Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

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Simon K
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Fleet Problem IX - January 1929

#121

Post by Simon K » 23 Jan 2009, 01:42

In January 1929 the U.S. Navy conducted a major exercise to the west and east of the Canal Zone. This was the first major exercise in which both sides used fleet carriers. The "Black" attacking side deployed Saratoga, and the "Blue" defending side, the Lexington. During these extensive exercises air operations against the Canal Zone were scenarioed.

The object of the attack was to establish the feasability of air attack on the locks of the Canal.

The Saratoga attacked from the Pacific side. 4 air groups were deployed, and attacked the Miroflores and Pedro Miguel locks. Umpires adjudged the attacks to be a success.

The Atlantic attack, upon the Gatun locks, was carried out by the seaplane tender, U.S.S.Aroostook. This was a last minute change to plans as the seaplane carrier Langley was unavailable. This proved later to be somewhat controversial, as the "Blue" side had not been informed of this change.

Launching a single seaplane from 150 miles, the aircraft achieved complete surprise and was adjudged to have destroyed the Gatun lock. The seaplane was not promptly assesessed as a threat by the defenses, and achieved a clear run.
Fleet Problem IX had less impact on the defence of the Panama Canal, which was the main focus of the operation. No changes were made in regard to coastal artillery, but AA defences did improve. During FP IX, fire from AA batteries had failed to defend the canal locks, but these must have been improved significantly because the AA defences were judged to have successfully defended canal installations in local exercises in 1933 save for the areas around Gatun. Following the 1933 exercises plans were laid for the installation of torpedo nets to protect Gatun spillways and locks in 1934. A shortage of materials with what to construct the nets allowed for a more thorough analysis of the nets, resulting in the conclusion that the nets proposed for the locks would be ineffective, because an aircraft could still drop a torpedo between the net and the locks, although the ones planned to protect the spillway were judged adequate and installed. It would appear that serious efforts to bolster other canal defences were not revived until 1939.
Memo to senior army members Joint Planning Committee 18/12/33 - Records of the Joint Board 1903 - 1947 "Torpedo Nets and boom in Gatun lake for defence of Panama Canal" Microfilm, reel 12, Joint Board serial 551. Cited in United States Navy fleet problems and the development of carrier aviation 1929 - 1933. Thesis by Ryan David Wadle 2005.

Thus from this evidence, it cannot be clearly established whether Gatun was adequately protected in 1941 with netting. The Spillway does appear to be protected however.
Last edited by Simon K on 23 Jan 2009, 10:03, edited 6 times in total.

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Re: Fleet problem IX - January 1929

#122

Post by robdab » 23 Jan 2009, 02:34

Simon K,

Thus from this evidence, it can not be clearly established whether Gatun was adequately protected in 1941 with netting. The Spillway does appear to be protected however.

Congratulations on presenting the first serious challenge to my ATL Panama Canal attack plan !

This development is indeed disturbing.

Good research work on your part.


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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#123

Post by Simon K » 23 Jan 2009, 02:46

Thanks for your generous response Robert.

However, the above flags up two issues

[*] Technical problems with the netting (?)

[*] A technique for avoiding the nets (for the locks) was already being discussed in 33.
Last edited by Simon K on 23 Jan 2009, 04:15, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#124

Post by phylo_roadking » 23 Jan 2009, 02:58

A technique for avoiding the nets (for the locks) was already being discussed in 33.
...by the DEFENDERS :wink:

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#125

Post by Simon K » 23 Jan 2009, 03:06

:)

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#126

Post by phylo_roadking » 23 Jan 2009, 04:13

Robert - if you go back to http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... s/ch12.htm ...and then read into the NEXT chapter, you'll find your question about airstrips on the Galapagos islands answered :wink:

Work didn't begin on a land strip until January 1942, and USAAF aircraft didn't start flying operations out of there until May 1942.

No runway for military aircraft on the Galapagos in your timeframe.

I'd suggest you take a look at USN movements of surface vessels in the Galapagos and Cocos islands in late 1941; it's quite clear the U.S. government was aware of both the risk of this islands, AND the advantages of having bases on them from 1938 when the first ground surveys were done. And from the comments in Chap13, I'd say the USN was regulary patrolling the area - as work began VERY soon after PH -
Less than a week after the attack, an advance unit of the Navy's base force was on its way to the Galapagos on a British steamer
That puts a permanent US military presence on the Galapagos a week or so after Pearl Harbour, closing off the use of the islands by Chitose and her escort group and giving you an end date for your proposed operational window.

As for you comments on AA cover at Gatun not reaching the middle of the lake - reading through Chap 12 there was a LOT of 3-inch AA in the Canal Zone - I can't see figures for very late 1941, but in 1940 at least, and the decision to add one 3-in gun to each battery, requiring 25 extra guns - that means AT LEAST 25 3-in AA batteries in the Canal Zone in 1940, and probably more by late 1941. And I would assume THESE would have no problem closing any blind spot compared to 20mm items...

