Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#346

Post by glenn239 » 09 Feb 2009, 00:02

the U.S. government was given permission by the Panamanians to lease one hundred and forty three extra sites for installations in the rest of Panama. Hence the growth of the large number of auxiliary depots, landing fields, coastal installations etc.
Ok, the U.S. had military units and aircraft stationed in western Panama in December and that fact rules out a landing. Just for curiosity, how many men and aircraft were there by December 10th or 15th?
and drive half the length of the country to the Canal - and NOT meet the U.S. Army coming in the other direction?
The US presence you just stated existed in western Panama rules out a landing, because for a landing to have a chance the coast has to be undefended. But just for curiosity, how passable is that central mountain range to infantry and vehicles?
and NOW you're suggesting the Japanese land trucks and ARMOUR???
Of course. There would be no point in arranging such a difficult and unlikely task as trying gain the Canal by force from a landing 170 miles distant, only to forget the trucks and tanks back in Japan. The insurmountable logistic problems are the lack of an escort, lack of airpower, and the shipping problems inherent to debarking a mixed mobile force. And no, I do not need your input to accurately model these factors.
This idea had a LITTLE merit when it rested with the level of "infiltration" - ALL that mattered was resolving how on earth enough men to CARRY enough explosives and supplies to do any damage to a potential target and to be able to survive until a target presented itself.
Inflitration was not going to work because the locals would be hostile and the units would know next to nothing of the terrain they would be operating in.
This WI started out with simply a badly-researched and assumption-heavy idea that MERELY fell apart on every single level; NOW it's morphing into a suggested military expedition.
We have 24 pages of mostly heated insulting and useless discussion on a broken premise. The Canal was not vulnerable to attack, period. But to be systematic about it, all possibilities should be examined and debunked.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#347

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 09 Feb 2009, 01:20

glenn239 wrote:We have 24 pages of mostly heated insulting and useless discussion on a broken premise. The Canal was not vulnerable to attack, period. But to be systematic about it, all possibilities should be examined and debunked.
Then we can distill and edit the points, writing them into a essay than can be posted as a all encompassing response it the question ever comes up again :D


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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#348

Post by phylo_roadking » 09 Feb 2009, 01:24

Just for curiosity, how many men and aircraft were there by December 10th or 15th?
I've never seen a precise figure for what arrived in the first week, apart from the anecdotal "1,000 more troops" and the P-40s brought in from the U.S. Usually the build-up in the Canal Zone is reported at various "mileposts" - end of calendar or fiscal years, change in Departmental commander, changes in command structure, etc.
But just for curiosity, how passable is that central mountain range to infantry and vehicles?
Here's a MODERN map, showing major metalled roads. Note that even today there are no major routes THROUGH the central mountains; instead just a series of roads going up ribbon valleys to highland towns like Santa Fe, El Cope, El Valle etc. Any other roads in the mountains are at best going to be down at the "unmetalled" level in the period under discussion - and that's possibly the most charitable that can be said about them :lol: I severely doubt if there were any that were passable for armour or wheeled traffic in the November/December period - given the rainy season.

http://www.schooneralliance.com/Panama%20map.jpg
Inflitration was not going to work because the locals would be hostile and the units would know next to nothing of the terrain they would be operating in.
This STILL applies to a motorised expedition in the rainy season. The locals don't actually have to do anything more hostile than lift a telepohone; but as it was, it would be remarkably easy to block trails out of season.
The Canal was not vulnerable to attack, period. But to be systematic about it, all possibilities should be examined and debunked.
Okay ; then bear in mind when modelling this that U.S. garrison has thirty years of experience and training at deployment to resist invasion, by its various levels of transport at various times. By the outbreak of war, with the two para battalions as well as thousands of ground troops and mechanised recce forces as well as mobile tracked artillery (this may be a generous description for the half-track mounted 75's but they still moved and fired LOL) I certainly wouldn't see that these wouldn't have been exercising and training appropriately...and are as mobile if not MORE so than a Japanese expedition limited in speed and roads it can use by its armour. Actually, the source Robert mentions at the very start of the WI elsewhere describes in detail the degree of mechanisation, and the garrison's development of the road network and cross-isthmian highway in this period. If you factor BACK in your already-mentioned unfamiliarity with the terrain and topography on the part of the invaders, then the garrison would literally be able to run rings round them...given that the terrain and the climate reduces the invaders' movement options to a particular number of choke points on the map - like the coastal plain between Penanome and San Carlos/Chame and on to La Chorrera , for example.

