Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#151

Post by glenn239 » 24 Jan 2009, 16:09

In short the canal would not be closed at all!
That is the most probable outcome, IMO.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#152

Post by robdab » 25 Jan 2009, 01:33

In short the canal would not be closed at all!
I've never claimed that it would have been. Just that falling water levels in Gatun Lake would have reduced the maximim draft limits for vessels requesting Canal transit to about 15', by the start of the next rainy season in Panama.

Unless a way was found to attack and open an entire set of locks for long enough that the entirety of Gatun Lake might drain to the sea, but I can't yet see how that might have been accomplished.


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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#153

Post by Alaric » 25 Jan 2009, 14:17

Sid Guttridge wrote:Hi Alaric,

Nope. I am not "the guy that totally derailed a fascinating thread about U-boat landings in southern Argentina circa July 1945 with this same kind of obtuse questioning of every single detail".

I am the guy who asked some of the the necessary questions and produced some of the the necessary sources and facts that showed that there is currently no demonstrable substance to that tale. Is this wrong on a military-historical site?

I'll take that as a yes. And as usual you are completely wrong, there most certainly was and is substance to what you derisively call a "tale". And it was proven, but you'll never admit it.

If posters put up alternative scenarios or unlikely tales on AHF they must expect to be challenged on the facts. AHF is not a one-way megaphone. To their credit, both Ohdruf and Robdab were fully prepared to debate the issues they fielded, if not always, in my opinion, entirely rationally.

It's apparent from both threads you simply engage in obtuse argument for the sake of obtuse argument, repeat the same statements as if you are unable to comprehend the facts that refute them, or else simply can't admit being wrong. I answered your question about airbases in the Galapagos on Dec 7th 1941 (there weren't any) and you simply repeat the same arguments, and the same when robdab answers your endless questioning. Round and round she goes...

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#154

Post by phylo_roadking » 25 Jan 2009, 16:03

One confirmed US military survey in the Galapagos islands in 1938, and no confirmation if its "by prior agreement".
And what is the source of this statement ?

How is it that you feel that a 1938 survey of something (unknown to me at this point in time
Strange that you don't know of it - it's mentioned in Chap12 of the Official History. Check back. Various negotiations with the Ecaudorans started in desultory fashion at various times AFTER that; there's no sign that they were contacted for permission to carry out the survey initially....
Do you not agree that this passage proves that Panagra aircraft were operating a regularly scheduled service to the Galapagos in head-to-head competiotion with SEDTA ?
It proves that Panagra began operating a service from the mainland to the Galapagos as of December 1940, yes....but it ALSO proves that Pan-Am's earlier attempt to establish a trans-Pacific route INCLUDING the Galapagos hadn't been successful :wink: Which is what we were ACTUALLY talking about at that point.
In General Andrews' opinion, the commandant of the naval district did not have enough planes or vessels under his control to conduct an adequate reconnaissance
...refers only to a daily air patrol/reconnaissance, not point-interception on report of an unidentified intruder.
The Aircraft Warning Service in the theater, he reported, was totally inadequate in personnel to supervise the installation of detectors on hand as well as to man the equipment when installed. Only two radar detectors were installed and in operation in the Panama Canal Department
...refers to the arrivial of the three extra installations which didn't appear in 1941. Obviously the two that WERE there WERE adequately manned for the quality issues to appear talked about elsewhere...
The problems involved in providing a serviceable radar screen to alert the inner defenses of the Canal were less easily solved. Equipment in use at these stations was "inadequate" for early warning and "quite useless" for purposes of controlled interception.
Controlled interception is the ground vectoring of aircraft, as you've been told. it was inadequate for early warning BECAUSE it didn't cover the inner Canal Zone - but DID cover the Carribean and pacific sea appraoches in a 160-degree arc from the two installations that WERE working. Not enough to provide coverage, but if the attacking aircraft - which YOU have decided would be flying IN CLOUD and therefore restricted visibility themselves - veered for any reason into the detection arc of the Taboga island installation...
Tests in Panama repeatedly disclosed that low-flying planes approaching directly over the Bay of Panama were not detected by the radar system. Visiting British experts had noted this characteristic in American sets and attributed it to a basic defect of the equipment, but the Signal Corps insisted that, properly placed and operated by competent crews, the American equipment in this respect was just as good as, if not better than, the British radar
If low-flying they'd be BELOW cloud approaching the canal zone and thus visible for detection by Mk One Eyeball. You can't slice your options BOTH ways...
These qualities were indispensable for ground-controlled interception (GCI), which British experience had demonstrated to be the most successful method for conducting an air defense."
We KNOW it was unsuitable for ground vectored interception - but NOT for alerting pilots by radio and tasking them to do their OWN search and interception.
What points within the 3 quotes just above inspire you to believe that the American radar on Panama was at all likely to actually pick up (and recognize) my 3 seperately inbound ATL "China Clipper" attackers and actually vector any US interceptors out to visually inspect them ? Just as happened on Oahu, these US radars had no IFF system fitted so EACH and EVERY radar contact was a potential enemy and would need to be checked out. What are the odds of that happening do you think ?
1/ Three four-engined aircraft is a relatively sizeable signal;

2/ they don't have to check EVERY radar contact - just ones that match no scheduled service, pre-posted flight plans, and didn't contact ground control by radio when entering military-regulated airspace. The task of interception and inspection is EXACTLY what the permanent-readiness aircraft were for.
My ATL fake "China Clippers" are NOT commercial airliners though. The last thing that they would try to do is follow airliner procedures.
...which is EXACTLY what would have the AWS reaching for the phone and requesting an aeriel check.
radar that even the USAAF admits was "quite useless" for interception purposes
No - quite useless for ground vectored interception.
Just how is it that you feel that those USAAF interceptors are actually going to find my 3 Mavis in the clouds ?
How are THEY going to find anything in clouds? Following passive radio signals etc. do not give adequate direction for torpedo runs :lol: They'll be spending a lot of time in plain air for navigational fixes etc.