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#127

Post by phylo_roadking » 23 Jan 2009, 04:41

However, I'm having problems with something; specifically, THIS -
Page #274 on http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/I/AAF-I-8.htmlprovides the assertion of: "The problems involved in providing a serviceable radar screen to alert the inner defenses of the Canal were less easily solved. Equipment in use at these stations was "inadequate" for early warning and "quite useless" for purposes of controlled interception. Sites had been selected for four British-type radars, the sets to be supplied from Canadian production, but improvement in equipment could not overcome deficiencies of operating personnel. Operators in Panama were largely untrained, had been given no indoctrination in the need for precision standards, and were frequently unenthusiastic about their assignment. Radar crews had made no effort to plot the permanent echoes in their search areas, and therefore could not discriminate between such "echoes" and "live" targets. The combination of inadequate equipment, poor site selection, and untrained operators produced such inefficiency that even the best station in Panama was "far below any acceptable standard of operational utility." The elimination of all the deficiencies noted depended on action by the War Department to provide improved equipment and better trained crews. No complete remedy was available to local commanders."
It doesn't provide any such assertion. ALL that Page 274 says is
...the Sault Sainte Marie canals, aircraft plants along both coasts, oil refineries off the coast of Venezuela, bauxite mines in the Guianas, and cryolite deposits--needed in making aluminum--at Ivigtut, Greenland. Military commanders, impressed with the damaged reputations which had been caused by Pearl Harbor, demanded large reinforcements to assure the safety of the area each was charged with defending.10 Had the War Department listened to all these pleas, the existing air force would have been dispersed in small and ineffective units, and the AAF would have been required to surrender any early hope of building an offensive force. A system of priorities was essential, and, because the chief fear was of further carrier raids by japan, initial air defense arrangements took the form of emergency reinforcements for Panama, Alaska, and the continental West Coast.11

A great deal of attention had been given before the war to the defense of the Panama Canal, and to a superficial observer this target might have appeared to be well defended in December 1941. [See above, pp. 160-66.] There were, to be sure, three pursuit groups and the equivalent of two bombardment groups on duty in or near the Canal Zone, and these units had in addition to obsolete equipment more than 100 reasonably modern airplanes.12 The appearance, however, was misleading, and the following fundamental weaknesses demanding immediate remedial measures: of the airplanes assigned, only one squadron of B-17's was capable of operating at high altitudes; only two ineffectual radar stations were available; neither the Army nor the Navy had enough planes to provide adequate offshore patrols; and aircraft bases were so concentrated that a surprise raid on two fields, situated only five miles apart, might have destroyed two-thirds of the tactical planes assigned to defend the canal.13

Officials in Washington were aware of the danger to the canal and gave priority to furnishing nine additional heavy bombers.14 Pursuit reinforcements were provided from within the Caribbean Defense Command by transferring twenty-five P-40's from Puerto Rice to the Canal Zone, a movement completed on 14 December.15 At the end of December eighty additional pursuit planes arrived in Panama from the United States.16 The critical need for aircraft warning instruments was eased by the arrival on 26 December of four mobile radar sets.17 Meantime, AAF officers in Panama had taken local measures to increase the readiness of their units. During December, planes were...
Can you please confirm where your very specific details on the deficiencies of the Canal Zone radar installations comes from, as it does not come from where you've said?

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#128

Post by robdab » 23 Jan 2009, 07:20

Simon K,

Thanks for your generous response Robert. Anytime. 'Twas well deserved. You dug deep on that one.

However, the above flags up two issues
[*] Technical problems with the netting (?)
[*] A technique for avoiding the nets (for the locks) was already being discussed in 33.[/b]

And a third.

Apparently installed in 1934 but was anti-torpedo netting still in place to protect the Gatun spillway in December of 1941, some 7 years later ? Although I readily admit that I am "reaching for salvation" with this one, page #336 of http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... S/ch13.htm indicates that, "antisubmarine and torpedo nets were placed in operation in front of the locks" only after an alert was received by General van Voorhis, the commander of the Panama Canal's defenses, in July of 1941. Mention of any 1941 netting at the Gatun spillway is conspicuously abscent.

"In December, 1940, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered the laying and tending of a net and boom defense at Cristobal, to prevent the enemy from entering the Atlantic side of the Panama Canal by submarine of surface craft." comes from http://www.navycthistory.com/NSGStationsHistory.txt but once again, the Gatun spillway is not mentioned.

"Two net depots were started in December [of 1940], one at each end of the Canal,..." comes from http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/Buildin ... es-18.html

I am mystified that my research at the NARA archives turned up no mention of any such Gatun netting at all. Granted, I didn't go back as far as 1934 but I did review the annual Canal Zone maintenance budgets back to 1938 and found no dollars allocated for net and net tender maintenance there, as did clearly show up in the budgets for the Pacific and Atlantic ends of the Canal, and in the Pearl Harbor budgets.

A puzzle to be solved during my next visit to NARA, hopefully later on this summer.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#129

Post by robdab » 23 Jan 2009, 07:34

phylo_roadking, you asked,

Can you please confirm where your very specific details on the deficiencies of the Canal Zone radar installations comes from, as it does not come from where you've said?