The major disadvantages of using an armed column to attack the Canal are very simple and obvious;

1/ once ashore it's incapable of reinforcement, with the USN moving to secure the coastal after any putative landing...whereas the defenders are able to air-lift in forces direct from the continental U.S. or other Carribean commands if necessary;

2/ Any action by an open attack like that against the Canal actually means GETTING there and STAYING there - against a force several times in size, with artillery and air support;

3/ It's vulnerable to air attack ALL the way from it's landing point to the Canal; remember, the defenders had had their own well-used bombing and ground-strafing range at Rio Hato for YEARS;

4/ And then there's the really major stopper that one radio message to Ernie King stops the Yorktown in its tracks; a loud, obvious, mechanised attack on the Canal stops the targets-of-opportunity from even approaching the Canal, let alone getting attacked and damaged there - reducing the attackers' options BACK to trying to damage the Locks or Dam...and ALSO gives the defenders probably days to get forces into position at the Canal to hold them away from those points...AND as mentioned up the thread the Locks are both as hard to damage AND as easy to repair as slot in replacement gates or divert around using the closed-for-the-duration parallel sets.

In other words - a land force has as few options for damaging the actual functioning of the Canal as a mechanism as a naval or aerial attack...while loosing ALL elements of suprise AND having almost no fall-back options. It's actually FAR more vulnerable to attack itself by the defenders - by blocking forces due to the terrain, fixed point defences on the Canal itself, and by air attack.

The defenders don't even need to be supermen; against an overland expedition they have ALL the advantages. Robert's plan for a time seemed to give his aerial attackers some advantages, before it turned out that these were spurious. An overland motorised expedition with armour however gives away even the last advantage of suprise.
Last edited by phylo_roadking on 09 Feb 2009, 01:47, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#349

Post by phylo_roadking » 09 Feb 2009, 01:32

As a P.S. -
We have 24 pages of mostly heated insulting and useless discussion on a broken premise. The Canal was not vulnerable to attack, period. But to be systematic about it, all possibilities should be examined and debunked.
This WI wasn't an open-ended discussion on options for disabling the Panama Canal; it was a specific secnario posited by ONE poster - as with the vast majority of WIs here. While the discussion of other mission profiles MAY be of interest - not necessarily here in this thread...

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#350

Post by phylo_roadking » 09 Feb 2009, 04:08

Here's a map of the Canal Zone in the mid 1940's; there's no year on it but it DOES have the trans-isthmian highway on it...but note how few OTHER metalled highways there are outside towns and cities... :wink:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/Bui ... s2-p17.jpg

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#351

Post by robdab » 09 Feb 2009, 04:24

glenn239,
Also, how rough is the terrain along the canal, both side, end to end? Can motorized vehicles like a tank access the whole length of it cross country?
At that point in time, not even the same chance of success as that given a proverbial snowball in hell. The term "rainforest" doesn't even begin to describe that terrain ... Think vertical rock faces, swamps, deadly snakes, malaria, mud, heat, humidity and those are the good things to be found in Panama's jungles. There was one road under construction down the eastern length of the Canal Zone but I don't believe that it was passable by Dec.7'41. AFAIK everything/body went by rail, airplane or ship. The pipelines were yet to be built.

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We have 24 pages of mostly heated insulting and useless discussion on a broken premise. The Canal was not vulnerable to attack, period. But to be systematic about it, all possibilities should be examined and debunked
Glenn239, you'll forgive me if I don't agree with your PoV.

