Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#211

Post by robdab » 27 Jan 2009, 07:12

Further to my previous posting on the torpedo attack made on the Hwachon Dam in Korea,

Address http://southernap.blogspot.com/2007/10/ ... opped.html presents:

"It was also realized that to help the torpedoes not dive deeply that some sort of device was going to be need. So the Aviation Ordnancemen placed plywood tails and plywood nose cones on the torpedo. These were going to help it stay shallow and not detonate against the bottom on the initial drop. This was before the use of parachute packs like we use now for aerial torpedoes."

"It was realized that due to how narrow the valley was that only two planes at a time could make the run. So that is what happened at just inches above the ways four times a pair of Skyraiders made the run down the valley. They had to go very low and very slow to make sure the torpedo didn't break up on the drop. All the while being shot at."

"Out of the 8 pilots that dropped a torpedo that day it was ruled that 6 actually got hits, two torpedoes suffered damage to their gyros and swerved into each other and blew each other up before the dam. Out of the 6 that hit the dam, one actually blew open a sluice gate and the other 5 heavily damaged the others that they were later the be found unusable when UN ground troops recaptured the area later that summer."

From http://steeljawscribe.com/2008/05/01/fl ... b-thinking comes:

"Today’s subject - the torpedo attack on the floodgates of the Hwachon Dam, is an example of what today is described as thinking out of the box."

"Since the 20-foot-high and 40-foot-wide gates made a vulnerable target for aircraft, the enemy strengthened the dam with rocks. The 4,000-foot ridges surrounding the reservoir limited access to only two aircraft at a time, making their runs against such a tiny target even more difficult."

"During the debriefing, they discussed every option, but no viable solution presented itself until Gallery boldly suggested torpedoes. His premise was that the torpedoes would provide both the accuracy and the punch to tackle the dam, and prior to sailing from the Puget Sound Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash., Princeton had actually loaded some MK 13 torpedoes left over from WW II.
http://steeljawscribe.com/wordpress/wp- ... iginal.jpg
Note that Gallery was CAPT William O. Gallery, CO of USS Princeton. So - while debriefing the crews and examining all possible alternatives, CAPT Gallery recalled a bit of recent history and mindful of the torpedos they’s loaded aboard prior to deployment, offered up the suggestion that they use those to attack the floodgates."

"Ensign Robert E. Bennett, one of only three pilots who had practiced antishipping tactics, said, “We trained extensively at coordinated tactics against shipping on a previous cruise, before Korea, and we got good at it.” Still, most of them had never dropped a torpedo, much less tried anything this unorthodox. In fact, Bennett recalled that he had never even seen an aerial torpedo before Hwachon. Thus, they decided to include on the strike three VC-35 pilots who had already practiced torpedo drops, Lieutenants Arthur F. Clapp, Frank Metzner and Addison R. English."

"During their run Clapp and English discovered the hard way that their torpedoes were faulty. Both men were stunned to watch their fish swerve at the last minute and avoid their targets completely !
Still they persisted:
Fortunately, the other six torpedoes ran true, slipping momentarily beneath the surface, but then regaining their calibration and racing on to slam into the gates. The explosions echoed off the hills and sent great waves roaring across the reservoir. The center gate was ripped apart, the second gate was torn by a 10-foot gash and one of the abutments was damaged. Circling above, the pilots watched in awe as millions of gallons of water poured through the stricken gates in huge churning columns, flooding the valley for miles."

"From this single raid, the enemy was denied control of the reservoir’s waters for the rest of the war. The elated pilots returned to Princeton for much needed rest. The squadron historian can perhaps be forgiven if he allowed his pride to get the best of him while listing his squadron’s accomplishments. Near the bottom of a long list of targets hit, ranging from bridges to tanks and barrels of fuel, he added an unusual item: “Flood Gates: 2 Destroyed, 1 Damaged.”

http://steeljawscribe.com/wordpress/wp- ... 428678.jpg

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#212

Post by Alaric » 27 Jan 2009, 08:44

Sid Guttridge wrote:Hi Alaric,

Anyone wanting to follow up the tale about supposed post-war U-boat landings in Argentina is welcome to go to that thread. There is clearly no substantive evidence for this proposition but I would encourage anyone interested to draw their own conclusions from the evidence presented by all parties there. This is not the place.
That's the kind of thing I'm talking about Sid, there certainly was evidence presented. But I agree, this isn't the place to discuss it.
On a point of information - I never thought that there were any airbases on the Galapagos. Please check. It was one of Robdab's Japanese intelligence links that suggested this. You should be taking this up with him, not me.

Cheers,

Sid.
OK, but you were suggesting there were airbases because the 22 November 1941 report mentioned the word. There were none on 7 December 1941, as I proved to my own satisfiction; there is no need to take it up with robdab. As robdab pointed out, Japanese intelligence operatives in Panama and Ecuador could have and would have determined this (not to mention final submarine and floatplane recon) if the Chitose operation had been planned and put in motion in the OTL as an adjunct to an invasion of Hawaii to follow the Oahu attacks. That is what robdab's ATL is predicated on.