Trust me when I say that the problem that you have at the moment is nowhere near the magnitude of the one that I am trying to deal with right now. LOL.

Sorry for the misdirection but I find it interesting that you are the first to notice the error after all this time. It seems that most of my readers don't bother to check the listed sources ?

The quote provided comes from page #302 of the same source, not from page #274 as I had indicated. I had originally began to include that page #274 reference in my initial posting as it details US fighter aircraft arrival dates in Panama but then realized that the P-40s arrived well after Dec.7'41 and thus weren't relevant to the topic. I just forget to change 274 to 302 before hitting the submit key. Sorry about that.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#130

Post by robdab » 23 Jan 2009, 08:33

phylo_roadking,

No runway for military aircraft on the Galapagos in your timeframe. - Thanks for the reference but I believe that it was Sid who was speculating wrt the presence of Ecuadorian naval or airforce units on the Galapagos islands prior to Dec.7'41, not me.

I have been aware for that source for several years now. I have long known that no USAAF warplanes were based there until months after the PH attacks although I have often wondered if a USN PBY or two might have landed on the waters there for refueling in case of emergency ?

I'd suggest you take a look at USN movements of surface vessels in the Galapagos and Cocos islands in late 1941; it's quite clear the U.S. government was aware of both the risk of this islands, AND the advantages of having bases on them from 1938 when the first ground surveys were done. - There are mentions in the literature of the Americans being interested in acquiring the Galapagos as far back as 1908. Possibly earlier but I gave up looking at that point.

And from the comments in Chap13, I'd say the USN was regulary patrolling the area - as work began VERY soon after PH. Less than a week after the attack, an advance unit of the Navy's base force was on its way to the Galapagos on a British steamer.- I don't see how you can draw that conclusion at all from your referenced chapter #13 which provides on pages #339 - 342: ....... Securing the Pacific Approaches

During 1941, while the Caribbean theater was being organized, the Pacific approaches to the Canal were likewise being secured. Before the year was out, permission to build bases in the Galapagos Islands had been obtained from the government of Ecuador, negotiations for similar bases at Salinas, Ecuador, and Talara, Peru, were under way, and a squadron of Army bombers had begun operating from airfields in Guatemala. Thus a semicircle of defense similar to that provided by the Antilles was constructed in the Pacific.

The question of acquiring bases on the Galapagos Islands had made one of its periodic appearances at the beginning of the year. At that time the War Plans Division had taken the position that nothing should be done unless the President expressly directed it and unless an outright lease was obtained from the government of Ecuador. If these conditions were met, the War Plans Division agreed that assistance should be offered the Ecuador air force in return for use of a base in the Galapagos Islands.32 During the following weeks reports filtered in from South America that the government of Ecuador would not be averse to ceding a base on the islands to the United States.33 At this point, in the spring of 1941, the question was still considered primarily a matter for the Navy Department to act upon, just as it had been three years earlier. Although definitely related to the defense of Panama, a base in the Galapagos fell within the Navy's responsibility for offshore patrol. The Army was officially concerned only to the extent that the base would have to be defended.

Meanwhile, the question was being approached at a more oblique angle than naval or military, or even diplomatic, channels permitted. President Roosevelt knew the Galapagos Islands and recognized their strategic importance; but he was also alive to the undesirable repercussions that would follow any attempt of the United States to establish a base there. He made various proposals aimed at setting up some sort of collective protectorate over the islands, but nothing came of them. More promising were the activities of the Pacific Development Company. This was a corporation organized and headed by a retired naval officer and chartered in Delaware for the purpose of developing a concession on the largest of the Galapagos Islands. Having received a sweeping grant of authority from the Ecuadoran Government and a large loan from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Pacific Development Company entered into negotiations with the private owner of the island. President Roosevelt, who had been introduced to the project by his naval aide, Capt. Daniel J. Callaghan, apparently intended to use the company much as the Pan American Airways Corporation was being employed in the airport development program. The Navy Department, somewhat to the annoyance of Admiral Stark, thus had to deal with the Pacific Development Company for the facilities it desired.

Then a hitch occurred.

The man with whom the development company was negotiating owned only 10 percent of the necessary property, it now transpired, so that the lease for most of the land would have to be obtained from the Ecuadoran Government. At about the same time an account of the Pacific Development Company and its activities appeared in the column of a Washington journalist. Although the story was far from complete, it nevertheless served to draw aside the curtain of secrecy that was essential to the success of the company's negotiations.

