaplanes rather than landplanes?


In general terms:

Have you never heard of a civilian airline substituting in a replacement airplane in place of a regularly scheduled type sidelined for mechanical reasons ? Where would we be if every 767 that replaced a 757 for one "hop" got shotdown ?

Have you never heard of an airline adding an extra flight or two because there were more passengers or freight to be moved than was the usual case ?

Have you never travelled in Latin America and not noticed that rigid schedules are regularly attempted but only rarely achieved ? I'd doubt that it was any better in 1941, probably worse.

Do you really think that the average "man in the street" going about his life notices the types of the civilian airliners flying over his head, if he/she even notices the aircraft at all ?

Granted, a military aviator might, but on a peacetime Sunday afternoon is he very likely to question an aircraft type that he knows (thru his work) is flown by that civilian airline, at least close by ? In fact, for my ATL scenario this is probably a better situation in that a USAAF pilot who sees one of my fake "China Clippers" in the air would be less likely to recognize it as a fake (painted Mavis) if he was not used to seeing S-42s "up close and personal". He would probably have heard about the 4 engines on an overhead main wing and the twin vertical fin tail thru the "grapevine" at work but wouldn't be familiar with the more subtle differences. Thanks for pointing this one out.



Yet again you attempt to "micro-detail" objections to my ATL scenario where such is not likely appropriate.

When one looks at what happened in the OTL at Pearl Harbor, in comparison to the reports on the poor state of the US defences at Panama that I listed in my initial posting, a clear picture of the distressing lack of US peacetime preparedness becomes apparent. I see little that moves me to believe that the American defenders of Panama would respond in any better fashion to any warnings than did the OTL defenders of Oahu. My tiny ATL band of disguised Japanese attackers at Panama would be far less likely to provide numerous warnings, as the KB's hundreds of warplanes and the 5 IJN minisubs did before Pearl Harbor.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#98

Post by robdab » 21 Jan 2009, 16:44

Tim Smith,

The Japanese did expect to 'win' Coral Sea. So much so, that they very nearly sent Kaga on her own instead of Shokaku and Zuikaku together for their covering force.

In my experience almost no one goes to a gunfight if they expect to lose it, yet I believe that most would acknowledge that the possibility always exists, despite any of the measures that one takes to help ensure a victory. Shit happens.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#99

Post by phylo_roadking » 21 Jan 2009, 17:29

Are you sure that: - On some mornings I'm not even sure of my own name.

1) Pan Am flew the west coast?
2) That Sikorski S-42s were used by either it or, more likely, Panagra on this route?
3) That the route was flown by seaplanes rather than landplanes?

In general terms:

Have you never heard of a civilian airline substituting in a replacement airplane in place of a regularly scheduled type sidelined for mechanical reasons ? Where would we be if every 767 that replaced a 757 for one "hop" got shotdown ?

Have you never heard of an airline adding an extra flight or two because there were more passengers or freight to be moved than was the usual case ?

Have you never travelled in Latin America and not noticed that rigid schedules are regularly attempted but only rarely achieved ? I'd doubt that it was any better in 1941, probably worse.

Do you really think that the average "man in the street" going about his life notices the types of the civilian airliners flying over his head, if he/she even notices the aircraft at all ?

Granted, a military aviator might, but on a peacetime Sunday afternoon is he very likely to question an aircraft type that he knows (thru his work) is flown by that civilian airline, at least close by ? In fact, for my ATL scenario this is probably a better situation in that a USAAF pilot who sees one of my fake "China Clippers" in the air would be less likely to recognize it as a fake (painted Mavis) if he was not used to seeing S-42s "up close and personal". He would probably have heard about the 4 engines on an overhead main wing and the twin vertical fin tail thru the "grapevine" at work but wouldn't be familiar with the more subtle differences. Thanks for pointing this one out.
Exactly WHO had responsibility for regulating/controlling Panamanian airspace in 1941? Any civil authority....or the US military?

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#100

Post by robdab » 21 Jan 2009, 17:42

Sid Guttridge,

2) I accept that you have gone beyond the internet sources you link to the best primary source - NARA - and that you are in as good a position to know whether the spillway was defended or not. So, did it have a torpedo net? - No. In several cases I have posted information to the detriment of my ATL scenario, so do you really think me dishonest enough to compose, post and then defend an entire scenario if I already knew that it could not succeed ? What could possibly be the point in that ?

