I am not disputing the clear fact that the Americans knew that the Galapagos (and Cocos & Clipperton) were very important to the defence of their Panama Canal, several decades before December 1941. Your problem is that all 3 were owned by other nations that the US wished in influence into aiding the Western Hemisphere's overall defences rather than alienating them via heavy handed "bully-boy" tactics. Discussions about USN/USAAF bases in the Galapagos had gone on for years, unsuccessfully from a US PoV.
Pan-Am was having success at building/using commercial air bases in many Latin American nations so why would the USN/USAAF "upset the whole applecart" by sending in unauthorized military flights and/or waships to intrude on Ecuadorian territory ? Nations fight wars over slights like that and I believe that such a move would greatly worry every other nation in the region withn Pan-Am bases already present.
If you feel so strongly that such did really occur then please, present your source(s) here for us all to read.
I have. One confirmed US military survey in the Galapagos islands in 1938,
and no confirmation if its "by prior agreement".
No, it confirms that PanAmerican were engaged by the government in developing a trans-Pacific route and fields for possible future military use just as in South America and Africa...that was to INCLUDE the Galapagos; however, reading the above nothing came of the Galapagos venture, especially if the US govt. then had to go to ANOTHER separate development company to even begin negotiations with the Ecuadorans. - Since you seem to be in need of further convincing, please consider,
"A different method of eliminating German aviation in Latin America was used in neighboring Ecuador. Though the German-owned local line in Ecuador, SEDTA, operated with only two obsolete transports as its "fleet," it provided an indispensable service to Ecuador's economy. When SEDTA in May 1940 applied for a permit to establish a service from the mainland to the Galápagos Islands, in which the United States had already indicated its strategic interest, the American government was moved to action. President Roosevelt in June authorized the loan of funds to Pan American-Grace Airways (Panagra), Pan American's associate, to enable it to establish a competing line. Panagra inaugurated its service in December 1940, with equipment and service superior to that provided by the German line. Nevertheless, SEDTA managed to operate a reduced service until Ecuador requisitioned its planes and property in September 1941. The Army contributed to the desired end not only by backing the Panagra line but also by establishing an ... "
--242--
And all THAT does is say
absolutely nothing about Pan-Am establishing facilities on the Galapagos - which was my point. I wasn't talking about, nor care, how Panagra established its services
on continental South America...
- I would not doubt that all of those procedures etc. existed in cloudy, rainy season Panama BUT if you don't have an effective working radar system nor an effective radio system in your pursuit aircraft, how will your USAAF intercepters even know that my 3 ATL attack aircraft are:
1. - incoming at all ?
2. - incoming where on which one of Panama's two long ocean coastlines or from over Costa Rica or from over Columbia ?
3. - heading in what direction (which certainly doesn't mean that they couldn't turn in another direction in 5 minutes) ?
4. - are unscheduled or just late due to a storm or unexpected headwinds ? Or early due to a lack of expected headwinds ?
5. - at what altitude and speed these "strangers" are cruising ? etc.
You ask much of the just 30 P-36 fighters assigned to the Panama Canal Department (PCD) at the time. Consider than some would be down for maintenance at any one time, some allocated to pilot training flights and that 20 of the 30 were assigned to the Atlantic/Caribbean coast and you will understand why I have a March 8'41 dated source which indicates that only two (2) US interceptors were assigned to be armed (with at least one .30 cal mg and 150 rounds of ammunition), fueled and ready for instant takeoff for the purposes of checking out civilian commercial flights. Of which some 90% at the time were being made by Pan-Am or related companies thru a rainy season cloudy sky.
In exactly the SAME way as ANY other nation
without VHF radio tasked aircraft during WWII - once the the fighters were tasked, either on the ground or immedaitely after take-off -
it was up to the pilots to find and intercept once given approximate headings. In the era before RDF and VHF it's what pilots were trained to do. THAT was the advantage of the RAF system, for example -
it removed the uncertainly in interception, for the pilots were constantly tied to to a sector control that had direct input from the RDF and ROC data at Group level. Do you actually know WHY VHF was far more useful to the task than HF?