P.S. PRE-ground vectoring....military pilots were actually TRAINED to search for intruder aircraft, you know...ground vectoring simply removed the need for wasted time and fuel doing that.
There were indeed but this not relevant to my ATL scenario in that AFAIK the S-42 was a "water lander" only.
You misunderstand my point, which was already made above. It's behaviour OUT of the ordinary - especially IF visual confirmation shows them to be flying Pan-Am colours - that makes them suspicious...
And what in god's name makes you think that my ATL Japanese would give a proverbial "rat's ass" about American airline regulations ? Give your head a shake man. What makes you think that the Americans/Panamanians would even know that regulations were being broken, let alone that they could identify what aircraft were doing so or even find them ? Panama's two lone radar installations were admitted crap.
Because IF they don't pretend FULLY to be airline aircraft following fixed airline routes or to airline timetables they stick out like the proverbail sore thumb saying "chase me". It might be best if you checked on the technical details of Ckair Chennaults early-warning system established in China... :wink:
Considering the abysmal state of the Panama Canal's defences as described in my initial posting, just how is this going to matter much ?
They weren't abysmal - just inadequate. Which is NOt the same thing. There doesn't seem to be very much wrong with what there was.
IIRC the same War Warning that went to Pearl Harbor on Novemebr 27'41 was also sent to Panama and all other American installations around the Pacific.
I'm not talking about the Nov 1941 Alert, I'm talking about the war scare after German uboats shelling targets in the Carribean. If the OC Canal Zone is in ANY way switched on - and from his own awareness of the inadequacies of the defences etc. and did everything he could to rectify this- he seems plenty switched on. You might want to actually check up exactly how long after the Pearl Harbour raid it was before the Canal Zone went on alert...
Why haven't you posted it here, given that its pertinent? - No one else seems to be doing so and your late discovery of my page numbering error indicates that almost no one is reading them anyway. I thought that I'd save myself the time and effort
Well, it's being asked for now...
A lively discussion earlier in this thread concluded that the P-39s were indeed serving in the Caribbean area, just not in the Panamanian sky. Please try to keep up.
So why did YOU say P-36s??? :wink: Especially when one of YOUR literary sources says P-39s...
The P-36s had indeed been relegated to the training aircraft pool at Albrook Field. - I don't believe that to be the case for Dec.7'41
Strange again...one of YOUR literary sources clearly says that of the 30 P-36s in the Canal Zone, at least 10 in the training pool at Albrook field...
At which point they will instruct them on Pan-Am's fixed HF frequency to approach the lake from Direction X...or by hand signal instruct them to follow them, and once they either fail to acknowledge, fail to change course, or change course to a visible attack run - they'll bring them down. Given that if in the absecence of radio contact, they'll approach close enough to inspect for damage - and be somewhat suprised by the torpedoes... - I note that you failed to address the 2 minute interceptiontime question that I just posed. Guided thru the clouds by radar already judged as as not useful for interception purposes.
This makes the USAAF problem much harder. instead of just having to screen aircraft within the 500 square miles of the Canal Zone, now the same tiny number of USAAF interceptors would have to cover the ENTIRE country, would they not ? They would be spread out many times thinner than before.
No I didn't forget - I proved that the USAAF had permission to overfly Panama, thus widening their time window for interception GREATLY. :wink: Once again, you can't slice it both ways - the USAAF DID have permission to overfly Panama so had much more search and interception time to react to reports of unidentified aircraft.
Previous discussion on this thread has also indicted that a breakaway sheet metal "tail cone" would be fitted to the torpedoes to make them look much more like cylindrical underwing external long range fuel tanks
An interesting proposition,indeed, that. Seeing as NO Pan-am clipper carried external tanks. By the way, how are these "cones" suppooed to be removed for the actual attack, so that the torpeods actually run in the direction intended???What percentage will NOT breakaway, and so the torpedos don't run true? What percentage tangle or damage the torpedos' fins? What percentage damages the torpedos' propellers...?
1.) just how many AA guns would actually have been deployed out in the peacetime rain ? within range and with ammo ?
It's called canvas....
2.) just how many AA gun crews would have been alerted & sitting/standing at their firing positions around those guns ?
Going by the press report from the actual location, that's exactly what they did on post...
6.) would US AA troops actually fire (if at their guns and within range) on what appears to be a civilian airline flyingboat, in peacetime, that looked like it was attempting an on-water landing in Gatun Lake ?
If told to - of course they would. Soldiers have that annoying habit of obeying orders.
Something ELSE that reduces the efficacy of the planned attack...there were actually TWELVE spillway gates in 1941 (by counting the spillway channels); - Every photo and drawing that I have seen shows 14 gates, not 12.
Likewise - every MODERN pic shows FOURTEEN. but that wartime one shows only TWELVE spillway channels...but there HAVE been at least TWO major renovations of the dam since the war...the concrete area where the soldier is on sentry duty is no longer there, for instance. So I assumed a later widening. I'm quite happy however to say fourteen - for THAT further reduces the actual amount of damage the SIX torpedos could theoretically do...
A fixed and visible defence that I assume would have been observed and reported to Tokyo by Japanese agents on the ground in Panama, pre-war.
Fixed, visible and reported obviously DOESN'T make them any easier to avoid though...given the experiences of the USAAC who were more than a little familiar with the area!!! 8O Especially by lumbering slow-to-manouver H6Ks...
A fixed and visible defence that I assume would have been observed and reported to Tokyo by Japanese agents on the ground in Panama, pre-war.
Yes, just establishing that the gates are/were indeed the only real weakness in the system at that point in time.
Yes, its a BIG lake and the more AA guns scattered around it's shores means more AA guns not deployed within trange of the Gatun Dam and it's spillway gates
Strangely enough - the literary sources DO say they were deployed to cover the Canal faclities, therefore YOU are reading too mcuh into the lack of adequate recording of their sightings to say that they WEREN'T there covering what the garrison KNEW was a weakness...
The Coco Solo NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS Air base...Robert, I think you need to chase down more detail on the naval defences and establishment in the Canal Zone; obviously the Army and USAAC is only part of the defence story.

I think that you'll find that your photo pre-dates the time period that we discuss by about 1.5 decades.
So??? It didn't vanish into thin air :wink: It was still a naval facility during the war; in fact, the base, NOW unused, is STILL visible.
but as things stand I would suggest that if Japanese intelligence believed there was a US airfield on the Galapagos they would be markedly less likely to consider using them as a base.
Agreed. ESPECIALLY if the Japanese knew ANYTHING about the slowly-rumbling U.S. negotiations with Ecuador to lease bases in the Galapagos and Cocos islands specifically with the express intention of EXPANDING their early-warning and reconnaissance perimeter...
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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#155

Post by phylo_roadking » 25 Jan 2009, 16:05

Amd now, a necessary question - at what depth did Japanese torpedos run? And no fancy Pearl Harbour shallow-running modifications, please, we've already been told the tails of the torpedos were covered in metal cones...

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#156

Post by robdab » 25 Jan 2009, 17:34

phylo_roadking

Amd now, a necessary question - at what depth did Japanese torpedos run? And no fancy Pearl Harbour shallow-running modifications, please, we've already been told the tails of the torpedos were covered in metal cones...

My initial thread starting posting specifies exactly that type of PH modified torpedo.

In the OTL Japanese were bright enough to sort out converting 8 tankers into fleet oilers in complete secrecy, underway re-fueling of the KB taskforce, the conversion of 16" BB shells into 800kg AP bombs, the entire mnisub & mothersub weapons system, complete radio silence by the KB on the way over to Oahu AND a shallow water drop depth modification for their air dropped torpedoes. Not to leave out the Zero and it's long range (releasable) belly fuel tank.