3) I am sure the crews would have been trained to the highest standard, but if the aircraft itself was not an effective delivery platform then this might not be enough. Hence my question about the Mavis's actual torpedo-delivery record. - I have already posted a URL that indicates that it was so used, though in that case, not successfully, against a moving naval target firing AA. On the afternoon of Dec.7'41 the Gatun Dam spillway would be doing neither.

4) Ecuador had no airfield or aircraft on the Galapagos. If any airfield existed it would have been US. If the 22 November message on US defences indicates the Japanese thought that the US did have an airfield on the Galapagos, would this not inhibit the use of them as a base ? - No. Were my ATL Panama attack to have been ordered I would suggest that the entire Galapagos group would have been thoroughly checked out some months before Nov.22'41. Visits by agents, a determined radio intercept effort, stops by passing Japanese merchant ships still trading with various South American nations and even IJN submarine recon (many carrried scouting floatplanes as I'm sure you know) would have ferreted out any sizeable airbase construction effort there well ahead of time.

5) This is not a question of Japaneses courage and daring, but of practicalities. Would the Japanese have knowingly risked the Pearl Harbour attack by launching a subsidiary operation from somewhere they thought contained a US maritime reconnaissance air base? - No. Please see my response to your #4 above.

6) I do, indeed, have a reasonable library on Latin America, (as my previous post might indicate), but if you continue to be so ill tempered, what is my insentive to be of assistance? You may may be foredooming yourself. At the moment I am contributing despite you, not because of you. Please lighten up. I have no dog in this fight. I am simply testing your hypotheses, which was what I thought you wanted. You must accept that in asking for your hypotheses to be tested there is a danger they may be tested to destruction, and that this can be done without malice. - Sorry if I appear "ill tempered" but I find your repeated failure to acknowledge solutions that I have provided to your questions to be very frustrating. If you were to provide say, an objection to the MAGIC intercepts that I referenced then we could discuss that issue but instead you still carried on with questions about the presence of anti-torpedo netting, as if I had not proven the presence of effective OTL Japanese agents on the ground in Panama.

There is no mention at all from you of my ATL "sightseeing recon flight" option either. 'Tis annoying, much like posting into a "black hole" and your points #7 and #8 below continue the trend.

7) Perhaps the Japanese could have found details of the spillway defences on request. Perhaps not. This is purely speculative. It is one of a large number of ahistorical dominos that have to fall exactly into place for this plan to work. Hence my reference to KISS. - Sigh.

8) Until you are certain there was no torpedo netting, this whole project is purely speculative. If the Japanese intelligence operatives find there was torpedo netting, what then? - If atn was discoverd prior to the "China Clipper" attack then I have already posted thumbnail details on a Galveston, Texas oil facility bombing raid option. If not discovered until during the torpedo drop run in then my ATL "China Clippers" pull out and return to Chitose in hope of finding a worthwhile American target for their torpedoes on another day, in another place.

Unless of course, one or more of the Mavis pilots decide that suicide dives into gatun Dam's spillway gates are a better solution.

One has to get this potential obstacle out of the way right from the start. - And I have already indicated exactly how my ATL Japanese could have easily done so using OTL Panama methods/resources. Why will you not acknowledge this ?

9) ... The Japanese were not mindlessly combative, particularly early in the war. - I don't believe that there is anything in my ATL Panama Canal attack proposal that suggests or requires that they were.

As a matter of interest, have you had a chance to check out their real contingency plans against the canal? (And before you ask, no I haven't, this is an open question.) - Do you refer to the 44/45 planned I-400s submarine mission or was there some other(s) that I am unaware of as of this date ?

From what I know of the details of the Panama Canal's lock constructions i cannot see a torpedo bomber attack on those lock gates as being very effective at all. Other than as a psycological blow that is. And so late in the war, I don't see that the Canal being slightly choked for a few weeks would matter much to the well rolling American war machine anyway.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#101

Post by robdab » 21 Jan 2009, 17:58

phylo_roadking, you asked,

Exactly WHO had responsibility for regulating/controlling Panamanian airspace in 1941 ? Any civil authority....or the US military?