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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#213

Post by Sid Guttridge » 27 Jan 2009, 12:14

Hi Alaric,

At no point did I suggest that there was an airfield on the Galapagos. I was very careful not to do so precisely because I did not think there was such an airfield.

My point, as repeatedly stated, is that a Japanese intelligence report of 22 November 1941, presented by Robdab but apparently not factored into his calculations, seemed to believe there was such a US airfield operating as part of the canal defences.

It is, of course, perfectly possible to massage an ATL so that it runs entirely smoothly. The joy of an ATL is that it can factor out anything inconvenient, such as this. However, Robdab's ATL was, as demonstrated above by several contributors, premised upon a number of other false assumptions as well. We have pointed these out so that he can refine his plan to take in more historical realities.

Particular weak points were all the sneaky-beaky contrivances surrounding disguised Mavises, Argentina and the Galapagos - uncertain usefulness of the Mavis as a reliable torpedo deliverer given its apparently non-existent wartime success in this role, the fact that the aircraft it was to be disguised as did not fly the route or in the livery it was to be painted in, that Argentina was angling for the second largest Lend-Lease allocation of PBYs at the time it was to acquire the Mavises, that Ecuador was hostile and did not possess the large Japanese community claimed, that the Galapagos had a monthly visit from the Ecuadoran Navy about which nothing was known, that Japanese intelligence appeared to think that the Galapagos contained a US air base, that the actrual defences of the Gatun spillway are unknown, that the whole complex operation could be foiled by a cheap low tech, torpedo net, etc., etc..

Most importantly, the proposed Chitose strike offered limited returns when compared to the risk its exposure posed to the far more important Pearl Harbour strike. Chitose was to be in the eastern Pacific for a good week ahead of the strike force for Pearl Harbour and her presence was to be flagged up. Given that the US had forbidden the passage of Japanese vessels through the canal in July, they were clearly already suspicious of Japanese intentions towards the canal. On top of this, Japanese merchant ships were, I was told on warsailor.com, ordered home some two months before Pearl Harbour. Unlike the 100 or so German and Italian vessels trapped in Latin American ports when they entered the war, not one Japanese vessel was still in South American waters at the time of Pearl Harbour. And into this vacuum of Japanese shipping openly sails a Japanese warship carrying warplanes on deck, hoping not to attract any US attention by advertising itself in advance.....

It could all go the way of Robdab's convoluted plan, but it would require so many variables to fall in its favour that I think it unlikely to succeed - and this is without addressing the debate being carried on by others about what damage a successful torpedo strike might do, even if on target.

Remember the old addage about "because of a nail a battle was lost"? I personally think that there are too many loose nails in this plan to give it much chance of success.

If the Japanese really wanted to hit the canal, surely a follow-up by the main strike force from Pearl Harbour would have been a much better bet - it wouldn't risk the Pearl Harbour attack, for a start, and could have saturated the defences, which had to cover several vulnerable points on the canal, with dozens and dozens of proven torpedo carriers and dive bombers.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#214

Post by Sid Guttridge » 27 Jan 2009, 12:31

Hi Robdab,

Sorry. I mistook this for a discussion based on the best available historical facts, not a fantasy debating exercise restricted to unreliable internet sources! Are you sure this should be on the Axis History Forum at all?

You stated earlier that you had consulted NARA archives. Now, by your own account, it appears that you won't even go to the library, let alone an archive. Nor will you offer NARA references. Have you actually consulted any sources outside the internet "with their admitted inaccuracies"? If so, what?

I have a strong suspicion that a number of well-meaning and informed posters are wasting their time on what is little more than ill-sourced fantasy put up by someone without sufficient interest in the subject to do any real research himself.

Cheers,

A disappinted Sid.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#215

Post by phylo_roadking » 27 Jan 2009, 17:08

Robert, that's an interesting and long post regarding the Hwachon Dam attack...but it's a pity you didn't re-read what you posted...
"Out of the 8 pilots that dropped a torpedo that day it was ruled that 6 actually got hits, two torpedoes suffered damage to their gyros and swerved into each other and blew each other up before the dam. Out of the 6 that hit the dam, one actually blew open a sluice gate and the other 5 heavily damaged the others that they were later the be found unusable when UN ground troops recaptured the area later that summer."
hmm....
The squadron historian can perhaps be forgiven if he allowed his pride to get the best of him while listing his squadron’s accomplishments. Near the bottom of a long list of targets hit, ranging from bridges to tanks and barrels of fuel, he added an unusual item: “Flood Gates: 2 Destroyed, 1 Damaged.”
There seems to be some discrepancy between what the various parties THINK was actually done :lol: :lol: :lol:

P.S. remember THIS???
It seems that out of 8 drops, one gate was totally destroyed and another had a 10' diameter hole blown through it. Two torpedoes were seen to veer wildly off target and a third hit an abutment but the remainder appeared to hit their target gates according to the pilots. Not bad at all for untrained pilots, attacking under AA fire, I'd say.
I somehow don't think you really want people reading your new sources TOO carefully...
Arriving over the target at 1130, the pilots were amazed to find the valley ominously quiet. Expecting the guns to riddle them at any moment, they pushed themselves over and went in, only then being greeted by the first bursts of flak. Apparently, the enemy did not expect them to return so soon and was caught by surprise. While the Corsairs went after the guns or circled, each pair of ADs flew in at wave-top level, struggling to hold their letdown to drop altitude so that they did not exceed torpedo speed.
The Americans attacked an open and barely defended target! :lol: :lol: :lol:

As an interesting P.S., however...
the other 5 heavily damaged the others that they were later the be found unusable
Look again at the picture you've referenced...

Image


*I* see the extreme left and extreme right gates open to sluice water anyway where the attackers couldn't have run torpedos at them, too close to shore as your referenced article say....while of the rest I see indeed two and a bit "opened" by the attack, in the centre of the dam

So if they did indeed find "the other 5 heavily damaged"....

Then they must have been buckled and jammed IN PLACE....for there is no outflow from them in the pic, ONLY the three mentioned as destoryed or punctured...which is EXACTLY what the DEFENDERS would WANT at Gatun Dam! The U.S. garrison commander would be CHEERING if an attack left some gates JAMMED rather than blown away completely! He could after all - like today - merely use the undamaged gates to sluice.

Robert, your thinking is proving disappointingly superficial in all this, for someone who seems to have put a lot of research into this.
Last edited by phylo_roadking on 27 Jan 2009, 20:20, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#216

Post by phylo_roadking » 27 Jan 2009, 17:44

As for your absolutely ridiculous idea that a H6K Mavis could carry up to twelve tons of explosive...I'm sure you're aware of what means the British had to use to deliver only FOUR AND A HALF tons to a dock gate in March 1942...

Image

A DESTROYER!!! :lol: :lol: :lol:

A Pan-Am Boeing 314 Clipper could as of 1941 carry a maximum payload of 10,000lbs - that's only 4.4 tons...and that's a box-with-wings-and-a-keel, not a military aircraft with longrange tanks, internal bulkheads and accomodation etc. I doubt there's anywhere inside the hull of a Mavis you could physically PUT even four tons of explosive without it falling through the hull somewhere or as I said before making the aircraft SO untrimmed that it would be impossible to fly.

And it's STILL only going to hit and damage or destroy ONE gate per aircraft :lol: :lol: :lol:

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#217

Post by robdab » 27 Jan 2009, 20:29

phylo_roadking,

Robert, that's an interesting and long post regarding the Hwachon Dam attack...but it's a pity you didn't re-read what you posted... - You'll note that I provided no analysis of the items that I posted, just the quotes and their sources so that my readers could make up their own minds. As most any traffic policeman will tell you, three eyewitnesses to any traffic accident will likely relate three widely varying versions of what they saw happen. War history seems to suffer from the same problem. 'Tis what makes our debates more difficult, the sorting out of contradictory reports. Which version is true ? I don't know because I wasn't there at the time. This one is a special situation though, in that it seems that video of the real attack was recorded. Viewing that should be interesting.
The squadron historian can perhaps be forgiven if he allowed his pride to get the best of him while listing his squadron’s accomplishments. Near the bottom of a long list of targets hit, ranging from bridges to tanks and barrels of fuel, he added an unusual item: “Flood Gates: 2 Destroyed, 1 Damaged.”
There seems to be some discrepancy between what the various parties THINK was actually done - I posted the quote to point that out.

I somehow don't think you really want people reading your new sources TOO carefully... - I posted the quotes to point out that there are several different versions of the dam attack story in circulation.
the other 5 heavily damaged the others that they were later the be found unusable
Image

*I* see the extreme left and extreme right gates open to sluice water - One of the quotes does mention that an abutment was damaged so that certainly might be the cause of the extreme right side or left side water flows that you see.

where the attackers couldn't have run torpedos at them, too close to shore as your referenced article say.... - Why could not the torpedoes been dropped at a slight angle to the gates ? Where is it writen that only an attack angle of 90 degrees to a gate could be used ?

So if they did indeed find "the other 5 heavily damaged"....Then they must have been buckled and jammed IN PLACE....for there is no outflow from them in the pic, ONLY the three mentioned as destoryed or punctured...which is EXACTLY what the DEFENDERS would WANT at Gatun Dam! The U.S. garrison commander would be CHEERING if an attack left some gates JAMMED rather than blown away completely! He could after all - like today - merely use the undamaged gates to sluice. - Were a really heavy storm to arrive when numerous gates were jammed then there would be real possibility of the entire Gatun Dam being overtopped and eroded away down to sea level. Such a disaster as that magnitude of water loss could put the Canal out of action for two or more years.