If capable of such technological inventiveness, I'd think it not too difficult for them to add release cables to the torpedo release mechanisms of each Mavis which would let go those metal tail cone disguises as the torpedoes were released by each Mavis. The torpedo tail covers need not be welded on afterall, just held against wind drag for the duration of the inbound flight.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#157

Post by phylo_roadking » 25 Jan 2009, 17:53

If capable of such technological inventiveness, I'd think it not too difficult for them to add release cables to the torpedo release mechanisms of each Mavis which would let go those metal tail cone disguises as the torpedoes were released by each Mavis. The torpedo tail covers need not be welded on afterall, just held against wind drag for the duration of the inbound flight.
???

First of all - IIRC the wooden attachment converting torpedos for shallow running for PH was larger than the original fins...so you're positing a metal cone that has to go over THAT as well. NOW you're posting a metal cone that is not actually attached to the torpedo itself, but is held in place by some Heath Robinson affair of Bowden Cables...

...while the OPEN end of the metal cone is not fixed or weld or bolted TO the torpedo - thus leaving it free to fill with air entering it at speed between the torpedo and the mouth of the cone...on an aircraft who's cruising speed is 138 mph...

So your deception plan depends on a lightweight metal cone that will act like an air brake, and depends in being held in place against the drag of a 138mph cruising speed by pins and Bowden Cables...which apart from anything else depend for their smooth functioning on the light-oil lubricated multicore inner wire sliding through the exterior ring-bound sheath - fitted EXTERNALLY near the water line on a flying boat - to work smoothly and reliably? That's if the air drag doesn't merely rip the cones off in the first place... 8O and either remove your "deception plan" at an inopportune moment, or in a worst case the cables or cones get tangled up with the torpedo tail and/or props...

I'm presuming you've actually LOOKED at a picture of a PH-used Type 91 torpedo??? The kind of device you're positing to hide THAT tailplane and props will be huge, and visibly attract attention in itself by anyone inspecting the aircraft...because it'll necessarily be FAR bigger than the diameter of the torpedo to fit over all THAT!.... 8O

Image

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#158

Post by robdab » 25 Jan 2009, 18:10

Alaric,

For what it is worth, please consider that you are unlikely to change Sid's debating style. As to his conduct in previous debate, it is "water under the bridge" and matters little to this one. Other readers here will be convinced, or not, of his viewpoints by the strength of his points and the sources provided in support, not by what he did or didn't post to some other forum.

He consistantly takes what I call a "shotgun" approach. Ask lots of questions to cast doubt rather than providing facts of his own, provides only opinions with few or no sources that can be proven one way or the other, and then repeats. You'll note that he even attempts to sabotage the crediblity of one of the few sourses that he did provide, the Latin American skies tome, by saying that it was written in the US during WW2 and so, was of doubtful reliablilty. Yet he had used it previously in support of his own viewpoint.

Yes, it is a frustrating approach to argue against but I believe that the other readers here will/have seen through the technique. In the future, I intend to answer each of his points just once and then ignore the repetition.

Simon K. on the other hand, takes what I call the "sniper" appraoch. He waited quietly, doing his research "down in the weeds" before popping up to nearly slay my ATL Panama proposal with one very unexpected shot. And he was kind enough to clearly tell me exactly who had written the ammunition that he used, by providing the author's name. No BS, just the fact and it's easily verifyable internet source. Refreshing, even if painfull.

I think that you'll save yourself much frustration by debating the points that he raises, one by one, not the man or his debating techniques.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#159

Post by robdab » 25 Jan 2009, 18:34

phylo_roadking
If capable of such technological inventiveness, I'd think it not too difficult for them to add release cables to the torpedo release mechanisms of each Mavis which would let go those metal tail cone disguises as the torpedoes were released by each Mavis. The torpedo tail covers need not be welded on afterall, just held against wind drag for the duration of the inbound flight.
First of all - IIRC the wooden attachment converting torpedos for shallow running for PH was larger than the original fins...so you're positing a metal cone that has to go over THAT as well. NOW you're posting a metal cone that is not actually attached to the torpedo itself, but is held in place by some Heath Robinson affair of Bowden Cables...

A quick look at http://groups.msn.com/japanesemodelairc ... otoID=1818 and http://groups.msn.com/japanesemodelairc ... otoID=2566 should convince my other readers that the PH shallow drop fins were not larger than the overall torpedo diameter and that a thin sheet metal sheath could have been slipped over them so as to disguise these torpedoes as cylindrical long ranged fuel tanks.

...while the OPEN end of the metal cone is not fixed or weld or bolted TO the torpedo - thus leaving it free to fill with air entering it at speed between the torpedo and the mouth of the cone...on an aircraft who's cruising speed is 138 mph... So your deception plan depends on a lightweight metal cone that will act like an air brake, and depends in being held in place against the drag of a 138mph cruising speed by pins and Bowden Cables...which apart from anything else depend for their smooth functioning on the light-oil lubricated multicore inner wire sliding through the exterior ring-bound sheath - fitted EXTERNALLY near the water line on a flying boat - to work smoothly and reliably? That's if the air drag doesn't merely rip the cones off in the first place... 8O and either remove your "deception plan" at an inopportune moment, or in a worst case the cables or cones get tangled up with the torpedo tail and/or props...

Not being an expert in torpedo design nor aerodynamic streamlining [edit: nor mechanical engineering], I am quite content to leave the design, testing and use of this torpedo disguise modification in the capable hands of the 1941 Japanese who successfully overcame far more difficult problems prior to the OTL Pearl Harbor attacks. Even if you are not.
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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#160

Post by phylo_roadking » 25 Jan 2009, 20:04

A quick look at http://groups.msn.com/japanesemodelairc ... otoID=1818 and http://groups.msn.com/japanesemodelairc ... otoID=2566 should convince my other readers that the PH shallow drop fins were not larger than the overall torpedo diameter and that a thin sheet metal sheath could have been slipped over them so as to disguise these torpedoes as cylindrical long ranged fuel tanks.
First of all those don't open for me, so I presume they don't for others.