While the matter of acquiring the land and providing the physical plant had been occupying the attention of the Pacific Development Company, the business of obtaining permission to make use of the islands and the territorial waters of Ecuador had been the subject of independent and direct negotiation between the State and Navy Departments on the one hand and the Ecuadoran Government on the other. More progress was made in this respect than by the development company. Before the company's negotiations reached a standstill, the Navy obtained permission to use the Galapagos Islands as a patrol base. The State Department thereupon began negotiating a formal agreement providing for the establishment of naval facilities and installations on the islands and a base on the mainland as well, in the vicinity of Salinas. Colonel Ridgway of the War Plans Division was informed of these developments by Capt. W.O. Spears, USN, on 16 October, during discussion of an Army staff study recommending that the War Department take active steps to acquire Aircraft Warning Service and landplane bases in the Galapagos. This study, advocating what was for the War Department a reversal of policy, had been drawn up in the War Plans Division and submitted to Captain Spears for comment. Now, informing Colonel Ridgway of the progress made in the negotiations for naval bases, Captain Spears offered the opinion that the Navy Department would be "very reluctant to consent to the diversion of any more materials . . . required by the establishment of additional bases." The naval bases, he thought, would suffice.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor intensified Ecuadoran fears for the safety of the islands and put an end to earlier objections by the State Department that a base agreement with Ecuador might offend Peru. Less than a week after the attack, an advance unit of the Navy's base force was on its way to the Galapagos on a British steamer.


This passage also confirms the pre-war activities of Pan-Am in beginning to establish a base for it's own air operations on the Galapogos, thus ensureing that my fake ATL "China Clippers" would not be a huge surprise to any USAAF pilot who might see one inbound into Panama from out over the Pacific.

However, nothing above would seem to indicate that the Americasn military was patrolling the Galapagos at all. In fact, any such American military presence might well have scuttled any talks underway with the Ecuadorians as such might be seen by them as a heavy handed US "pressure tactic".

That puts a permanent US military presence on the Galapagos a week or so after Pearl Harbour, closing off the use of the islands by Chitose and her escort group and giving you an end date for your proposed operational window. - I'd estimate an end date/time of about 0900 (Honolulu time) Dec.7'41 for any realisticly possible ATL Panama attack.

As for you comments on AA cover at Gatun not reaching the middle of the lake - reading through Chap 12 there was a LOT of 3-inch AA in the Canal Zone - I can't see figures for very late 1941, but in 1940 at least, and the decision to add one 3-in gun to each battery, requiring 25 extra guns - that means AT LEAST 25 3-in AA batteries in the Canal Zone in 1940, and probably more by late 1941. And I would assume THESE would have no problem closing any blind spot compared to 20mm items... - I would point out to you that the Canal Zone was about 50 miles long by 10 miles wide, giving an average AA density of 1 AA battery per 20 square miles. Hardly a strong AA defense. Granted, in reality those AA baterys were much more concentrated near to Canal facilties and to the forts and airbases of the US defenders of it. However, in the case of a fast surprise "China Clipper" torpedo attack, I would suggest that almost none of them would get the chance to even open fire before the 3 IJN air raiders were gone again.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#131

Post by Sid Guttridge » 23 Jan 2009, 15:27

Hi Robdab,

Firstly, regarding a point you make incorrectly to Phylo, no, it was not me who was speculating that the Galapagos might contain an Ecuadoran airfield. This was your introduction. I simply pointed out that one of your sources on 22/11/41 indicated that Japanese intelligence seemed to think that the US had an airfield there.

Ill temper and sarcasm doesn't hide the fact that you are not, by and large, addressing my objections and suggestions. In fact, they might indicate you don't want to face constructive criticism, which was what I rather thought you were after.

You must know the old line about "because of a horseshoe a battle was lost". You can resist my suggestions and objections all you want, but remember, this whole convoluted plan (and the Pearl Harbour attack) could be tripped up by just one elementary mistake, and it seems to contain several of them.

How true, "Not being able to find written proof of the Mavis's torpedo accuracy does NOT prove that the type wasn't able to always drop two torpedoes into a proverbial pickle barrel." But if this whole project is to be based on using the absence of evidence as a positive attribute, it is doomed.

Must go prematurely.

sid.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#132

Post by phylo_roadking » 23 Jan 2009, 16:35

And from the comments in Chap13, I'd say the USN was regulary patrolling the area - as work began VERY soon after PH. Less than a week after the attack, an advance unit of the Navy's base force was on its way to the Galapagos on a British steamer.- I don't see how you can draw that conclusion at all from your referenced chapter #13 which provides on pages #339 - 342
...because if you read Chap12 and the relevant sections Chap13 it's quite clear the US was aware of the threat potential to the western end of the Canal from at least 1938 onwards when they made the first official surveys for landing grounds in the Galapagos....and it doesn't say anything aboout having Ecuadoran permission to do so! :lol: Knowing how valuable the Galapagos and Cocos islands were to them AND any potential enemy, I think you're wishing too much negligence and blindness upon the USN not to patrol by air or sea.