Do you have any idea of when during the attack sequence that photo was taken ? It could have been taken after the torpedo attacks were over but it also could have been taken mid-way thru, before all of the hits were finished being made.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#218

Post by robdab » 27 Jan 2009, 20:55

phylo_roadking,

As for your absolutely ridiculous idea that a H6K Mavis could carry up to twelve tons of explosive...I'm sure you're aware of what means the British had to use to deliver only FOUR AND A HALF tons to a dock gate in March 1942... - What has a destroyer got to do with a Mavis ? In a time of war when explosive would be useful for many projects, I'd imagine that the British would only have used the MINIMUM needed to get the job done, not the MAXIMUM that the destroyer could have carried.

A Pan-Am Boeing 314 Clipper could as of 1941 carry a maximum payload of 10,000lbs - that's only 4.4 tons... - I listed my Mavis info source. If you don't like the numbers then please take it up with that site's owner and/or provide an alternative set of numbers, with a source, other than yourself, listed.

and that's a box-with-wings-and-a-keel, not a military aircraft with longrange tanks, internal bulkheads and accomodation etc. I doubt there's anywhere inside the hull of a Mavis you could physically PUT even four tons of explosive without it falling through the hull somewhere or as I said before making the aircraft SO untrimmed that it would be impossible to fly. - Just as with your destroyer example, I'm sure that the ATL Japanese would calculate the minimum explosive charge needed for whatever mayhem they intended and carefully load each Mavis. Keep in mind that not all would have to go inside the aircraft's hull. We know that a Mavis could haul two 1,850 lb torpedoes so two hollow cylinders packed with 3,700 lbs of explosives could be carried that way. That is very nearly two more tons right there.

And it's STILL only going to hit and damage or destroy ONE gate per aircraft - Since it was Glenn239's idea, I'd suggest that you file your protestations with him, not me.

I would point out though, that with a big bomb, placed correctly by a very calm IJN pilot, there could exist the possibility of taking out two or three adjacent gates with each such blast. I'd have to see the "as built" reinforcing steel drawings for the concrete piers dividing the gates to be sure but it might indeed be possible to topple a pier(s) with their adjacent gates, that way.

Poor chances for aircrew escape though.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#219

Post by phylo_roadking » 27 Jan 2009, 21:14

*I* see the extreme left and extreme right gates open to sluice water - One of the quotes does mention that an abutment was damaged so that certainly might be the cause of the extreme right side or left side water flows that you see.
where the attackers couldn't have run torpedos at them, too close to shore as your referenced article say.... - Why could not the torpedoes been dropped at a slight angle to the gates ? Where is it writen that only an attack angle of 90 degrees to a gate could be used ?
IF you actually READ the rest of the account you referenced, you'll see this was EXACTLY the case during the attack, the aircraft could only attack in twos, one after the other because of the narrowness of the approach between the two "artifical hillsides" the defenders had built up. Ergo - 90 degrees to the dam gates and running central, so only the centre couple of gates were hit.
So if they did indeed find "the other 5 heavily damaged"....Then they must have been buckled and jammed IN PLACE....for there is no outflow from them in the pic, ONLY the three mentioned as destoryed or punctured...which is EXACTLY what the DEFENDERS would WANT at Gatun Dam! The U.S. garrison commander would be CHEERING if an attack left some gates JAMMED rather than blown away completely! He could after all - like today - merely use the undamaged gates to sluice. - Were a really heavy storm to arrive when numerous gates were jammed then there would be real possibility of the entire Gatun Dam being overtopped and eroded away down to sea level. Such a disaster as that magnitude of water loss could put the Canal out of action for two or more years
:lol: :lol: :lol: REALLY??? I'm afraid Robert, you've JUST illustrated the LACK of indepth research you've done on this, even in the civil engineering aspects....

Image

The Spillways were set radially AND with "baffles" at the bottom to ensure that multiple outflows running into each other at their full 10,000 cubic feet persecond per gate actually compensated for each other to leech away the effect of a single concentrated outflow IF IN FULL SPATE eroding the concrete down to the earth berm!!!