BUT you're unfortunately WRONG - note the scale model at the bottom of the pic!

http://img6.travelblog.org/Photos/38234 ... fish-2.jpg

Look just HOW much bigger the wooden-add-on was. Even without it, only the VERTICAL fins of the period Type 91 were the same size as the torpedo diameter - the horizontal fin was actually slightly WIDER...

http://www.j-aircraft.com/research/brya ... agrams.JPG

Second...NOW you're having to posit a thin metal SHEATH that therefore has to be ejected cleanly from the rear of the torpedo without hanging up on any of the unfortunately protrusions...fins, props etc.
Not being an expert in torpedo design nor aerodynamic streamlining, I am quite content to leave the design, testing and use of this torpedo disguise modification in the capable hands of the 1941 Japanese who successfully overcame far more difficult problems prior to the OTL Pearl Harbor attacks. Even if you are not.
Robert, even the technically advanced German aviation and munition industries couldn't manage to produce a cluster bomb that would effectively BOTH shed its clamshells AND scatter its bomblets every time during WWII - even with the addition of blackpowder charges! - judging by the items that are occasionally dug up still "clustered". We tend not to go for ASB technology here. Your deception plan requires a metal sheath now to be attached to the end of a torpedo on EACH side of the plane, held in place by Bowden Cable and pins that will pick up salt and that be constantly flapping about and fraying - salt +Bowden Cable inner + constant fatiguing = breakage - over a trip of some considerable distance....a distance made unnecessarily long by diverting to approach the target over land to avoid detection by Taboga Island, and staying in cloud as long as possible. When the mechanism is operated and the pins released, the sheath has to remove ITSELF cleanly from the torpedo and not either damage or get caught on any of the awkwardly-shapped items at the rear of the torpedo. During the flight itself, the sheath has to be tight enough to the torpedo so that it doesn't either act like an air brake - you know they DO use "cones" to brake performance aircraft on landing, albeit made of nylon etc. :wink: - or strip itself off the torpedo in flight. So if it's THAT tight-fitting - there is no guarantee it is THEN loose enough to deploy cleanly...especially over the horizontal fins...

And no matter how good designers the Japanese are, even THEY had to use setscrews, Dzuz fasteners and rivets to hold thin metal shapes onto aircraft during WWII. ALL manufacturers had to.

Sid's KISS reservations are apposite here...but ALSO is a warning that you're bleeding yourself on Occam's Razor here ; EVERY SINGLE TIME a major reservation about your WI is raised, your answer is to complicate the whole undertaking even more, with extra flying time, extra manouvers, extra technology - every one of which is a Point Of Failure for the operation if it doesn't work as you intend.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#161

Post by phylo_roadking » 25 Jan 2009, 21:18

P.S....

The AA defences are gradually getting closer than the EDGE of Gatun Lake...
Executive Order 8782
Establishing a Military Reservation on Certain Islands in Gatun Lake, Canal Zone

Signed: June 12, 1941
Federal Register page and date: 6 FR 2896, June 17, 1941
Superseded by: Canal Zone Order 2, December 1, 1946 (12 FR 5364)

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#162

Post by robdab » 25 Jan 2009, 21:28

phylo_roadking,

Strange that you don't know of it - it's mentioned in Chap12 of the Official History. Check back. Various negotiations with the Ecaudorans started in desultory fashion at various times AFTER that; there's no sign that they were contacted for permission to carry out the survey initially.... - "Tis not a case of not knowing of it, but rather a case of having far too many open rerference books on my desk at any one time to always remeber the source and page number of every single quote. Thank you for the chapter 12 reminder.

I just had another look at that chapter 12 and note that it is totally silent on the subject of whether survey permission was requested or not requested. Neither does it specify the name of the survey party chief's third child which aptly demonstrates that your point is just a waste of time and bandwidth.

It proves that Panagra began operating a service from the mainland to the Galapagos as of December 1940, yes....but it ALSO proves that Pan-Am's earlier attempt to establish a trans-Pacific route INCLUDING the Galapagos hadn't been successful :wink: Which is what we were ACTUALLY talking about at that point. - We were ? I thought that we were discussing the likelyhood that a Pan-Am (in this case a Panagra subsidiary) airliner seen flying in towards Panama from the Galapagos would be to raise alarm in the mind of a USAAF interceptor pilot. Since we have finally established that Panagra ran a regular service to and from that Island group I would think that any such USAAF pilot would be unconcerned.
In General Andrews' opinion, the commandant of the naval district did not have enough planes or vessels under his control to conduct an adequate reconnaissance
...refers only to a daily air patrol/reconnaissance, not point-interception on report of an unidentified intruder. - That is not what the quote states. Did you just invent the additional interpretation or can you present a source in support of it ?
The Aircraft Warning Service in the theater, he reported, was totally inadequate in personnel to supervise the installation of detectors on hand as well as to man the equipment when installed. Only two radar detectors were installed and in operation in the Panama Canal Department
...refers to the arrivial of the three extra installations which didn't appear in 1941. Obviously the two that WERE there WERE adequately manned for the quality issues to appear talked about elsewhere... - That is not what the quote states. Did you just invent the additional interpretation or can you present a source in support of it ?
The problems involved in providing a serviceable radar screen to alert the inner defenses of the Canal were less easily solved. Equipment in use at these stations was "inadequate" for early warning and "quite useless" for purposes of controlled interception.
Controlled interception is the ground vectoring of aircraft, as you've been told. it was inadequate for early warning BECAUSE it didn't cover the inner Canal Zone - but DID cover the Carribean and pacific sea appraoches in a 160-degree arc from the two installations that WERE working. Not enough to provide coverage, but if the attacking aircraft - which YOU have decided would be flying IN CLOUD and therefore restricted visibility themselves - veered for any reason into the detection arc of the Taboga island installation... - That is not what the quote states. Did you just invent the additional interpretation or can you present a source in support of it ?
Tests in Panama repeatedly disclosed that low-flying planes approaching directly over the Bay of Panama were not detected by the radar system. Visiting British experts had noted this characteristic in American sets and attributed it to a basic defect of the equipment, but the Signal Corps insisted that, properly placed and operated by competent crews, the American equipment in this respect was just as good as, if not better than, the British radar
If low-flying they'd be BELOW cloud approaching the canal zone and thus visible for detection by Mk One Eyeball. You can't slice your options BOTH ways... - We have just established that Pan-Am flights by sister Panagra were on a regular schedule to and from the Galapagos so a "China Clipper" seen inbound would be unlikely to raise alarm.
These qualities were indispensable for ground-controlled interception (GCI), which British experience had demonstrated to be the most successful method for conducting an air defense."
We KNOW it was unsuitable for ground vectored interception - but NOT for alerting pilots by radio and tasking them to do their OWN search and interception. - The exact quote, already provided above, was, " The problems involved in providing a serviceable radar screen to alert the inner defenses of the Canal were less easily solved. Equipment in use at these stations was "inadequate" for early warning and "quite useless" for purposes of controlled interception." That is clearly - inadequate for early warning.

What points within the 3 quotes just above inspire you to believe that the American radar on Panama was at all likely to actually pick up (and recognize) my 3 seperately inbound ATL "China Clipper" attackers and actually vector any US interceptors out to visually inspect them ? Just as happened on Oahu, these US radars had no IFF system fitted so EACH and EVERY radar contact was a potential enemy and would need to be checked out. What are the odds of that happening do you think ?
1/ Three four-engined aircraft is a relatively sizeable signal; - My initial posting to start this thread specifies that my 3 ATL Mavis would be flying seperate courses for the run in to Gatun Lake.