I would counsel you at this point that you're missing possibly anything up to 50% of what you need to know about the defences of the Canal Zone and out into the Pacific - given that the title of http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... m#contents is GUARDING THE UNITED STATES AND ITS OUTPOSTS, CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, UNITED STATES ARMY, WASHINGTON, D.C., 2000 You need to find a similar comprehensive source from the U.S. Navy on its Central American and Pacific operations.
This passage also confirms the pre-war activities of Pan-Am in beginning to establish a base for it's own air operations on the Galapogos, thus ensureing that my fake ATL "China Clippers" would not be a huge surprise to any USAAF pilot who might see one inbound into Panama from out over the Pacific.
No, it confirms that PanAmerican were engaged by the government in developing a trans-Pacific route and fields for possible future military use just as in South America and Africa...that was to INCLUDE the Galapagos; however, reading the above nothing came of the Galapagos venture, especially if the US govt. then had to go to ANOTHER separate development company to even begin negotiations with the Ecuadorans. :wink:

Another profitable direction for research would be into the records of the predecessor of the Federal Aviation Authority - IIRC responsibility for civil avaiation moved about from agency to agency a few times in the 1930s and 1940s. I presume there would be some protocol for USAAC pilots challenging incoming unscheduled aircraft, sharing of radio frequencies, what happened if an unscheduled flight failed to contact ground stations etc. Everything I can see in Chap12 and 13 points to the Canal Zone being indeed a military compound with regard to the control of airspace and overflights. At this point, given the growing regulation of aviation begun in the Americas in the early 1930s, I wouldn't choose to interpret your not finding anything on procedures to date as confirmation of their abscence... :wink: You're perhaps looking in the wrong location if only looking at military sources. Look where civil and military aviation interface...
That puts a permanent US military presence on the Galapagos a week or so after Pearl Harbour, closing off the use of the islands by Chitose and her escort group and giving you an end date for your proposed operational window. - I'd estimate an end date/time of about 0900 (Honolulu time) Dec.7'41 for any realisticly possible ATL Panama attack.
Actually - no. I have a thread open somewhere on AHF about this from some time ago; the window REALLY closes once all U.S. commands in the Pacific theatre and Central America are informed both of events at Pearl harbour AND that the US is at war with the Empire of Japan. The actual window closes depending on when - relative to Washington - each command receives the order to put itself on a war footing "and govern yourself appropriately"...anything ELSE prior to that depends on what detail of events reaches them when, how reactive an OC is, what time zone it's in etc. IIRC there was one command in the Pacific theatre didn't receive word until 72 hours after Pearl.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#133

Post by robdab » 23 Jan 2009, 21:53

phylo_roadking,

And from the comments in Chap13, I'd say the USN was regulary patrolling the area - as work began VERY soon after PH. Less than a week after the attack, an advance unit of the Navy's base force was on its way to the Galapagos on a British steamer.- I don't see how you can draw that conclusion at all from your referenced chapter #13 which provides on pages #339 - 342 ...because if you read Chap12 and the relevant sections Chap13 it's quite clear the US was aware of the threat potential to the western end of the Canal from at least 1938 onwards when they made the first official surveys for landing grounds in the Galapagos....and it doesn't say anything aboout having Ecuadoran permission to do so! :lol: Knowing how valuable the Galapagos and Cocos islands were to them AND any potential enemy, I think you're wishing too much negligence and blindness upon the USN not to patrol by air or sea.

I am not disputing the clear fact that the Americans knew that the Galapagos (and Cocos & Clipperton) were very important to the defence of their Panama Canal, several decades before December 1941. Your problem is that all 3 were owned by other nations that the US wished in influence into aiding the Western Hemisphere's overall defences rather than alienating them via heavy handed "bully-boy" tactics. Discussions about USN/USAAF bases in the Galapagos had gone on for years, unsuccessfully from a US PoV.

Pan-Am was having success at building/using commercial air bases in many Latin American nations so why would the USN/USAAF "upset the whole applecart" by sending in unauthorized military flights and/or waships to intrude on Ecuadorian territory ? Nations fight wars over slights like that and I believe that such a move would greatly worry every other nation in the region withn Pan-Am bases already present.

If you feel so strongly that such did really occur then please, present your source(s) here for us all to read.

I would counsel you at this point that you're missing possibly anything up to 50% of what you need to know about the defences of the Canal Zone and out into the Pacific - given that the title of http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... m#contents is GUARDING THE UNITED STATES AND ITS OUTPOSTS, CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, UNITED STATES ARMY, WASHINGTON, D.C., 2000 You need to find a similar comprehensive source from the U.S. Navy on its Central American and Pacific operations. - Thank you for pointing out the obvious. Perhaps you can suggest just such an easily accessable (for all my other readers) treasure trove of roughly 70 year old information ? Or is this a case of the old expression, "Nothing is impossible for those that don't actually have to do the work !" ?
This passage also confirms the pre-war activities of Pan-Am in beginning to establish a base for it's own air operations on the Galapogos, thus ensureing that my fake ATL "China Clippers" would not be a huge surprise to any USAAF pilot who might see one inbound into Panama from out over the Pacific.
No, it confirms that PanAmerican were engaged by the government in developing a trans-Pacific route and fields for possible future military use just as in South America and Africa...that was to INCLUDE the Galapagos; however, reading the above nothing came of the Galapagos venture, especially if the US govt. then had to go to ANOTHER separate development company to even begin negotiations with the Ecuadorans. :wink: - Since you seem to be in need of further convincing, please consider,

