Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#136

Post by phylo_roadking » 24 Jan 2009, 02:38

P.S. .....

Have you considered the impact (sic) of one or more of the Mavis' flying into the counter-air cables strung between the hill tops after 1938 on the approaches to the dams? A number of US planes fell victim to them before the war...

And it appears there WERE torpedo nets, possibly upgraded and paid for as part of the program of emergency "closure" which had been designed by the late 1930s to replace the old pre-1920s system. It was called SIP 7 (Special Improvement Project-7). These were emergency closure doors which could be raised in seconds using electric-hydraulic pumps, or in minutes using hand levers on the same hydraulic pumps if the local power plants were knocked out; because of the fear of Axis sabotage by scuttling a ship, exploding one in the locks, bombing, or air-torpedo attack plans had been made for emergency closure of each lock and had anti-torpedo netting installed between each lock. As I understand the way the system worked with the net was it lowered when and by the power of the lock opening, and raised behind the ship when it cleared each lock. So that protects the locks themselves.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#137

Post by phylo_roadking » 24 Jan 2009, 03:47

As for the location of the Canal Zone's AA defences in December 1941...from May 1941 -

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/artic ... -1,00.html
On Gatun Lake, in the Panama Canal Zone, floats a little fleet of motorboats. They are blue-grey, stubby, old—so old, some of them, that they are kept lake-worthy mainly by the heroic ingenuity of their soldier crews. The soldiers who run the boats call them the third-ocean fleet. They are the supply boats of one of the finest, least-known outfits in the U.S. Army: the Panama Coast Artillery Command.

Each day, from docks along the lakeside, the stubby boats chutter off with men and supplies for the listening posts, anti-aircraft gun batteries, searchlight positions which stud the green, hot hills around the lake.


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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#138

Post by phylo_roadking » 24 Jan 2009, 03:56

And finally, the answer to what approach line any torpedo run would have to take...

http://www.czimages.com/CZMemories/Photos/photoof20.htm

Look what is BEHIND the Gatun spillway gates. Any attacking aircraft don't have any option but to drop their torpedos directly at the centre of the arc of spillway gates, for the shape of the shoreline doesn't allow them any other angles of attack 8O To get at the gates on either side of centre means an attacking aircraft is dropping its torpedos at an oblique angle to them - reducing the size of the target.

So this means repeated strikes on the centre gates. Which means a much reduced speed of water loss if punctured..

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#139

Post by phylo_roadking » 24 Jan 2009, 04:06

http://www.czimages.com/CZMemories/Lifemag/lmindex.htm

...and unfortunately the USAAF wasn't restricted to the airspace OVER the Canal Zone; as of March 1941 the USAAF had overfly rights into Panamanian airspce.

http://www.czimages.com/CZMemories/Phot ... oof498.htm

Do you notice anything about this picture?

The Coco Solo NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS Air base...Robert, I think you need to chase down more detail on the naval defences and establishment in the Canal Zone; obviously the Army and USAAC is only part of the defence story.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#140

Post by Alaric » 24 Jan 2009, 05:28

LWD wrote:
Alaric wrote: ...BTW Sid, weren't you the guy that totally derailed a fascinating thread about U-boat landings in southern Argentina circa July 1945 with this same kind of obtuse questioning of every single detail?
It's hardly derailing when one refutes or brings into question "every single detail" of what is pretty clearly a conspiracy theory.
Despite the prediliction of yourself and others who think that most every thing that happens is a coincidence or an accident (doesn't that make you "Coincidence Theorists"?) that thread was fact based by a South American based poster who clearly did his homework and some thorough research. Your refusal to recognize or admit to something outside your narrow view doesn't change that.
I note that while you did find when the fields were built you did not refute that the Japanese may have believed that there was a field there.
I have not tried to research Japanese records which may or may not exist in some dusty archive in Tokyo or wherever; so I do not know what the IJN or the general staff may have or may not have believed about an airfield in the Galapagos. And neither do you or Sid; so there is nothing to "refute". What I do know as fact is that there was no such airfield in the Galapagos Islands, and any intelligence operative worth his salt in either Panama or Ecuador would know if there was construction started on such a base (which would have required tacit approval of the Eduadoran government, given after Pearl Harbor although never formalized in writing). Such an operative in Ecuador could have hired a boat or gone out with local Japanese fishermen to scout the area for himself to make such a determination. A Japanese mission to carry out robdab's ATL attack could have dispatched one of it's 3 submarines to scout the area for any aircraft as could a two-seat floatplane lauched from Chitose. It just wouldn't be that difficult to make a determination.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#141

Post by robdab » 24 Jan 2009, 08:00

phylo_roadking,

If you feel so strongly that such did really occur then please, present your source(s) here for us all to read. - I have. One confirmed US military survey in the Galapagos islands in 1938, and no confirmation if its "by prior agreement".