2/ they don't have to check EVERY radar contact - just ones that match no scheduled service, pre-posted flight plans, and didn't contact ground control by radio when entering military-regulated airspace. The task of interception and inspection is EXACTLY what the permanent-readiness aircraft were for. - This methodology would supply no security at all. Three enemy bombers could be "tailgating" just slightly below and behind a regularly scheduled airliner and that civilian aircrew would never know it. And neither would the radar if it were lucky enough (under the existing circumstances previously listed) to even pick-up the airliner at all.
My ATL fake "China Clippers" are NOT commercial airliners though. The last thing that they would try to do is follow airliner procedures.
...which is EXACTLY what would have the AWS reaching for the phone and requesting an aeriel check. - Only if the radar of the AWS manages to pick-up any aircraft at all. Which in light of the evidence presented seems unlikely.
radar that even the USAAF admits was "quite useless" for interception purposes
No - quite useless for ground vectored interception. - That is not what the quote states. Did you just invent the additional interpretation or can you present a source in support of it ?

Just how is it that you feel that those USAAF interceptors are actually going to find my 3 Mavis in the clouds ?
How are THEY going to find anything in clouds? Following passive radio signals etc. do not give adequate direction for torpedo runs :lol: They'll be spending a lot of time in plain air for navigational fixes etc. - Just as a peacetime Pan-Am airliner would be expected to be doing.

P.S. PRE-ground vectoring....military pilots were actually TRAINED to search for intruder aircraft, you know...ground vectoring simply removed the need for wasted time and fuel doing that. - As you pointed out, the USAAF would now have to cover ALL of Panama, a HUGE area much larger than the Canal Zone's 500 square miles. the term "looking for a needle in a haystack" comes to mind even without considering Panama's rainy season cloud cover.

There were indeed but this not relevant to my ATL scenario in that AFAIK the S-42 was a "water lander" only.
You misunderstand my point, which was already made above. It's behaviour OUT of the ordinary - especially IF visual confirmation shows them to be flying Pan-Am colours - that makes them suspicious... - I'd doubt that radio failure, engine failure, getting lost in the clouds or running off schedule would be at all out of the ordinary in 1941 Panamanian skies.
And what in god's name makes you think that my ATL Japanese would give a proverbial "rat's ass" about American airline regulations ? Give your head a shake man. What makes you think that the Americans/Panamanians would even know that regulations were being broken, let alone that they could identify what aircraft were doing so or even find them ? Panama's two lone radar installations were admitted crap.
Because IF they don't pretend FULLY to be airline aircraft following fixed airline routes or to airline timetables they stick out like the proverbail sore thumb saying "chase me". It might be best if you checked on the technical details of Ckair Chennaults early-warning system established in China... :wink: - Can you present a source that indicates that Chennault's system was in use in Panama in December of 1941 ?
IIRC the same War Warning that went to Pearl Harbor on Novemebr 27'41 was also sent to Panama and all other American installations around the Pacific.
I'm not talking about the Nov 1941 Alert, I'm talking about the war scare after German uboats shelling targets in the Carribean. If the OC Canal Zone is in ANY way switched on - and from his own awareness of the inadequacies of the defences etc. and did everything he could to rectify this- he seems plenty switched on. You might want to actually check up exactly how long after the Pearl Harbour raid it was before the Canal Zone went on alert... - I would point out that there is a difference between "going on alert" and "being on alert". For instance, at Pearl Harbor some American AA guns were not in position (with ammunition) and ready to fire until some 3 hours AFTER the KB's Japanese warplanes had already left Oahu's sky.
Why haven't you posted it here, given that its pertinent? - No one else seems to be doing so and your late discovery of my page numbering error indicates that almost no one is reading them anyway. I thought that I'd save myself the time and effort
Well, it's being asked for now... Please see the 200 pages at http://afhra.maxwell.af.mil/numbered_studies/467633.pdf
Since you aren't providing page numbers for me, I'll return that favour.
A lively discussion earlier in this thread concluded that the P-39s were indeed serving in the Caribbean area, just not in the Panamanian sky. Please try to keep up.
So why did YOU say P-36s??? :wink: Especially when one of YOUR literary sources says P-39s... - Now you are getting me confused. I typed P-36s because there were 30 of them defending Panama's sky on Dec.7'41. AFAIK there were still just 7 P-26s still flying but they were unarmed and used for flight training only. As previously stated there were P-39s flying elsewhere in the Caribbean but not in defense of Panama.
The P-36s had indeed been relegated to the training aircraft pool at Albrook Field. - I don't believe that to be the case for Dec.7'41
Strange again...one of YOUR literary sources clearly says that of the 30 P-36s in the Canal Zone, at least 10 in the training pool at Albrook field... - So,, is it 10 or is it 30 regulated to training ? Well, this is my new fact for the day. I had thought that meant that the 10 were being used for training but would be used for combat if and when an enemy showed up to fight. Since you indicate that such was not the case I will from now on only count on 20 USAAF fighters being "on hand" to defend all of Panama. It's getting better for my ATL Japanese attackers all the time !!
At which point they will instruct them on Pan-Am's fixed HF frequency to approach the lake from Direction X...or by hand signal instruct them to follow them, and once they either fail to acknowledge, fail to change course, or change course to a visible attack run - they'll bring them down. Given that if in the absecence of radio contact, they'll approach close enough to inspect for damage - and be somewhat suprised by the torpedoes... - I note that you failed to address the 2 minute interceptiontime question that I just posed. Guided thru the clouds by radar already judged as as not useful for interception purposes.
This makes the USAAF problem much harder. instead of just having to screen aircraft within the 500 square miles of the Canal Zone, now the same tiny number of USAAF interceptors would have to cover the ENTIRE country, would they not ? They would be spread out many times thinner than before.