I call your attention to http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box6/a71q02.html which is the cover letter for a report written by the American Secretary of War, Henry Stimson,to FDR on March 14 / 1942, some 3 months AFTER the OTL events of Pearl Harbor. Although I have yet to find the map mentioned, the body of that Panama travel report can be found at http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box6/a71q03.html with a retyped and easier to read text copy at
http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box6/t71q03.html

Five points from it seem most important and relevant to this ongoing discussion:
1.) - "My views in general coincided with those of General Andrews and his officers."
2.) - "A heavy successful attack at either of two places might, by draining Gatun Lake, close the Canal for over two years.
3.) - "Torpedo Nets. The torpedo bomber is considered the greatest danger to the canal. Torpedo nets have been installed but I think that their number should be increased and spare nets kept on hand."
4.) - "Anti Aircraft Guns. A fairly satisfactory supply of the larger anti-aircraft guns have been installed, with some shortages. The main need of anti-aircraft guns was in the smaller calibre automatic weapons suitable for defence against torpedo and divebombers." and finally,
5.) - "While the Canal is not at present in danger of a sustained land attack, it is in danger at almost any time from surprise raids from sea and air."

I think it obvious that if the US General in charge of Panama's defences AND the American Secretary of War feel that the Canal was STILL at risk almost 100 reinforced days later, then it was likely to have been even more vulnerable to an ATL Japanese surprise attack on Dec.7'41.

Unfortuneately for us, Henry Stimson's March 14 / 1942 report does NOT specifically name those two vulnerable locations !! He does mention his consultation with the British radar expert Robert Watson-Watt however and that gentleman does mention elsewhere that he found the Gatun Dam to be the weakest link, but again WITHOUT specifically detailing how/why.

It seems to me that my ATL Panama scenario picked the right target, the Gatun Dam, but for the wrong reason ?? I am quite mystified as to what exactly the two vulnerable points were althought the need for 1-3 IJN carriers worth of attacking warplanes indicates that such would still not be easy. However, a Canal out of service for more than two years might have been worth such an expenditure of effort, had Oahu been an invasion target as well.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#352

Post by phylo_roadking » 09 Feb 2009, 05:29

Robert, the above report has some contant of more immediate relevancy to your original WI -
My views in general coincided with
those of General Andrews and his officers
.
I.
The problem
1. At present the Canal is vulnerable to a sufficiently
heavy air attack. Such an attack from one carrier might be sufficient
.
From two or three carriers it would have a strong chance of success.
In other words...exactly HOW many separate attack aircraft are THEY viewing as a bare minimum? :wink: Unfortuantely MANY times more than three or two H6Ks.
2. A heavy successful attack at either of two places might,
by draining Gatun Lake, close the Canal for over two years
That's a VERY odd premise; I wonder if General Andrews and the other commanders in the Zone didn't over-egg the pudding to free up resources :wink: For there really don't seem to be any locations that would drain the entire LAKE. As we can see from the content of this thread...ANY outflow will STOP once the water level reaches the bottom of the gate sill on the spillway gates. They can ONLY be talking about destroying the entire Dam itself and the time needed to rebuild...and obviously aren't aware of the British work on this. Remember - CHASTISE was yet to to occur - a FULL YEAR after this report was written...
3. After a carrier has released its planes for attack, no
subsequent means of defense against those planes can sufficiently ensure
the safety of the Canal.
Interestingly, they regard the problem as one of degree - as in they can't guarantee that NO attacking aircraft from a carrier-sized force wouldn't get through. One or two aircraft could be intercepted, but in an air battle involving, what, some 24-36 enemy aircraft? - divebombers, torpedo bombers plus escorting fighters - SOME might get through. I would have to say that in a massed raid of that size THAT is indeed probably a given - but raises again the issue...simply from another direction...of what installation one or two carrier aircraft CAN actually damage 8O