And what is the source of this statement ?

How is it that you feel that a 1938 survey of something (unknown to me at this point in time) in the Galapagoes proves that the US military was regularly checking that area by ship and aircraft ? I don't yet see the same connection that you seem to ?

And all THAT does is say absolutely nothing about Pan-Am establishing facilities on the Galapagos - which was my point. I wasn't talking about, nor care, how Panagra established its services on continental South America... - I thought that it was quite clear ... "When SEDTA in May 1940 applied for a permit to establish a service from the mainland to the Galápagos Islands, in which the United States had already indicated its strategic interest, the American government was moved to action. President Roosevelt in June authorized the loan of funds to Pan American-Grace Airways (Panagra), Pan American's associate, to enable it to establish a competing line. Panagra inaugurated its service in December 1940, with equipment and service superior to that provided by the German line."

Do you not agree that this passage proves that Panagra aircraft were operating a regularly scheduled service to the Galapagos in head-to-head competiotion with SEDTA ?

As for where the bogies are coming from...prior to Pearl Harbour there were as you know only TWO SCR-217 fixed radars in the Canal Zone, with the Pacific end one being in Fort Hudson on Taboga Island...and as far as I know the 270/271 wasn't omnidirectional...If they appear onscreen at Fort Hudson, they'll be incoming. - IF they appear onscreen, remains the question. If you'll remember, my initial posting contained:

1. - "In General Andrews' opinion, the commandant of the naval district did not have enough planes or vessels under his control to conduct an adequate reconnaissance. The Aircraft Warning Service in the theater, he reported, was totally inadequate in personnel to supervise the installation of detectors on hand as well as to man the equipment when installed. Only two radar detectors were installed and in operation in the Panama Canal Department."

2. -"The problems involved in providing a serviceable radar screen to alert the inner defenses of the Canal were less easily solved. Equipment in use at these stations was "inadequate" for early warning and "quite useless" for purposes of controlled interception. Sites had been selected for four British-type radars, the sets to be supplied from Canadian production, but improvement in equipment could not overcome deficiencies of operating personnel. Operators in Panama were largely untrained, had been given no indoctrination in the need for precision standards, and were frequently unenthusiastic about their assignment. Radar crews had made no effort to plot the permanent echoes in their search areas, and therefore could not discriminate between such "echoes" and "live" targets. The combination of inadequate equipment, poor site selection, and untrained operators produced such inefficiency that even the best station in Panama was "far below any acceptable standard of operational utility." The elimination of all the deficiencies noted depended on action by the War Department to provide improved equipment and better trained crews. No complete remedy was available to local commanders."

3. - "There were nevertheless certain deficiencies which were not entirely the result of a shortage of equipment and trained men. Tests in Panama repeatedly disclosed that low-flying planes approaching directly over the Bay of Panama were not detected by the radar system. Visiting British experts had noted this characteristic in American sets and attributed it to a basic defect of the equipment, but the Signal Corps insisted that, properly placed and operated by competent crews, the American equipment in this respect was just as good as, if not better than, the British radar. Whatever the cause, the blind spot remained. Furthermore, neither the SCR-270 nor the SCR-271 was designed to show the elevation of the approaching plane, and neither gave a continuous tracking plot. These qualities were indispensable for ground-controlled interception (GCI), which British experience had demonstrated to be the most successful method for conducting an air defense."