No I didn't forget - I proved that the USAAF had permission to overfly Panama, thus widening their time window for interception GREATLY. :wink: Once again, you can't slice it both ways - the USAAF DID have permission to overfly Panama so had much more search and interception time to react to reports of unidentified aircraft.
So, a very few USAAF interceptors to check out a now greater number of aircraft spread out over a much, much larger territory ? Doesn't sound very likely to be successful to me at all
Previous discussion on this thread has also indicted that a breakaway sheet metal "tail cone" would be fitted to the torpedoes to make them look much more like cylindrical underwing external long range fuel tanks
An interesting proposition,indeed, that. Seeing as NO Pan-am clipper carried external tanks. - And your proof of that would be ... ? How would any USAAF pilot in Panama know what additional equipment Pan-Am had bought or not bought just last week ?
1.) just how many AA guns would actually have been deployed out in the peacetime rain ? within range and with ammo ?
It's called canvas.... - and is followed by rust and damp ammunition.
2.) just how many AA gun crews would have been alerted & sitting/standing at their firing positions around those guns ?
Going by the press report from the actual location, that's exactly what they did on post... - From a sickleave point of view alone, I'd doubt that. Maybe for the few minutes of a press tour "photo-op" but I'd doubt day-in-and-day-out.
6.) would US AA troops actually fire (if at their guns and within range) on what appears to be a civilian airline flyingboat, in peacetime, that looked like it was attempting an on-water landing in Gatun Lake ?
If told to - of course they would. Soldiers have that annoying habit of obeying orders. - True but what sane American AA officer would order the cold-blooded murder of civilian passengers just because a flyingboat airliner was attempting a Gatun Lake landing ?
Something ELSE that reduces the efficacy of the planned attack...there were actually TWELVE spillway gates in 1941 (by counting the spillway channels); - Every photo and drawing that I have seen shows 14 gates, not 12.
Likewise - every MODERN pic shows FOURTEEN. but that wartime one shows only TWELVE spillway channels...but there HAVE been at least TWO major renovations of the dam since the war...the concrete area where the soldier is on sentry duty is no longer there, for instance. So I assumed a later widening. I'm quite happy however to say fourteen - for THAT further reduces the actual amount of damage the SIX torpedos could theoretically do... - This is interesting news to me. I was aware of a fairly recent road bridge replacement at the Gatun Dam but not of any other major modifications. Perhaps this might explain the 65' asl vs 69' asl difference in spillway crest elevation that I have been attempting to resolve for some time now. A source please.
A fixed and visible defence that I assume would have been observed and reported to Tokyo by Japanese agents on the ground in Panama, pre-war.
Fixed, visible and reported obviously DOESN'T make them any easier to avoid though...given the experiences of the USAAC who were more than a little familiar with the area!!! 8O Especially by lumbering slow-to-manouver H6Ks... - Forewarned is forearmed ...
A fixed and visible defence that I assume would have been observed and reported to Tokyo by Japanese agents on the ground in Panama, pre-war.
Yes, just establishing that the gates are/were indeed the only real weakness in the system at that point in time. - My ATL scenario hinges on that realization happening
Yes, its a BIG lake and the more AA guns scattered around it's shores means more AA guns not deployed within trange of the Gatun Dam and it's spillway gates
Strangely enough - the literary sources DO say they were deployed to cover the Canal faclities, therefore YOU are reading too mcuh into the lack of adequate recording of their sightings to say that they WEREN'T there covering what the garrison KNEW was a weakness... - My visits to the NARA archives have resulted in my having large maps of the Canal's 1941 AA positions, permanent fixed, temporary field and field alternate. Granted, I do not know if the positions indicated were January 1941, December 1941 or some mix of both. Had I thought of it at the time it would have been good to review the 1940 and 1942 AA records as well but my time there was not endless and there was much other information to be searched for.
The Coco Solo NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS Air base...Robert, I think you need to chase down more detail on the naval defences and establishment in the Canal Zone; obviously the Army and USAAC is only part of the defence story.

I think that you'll find that your photo pre-dates the time period that we discuss by about 1.5 decades.
So??? It didn't vanish into thin air :wink: It was still a naval facility during the war; in fact, the base, NOW unused, is STILL visible. - Last I knew it was not bases located several miles away that downed enemy attack aircraft but rather AA guns and intercept/persuit warplanes.
but as things stand I would suggest that if Japanese intelligence believed there was a US airfield on the Galapagos they would be markedly less likely to consider using them as a base.
Agreed. ESPECIALLY if the Japanese knew ANYTHING about the slowly-rumbling U.S. negotiations with Ecuador to lease bases in the Galapagos and Cocos islands specifically with the express intention of EXPANDING their early-warning and reconnaissance perimeter... - As I've posted before, had my ATL Panama attack scenario been approved then it would have been a simple matter for the Japanese agents on the ground to have investigated further.

We have finally established that both SEDTA and Panagra were flying out there. Buying a one-way ticket on each would be good just in case they flew differing routes ?

An IJN submarine could have launched a seaplane scout. Two, or three or ... times.

A Japanese merchant ship with undercover intell operatives aboard (as the OTL Japanese sent to Oahu) could have found an excuse to motor thru.

Foreign nationals could be paid for information ...

I just don't see that the gathering of more information on the details of the peacetime Galapagos islands would have been at all difficult.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#163

Post by robdab » 25 Jan 2009, 21:59

phylo_roadking
Executive Order 8782
Establishing a Military Reservation on Certain Islands in Gatun Lake, Canal Zone

Signed: June 12, 1941
Federal Register page and date: 6 FR 2896, June 17, 1941
Superseded by: Canal Zone Order 2, December 1, 1946 (12 FR 5364)
The AA defences are gradually getting closer than the EDGE of Gatun Lake... - So ? Just because Zorra Island and Piedras island were designated as US military reserves does not mean that American AA guns were actually located on either for Dec.7'41. In both cases, these islands are located further away from the Gatun Dam than other already existing AA batterys and likewise are nowhere near the torpedo drop fight paths that lead to it's spillway gates.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#164

Post by robdab » 25 Jan 2009, 22:34

phylo_roadking,

First of all those don't open for me, so I presume they don't for others. - Sorry to read that. I have pm'd three other readers who can open both just fine so I'm not at all sure what the problem is. What browser are you using ?

BUT you're unfortunately WRONG - note the scale model at the bottom of the pic! - It certainly wouldn't be the first, nor liklely the last time that I will be wrong, as I am married.

http://img6.travelblog.org/Photos/38234 ... fish-2.jpg

Look just HOW much bigger the wooden-add-on was. Even without it, only the VERTICAL fins of the period Type 91 were the same size as the torpedo diameter - the horizontal fin was actually slightly WIDER... - Have you considered that perhaps the model is wrong instead ? One of the URLs that you can't open is a photo of the "real thing" that does NOT agree with the dimensions displayed by that model.