"A different method of eliminating German aviation in Latin America was used in neighboring Ecuador. Though the German-owned local line in Ecuador, SEDTA, operated with only two obsolete transports as its "fleet," it provided an indispensable service to Ecuador's economy. When SEDTA in May 1940 applied for a permit to establish a service from the mainland to the Galápagos Islands, in which the United States had already indicated its strategic interest, the American government was moved to action. President Roosevelt in June authorized the loan of funds to Pan American-Grace Airways (Panagra), Pan American's associate, to enable it to establish a competing line. Panagra inaugurated its service in December 1940, with equipment and service superior to that provided by the German line. Nevertheless, SEDTA managed to operate a reduced service until Ecuador requisitioned its planes and property in September 1941. The Army contributed to the desired end not only by backing the Panagra line but also by establishing an ... "
--242--

Another profitable direction for research would be into the records of the predecessor of the Federal Aviation Authority - IIRC responsibility for civil avaiation moved about from agency to agency a few times in the 1930s and 1940s. I presume there would be some protocol for USAAC pilots challenging incoming unscheduled aircraft, sharing of radio frequencies, what happened if an unscheduled flight failed to contact ground stations etc. - I would not doubt that all of those procedures etc. existed in cloudy, rainy season Panama BUT if you don't have an effective working radar system nor an effective radio system in your pursuit aircraft, how will your USAAF intercepters even know that my 3 ATL attack aircraft are:

1. - incoming at all ?
2. - incoming where on which one of Panama's two long ocean coastlines or from over Costa Rica or from over Columbia ?
3. - heading in what direction (which certainly doesn't mean that they couldn't turn in another direction in 5 minutes) ?
4. - are unscheduled or just late due to a storm or unexpected headwinds ? Or early due to a lack of expected headwinds ?
5. - at what altitude and speed these "strangers" are cruising ? etc.

You ask much of the just 30 P-36 fighters assigned to the Panama Canal Department (PCD) at the time. Consider than some would be down for maintenance at any one time, some allocated to pilot training flights and that 20 of the 30 were assigned to the Atlantic/Caribbean coast and you will understand why I have a March 8'41 dated source which indicates that only two (2) US interceptors were assigned to be armed (with at least one .30 cal mg and 150 rounds of ammunition), fueled and ready for instant takeoff for the purposes of checking out civilian commercial flights. Of which some 90% at the time were being made by Pan-Am or related companies thru a rainy season cloudy sky.

Everything I can see in Chap12 and 13 points to the Canal Zone being indeed a military compound with regard to the control of airspace and overflights. At this point, given the growing regulation of aviation begun in the Americas in the early 1930s, - I haven't claimed otherwise. The USAAF had the freedom to do almost whatever it liked over the 500 square miles of the Zone. This is part of the problem faced by your USAAF defenders. The Canal Zone was only 10 miles wide so if my ATL attack planes approach by surprise from overland then they only have to cover , at most, 5 miles @ 150 mph before being over their torpedo targets. Can any USAAF pursuit planes intercept thru the cloud cover in just 2 minutes and will they recognize my fake "China Clipper" as a real threat to the Canal ? Or just think it a civilian flyingboat in mechanical distress looking for a big soft Lake (Gatun) to land in ? I'd suggest that any American pilot even lucky enough to sight one, just wouldn't instantly try to shootdown what appears to be a civilian airline flyingboat dropping down towards the Lake's surface in what would at first, appear to be a landing attempt.

I wouldn't choose to interpret your not finding anything on procedures to date as confirmation of their abscence... :wink: - I'm beginning to think that you are really Sid, posting in disguise ?

You're perhaps looking in the wrong location if only looking at military sources. Look where civil and military aviation interface... - I am well ahead of your advice but thanks anyway.

Actually - no. I have a thread open somewhere on AHF about this from some time ago; the window REALLY closes once all U.S. commands in the Pacific theatre and Central America are informed both of events at Pearl harbour AND that the US is at war with the Empire of Japan. The actual window closes depending on when - relative to Washington - each command receives the order to put itself on a war footing "and govern yourself appropriately"...anything ELSE prior to that depends on what detail of events reaches them when, how reactive an OC is, what time zone it's in etc. IIRC there was one command in the Pacific theatre didn't receive word until 72 hours after Pearl. - I hate to break the news to you but it doesn't matter at all what the US defenders think, feel or know. It is my ATL Japanese who decide when their "attack window" closes. Or doesn't if the Mavis aircrews are feeling particulary bold and/or suicidal that day.

I'd expect that my ATL Panama attackers would not have even been told about the planned OTL attack on Hawaii. They wouldn't need to know and so, couldn't somehow "spill the beans". All they would know was that the Emperor was personnaly watching their progress and that they were ordered to attack the Canal spillway gates at precisely 1300 (Panama time) on Dec.7'41. Slightly later was allowable but MUCH more dangerous to them. Even 1 minute earlier was NOT at all acceptable.

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phylo_roadking
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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#134

Post by phylo_roadking » 23 Jan 2009, 23:13

I am not disputing the clear fact that the Americans knew that the Galapagos (and Cocos & Clipperton) were very important to the defence of their Panama Canal, several decades before December 1941. Your problem is that all 3 were owned by other nations that the US wished in influence into aiding the Western Hemisphere's overall defences rather than alienating them via heavy handed "bully-boy" tactics. Discussions about USN/USAAF bases in the Galapagos had gone on for years, unsuccessfully from a US PoV.

