So questions are -
What are the air and sea defences there, in the Gulf of Chiriqui? Are there US warships or an airbase?
What are the roads like between west Panama and Balboa?
What were the Panama defence command’s planning provisions if a force landed in western Panama near David and approached the Canal via the coastal road? Would it throw out a blocking force into Panama immediately, or was it confined to the Canal Zone until Panama and Washington reached an agreement? Was there a public agreement that Japan would have known about?
Is it possible to march over the mountains of central Panama, or is a force stuck on the south coast?
Did Panama have an army, navy or air force?
Glenn, a large number of THOSE are also moot; after the death of President Arias and his replacement by President De la Guardia in mid 1941, the U.S. government was given permission by the Panamanians to lease
one hundred and forty three extra sites for installations in the rest of Panama. Hence the growth of the large number of auxiliary depots, landing fields, coastal installations etc. The Japanese - or at lease Akiyama with his resources - would almost certainly have known about this change in stance, and the suddent growth of the Department's responsibilities beyond the boundaries of the Zone...incidnetly leading to the growing of Rio Hato into a full AAF depot and other developments that would have been hard
NOT to know about! And as far as I can see, this change in stance and the Pan-American Security Zone provisions - the "meat" behind the Declaration of Panama - meant that there wouldn't need to be any subsequent arrangement between the Department and the government of Panama before U.S. forces were deployed...
...because as for the "army of Panama"...Panama's first army was formed in 1903, when the commander of a brigade of the Colombian army defected to the pro-independence side during Panama's fight for independence. His brigade became the Panamanian army. However - in 1904, the Army THEN tried to overthrow the government, but failed. The United States persuaded Panama that a standing army could threaten the security of the Panama Canal Zone. Instead, the country set up a "National Police." For 48 years, this was the only armed force in Panama belonging to the Panamanians; the U.S. was responsible for military affairs
and then advance by truck and armor to the vicinity of Penonome (50 miles west of the Canal).
Glenn, you ARE aware that the general idea of "infiltration" means "to pass surreptitiously into enemy-held territory", "to enter or take up positions in gradually or surreptitiously" - note the word SURREPTITIOUSLY....
and NOW you're suggesting the Japanese land trucks and ARMOUR??? How??? How exactly do you expect the Japanese to land EITHER trucks OR armour on a technically-hostile coast under war alert without the aid of a quayside??? And without someone ANYONE lifting a phone or simply running away yelling at the top of their lungs??? Armour tends also to be
noisy. You might as well be waving a flag saying "We're here"....
This idea had a LITTLE merit when it rested with the level of "infiltration" - ALL that mattered was resolving how on earth enough men to CARRY enough explosives and supplies to do any damage to a potential target
and to be able to survive until a target presented itself could actually LAND
unseen close enough to the Canal yet outside ANY possible defences
AND manage to get as far as the Canal without being rumbled by
somebody...
but a FULL military expedition of ANY size is EXACTLY the reason the U.S. HAD 21,000 men, motorised arty, Air Force bombers etc. in the Canal Zone!
Why don't YOU go now and find out how long it actually took to disembark similar forces in Malaya in late 1941...certainly DAYS
plural. AND apart from anything else you'll find out the British knew quite a lot about when, where, and by what ships, they just made different (and untimately unsuitable) plans to deal with them. And remember in THIS case the whole length of the coast of Panama was patrolled by the Pacific Coast squadron, and patrolled by the USN's PBYs. How are you planning for your Japanese forces to seize heavy landing facilties without ANYONE reporting it? How are you planning for the vessels necessary for carrying this level of force to actually enter patrolled coastal waters without being noticed...how are you planning that they deal with the situation when challenged or inspection is demanded? Hiding explosives in the bilges of a merchantman - one of the things the Americans wWERE worried about - is ONE thing...
where do you intend them to hide a TANK???
"I'm sorry, they're actually four thousand fishermen of Japanese origin all heading to Panama in the hold of one cargo ship, Officer - and yes, those may LOOK like Japanese military uniforms, but....oh, you mean THOSE rifles?" isn't going to work.
This WI started out with simply a badly-researched and assumption-heavy idea that MERELY fell apart on every single level; NOW it's morphing into a suggested
military expedition in the face of defences, thirty years of plans and exercises, and a sizeable ground force...
all specifically there to PREVENT a military expedition marching on the Canal!
And finally - you expect them to be able to land HERE...
...and drive
half the length of the country to the Canal - and NOT meet the U.S. Army coming in the other direction???