a. Such a theoretically perfect outer patrol on the Pacific
side would consist of a patrol zone about 400 nautical
miles in width extending from an outer semi-circle
1000 nautical miles distant from the Canal to an inner
semi-circle about 600 miles distant. The patrolling
Bombers for such a zone could be most conveniently based
upon Guatemala City, Tehuantepec, Mexico, on the Central
American coast; Salinas, Ecuador, and Telara, Peru, in
South America; and the Galapagos Islands in the center.
The width of the patrol zone is fixed by the distance
a carrier could cover at a speed of thirty knots during
the twelve hours of darkness and allowing a two and a
half hour margin of safety. The longer arc between
Central America and Galapagos could be covered by the
faster Army four engine bombers; and the shorter arc
between South America and Galapagos could be covered by
the slower Navy PBY' s.
In other words - the discussion/debate...ok, polite argument...over areas of responsibility for longer-range patrols over the Pacific Arc referred to in AAFHS-42 in 1940 has NOW swung back in favour of the ARMY carrying out the longer-range over-sea patrolling :wink: Interesting...in fact made MORE interesting in light of
b. The number of the heavy bombers available is not yet
sufficient even if they were equipped with ASV.
I.E. the Army Air Force WAS carrying out the longer-range maritime patrols. Between the end of the period covered by AAFHS-42 and this meeting five months later, the new wartime situation seems to have forced a change of policy ALREADY :wink: Confirmed by THIS
1. The inner patrol. An inner patrol is now being con-
ducted by medium range bombers and flying boats on a radius of
400 nautical miles out from Panama.
7. Torpedo nets. The torpedo bomber is considered the
greatest danger to the Canal. Torpedo nets have been installed but I
think their number should be incresased and spare nets kept on hand.
Interestingly he doesn't say WHEN they were installed :wink: As for keeping spare nets on hand, see my comment earlier about two "net depots" being constructed.
While the Canal is not at present in danger of a sustained
land attack, it is in danger at almost any time from surprise raids from
sea and air. There is the possibility of very serious damage from
such raids.
Before anyone should leap at that paragraph in summation - the scope of suprise attack they are discussing is by a carrier air group, not two slow flyingboats :wink:

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#353

Post by phylo_roadking » 09 Feb 2009, 05:34

Robert, regarding the picture you linked to of a mavis carrying a torpedo with a strange tail that didn't look like a water-brake...could this actually have been a "Type 91 (1931) Mod 1" torpedo, rather than "Mod 2"???

It was the Model 2s that were modified for shallow running for the pearl harbour attack; AFAIK no such modification was made to a Model 1 - but I've never seen a picture of the earlier Model 1. Could that big ugly thing actually be that model's original tail...? :wink:

Though I can't turn up a picture of a Model 1....interestingly I did find a comment that the Model 1 had "FOUR full fins"...which is what that torpedo visibly has, stabilised by support struts between each one.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#354

Post by phylo_roadking » 09 Feb 2009, 05:55

And finally - a slight problem...
the need for 1-3 IJN carriers worth of attacking warplanes indicates that such would still not be easy. However, a Canal out of service for more than two years might have been worth such an expenditure of effort
The problem is....they were otherwise engaged on and around the 7th of December 1941...

Once a carrier-sized air attack would be launched and is incoming...once encountered - exactly what do you think the B-17s and PBYs that WERE in the Canal Zone would be doing??? :wink: Just...sitting there???

I don't think so. Stimson says that nothing could guarantee no hits on vulnerable parts of the Canal once a carrier-borne attack was launched; he makes NO comment about the hostile carriers being safe from attack by bombers etc. NOT occupied in any interception of the attacking aircraft :wink: The IMMEDIATE assumption would be that once carrier-borne aircraft are spotted in whatever circumstance - there MUST be carriers in range to launch and lingering to recover their aircraft, an offensive patrol/counter-strike would be in the air ASAP...

Stimson et al weren't to know in MARCH that Midway would decimate the IJN's carrier force :wink: But imagine the effect to Japanese plans of the loss of or damage to "1-3 carriers" off Panama in December.... 8O

So there's a major caveat; such a raid therefore would have been worth the expenditure IF SUCCESSFUL; if not, or if only of limited success, there was STILL no loss-free recovery of aircraft and getaway guaranteed :wink: Given that as of Pearl Harbour the IJN STILL faced ALL the USN's carriers...dare they risk any of their own, pending the great carrier-on-carrier engagement that HAD to come eventually???

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#355

Post by Sid Guttridge » 09 Feb 2009, 13:49

Hi Phylo,

You write that that it would be "EXTREMELY fatuous to demand that a newspaper archive should update its CONTEMPORARY articles with modern knowledge when the articles are there for use in context." Indeed, but I didn't do that, did I? My point, to repeat it, was that journalistic standards of evidence are not up to those of historians. The writers are not necessarily experts in their subjects, have limited sources, deadlines to meet and copy space to fill. In this particular case, Time is simply reissuing its old stories on the internet without any modification whatsoever. My point was not against Time but against your reliance on such soft sources simply because they are readily available on the internet.