Pan-Am was having success at building/using commercial air bases in many Latin American nations so why would the USN/USAAF "upset the whole applecart" by sending in unauthorized military flights and/or waships to intrude on Ecuadorian territory ? Nations fight wars over slights like that and I believe that such a move would greatly worry every other nation in the region withn Pan-Am bases already present.

If you feel so strongly that such did really occur then please, present your source(s) here for us all to read.
I have. One confirmed US military survey in the Galapagos islands in 1938, and no confirmation if its "by prior agreement".
No, it confirms that PanAmerican were engaged by the government in developing a trans-Pacific route and fields for possible future military use just as in South America and Africa...that was to INCLUDE the Galapagos; however, reading the above nothing came of the Galapagos venture, especially if the US govt. then had to go to ANOTHER separate development company to even begin negotiations with the Ecuadorans. :wink: - Since you seem to be in need of further convincing, please consider,

"A different method of eliminating German aviation in Latin America was used in neighboring Ecuador. Though the German-owned local line in Ecuador, SEDTA, operated with only two obsolete transports as its "fleet," it provided an indispensable service to Ecuador's economy. When SEDTA in May 1940 applied for a permit to establish a service from the mainland to the Galápagos Islands, in which the United States had already indicated its strategic interest, the American government was moved to action. President Roosevelt in June authorized the loan of funds to Pan American-Grace Airways (Panagra), Pan American's associate, to enable it to establish a competing line. Panagra inaugurated its service in December 1940, with equipment and service superior to that provided by the German line. Nevertheless, SEDTA managed to operate a reduced service until Ecuador requisitioned its planes and property in September 1941. The Army contributed to the desired end not only by backing the Panagra line but also by establishing an ... "
--242--
And all THAT does is say absolutely nothing about Pan-Am establishing facilities on the Galapagos - which was my point. I wasn't talking about, nor care, how Panagra established its services on continental South America...
- I would not doubt that all of those procedures etc. existed in cloudy, rainy season Panama BUT if you don't have an effective working radar system nor an effective radio system in your pursuit aircraft, how will your USAAF intercepters even know that my 3 ATL attack aircraft are:

1. - incoming at all ?
2. - incoming where on which one of Panama's two long ocean coastlines or from over Costa Rica or from over Columbia ?
3. - heading in what direction (which certainly doesn't mean that they couldn't turn in another direction in 5 minutes) ?
4. - are unscheduled or just late due to a storm or unexpected headwinds ? Or early due to a lack of expected headwinds ?
5. - at what altitude and speed these "strangers" are cruising ? etc.

You ask much of the just 30 P-36 fighters assigned to the Panama Canal Department (PCD) at the time. Consider than some would be down for maintenance at any one time, some allocated to pilot training flights and that 20 of the 30 were assigned to the Atlantic/Caribbean coast and you will understand why I have a March 8'41 dated source which indicates that only two (2) US interceptors were assigned to be armed (with at least one .30 cal mg and 150 rounds of ammunition), fueled and ready for instant takeoff for the purposes of checking out civilian commercial flights. Of which some 90% at the time were being made by Pan-Am or related companies thru a rainy season cloudy sky.
In exactly the SAME way as ANY other nation without VHF radio tasked aircraft during WWII - once the the fighters were tasked, either on the ground or immedaitely after take-off - it was up to the pilots to find and intercept once given approximate headings. In the era before RDF and VHF it's what pilots were trained to do. THAT was the advantage of the RAF system, for example - it removed the uncertainly in interception, for the pilots were constantly tied to to a sector control that had direct input from the RDF and ROC data at Group level. Do you actually know WHY VHF was far more useful to the task than HF?

As for where the bogies are coming from...prior to Pearl Harbour there were as you know only TWO SCR-217 fixed radars in the Canal Zone, with the Pacific end one being in Fort Hudson on Taboga Island...and as far as I know the 270/271 wasn't omnidirectional...If they appear onscreen at Fort Hudson, they'll be incoming.
Equipment in use at these stations was "inadequate" for early warning and "quite useless" for purposes of controlled interception
The "quite useless" refers as far as I can see to the lack of VHF kit, the "inadequate" refers to the lack of TOTAL coverage - and your quote isn't correct anywhay THREE more sets were on order, to be paid for out of FY 1941 budget - not four.
4. - are unscheduled or just late due to a storm or unexpected headwinds ? Or early due to a lack of expected headwinds ?
Robert - commercial airlines do NOT land at airfields or enter a ground control zone without announcing their presence and requesting PERMISSION to land. They do not enter military control zones without reporting in - or they are aware they will be inspected. Airliners of any size or shape are in constant contact with the ground once they come within radio range, and NOT contacting is liable to have them checked out.