A most relevant question that I have been attempting to find a good answer for. As best I can tell the Panamanians still technically held soveriegnty over their own air space but without radar installations it seems a mostly moot point. The USAAF did pretty much what it wanted over the Canal Zone and most of the rest of Panama too. Ongoing disputes over air control went on for years.

Since Sid owns a full copy of http://books.google.com/books?id=G3g0yj ... 0#PPR14,M1 then perhaps he can provide a better answer than I can at the moment ?

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#102

Post by phylo_roadking » 21 Jan 2009, 18:34

Not necessarily a moot point; if the Panamanian airspace and the Canal Zone was run as a military compound...then the USAAC is going to be more stringent about checking out-of-schedule flights and intruders. If anything, they're possibly going to be more rigorous about it as "live training", the way the RAF "exercised" against KLM and Lufthansa airliners in 1938 . A tropical posting with unlimited flying hours? A pilot's paradise lol
Last edited by phylo_roadking on 22 Jan 2009, 05:15, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#103

Post by glenn239 » 21 Jan 2009, 19:54

The Japanese often 'cheated' when running their wargames by disqualifying results they didn't like. See 'Shattered Sword' for the Midway example.
Shattered Sword had an axe to grind there, so their conclusions are suspect. Ukagi’s job was to use wargaming as an operational tool to evaluate the pros and cons of the tactical mission at Midway (something, BTW, that I don’t think the USN was doing at the time, so a progressive development in naval planning practices). Ukagi did not and was not intending to pass a verdict on the plan, only to use gaming techniques to identify potential weaknesses in it, so that these could be corrected ahead of time.

So, IMO, it was not unusual or unfortunate that Ukagi overrode elements of the games in order to keep the ‘evaluation’ program on track, so long as the Combined Fleet acted upon the weaknesses identified by gaming when implementing the actual tactical plan. That is were the ball was dropped, because Ukagi passed the buck to Nagumo’s command to come up with a fix to the problem of a flanking carrier force, and Nagumo promptly ignored him. Yamamoto was forced into what Ukagi considered to be a clunky solution (to hold ½ the bombers back for naval use), and Nagumo promptly ignored that instruction as well.
These were indeed logistic targets, but, with the invasion just about to begin, they were also tactically useful targets.
Practically the entire USN submarine fleet was armed and at sea, so the purpose in bombing Cavite on the 10th was to interdict USN logistics.
I think it's Takao who wrote that in the japanese military doctrine "if it's not a gun, it's not a target" or something like that.
Here the term “doctrine” is being used fairly loosely. The IJN was not so rigid or uniform in its approach as Takao suggests. For example, it would be impossible to argue that Nagumo and Ozawa were not focused on logistical targets in the Indian Ocean Raid when Nagumo was ordered to bomb dockyards, storage facilities and oil tanks as priorities and Ozawa’s entire mission was to find and sink merchant ships.
hence the debate on the PH infrastructre and a "third wave" aimed at it )
The confusion on the Japanese side was not doctrinal, it was in the division in authority when executing the plan. Yamamoto devised the strike and fully expected Nagumo to exploit surprise to deliver a crushing attack which would include heavy bombing of logistic targets. Nagumo, however, hated Yamamoto and had no intention of fulfilling his mission beyond the absolute minimal requirements.
Now, IF we are in an attempt to invade Oahu, which then makes the PH operation really strategic, THEN the joint strike has much more meaning.
If the Panama Canal was damaged, even for two or three weeks, it would have significantly increased the chances for an invasion of Hawaii undertaken in December/January 1941/42.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#104

Post by LWD » 22 Jan 2009, 05:08

robdab wrote:LWD,

If this is the target it's not an easy one.
http://maps.google.com/maps


Was there supposed to be an "on topic" point in your posting of a link to a map of North America ?
It was suppose to be a close up of the canal. I tried to edit out some HTML guess I got to much. Let's try again:
canal image I hope

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#105

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 22 Jan 2009, 05:40

That link & the same you posted on ConSimWorld crashed my internet link. I did pull up Google Earth and take a look that way.

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