I'm afraid the dam's designers and builders beat you there, Robert...
A Pan-Am Boeing 314 Clipper could as of 1941 carry a maximum payload of 10,000lbs - that's only 4.4 tons... - I listed my Mavis info source. If you don't like the numbers then please take it up with that site's owner and/or provide an alternative set of numbers, with a source, other than yourself, listed.
Robert, for the sake of your own private mania you're choosing to IGNORE the scientific explanation of "loaded weight" - and for absolutely ANYONE that can Google for themselves you're making yourself look unnecessarily foolish now. I'd REALLY suggest you do some research on what "loaded weight" MEANS in aviation terms before you go ANY further.
and that's a box-with-wings-and-a-keel, not a military aircraft with longrange tanks, internal bulkheads and accomodation etc. I doubt there's anywhere inside the hull of a Mavis you could physically PUT even four tons of explosive without it falling through the hull somewhere or as I said before making the aircraft SO untrimmed that it would be impossible to fly. - Just as with your destroyer example, I'm sure that the ATL Japanese would calculate the minimum explosive charge needed for whatever mayhem they intended and carefully load each Mavis. Keep in mind that not all would have to go inside the aircraft's hull. We know that a Mavis could haul two 1,850 lb torpedoes so two hollow cylinders packed with 3,700 lbs of explosives could be carried that way. That is very nearly two more tons right there.
Oh dear, Robert - external hardpoints and their payload are NOT "in addition" to weight carried internally - they ALL add to an aircraft's TOTAL weight to MTO :lol: :lol: :lol: What you carry ON the hardpoints you CAN'T carry in the body of the plane or else it won't get off the "ground". I'm afraid that's how aircraft work. Flying boats carried external ordnance NOT because they didn't have the TOTAL weight free or the space inside...BUT BECAUSE YOU DON'T CUT BOMBDOORS IN A FLYING BOATS'S KEEL :lol: :lol: :lol: BUT if you carry X-weight externally, you just can't load on more internally in addition...unless the aircracft is DESIGNED with the excess payload weight to do so - and as we know the Mavis was marginal in its weight-carrying capacity anyway...

And P.S. - in 1941 the H6K's external pylons CAN'T carry 3,700lbs a side.... :lol:
And it's STILL only going to hit and damage or destroy ONE gate per aircraft - Since it was Glenn239's idea, I'd suggest that you file your protestations with him, not me.
He had a semi-sensible idea - YOU are the one making a mockery of it.

This indicates what I mean...
I would point out though, that with a big bomb, placed correctly by a very calm IJN pilot, there could exist the possibility of taking out two or three adjacent gates with each such blast. I'd have to see the "as built" reinforcing steel drawings for the concrete piers dividing the gates to be sure but it might indeed be possible to topple a pier(s) with their adjacent gates, that way.

Poor chances for aircrew escape though.
I believe Glenn's idea was to ram the gates at speed - YOU seem to have come up with the idea of the Mavis taxiing up to the gate, the crew priming the "bomb" then going overboard. So, you're saying that the Mavis will sit bobbing merrily like a cork until zero hour....

I'm afraid THAT is EXACTLY where Barnes Wallis comes back in. The vast majority of the explosive force of ANY such device will be expended simply blowing the Mavis AWAY from the gates, not the gates away from the Mavis The gates are the "immovable object" compared to the floating H6K :lol: :lol: :lol:

I presume in your NEXT posting the crew will NOW be expected to moor the Mavis to the gates with some sort of grappling hook.... :P

And you accuse ME of working thse problems down to the micro level!!! Maybe YOU should before you put finger to keyboard. It would save you a lot of embarassment.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#220

Post by phylo_roadking » 27 Jan 2009, 23:01

P.S. you've neglected one other detail - I DID tell you to look closely at the Hwachon Dam pictures. If you had you'd have seen something that made them very different to Stoney Gates....they're vertical lift fixed wheel gates with overhead electric hoists, not Stoney gates. You can even SEE the overhead lift piers.

I of course wonder if vertical lift fixed wheel gates are more vulnerable than Stoney gates... :wink: :wink: :wink: I note your "damage report" mentions other gates were "unusable" - as perhaps in the exposed lifting mechanisms being damaged rather than the GATES??? :wink:

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#221

Post by JTG » 28 Jan 2009, 00:49

*********
As for your absolutely ridiculous idea that a H6K Mavis could carry up to twelve tons of explosive...I'm sure you're aware of what means the British had to use to deliver only FOUR AND A HALF tons to a dock gate in March 1942... - What has a destroyer got to do with a Mavis ? In a time of war when explosive would be useful for many projects, I'd imagine that the British would only have used the MINIMUM needed to get the job done, not the MAXIMUM that the destroyer could have carried.
********

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/St._Nazaire_Raid

Imagine away: HOWEVER...

There was a very important element here (St Nazaire) in that the delayed charge was intended to remain undetected aboard Cambletown... in order that the objective of crippling the gates would be achieved regardless of the success or failure of the diversionary shore ops.

JOHN

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#222

Post by phylo_roadking » 28 Jan 2009, 03:01

Regarding how alert the Canal Zone would or would not be...at 12:05 on 7th December 1941, George Marshall sent his famous warning out to Hawaii and Manila - and we know how the alert warning arrived late on anyone's desk in Oahu due to having to be sent "conventionally" due to atmospherics. Manila however recieved Radiogram 733 on transmission, and one hour and eighteen minutes AFTER the message was sent Japanese aircraft were crossing their coastal entry points on Oahu...