What points within the 3 quotes just above inspire you to believe that the American radar on Panama was at all likely to actually pick up (and recognize) my 3 seperately inbound ATL "China Clipper" attackers and actually vector any US interceptors out to visually inspect them ? Just as happened on Oahu, these US radars had no IFF system fitted so EACH and EVERY radar contact was a potential enemy and would need to be checked out. What are the odds of that happening do you think ?
Equipment in use at these stations was "inadequate" for early warning and "quite useless" for purposes of controlled interception
The "quite useless" refers as far as I can see to the lack of VHF kit, the "inadequate" refers to the lack of TOTAL coverage - and your quote isn't correct anywhay THREE more sets were on order, to be paid for out of FY 1941 budget - not four.

If your were to review your analysis of "inadequate" and "quite useless" in the context of the full quote once again provided in point #2 above, I think it becomes quite clear that the author would not agree with your imaginings.

Robert - commercial airlines do NOT land at airfields or enter a ground control zone without announcing their presence and requesting PERMISSION to land. They do not enter military control zones without reporting in - or they are aware they will be inspected. Airliners of any size or shape are in constant contact with the ground once they come within radio range, and NOT contacting is liable to have them checked out. - My ATL fake "China Clippers" are NOT commercial airliners though. The last thing that they would try to do is follow airliner procedures. They are afterall trying hard to sneak into and thru Panamanian airspace. With cloud cover, few radio equipped US fighters in the air for the size of the country and radar that even the USAAF admits was "quite useless" for interception purposes. Just how is it that you feel that those USAAF interceptors are actually going to find my 3 Mavis in the clouds ?

For the purposes of your deception plan you would be better checking if there even WERE any commercial flights across the Canal Zone during the period. - I've already posted the URL to a 1938 source that indicates that there were such. Please try to keep up.

Did they or did they not fly fixed routes or air corridors, and what would happen if they didn't/ Were there any commercial services into ANY airfield close to or in the Canal Zone? - There were indeed but this not relevant to my ATL scenario in that AFAIK the S-42 was a "water lander" only. A carriage could be fitted so they could lumber up out of the water but wheels were not a normal part of their fitted equippment.

Once the Federal procedures started coming in in the 1930s, even the respected Pan-Am did not fly willy-nilly around the place, they were OBLIGED to report their presence to ground control wherever they were - to report when they leave one ground control's are of responsibility and "handshake" when they enter the next. And Federal procedures and legislation WILL have applied in the Canal Zone, not Panamanian ones. - And what in god's name makes you think that my ATL Japanese would give a proverbial "rat's ass" about American airline regulations ? Give your head a shake man. What makes you think that the Americans/Panamanians would even know that regulations were being broken, let alone that they could identify what aircraft were doing so or even find them ? Panama's two lone radar installations were admitted crap.

I hate to break the news to you but it doesn't matter at all what the US defenders think, feel or know. It is my ATL Japanese who decide when their "attack window" closes. Or doesn't if the Mavis aircrews are feeling particulary bold and/or suicidal that day. - Wrong. It depends in the state of readiness and alert status of the Canal Zone garrison :wink: Remember the War Scare of 1940 in the Canal Zone; once they hear even one peep of something happening at hawaii the Canal Zone will go onto full alert. - Considering the abysmal state of the Panama Canal's defences as described in my initial posting, just how is this going to matter much ? IIRC the same War Warning that went to Pearl Harbor on Novemebr 27'41 was also sent to Panama and all other American installations around the Pacific.

We know how poorly that helped out for the Americans defending Oahu so please tell me how/why you think that Panama's defenders were going to put on a better effort ?
and you will understand why I have a March 8'41 dated source which indicates that only two (2) US interceptors were assigned to be armed (with at least one .30 cal mg and 150 rounds of ammunition), fueled and ready for instant takeoff for the purposes of checking out civilian commercial flights
Why haven't you posted it here, given that its pertinent? - No one else seems to be doing so and your late discovery of my page numbering error indicates that almost no one is reading them anyway. I thought that I'd save myself the time and effort.

You ask too little of the P-39 fighters stationed there, as per Chap 12; there's quite a difference. - A lively discussion earlier in this thread concluded that the P-39s were indeed serving in the Caribbean area, just not in the Panamanian sky. Please try to keep up.