For the purposes of your deception plan you would be better checking if there even WERE any commercial flights across the Canal Zone during the period. Did they or did they not fly fixed routes or air corridors, and what would happen if they didn't/ Were there any commercial services into ANY airfield close to or in the Canal Zone? Once the Federal procedures started coming in in the 1930s, even the respected Pan-Am did not fly willy-nilly around the place, they were OBLIGED to report their presence to ground control wherever they were - to report when they leave one ground control's are of responsibility and "handshake" when they enter the next. And Federal procedures and legislation WILL have applied in the Canal Zone, not Panamanian ones.
I hate to break the news to you but it doesn't matter at all what the US defenders think, feel or know. It is my ATL Japanese who decide when their "attack window" closes. Or doesn't if the Mavis aircrews are feeling particulary bold and/or suicidal that day.
Wrong. It depends in the state of readiness and alert status of the Canal Zone garrison :wink: Remember the War Scare of 1940 in the Canal Zone; once they hear even one peep of sopmething happening at hawaii the Canal Zone will go onto full alert.
and you will understand why I have a March 8'41 dated source which indicates that only two (2) US interceptors were assigned to be armed (with at least one .30 cal mg and 150 rounds of ammunition), fueled and ready for instant takeoff for the purposes of checking out civilian commercial flights
Why haven't you posted it here, given that its pertinent? By the way, that is exactly what I'd expect to be done in the abscence of VHF radios for ground vectoring (see above). I'd be very interested to see if it says "two (2)" or "only two (2)" - as you may be interpreting the "two (2)" instruction as a maximum rather than the minimum...which would make more sense. It also would of course indicate that the Canal Zone garrison WAS ready to intercept and identify incoming bogies that didn't get into radio contact.
You ask much of the just 30 P-36 fighters
You ask too little of the P-39 fighters stationed there, as per Chap 12; there's quite a difference. The P-36s had indeed been relegated to the training aircraft pool at Albrook Field.
Can any USAAF pursuit planes intercept thru the cloud cover in just 2 minutes and will they recognize my fake "China Clipper" as a real threat to the Canal ? Or just think it a civilian flyingboat in mechanical distress looking for a big soft Lake (Gatun) to land in ?
At which point they will instruct them on Pan-Am's fixed HF frequency to approach the lake from Direction X...or by hand signal instruct them to follow them, and once they either fail to acknowledge, fail to change course, or change course to a visible attack run - they'll bring them down. Given that if in the absecence of radio contact, they'll approach close enough to inspect for damage - and be somewhat suprised by the torpedoes...
Granted, in reality those AA baterys were much more concentrated near to Canal facilties and to the forts and airbases of the US defenders of it.
...like for instance the US Naval communications centre beside Gatun Lake, the ruins of which are today a stop on tourist excursions to the Gatun Lake wildlife reserve? Or the Army's 310th General Hospital that overlooked the Lake?

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#135

Post by phylo_roadking » 24 Jan 2009, 02:09

As for the attack idea itself - I'm STILL scratching my head over the efficacy of it. Even with the lake at its normal level the spillway gates are only holding back 16ft of water. The maximum draught of a ship in the canal was 44ft. This means even if the spillway gates are compromised and the entire lake drains down to the bottom of the gates (which would take quite some time) ships of up to 28 foot draught could still use the canal! That includes almost all of the world’s merchant ships and Yorktown class aircraft carrier at full load! Even US battleships could still transit if they first offloaded a good deal of fuel, most standards as they stood in 1941 drew about 30-32 feet loaded. At worst this would add a day to transit for defueling and refueling on the other end.

In short the canal would not be closed at all. The only limitation would be with less water stored, transits could not be sustained at a high rate. That would affect merchant shipping, but certainly not warship transits. However - releasing water from the Madden dam could be used to help make up the difference anyway, this was the whole point of building that dam, and in the wet season Panama got so much rain you’d hardly notice the loss…. This was after all the whole reason for building such a big spillway 8O

Regarding the actual damage a torpedo would do to the spillway gates...because the gates are so thin, they won't offer much resistance to a torpedo explosion.. and thus will take LESS damage than the side of a battleship (even the outer skin of a battleship is thicker, let alone the inner hull ect...) because the blast partly vents to the empty air through any hole it punches. Not that it matters anyway, its just some sliding steel plates. Once the water drops you can move a boat right up and get to work welding. Or if the worst comes to the aorst...bring up the dredgers from the Dredging Division at Gamboa and simply build a berm across the punctured gates, and use the others to regulate the level :wink: Same as the Germans did at St.Nazaire instead of bothering to repair the gates of the Normadie Dock.

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Something ELSE that reduces the efficacy of the planned attack...there were actually TWELVE spillway gates in 1941 (by counting the spillway channels); so that's three aircraft with two torpedos each...six torpedos. Even if ALL the torpedos manage to impact a SEPARATE spillway gate at the top of Gatun Dam - which means three different attack runs from three different directions...that's only HALF of the gates punctured - which of course reduces greatly the rate of loss of water down even to the 16-foot level mentioned above. As the weapons weren't in ANY way guided, factor in weapons hitting the reinforced-concrete uprights, or two weapons hitting the SAME gate...and the possible damage any such attack could do is reduced even further.
Last edited by phylo_roadking on 24 Jan 2009, 03:58, edited 4 times in total.

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