The SAME alert was ALSO sent to the Canal Zone from the War Depratment Message Centre Code Room at 12:05 on December 7th 1941; there is NO trace of it having to be resent in any other way, or of it not being received, so the Commander, Canal Zone received a War Alert roughly 90+ minutes before Pearl Harbour was attacked, the same alert Manila received. MacArthur wasn't wakened by his staff until they received a report of Pearl being attacked, and when getting ready to leave the Manila Hotel he was ALSO handed Marshall's War Alert...

However, Panama is in the same timezone as Washington D.C. - it would have been 12:05 when the message was received there, closing any window of the garrison not being on alert :wink: BEFORE the attack on Pearl Harbour.

I've spent the evening in some very profitable research; Robert, I can now give you your point and say there were apparently NO P-39s in the Canal Zone after all...

THERE WAS SOMETHING FAR MORE INTERESTING...

As far as I can see, the Internet copy of GUARDING THE UNITED STATES AND ITS OUTPOSTS is a 2000 archived copy of the original 1962 book...and I'm afraid in the intervening 47 years a LOT more has been found out about a whole raft of things historical and military, as we all know...

For instance - we have THIS interesting archive throwing more light on matters... http://www.navsource.org/Naval/usaaf.htm specifically -

The USAAF units and aircraft stationed in the Canal Zone ON DECEMBER 7TH 1941 as the Carribbean AF, later in 1942 the 6th Air Force!
CANAL ZONE
----------
Albrook Field
HQ Caribbean Air Force
HQ VI Bomber Command
HQ 12th Pursuit Wing
37th Pursuit Group (Interceptor)
16th Pursuit Group (Interceptor)
24th Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor) (P-36)
28th Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor) (P-40)
29th Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor) (P-40)
31st Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor) (P-26, P-40)
43d Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor) (P-40)

France Field
6th Bombardment Group (Heavy), France Fld, CZ
3d Bombardment Squadron (Heavy) (B-18)
20th Transport Squadron (C-39, C-47, C-49)
25th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy) (B-18)
39th Observation Squadron (O-47, O-49)

Howard Field
7th Reconnaissance Squadron (Heavy) (B-17, B-18)
59th Bombardment Squadron (Light) (A-20)
Detachment, 20th Transport Squadron (C-39, C-47, C-49)
That looks suspiciously like AT LEAST three and a half squadrons of P-40s in there, or 42 top-range USAAF fighters.

And to THAT you can add the 12 PBY Catalinas based at the aforementioned Coco Solo Naval Air base, according to History of United States Naval Operations in World War II by Samuel Eliot Morison...which of course you know about, yet didn't know they were based at Coco Solo.

The garrison's performance interception capacity, AND it's capacity to patrol out to the Galapagos etc. is spiralling up and up all the time...

Oh, and as a P.S., from Army Air Forces in World War II Vol. I: Plans & Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942 edited by W.F. Craven, Princeton University & J.L. Cate, University of Chicago...since the "Final Alert" of 27th November sent out by Washington,
The Caribbean Air Force, now under the command of Maj. Gen. Davenport Johnston, was not adequately equipped by 7 December 1941 to carry out all of its responsibilities. Although approximately 165 P-40's had arrived in the Caribbean, they were not furnished with the necessary devices to assure interception or to operate effectively at night. The pursuit aircraft were on the alert twenty-four hours a day, but only about 50 per cent of their practice missions resulted in interceptions
So from THAT we can see that while they didn't have the VHF radios as discussed before to ensure controlled/ground vectored interception, THEY WERE ALL ON 24-HOUR ALERT...

...and 50% of their training missions STILL resulted in interceptions ANYWAY despite the lack of ground vectoring...

Remember, I DID tell you that fighter pilots were trained to do their OWN search and pursuit... :wink:

All of which to me reads as in the event of an alert ONLY 21 out of 42 P-40s would find their targets....

Seven P-40s against each of three slow flying boats; it may only be statistics, but that's enough to do the job :wink:

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phylo_roadking
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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#223

Post by phylo_roadking » 28 Jan 2009, 04:04

Robert - where exactly on the Chitose do you expect it to be able to carry THREE H6K Mavis flyingboats??? H6Ks are actually quite BIG, in both wingspan and length. I know you're quite familiar with this picture of the admittedly-smaller Akitsushima, http://www.aeronautic.dk/Warship%20Akitsushima18.htm...but the Chitose is likewise a bit cramped for four-engined flying boats...http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... ose-av.gif

Bigger crane ot not, there's only room for TWO on the afterdeck that the crane can reach...and it had better be calm weather all the way across the Pacific... 8O

EDIT: Actually....with the bigger support a bigger crane visibly needs, will there BE room for even two on the Chitose's afterdeck? :wink:
Last edited by phylo_roadking on 28 Jan 2009, 04:25, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#224

Post by phylo_roadking » 28 Jan 2009, 04:12

P.S.
I'm sure you have - *I* however would prefer to go with the future plans for expansion of the water supply made necessary by increased traffic...at least as said by the present administration of the Canal on their various business plans that can be found on the Net; being a civil engineer I'm suprised you've not found these.
I haven't looked. How would my 1941 ATL Japanese have known about modern day Panama Canal expansion plans ?
I do hope you're not being intentionally obtuse there. and all your other comments about not knowing about increased traffic and water requirements etc.; I know you're quite familiar with http://www.pancanal.com ....