The P-36s had indeed been relegated to the training aircraft pool at Albrook Field. - I don't believe that to be the case for Dec.7'41.
Can any USAAF pursuit planes intercept thru the cloud cover in just 2 minutes and will they recognize my fake "China Clipper" as a real threat to the Canal ? Or just think it a civilian flyingboat in mechanical distress looking for a big soft Lake (Gatun) to land in ?
At which point they will instruct them on Pan-Am's fixed HF frequency to approach the lake from Direction X...or by hand signal instruct them to follow them, and once they either fail to acknowledge, fail to change course, or change course to a visible attack run - they'll bring them down. Given that if in the absecence of radio contact, they'll approach close enough to inspect for damage - and be somewhat suprised by the torpedoes... - I note that you failed to address the 2 minute interceptiontime question that I just posed. Guided thru the clouds by radar already judged as as not useful for interception purposes.

Previous discussion on this thread has also indicted that a breakaway sheet metal "tail cone" would be fitted to the torpedoes to make them look much more like cylindrical underwing external long range fuel tanks. Please try to keep up.
Granted, in reality those AA baterys were much more concentrated near to Canal facilties and to the forts and airbases of the US defenders of it.
...like for instance the US Naval communications centre beside Gatun Lake, the ruins of which are today a stop on tourist excursions to the Gatun Lake wildlife reserve? Or the Army's 310th General Hospital that overlooked the Lake? - Gatun Lake is VERY large and the range of 3" AA quite limited. The real issues would have been:

1.) just how many AA guns would actually have been deployed out in the peacetime rain ? within range and with ammo ?
2.) just how many AA gun crews would have been alerted & sitting/standing at their firing positions around those guns ?
3.) how/why would those gunners believe that the Pan-Am "China Clipper" approaching the Gatun Dam low above the water was a real threat, until they saw the cylinders drop ?
4.) would they believed that those cylinders were actually torpedoes and not just long ranged fuel tanks being dropped before a water landing, in an effort to reduce impact landing loads on the aircraft ?
5.) how much time would be wasted in calling a superior officer or two in an effort to get orders ?
6.) would US AA troops actually fire (if at their guns and within range) on what appears to be a civilian airline flyingboat, in peacetime, that looked like it was attempting an on-water landing in Gatun Lake ?

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#142

Post by Simon K » 24 Jan 2009, 08:44

It may be a good idea to pause for a moment, and revisit the actual events of the mock attack of January 1929 in Problem IX. A single aircraft (a floatplane :) ) is able to attack and destroy the spillway gates due to confusion and hesitancy on the part of the defenders. (the black force complained about this part of the manoevre and its outcome, but the umpires adjudged a successful strike). They would have been aware of lock angles, etc. That means a torpedo attack is deliverable.

I think a manoevre practiced 12 years before would not necessarily have improved the the military personnells' natural reactions of shock and hesitancy which greeted the "real" manoevre, back in 1929.

I have not been able to find the AA strengths in Panama in 1929, but I would assume them to be unimpressive. This may have had an effect on the outcome of the 1929 exercise (The source is unclear)

There seems on balance so far, a high probability that the IJN attack force will at least be able to reach the target. Judging by the historical ability of the IJN to successfully penetrate Hawaiian (and thus American) airspace for a long period unchallenged before delivering their attacks, this seems feasable. What happens then, I think is of the primary interest. I still believe the attack would then have been thwarted by defence measures taken some years before. Their maintenance state, however, may be worrying.

Unless it can be proved that the route chosen was highly susceptable to hostile identification/interception.
Last edited by Simon K on 24 Jan 2009, 08:57, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#143

Post by robdab » 24 Jan 2009, 08:51

phylo_roadking, you've obviously been inspired to great efforts,

As for the attack idea itself - I'm STILL scratching my head over the efficacy of it. Even with the lake at its normal level the spillway gates are only holding back 16ft of water. - The elevation of the Canal's bottom thru gatun was 40' above sea level. Most internet sources list the spillway crest elevation at 69 ft above sea level (asl) but the engineer stamped "as built construction drawings" of record at NARA indicate 65' asl instead. The spillway gates were 45' wide by 20' tall. The Canal water level thru Gatun Lake etc was usually maintained at 85' asl with 87' asl held at the end of the rainy season for use during the following dry.

The usual navigation depth of the Canal was 85' - 40' = 45' although the Panama Canal authority usually insisted on a 2' safety margin between any ship's keel and the bottom of the Canal due to constant rock falls/slides into the Culebra Cut area. Ship's rudders & propellers don't do well if driven thru rocks.