Here we go again with the usual evasive opaqueness through reference to an anonymous "couple that have expressed an interest have been told" and about an "an offline source I don't have access to." Can't you just tell it like it is? What "offline" source?

Indeed, a chronology of RN ship movements would answer the specific question of what ships and where. However, in our context, it wouldn't make much difference which ships and where, because all the eligible ports for them to visit in Latin America were in powers that were "signatories of the Declaration of Panama". The answer is, necessarily "Yes" if any RN ship visited any Latin American port. And they did. (If you want to follow this up, try the PRO files on the light cruisers and auxiliary cruisers on the South Atlantic and Caribbean stations, who also covered the Pacific coast somewhat spasmodically until the US entered the war).

You write: "I somehow don't think the position of various small Neutral African nations is relevant to this thread." How true. So why have you brought it up?

There are at least a couple of questions that are still outstanding:

I repeat, for the third time, "I have looked into this subject area long before this thread and found no reference to any Ecuadoran or Panagra airfield on the Galapagos in 1941 or earlier. However, it is not impossible, so I would like to know what your two sources are so that I may check them."

and

You write, "if we had worked from JUST the "official history" on the defence of the Caribbean we'd STILL be working on the basis of only THREE airfields IN TOTAL in Panama and the Canal Zone...". Really? Which official history is that?

Cheers,

Sid.

P.S. You write ".....after the death of President Arias and his replacement by President De la Guardia in mid 1941....." No. Arias died in the 1980s and he was replaced in October 1941. Comparitively few of the "one hundred and forty three extra sites" you mention were set up by December 1941. If I am not mistaken, the figure is for the rest of the war.

If only these were the only factual error in your posts.............

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#356

Post by phylo_roadking » 09 Feb 2009, 16:34

You write that that it would be "EXTREMELY fatuous to demand that a newspaper archive should update its CONTEMPORARY articles with modern knowledge when the articles are there for use in context." Indeed, but I didn't do that, did I? My point, to repeat it, was that journalistic standards of evidence are not up to those of historians. The writers are not necessarily experts in their subjects, have limited sources, deadlines to meet and copy space to fill. In this particular case, Time is simply reissuing its old stories on the internet without any modification whatsoever. My point was not against Time but against your reliance on such soft sources simply because they are readily available on the internet.
Sid, I seem to remember that YOU tend to rail against simply repeating something SO often it gets accepted. As I did say, journalistic sources don't NEED to be as accurate as researched history - for in this example we're NOT looking for the exact unit details, number, site of positions etc. of the soldiers the Time journalist met there - just that they WERE there when one poster was somewhat adamant that they were not. Remember a discussion once about what constituted "statistically significant"??? :wink: Even ONE soldier proves statistically significant, given that the original poster posited NONE...and here we have plenty, in deployed positions and on alert.
Here we go again with the usual evasive opaqueness through reference to an anonymous "couple that have expressed an interest have been told" and about an "an offline source I don't have access to." Can't you just tell it like it is?
Sid, if you think I have ANY interest in making the contents of my private PMs public, you are VERY much mistaken :lol: :lol: :lol:
You write: "I somehow don't think the position of various small Neutral African nations is relevant to this thread." How true. So why have you brought it up?
Because YOU brought up the entirely spurious - with respect of this WI - of Argentina. As I DID say, Japanese goodwill visits to Atlantic ports would be somewhat difficult in the specific context suggested by the original poster.
Comparitively few of the "one hundred and forty three extra sites" you mention were set up by December 1941
Did I SAY they were all set up??? :wink: No, I don't believe I did. What I DID say was "the U.S. government was given permission by the Panamanians to lease one hundred and forty three extra sites for installations in the rest of Panama" That's a very clumsy effort at creating a strawman argument. Again I would have to note that you prefer attempting THAT over bringing ANY knowledge of which if these had indeed been set up by December 1941 to this thread...
I repeat, for the third time, "I have looked into this subject area long before this thread and found no reference to any Ecuadoran or Panagra airfield on the Galapagos in 1941 or earlier. However, it is not impossible, so I would like to know what your two sources are so that I may check them."
And *I* repeat again, the sources have ALREADY been cited in this thread.