As for where the bogies are coming from...prior to Pearl Harbour there were as you know only TWO SCR-217 fixed radars in the Canal Zone, with the Pacific end one being in Fort Hudson on Taboga Island...and as far as I know the 270/271 wasn't omnidirectional...If they appear onscreen at Fort Hudson, they'll be incoming.
Equipment in use at these stations was "inadequate" for early warning and "quite useless" for purposes of controlled interception
The "quite useless" refers as far as I can see to the lack of VHF kit, the "inadequate" refers to the lack of TOTAL coverage - and your quote isn't correct anywhay THREE more sets were on order, to be paid for out of FY 1941 budget - not four.
4. - are unscheduled or just late due to a storm or unexpected headwinds ? Or early due to a lack of expected headwinds ?
Robert - commercial airlines do NOT land at airfields or enter a ground control zone without announcing their presence and requesting PERMISSION to land. They do not enter military control zones without reporting in - or they are aware they will be inspected. Airliners of
any size or shape are in constant contact with the ground once they come within radio range, and NOT contacting is liable to have them checked out.
For the purposes of your deception plan you would be better checking if there even WERE any commercial flights across the Canal Zone during the period. Did they or did they not fly fixed routes or air corridors, and what would happen if they didn't/ Were there any
commercial services into ANY airfield close to or in the Canal Zone? Once the Federal procedures started coming in in the 1930s, even the respected Pan-Am did not fly willy-nilly around the place, they were OBLIGED to report their presence to ground control wherever they were - to report when they leave one ground control's are of responsibility and "handshake" when they enter the next. And Federal procedures and legislation WILL have applied in the Canal Zone, not Panamanian ones.
I hate to break the news to you but it doesn't matter at all what the US defenders think, feel or know. It is my ATL Japanese who decide when their "attack window" closes. Or doesn't if the Mavis aircrews are feeling particulary bold and/or suicidal that day.
Wrong. It depends in the state of readiness and alert status of the Canal Zone garrison
Remember the War Scare of 1940 in the Canal Zone; once they hear even one peep of sopmething happening at hawaii the Canal Zone will go onto full alert.
and you will understand why I have a March 8'41 dated source which indicates that only two (2) US interceptors were assigned to be armed (with at least one .30 cal mg and 150 rounds of ammunition), fueled and ready for instant takeoff for the purposes of checking out civilian commercial flights
Why haven't you posted it here, given that its pertinent? By the way, that is exactly what I'd expect to be done in the abscence of VHF radios for ground vectoring (see above). I'd be very interested to see if it says "two (2)" or "
only two (2)" - as you may be interpreting the "two (2)" instruction as a maximum rather than the
minimum...which would make more sense. It also would of course indicate that the Canal Zone garrison WAS ready to intercept and identify incoming bogies that didn't get into radio contact.
You ask much of the just 30 P-36 fighters
You ask too little of the P-
39 fighters stationed there, as per Chap 12; there's quite a difference. The P-36s had indeed been relegated to the
training aircraft pool at Albrook Field.
Can any USAAF pursuit planes intercept thru the cloud cover in just 2 minutes and will they recognize my fake "China Clipper" as a real threat to the Canal ? Or just think it a civilian flyingboat in mechanical distress looking for a big soft Lake (Gatun) to land in ?
At which point they will instruct them on Pan-Am's fixed HF frequency to approach the lake from Direction X...or by hand signal instruct them to follow them, and once they either fail to acknowledge, fail to change course, or change course to a visible attack run - they'll bring them down. Given that if in the absecence of radio contact, they'll approach close enough to inspect for damage - and be somewhat suprised by the torpedoes...
Granted, in reality those AA baterys were much more concentrated near to Canal facilties and to the forts and airbases of the US defenders of it.
...like for instance the US
Naval communications centre beside Gatun Lake, the ruins of which are today a stop on tourist excursions to the Gatun Lake wildlife reserve? Or the Army's 310th General Hospital that overlooked the Lake?