If my ATL torpedo attack manages to destroy enough spillway gates to partially drain Gatun Lake then that safe depth will drop to 85' - 40' - 20' - 2' = 23' at the START of the dry season. I have previously posted here that a typical dry season would result in a a further 8' (and probably more due to heavier wartime use) loss of water, so reducing the Canal's navigation depth to 23' - 8' = 15'

Not a complete closure but a serious reduction until the next rainy season refills Gatun Lake. Spillway gate repairs would take only a few weeks once the flow thru the blown spillways subsided.

However - releasing water from the Madden dam could be used to help make up the difference anyway, this was the whole point of building that dam, and in the wet season Panama got so much rain you’d hardly notice the loss…. - I have previously posted a source here which indicates that the Madden Dam was NOT operated in that fashion. In fact it's reservoir was at it's lowest level at this time of year, not at it's most full.

Regarding the actual damage a torpedo would do to the spillway gates...because the gates are so thin, they won't offer much resistance to a torpedo explosion.. and thus will take LESS damage than the side of a battleship (even the outer skin of a battleship is thicker, let alone the inner hull ect...) because the blast partly vents to the empty air through any hole it punches. Not that it matters anyway, its just some sliding steel plates. - The best comparison that I could find (since AFAIK the OTL Japanese never did torpedo a spillway gate) is the Japanese torpedo hit on the light cruiser USS Raleigh (Omaha class) at Pearl Harbor. The same type of Japanese torpedo that I propose using at Panama blew only a 15" diameter hole thru her side but dented said hull in by 8' over an area 50' wide by 30' tall. And that was done to a hull supported at 4' centres by heavy steel ship's ribs not present at the Gatun Dam spillway gates. Those 45' x 20' gates would have been torn right off of the concrete spillway piers by even a single such torpedo hit.

Once the water drops you can move a boat right up and get to work welding. Or if the worst comes to the aorst...bring up the dredgers from the Dredging Division at Gamboa and simply build a berm across the punctured gates, and use the others to regulate the level :wink: Same as the Germans did at St.Nazaire instead of bothering to repair the gates of the Normadie Dock. - Possible but such would take much time as the water depth in front of the spillway gates was 55' up to the sill level and then another 20' where the gate used to be. Time that would see the rainy season water slip away downstream just as the dry season was begining. It is NOT the steel repairs that will keep the Canal at reduced service but rather the wait for the rains to return and refill Gatun Lake.

Image

Something ELSE that reduces the efficacy of the planned attack...there were actually TWELVE spillway gates in 1941 (by counting the spillway channels); - Every photo and drawing that I have seen shows 14 gates, not 12.

so that's three aircraft with two torpedos each...six torpedos. Even if ALL the torpedos manage to impact a SEPARATE spillway gate at the top of Gatun Dam - which means three different attack runs from three different directions...that's only HALF of the gates punctured - which of course reduces greatly the rate of loss of water down even to the 16-foot level mentioned above. As the weapons weren't in ANY way guided, factor in weapons hitting the reinforced-concrete uprights, or two weapons hitting the SAME gate...and the possible damage any such attack could do is reduced even further. - Based on the KB's torpedo success rate at Pearl Harbor (under some flak fire where I suspect there would be none at Panama) I have always assumed just 4 spillway gates hit and destroyed.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#144

Post by robdab » 24 Jan 2009, 09:00

phylo_roadking

Have you considered the impact (sic) of one or more of the Mavis' flying into the counter-air cables strung between the hill tops after 1938 on the approaches to the dams? A number of US planes fell victim to them before the war

A fixed and visible defence that I assume would have been observed and reported to Tokyo by Japanese agents on the ground in Panama, pre-war. I was more worried about US barrage balloons & their cables hidden by clouds but it seems that none were flying in Panama on Dec.7'41.

And it appears there WERE torpedo nets, possibly upgraded and paid for as part of the program of emergency "closure" which had been designed by the late 1930s to replace the old pre-1920s system. It was called SIP 7 (Special Improvement Project-7). These were emergency closure doors which could be raised in seconds using electric-hydraulic pumps, or in minutes using hand levers on the same hydraulic pumps if the local power plants were knocked out; because of the fear of Axis sabotage by scuttling a ship, exploding one in the locks, bombing, or air-torpedo attack plans had been made for emergency closure of each lock and had anti-torpedo netting installed between each lock. As I understand the way the system worked with the net was it lowered when and by the power of the lock opening, and raised behind the ship when it cleared each lock. So that protects the locks themselves.