P.S. thanks for the hint about Stanton; it's been years since I saw a copy of that...but I don't recollect him saying anything about the actual siting of AA defences, which is what I'd be interested in establishing finally. I'm actually QUITE au fait with the number of AA pieces in the Canal Zone, their unit organisation, named posts of assignment etc. - that's not what's at issue.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#357

Post by phylo_roadking » 09 Feb 2009, 23:35

Okay, been checking some fleet movements...

As of the 7th of December Shokaku, Zuikaku, Soryu, Hiryu, Akagi and Kaga are at Pearl Harbour; for half of November they've been travelling from Japan to assemble in the Kuriles, then heading for Pearl. Taiyo is ferrying fighters forward to Palau. Ryujo is moving back and forth to/from Palau supporting the landings at Luzon....

After Pearl, Soryu and Hiryu head to support the attack on Wake. Akagi, Kaga, Shokaku and Zuikaku don't arrive back at Hashirajima in the 23rd of December.

In other words...the IJN's carriers are either recovering back to Japan OR are involved in other operations vital to the war for a couple of weeks. If we look again at Stimson's report...this CAN be interpreted as the Americans actually NOT being suprised by a carrier attack in the Canal Zone - but in reality anticipating one and analysing their weaknesses, as they have been really since the first Fleet problem, and certainly since Pearl harbour.

Therefore - there's no slack in the Japanese plans for that first week of the war that sees any of the IJN's carriers available for a "suprise" attack...and AFTER that it's not really a "suprise" anyway - merely one that manages to avoid the defenders' countermeasures. And STILL encounters the defenders on full war alert.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#358

Post by Sid Guttridge » 10 Feb 2009, 12:18

Hi Phylo,

The rules are quite simple. Accurate facts always bear repeating. Inaccurate facts never do. Stick to that and you won't go far wrong!

Exactly - "journalistic sources don't NEED to be as accurate as researched history" and so are not equatable with researched history.

I think you are confusing issues. I have never talked about "unit details, number, site of positions". My point has always been about "the commercial battle in Ecuador for internal and the Galapagos service between SEDTA and Panagra....." as referenced by you in: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/artic ... 49,00.html

Naughty, naughty. Selective quoting to create an inaccurate impression of another poster's contributions is dishonest. My full quote was: "Here we go again with the usual evasive opaqueness through reference to an anonymous "couple that have expressed an interest have been told" and about an "an offline source I don't have access to." Can't you just tell it like it is? What "offline" source?" At NO time did I ask for you to make your PMs public. I asked "What "offline" source?", a sentence you conveniently edited off the end of my post to create a false impression. A little more integrity would help.

We can all claim "offline sources" every time we are caught out going beyond the historical evidence. It is not a defence. If you can't justify something, don't post it in the first place. It just clogs the internet up with inaccuracies that other internet-only junkies will perpetuate.

Argentina was a "small Neutral African nation"? I presume now that this was a mistake and it should have read "small Neutral American nation"? If so, end of subject.

Did I say that you did say all 143 US bases on Panamanian soil were set up? No. My point was that the great majority of the bases were set up after Pearl Harbour and fall outside the time scale we are discussing - something you omitted to do. Without this correction one might have got the false impression that Panama was heaving with far more US bases in December 1941 than was in fact the case.

No, I don't prefer correcting you to bringing new facts to this thread. Being your pooper-scooper is no great pleasure, believe me, but it is a necessary public service in order to prevent inaccuracies undermining this and other sites. You seem to think that provided one can use a search engine one can become an instant expert on any subject. Sorry, but it just ain't so. I beg you to read more widely and go to the occasional archive.

Stanton doesn't give tactical deployments. He is, as I said, a good starting point. He gives the duration of tour of all US AA (and other) units down to battalion size deployed in the Canal Zone and Panama. This gives one a baseline to start working from.

Are you serious? Do you really think that: "Panagra (Pan American-Grace Airways) 1936. Envelope postmarked October 20 to inaugurate Panagra air service from Ecuador. Galápagos stamps on rear of envelope." gives any indication whatsoever that there was a Panagra airstip on the Galapagos in 1936? All it indicates is what it says: that an envelope used on the first Panagra air service from Ecuador had Galapagos stamps on it! You also failed to report that the post mark, which indicates origin, reads "Quito". A quck glance at my local library's Stanley Gibbons catalogue shows that in 1935 Ecuador issued a series of Galapagos stamps to commemmorate the centenary of Darwin's visit. They were not exclusive to the islands.