http://www.j-aircraft.com/research/brya ... agrams.JPG

How do we know that Bryan Wilburn got it right when he drew those modelling sketches in 1985 ? I didn't notice that he provided any sources for his information so perhaps he was just being "inventive" ?
Not being an expert in torpedo design nor aerodynamic streamlining, I am quite content to leave the design, testing and use of this torpedo disguise modification in the capable hands of the 1941 Japanese who successfully overcame far more difficult problems prior to the OTL Pearl Harbor attacks. Even if you are not.
Robert, even the technically advanced German aviation and munition industries couldn't manage to produce a cluster bomb that would effectively BOTH shed its clamshells AND scatter its bomblets every time during WWII - even with the addition of blackpowder charges! - judging by the items that are occasionally dug up still "clustered". We tend not to go for ASB technology here. Your deception plan requires a metal sheath now to be attached to the end of a torpedo on EACH side of the plane, held in place by Bowden Cable and pins that will pick up salt and that be constantly flapping about and fraying - salt +Bowden Cable inner + constant fatiguing = breakage - over a trip of some considerable distance....a distance made unnecessarily long by diverting to approach the target over land to avoid detection by Taboga Island, and staying in cloud as long as possible. When the mechanism is operated and the pins released, the sheath has to remove ITSELF cleanly from the torpedo and not either damage or get caught on any of the awkwardly-shapped items at the rear of the torpedo. During the flight itself, the sheath has to be tight enough to the torpedo so that it doesn't either act like an air brake - you know they DO use "cones" to brake performance aircraft on landing, albeit made of nylon etc. :wink: - or strip itself off the torpedo in flight. So if it's THAT tight-fitting - there is no guarantee it is THEN loose enough to deploy cleanly...especially over the horizontal fins...

And no matter how good designers the Japanese are, even THEY had to use setscrews, Dzuz fasteners and rivets to hold thin metal shapes onto aircraft during WWII. ALL manufacturers had to.

Sid's KISS reservations are apposite here...but ALSO is a warning that you're bleeding yourself on Occam's Razor here ; EVERY SINGLE TIME a major reservation about your WI is raised, your answer is to complicate the whole undertaking even more, with extra flying time, extra manouvers, extra technology - every one of which is a Point Of Failure for the operation if it doesn't work as you intend.[/quote]

Amazingly enough, the OTL Japanese managed to co-ordinate a much, much larger and many times more complicted operation at Pearl Harbor than I have suggested here for an ATL Panama Canal attack, to great success, without having to harness any alien space bats.

I remain confident that the Japanese could have designed, prototyped, tested, modified and then finally used a rear end torpedo sheath in light of all of their other pre-PH successess. 'Tis not rocket science when compared to designing and testing the wooden torpedo fins or the A6M ZERO fighter, in the first plasce.

So far, the only criticism of my ATL Panama plan that worries me at all is Simon K's surprising (to me anyway) find that torpedo netting was installed at Gatun Dam in 1934.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#165

Post by phylo_roadking » 25 Jan 2009, 22:48

- That is not what the quote states. Did you just invent the additional interpretation or can you present a source in support of it ?
The USAAF had a definition of "patrol reconnaissance". It's what they got funding for long range "Patrol Bombers" like the first-mark B-17s for...when they couldn't get funding for strategic bombers.
...refers to the arrivial of the three extra installations which didn't appear in 1941. Obviously the two that WERE there WERE adequately manned for the quality issues to appear talked about elsewhere... - That is not what the quote states. Did you just invent the additional interpretation or can you present a source in support of it ?
I merely read English as wot she is wrote - where it says
The Aircraft Warning Service in the theater, he reported, was totally inadequate in personnel to supervise the installation of detectors on hand as well as to man the equipment when installed. Only two radar detectors were installed and in operation in the Panama Canal Department
Controlled interception is the ground vectoring of aircraft, as you've been told. it was inadequate for early warning BECAUSE it didn't cover the inner Canal Zone - but DID cover the Carribean and pacific sea appraoches in a 160-degree arc from the two installations that WERE working. Not enough to provide coverage, but if the attacking aircraft - which YOU have decided would be flying IN CLOUD and therefore restricted visibility themselves - veered for any reason into the detection arc of the Taboga island installation... - That is not what the quote states. Did you just invent the additional interpretation or can you present a source in support of it ?
Yes it is what it says - "and "quite useless" for purposes of controlled interception." Also, I merely Goggled on SCR-271 radar and confirmed the detection arc in degrees, and YOU are the one said they'd be flying in CLOUD and not thus at low level.
If low-flying they'd be BELOW cloud approaching the canal zone and thus visible for detection by Mk One Eyeball. You can't slice your options BOTH ways... - We have just established that Pan-Am flights by sister Panagra were on a regular schedule to and from the Galapagos so a "China Clipper" seen inbound would be unlikely to raise alarm.
No, we have confirmed PANAGRA clippers were flying, BUT NOT TO THE CANAL ZONE...and Panagra's colours were different. SO if a PAN-AM clipper is spotting, and approaching the CANAL ZONE military reservation...it would be challenged by radio or inspected; in ANY case it would be expected to announce its presence first.
The exact quote, already provided above, was, " The problems involved in providing a serviceable radar screen to alert the inner defenses of the Canal were less easily solved. Equipment in use at these stations was "inadequate" for early warning and "quite useless" for purposes of controlled interception." That is clearly - inadequate for early warning.
No, "inadequate" is a MEASUREMENT, it means "not enough" of - i.e coverage. If an intruder is in Taboga Island's arc, it is detected, but the SCR-271 cannot provide live data in all three dimensions for minute-to-minute vectoring onto a target.
1/ Three four-engined aircraft is a relatively sizeable signal; - My initial posting to start this thread specifies that my 3 ATL Mavis would be flying seperate courses for the run in to Gatun Lake.
THREE unidentified bogies approaching a military reservation are guaranteed to start an alert...
2/ they don't have to check EVERY radar contact - just ones that match no scheduled service, pre-posted flight plans, and didn't contact ground control by radio when entering military-regulated airspace. The task of interception and inspection is EXACTLY what the permanent-readiness aircraft were for. - This methodology would supply no security at all. Three enemy bombers could be "tailgating" just slightly below and behind a regularly scheduled airliner and that civilian aircrew would never know it. And neither would the radar if it were lucky enough (under the existing circumstances previously listed) to even pick-up the airliner at all.
Once again to wriggle the WI to fit the objections; you said they WOULDN'T be mimicking commercial airliners in ANY way...
...which is EXACTLY what would have the AWS reaching for the phone and requesting an aeriel check. - Only if the radar of the AWS manages to pick-up any aircraft at all. Which in light of the evidence presented seems unlikely.
Oh dear. I think you need to do more research; you MIGHT just find the AWS predated radar... :wink: There are OTHER ways of detecting aircraft, whioch were very popular in the 1930s...How do you think the RAF kept track of German aircraft during the Battle of Britain AFTER they had passed Chain Home and Chain Home Low.....?
No - quite useless for ground vectored interception.
- That is not what the quote states. Did you just invent the additional interpretation or can you present a source in support of it ?
Yes it IS what the quote said, as I've indicated above - "and "quite useless" for purposes of controlled interception." You DO know what ground vectoring is, don't you???
How are THEY going to find anything in clouds? Following passive radio signals etc. do not give adequate direction for torpedo runs :lol: They'll be spending a lot of time in plain air for navigational fixes etc. - Just as a peacetime Pan-Am airliner would be expected to be doing.
Ummm - not really; Pan-Am clippers had this tendency to follow coastlines if they got lost, given that the VAST majority of their services operated to ports etc....
even without considering Panama's rainy season cloud cover.
Ah, just what I was looking for - I'll return to that soon...
You misunderstand my point, which was already made above. It's behaviour OUT of the ordinary - especially IF visual confirmation shows them to be flying Pan-Am colours - that makes them suspicious... - I'd doubt that radio failure, engine failure, getting lost in the clouds or running off schedule would be at all out of the ordinary in 1941 Panamanian skies.
...hence the new 1930s regulations, and the aircraft kept ready to inspect aircraft. On rendezvousing with which "police aircraft" would attempt to radio an unidentified aircraft, an if no contact indicate the aircraft under question was to follow them.
Because IF they don't pretend FULLY to be airline aircraft following fixed airline routes or to airline timetables they stick out like the proverbail sore thumb saying "chase me". It might be best if you checked on the technical details of Clair Chennaults early-warning system established in China... :wink: - Can you present a source that indicates that Chennault's system was in use in Panama in December of 1941 ?
Have you checked out the advised details? Then you'll have found out that ALL it depended on was the use of NORMAL telephones :wink: You'll find people have a habit of telephoning their local police/priest/civil servant...at the very least to COMPLAIN!...if something really out of the ordinary happens...