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#225

Post by robdab » 29 Jan 2009, 08:52

phylo_roadking,

The SAME alert was ALSO sent to the Canal Zone from the War Depratment Message Centre Code Room at 12:05 on December 7th 1941; there is NO trace of it having to be resent in any other way, or of it not being received, so the Commander, Canal Zone received a War Alert roughly 90+ minutes before Pearl Harbour was attacked, ... - No record of it not being received does NOT guarantee that it was received, nor that it was delivered to anyone of importance in the Panama defence Chain of Commad. Good try though.

However, Panama is in the same time zone as Washington D.C. - it would have been 12:05 when the message was received there, closing any window of the garrison not being on alert BEFORE the attack on Pearl Harbour. - So not 90 minutes ahead of my ATL attack, just 55 minutes.

From page #410 of http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... h16.htm#b1 I provide:

"On Friday, 12 December, five days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Secretary Stimson was amazed to find that no scheme for establishing unity of command in Panama had been worked out. Aroused by the thought that the canal would probably be one of the next objectives of the Japanese, he had General Marshall draw up a proposed directive placing all Army and Navy forces in the Panama Coastal Frontier, except fleet units, under Army command, and later in the day Mr. Stimson laid the proposal before the Cabinet.3 The President approved the idea by taking a map, writing "Army" over the area of the Panama Coastal Frontier, but at the same time writing "Navy" over the Caribbean Coastal Frontier, and then adding his "O.K.-F.D.R." As presented by Secretary Stimson, the draft proposal had said nothing about the command of the Caribbean area except that "the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, within his means and other responsibilities, will support the Naval Commander of the Caribbean Coastal Frontier."

So, phylo, please tell me, with just 55 minutes warning, who exactly got the War Warning in Panama and what did they do with it ? Being that there was NO clear chain of command at the time, did anyone at all listen ? War Alerts and warnings had become a regular event over the last few months afterall. Would anyone have taken THIS ONE any more seriously ? Did the Navy order the Airforce or did the Airforce order the Navy ? Maybe a junior officer wasted an hour of valuable time by going off to look for a superior officer just gone to lunch at 1200 ? Did anyone tell the Army and who, if anyone, finally got around to telling the AA gunners ? I'm not at all worried that this alert would have resulted in any actual increased alert in the field defences within just 55 minutes. Not a hope in that peacetime cluster...k.

I've spent the evening in some very profitable research; Robert, I can now give you your point and say there were apparently NO P-39s in the Canal Zone after all...
THERE WAS SOMETHING FAR MORE INTERESTING...
The USAAF units and aircraft stationed in the Canal Zone ON DECEMBER 7TH 1941 as the Carribbean AF, later in 1942 the 6th Air Force!
CANAL ZONE
----------
Albrook Field
HQ Caribbean Air Force
HQ VI Bomber Command
HQ 12th Pursuit Wing
37th Pursuit Group (Interceptor)
16th Pursuit Group (Interceptor)
24th Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor) (P-36)
28th Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor) (P-40)
29th Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor) (P-40)
31st Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor) (P-26, P-40)
43d Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor) (P-40)

France Field
6th Bombardment Group (Heavy), France Fld, CZ
3d Bombardment Squadron (Heavy) (B-18)
20th Transport Squadron (C-39, C-47, C-49)
25th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy) (B-18)
39th Observation Squadron (O-47, O-49)

Howard Field
7th Reconnaissance Squadron (Heavy) (B-17, B-18)
59th Bombardment Squadron (Light) (A-20)
Detachment, 20th Transport Squadron (C-39, C-47, C-49)
That looks suspiciously like AT LEAST three and a half squadrons of P-40s in there, or 42 top-range USAAF fighters.

I truely hope that you didn't spend a whole lot of time on that research when my initial thread opening post on this topic stated, "I do know that 3 US interceptor squadrons, each of 10 x P-36 fighters, were flying in Panama's rainy season cloudy skies already but AFAIK the 71 more modern P-40s which had just arrived were not operational there until well after Dec.7'41."

Please try to keep up.