The other quote refers to Panagra setting up competition to SEDTA in Ecuador, not on the non-existent Galapagos route, for which SEDTA did not get permission.

If these are your two sources for contending that Panagra had an airfield on the Galapagos then your standards of evidence remain as low as ever. As usual you are extrapolating far beyond the evidence.

Can you not see that extrapolating beyond the evidence on the internet just sets up another inaccurate source other over internet-reliant "researchers" will misuse?

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#359

Post by phylo_roadking » 10 Feb 2009, 17:04

Naughty, naughty. Selective quoting to create an inaccurate impression of another poster's contributions is dishonest. My full quote was: "Here we go again with the usual evasive opaqueness through reference to an anonymous "couple that have expressed an interest have been told" and about an "an offline source I don't have access to." Can't you just tell it like it is? What "offline" source?" At NO time did I ask for you to make your PMs public. I asked "What "offline" source?", a sentence you conveniently edited off the end of my post to create a false impression. A little more integrity would help
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An apology please, Sid, for the adhominem attack on my integrity. My statement regarding the content of my PMs applies to that entire answer. It's not for YOU to choose to be selective about what *I* mean. If I was using material from an off-line source I would reference it.
Argentina was a "small Neutral African nation"? I presume now that this was a mistake and it should have read "small Neutral American nation"? If so, end of subject
Now you're being obtuse again to create a strawman argument. You are quite aware I did NOT call Argentina a "small African" nation, and any reader of the thread will be QUITE clear I was referring to ANY port in the South Atlantic being off-sie to Chitose due to the problems it would experience rounding Cape Horn with such a deck cargo...whether Argentina to the west or any African port to the east.
Did I say that you did say all 143 US bases on Panamanian soil were set up? No. My point was that the great majority of the bases were set up after Pearl Harbour and fall outside the time scale we are discussing - something you omitted to do. Without this correction one might have got the false impression that Panama was heaving with far more US bases in December 1941 than was in fact the case
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No - you accused ME in error of saying that, which is NOT the case, as my sentence "the U.S. government was given permission by the Panamanians to lease one hundred and forty three extra sites for installations in the rest of Panama" CLEARLY shows. I did not say "143 installations were built" - I said they leased sites to build them. Some were - at present I have numbers and locations for the USAAF ones built outside the Zone, but not yet the Army ones.

Now - why don't YOU prove your point, as you are so clearly able to do, by quoting from your obviously extensive knowledge of what installations HAD been built in Panama outside the Canal Zone before of 7th December 1941...or like your extensive knowledge of the Zone's anti-aircraft defence will this not materialise either when challenged?
Are you serious? Do you really think that: "Panagra (Pan American-Grace Airways) 1936. Envelope postmarked October 20 to inaugurate Panagra air service from Ecuador. Galápagos stamps on rear of envelope." gives any indication whatsoever that there was a Panagra airstip on the Galapagos in 1936? All it indicates is what it says: that an envelope used on the first Panagra air service from Ecuador had Galapagos stamps on it! You also failed to report that the post mark, which indicates origin, reads "Quito". A quck glance at my local library's Stanley Gibbons catalogue shows that in 1935 Ecuador issued a series of Galapagos stamps to commemmorate the centenary of Darwin's visit. They were not exclusive to the islands.

The other quote refers to Panagra setting up competition to SEDTA in Ecuador, not on the non-existent Galapagos route, for which SEDTA did not get permission.

If these are your two sources for contending that Panagra had an airfield on the Galapagos then your standards of evidence remain as low as ever. As usual you are extrapolating far beyond the evidence
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KINDLY RE-ADDRESS THEE COMMENTS TO THE PERSON WHO POSTED THOSE SOURCES. For your personal issues seem to have blinded you to the fact that it WASN'T me who drew the threads attention to them on 09 Feb 2009 at 21:48

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Tim Smith
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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#360

Post by Tim Smith » 10 Feb 2009, 17:19

Are you two still fighting?

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