I'll return to the issue pf P-39s and P-36s soon, I'm awaiting more detail on that...
An interesting proposition,indeed, that. Seeing as NO Pan-am clipper carried external tanks. - And your proof of that would be ... ? How would any USAAF pilot in Panama know what additional equipment Pan-Am had bought or not bought just last week ?
Because aircraft don't sudely sprout external tanks, they have to be designed to have the capacity to use them. And civil aircraft specs were always well known to the military, especially pilots who were expected to INSPECT aircraft over the Canal Zone military reserve...

Robert, you're NOW expecting professional military pilots to be A/not capable of doin their jobs, and B/not taking ANY notice of their professional duties. Is THIS really what the success of the japanese attack depends on????

It's called canvas.... - and is followed by rust and damp ammunition.


RUST??? Robert, I presume you were never in the services - or else you would KNOW from bored experience what soldiers in peacetime on duty spend their time doing, unless it's painting pieces of coal white...

Going by the press report from the actual location, that's exactly what they did on post... - From a sickleave point of view alone, I'd doubt that. Maybe for the few minutes of a press tour "photo-op" but I'd doubt day-in-and-day-out


Sorry; you can ridicule if you want, but the press report is QUITE clear that the hills in and around Gatun Lake contained a large number of military posts. Your logic has evidently been if you can't find something it wasn't there; well NOW you''ve been shown that there WERE AA positions surrounding the lake. I really can't help it if you don't like that new information...

If told to - of course they would. Soldiers have that annoying habit of obeying orders. - True but what sane American AA officer would order the cold-blooded murder of civilian passengers just because a flyingboat airliner was attempting a Gatun Lake landing ?


You've STILL never told us exactly what an ocean-going clipper would be expected to be doing landing in Gatun lake, except for some fictional emergency. AND with the anti-air cables being posted publically as an avaiation hazard :wink: The military have to live by the same regulations as commercial carriers in some respects, you know...

Likewise - every MODERN pic shows FOURTEEN. but that wartime one shows only TWELVE spillway channels...but there HAVE been at least TWO major renovations of the dam since the war...the concrete area where the soldier is on sentry duty is no longer there, for instance. So I assumed a later widening. I'm quite happy however to say fourteen - for THAT further reduces the actual amount of damage the SIX torpedos could theoretically do... - This is interesting news to me. I was aware of a fairly recent road bridge replacement at the Gatun Dam but not of any other major modifications. Perhaps this might explain the 65' asl vs 69' asl difference in spillway crest elevation that I have been attempting to resolve for some time now. A source please


If you check the CZimages site I linked to, I came across the reference to major works in passing. It was of no interest until the issue of how many spillways there actuallywere/are come to the fore.

Fixed, visible and reported obviously DOESN'T make them any easier to avoid though...given the experiences of the USAAC who were more than a little familiar with the area!!! 8O Especially by lumbering slow-to-manouver H6Ks... - Forewarned is forearmed ...


Forewarning doesn't matter - if nimble monplane fighters and trainers can't avoid them , fourenginned flyingboats won't.

Strangely enough - the literary sources DO say they were deployed to cover the Canal faclities, therefore YOU are reading too mcuh into the lack of adequate recording of their sightings to say that they WEREN'T there covering what the garrison KNEW was a weakness... - My visits to the NARA archives have resulted in my having large maps of the Canal's 1941 AA positions, permanent fixed, temporary field and field alternate. Granted, I do not know if the positions indicated were January 1941, December 1941 or some mix of both. Had I thought of it at the time it would have been good to review the 1940 and 1942 AA records as well but my time there was not endless and there was much other information to be searched for.


Then you'll ALSO know that those records are by no means complete...

So??? It didn't vanish into thin air :wink: It was still a naval facility during the war; in fact, the base, NOW unused, is STILL visible. - Last I knew it was not bases located several miles away that downed enemy attack aircraft but rather AA guns and intercept/persuit warplanes.


And what exactly would have been flying out of Coco Solo and any others???

An IJN submarine could have launched a seaplane scout. Two, or three or ... times.


I believe it was you who said that this would be a cause for war if detected....

How do we know that Bryan Wilburn got it right when he drew those modelling sketches in 1985 ? I didn't notice that he provided any sources for his information so perhaps he was just being "inventive" ?


His information seems to be fine to me - what little *I* knew about the Type 91 didn't include the rubber condom, for example...

I remain confident that the Japanese could have designed, prototyped, tested, modified and then finally used a rear end torpedo sheath in light of all of their other pre-PH successess. 'Tis not rocket science when compared to designing and testing the wooden torpedo fins or the A6M ZERO fighter, in the first plasce.


But it IS rocket science - technically. You're expecting a steel construction operated by external Bowden cables not to suffer fatigue from flapping around at 130mph+ for several hundred miles to be released cleanly over the most important parts of the torpedo's guidance and motor mechanisms...AND to have this strange item to escape the attention or fool inspecting pilots :lol: You may not accept this....but a mechanism like YOU make necessary is actually MORE likely to attract the attention of any inspecting pilot...ESPECIALLY OVERFLYING A MILITARY RESERVATION.

So far, the only criticism of my ATL Panama plan that worries me at all is Simon K's surprising (to me anyway) find that torpedo netting was installed at Gatun Dam in 1934


Oh, I can provide just ONE problem that literally blows the idea out of the water...

You DID say it was the rainy season, didn't you???

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