As mentioned above, this system protects the locks, not the Gatun Spillway gates which are the intended torpedo target of my 3 fake "China Clippers".

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#145

Post by robdab » 24 Jan 2009, 10:40

phylo_roadking,

Each day, from docks along the lakeside, the stubby boats chutter off with men and supplies for the listening posts, anti-aircraft gun batteries, searchlight positions which stud the green, hot hills around the lake

Yes, its a BIG lake and the more AA guns scattered around it's shores means more AA guns not deployed within trange of the Gatun Dam and it's spillway gates.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#146

Post by robdab » 24 Jan 2009, 10:49

phylo_roadking,

And finally, the answer to what approach line any torpedo run would have to take... - I hadn't realized that such was in question ? My initial posting at the start of this thread included http://www.panoramio.com/photo/5294557 which clearly indicates the angles of approach to the spillway that were/are possible. Targeting 8 of the 14 spillway gates from straight on shouldn't be difficult.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#147

Post by robdab » 24 Jan 2009, 10:55

phylo_roadking,

...and unfortunately the USAAF wasn't restricted to the airspace OVER the Canal Zone; as of March 1941 the USAAF had overfly rights into Panamanian airspce.

This makes the USAAF problem much harder. instead of just having to screen aircraft within the 500 square miles of the Canal Zone, now the same tiny number of USAAF interceptors would have to cover the ENTIRE country, would they not ? They would be spread out many times thinner than before.

http://www.czimages.com/CZMemories/Phot ... oof498.htm

Do you notice anything about this picture?
The Coco Solo NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS Air base...Robert, I think you need to chase down more detail on the naval defences and establishment in the Canal Zone; obviously the Army and USAAC is only part of the defence story.


I think that you'll find that your photo pre-dates the time period that we discuss by about 1.5 decades.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#148

Post by Alaric » 24 Jan 2009, 11:27

Work didn't begin on a land strip until January 1942, and USAAF aircraft didn't start flying operations out of there until May 1942.

No runway for military aircraft on the Galapagos in your timeframe.
Phylo, I answered that question with links on page 6 of this thread, Jan 21st at 3:39.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#149

Post by Sid Guttridge » 24 Jan 2009, 14:14

Hi Alaric,

Nope. I am not "the guy that totally derailed a fascinating thread about U-boat landings in southern Argentina circa July 1945 with this same kind of obtuse questioning of every single detail".

I am the guy who asked some of the the necessary questions and produced some of the the necessary sources and facts that showed that there is currently no demonstrable substance to that tale. Is this wrong on a military-historical site?

If posters put up alternative scenarios or unlikely tales on AHF they must expect to be challenged on the facts. AHF is not a one-way megaphone. To their credit, both Ohdruf and Robdab were fully prepared to debate the issues they fielded, if not always, in my opinion, entirely rationally.

Cheers,

Sid.
Last edited by Sid Guttridge on 24 Jan 2009, 14:53, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#150

Post by Sid Guttridge » 24 Jan 2009, 14:33

I see that following response to this question has appeared elsewhere:

"Also keep in mind, with the lake at its normal level the spillway gates are only holding back 16 feet of water. The maximum draught of a ship in the canal was 44 feet. This means even if the spillway gates are compromised and the entire lake drains down (which would take quite some time) ships of up to 28 foot draught could still use the canal! That includes almost all of the world’s merchant ships and Yorktown class aircraft carrier at full load! Even US battleships could still transit if they first offloaded a good deal of fuel, most standards as they stood in 1941 drew about 30-32 feet loaded. At worst this would add a day to transit for defueling and refueling on the other end.

In short the canal would not be closed at all! The only limitation would be with less water stored, transits could not be sustained at a high rate. That would affect merchant shipping, but certainly not warship transits. However releasing water from the Madden dam could be used to help make up the difference anyway, this was the whole point of building that dam, and in the wet season Panama got so much rain you’d hardly notice the loss…. This was after all the whole reason for building such a big spillway."

If this is true, the canal was markedly over engineered.

Cheers,

Sid.

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