And to THAT you can add the 12 PBY Catalinas based at the aforementioned Coco Solo Naval Air base, according to History of United States Naval Operations in World War II by Samuel Eliot Morison...which of course you know about, yet didn't know they were based at Coco Solo. - These were busy patrolling the Caribbean off of Panama in search of German U-boats and so were not at all important to my ATL scenario. It was the OTHER 12 PBYs based at the Pacific end of the Canal, that you didn't mention, which were the only long range search aircraft available to the USN for peacetime Pacific Ocean patrols at the time.

Yet again, reference to my initial thread starting post would have provided you with, "AFAIK there were only 12 PBY scouts assigned to search the Pacific to the west of Panama out of the 96 that were estimated to be able to provide a proper long ranged search." had you bothered to read it.

Please try to keep up.

The garrison's performance interception capacity, AND it's capacity to patrol out to the Galapagos etc. is spiralling up and up all the time... - Please try to keep up.

Oh, and as a P.S., from Army Air Forces in World War II Vol. I: Plans & Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942 edited by W.F. Craven, Princeton University & J.L. Cate, University of Chicago...since the "Final Alert" of 27th November sent out by Washington,
The Caribbean Air Force, now under the command of Maj. Gen. Davenport Johnston, was not adequately equipped by 7 December 1941 to carry out all of its responsibilities. Although approximately 165 P-40's had arrived in the Caribbean, they were not furnished with the necessary devices to assure interception or to operate effectively at night. The pursuit aircraft were on the alert twenty-four hours a day, but only about 50 per cent of their practice missions resulted in interceptions
So from THAT we can see that while they didn't have the VHF radios as discussed before to ensure controlled/ground vectored interception, THEY WERE ALL ON 24-HOUR ALERT - So ? The US pilots could have been sitting in their cockpits but without good initial radar plot locations and NO radio guidance possible after takeoff, what good were they going to really do against 3 seperated Pan-Am flyingboats that were trying hard not to mbe found ?

For your further education I quote from pages 291/2 of

"Any vestiges of complacency as to the adequacy of the American aircraft warning service which may have remained in War Department circles were destroyed by the severely critical report made by Watson-Watt in January 1942 of the air defenses on the West Coast. Dangerously unsatisfactory conditions existed, reflecting "insufficient organization applied to technically inadequate equipment used in exceptionally difficult conditions." Progress would depend upon giving all levels of command an understanding of the true capabilities of radar, which, according to the British expert, could be found as a happy medium between two absurd attitudes, one of which viewed radar as an all-seeing, omniscient weapon, "a crystal ball on a truck," and the other extreme which regarded it as nothing more than a freak gadget "producing snap observations on targets which may or may not be aircraft." Actually, radar, in the hands of trained technicians, could provide a dependable warning system "in which continuity of tracking is normal, [and] where the unexplained is rare." But such results could be achieved only with close organization and supervision, a point at which the American warning service fell short.
Equally serious was the problem of equipment. In a report filled with illuminating detail, the British expert found our seaward reconnaissance grossly inefficient because of the total lack of ASV equipment and because of the limited number of patrol aircraft of suitable range. The radar screen along the West Coast was based on too few stations, and the equipment itself had inherent defects which made it "gravely unsuitable." All radar experts were agreed that each set represented a compromise between a variety of demands, but the principal American radar was "unique in combining slow search with poor cover in elevation, with lack of all facilities for height finding, and with a grave danger of plotting false tracks." Moreover, dependable employment of this radar had been made even more unlikely because of a mistake in the selection of sites for its installation. Personnel to operate the radars had not been carefully selected and were inadequate both in numbers and in training. The United States was found to have repeated an early error of Britain in failing to provide for the training of large numbers of skilled radar technicians.


So, the US interceptors get no target height info, false tracks and no reports for targets in rough terrain. Inspires confidence doesn't it ?

...and 50% of their training missions STILL resulted in interceptions ANYWAY espite the lack of ground vectoring... - Do you have any information about how realistic those practise interception missions really were ? Did the targets fly in the clouds and attempt to avoid detection or were they cruising along at a fixed altitude above the clouds in the bright sunshine ? How many minutes of advance warning did the US fighters get ?

Remember, I DID tell you that fighter pilots were trained to do their OWN search and pursuit... - Do you really think that only 50% against peacetime training targets was "good enough" for wartime ??

All of which to me reads as in the event of an alert ONLY 21 out of 42 P-40s would find their targets
Seven P-40s against each of three slow flying boats; it may only be statistics, but that's enough to do the job
- Except that on Dec.7'41 none of the P-40s were declared operational. They were still training and awaiting radio equipment installation.

BTW, I found "Air traffic regulations for the Canal Zone were revised to provide for a defended zone extending ten miles on either side of the canal.19" with "19. Panama Canal Air Traffic Reg., 15 Dec. 1941" on page #275 of http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/I/AAF-I-8.html so my ATL "Chins Clippers" would have been free and clear to fly over the Canal Zone on Dec.7'41. That airspace wasn't closed/defended until Dec.15'41.

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