Christian Streit, 'Keine Kameraden' for download
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Re: Christian Streit, 'Keine Kameraden' for download
I would like to see how this should be done effectivly when parts of a Division were ordered to guard over 50,000s of POWs over hundred miles back...through a terrain were roughly more than a few hundred german where at all...
In one point Thom is more than right, we have to come back to the existing primary souces, to go through them and analyze them without ideolocial fences like f.e. Streit and Gerlach did.
Or why did nearly all the veterans I spoke who had particitpated in 'Barbarosso' told me, that the frontline was rather the most secure area, because in the rear area were already in July marauding huge groups of escaped soldiers, making supply colummns neccassary to drive in guarded convoys, like the suggested picture of Hollywood on the wars of the USA to occupy the indian territories
Maybe I find at the weekend time to dig a bit through KTB of HGr.Süd where I spotted once some interesting documents regarding the topic POWs
Jan-Hendrik
In one point Thom is more than right, we have to come back to the existing primary souces, to go through them and analyze them without ideolocial fences like f.e. Streit and Gerlach did.
Or why did nearly all the veterans I spoke who had particitpated in 'Barbarosso' told me, that the frontline was rather the most secure area, because in the rear area were already in July marauding huge groups of escaped soldiers, making supply colummns neccassary to drive in guarded convoys, like the suggested picture of Hollywood on the wars of the USA to occupy the indian territories
Maybe I find at the weekend time to dig a bit through KTB of HGr.Süd where I spotted once some interesting documents regarding the topic POWs
Jan-Hendrik
Last edited by Jan-Hendrik on 24 Sep 2009, 13:48, edited 2 times in total.
Re: Christian Streit, 'Keine Kameraden' for download
I wholeheartedly agree, that the topic requires a goback for a detailed examination of primary sources. (To use a totally different context, it reminds me somewhat of Greg Michno in "Lakota Noon", where he states that such a vast amount of books has been written on the Little Bighorn Battle, including so much poppycock, that going back to the original sources to establish what actually happened, was the only solution.)
However, I would say there are some doing exactly this, e.g. the group around Reinhard Otto.
It would be very interesting to see the sources from the HG Süd KTB.
K.-J. Arnold has become intimate enemy to Gerlach, both fire intellectual broadsides against each other at every opportunity.
However, I would say there are some doing exactly this, e.g. the group around Reinhard Otto.
It would be very interesting to see the sources from the HG Süd KTB.
Hartmann and Hürter have stated they disagree with his claims of deliberate starvation policy to Soviet PoWs or consider it at least exaggerated. Same, IIRC, with Otto and Keller.Btw, some of Gerlach's claims are now heavily criticized by German historians. Seems to be another author that has to be looked at more critically before reproducing long passages of his book on this forum. Of course shootings of those left behind happened, but not as a general politics or on the scale claimed, as shown on my example above. Tens of thousands of Soviet POWs indeed managed to escape captivity during the marches without being shot.
K.-J. Arnold has become intimate enemy to Gerlach, both fire intellectual broadsides against each other at every opportunity.
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Re: Christian Streit, 'Keine Kameraden' for download
From the site linked by Emil:
The above suggests that the high mortality of Soviet POWs during the winter of 1941-42 (almost 50% in the area of operations, according to the statistics quoted by General von Gravenitz) was not the result of an exterminatory intent by their German captors, but rather of logistical factors that resulted in a food shortage. Note that Hitler had as early as September 1941 ordered that the Soviet POWs be kept in a condition that would enable them to be used for labour, ie they should not be allowed to starve to death; apparently, logistical difficulties meant that Hitler's order could not be fulfilled.Gen. von Gravenitz made the point that the propaganda should
stop referring to the great numbers of Prisoners of War in order
not to create a false impression among the public. He quoted the
order of the Fuehrer of September 1941 to the effect that Soviet
Prisoners of War should be kept in condition to enable them to work.
The slogan, "der Russe sei eine Bestie, er muesse verrecken" (the
- Russian is a Beast, he must croak) must, therefore, be eliminated.
The treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War must, therefore, be dictated
by the necessity of keeping Soviet prisoners available for
the labor contingent. With regard to the treatment of French and
Belgian Prisoners of war, a command of OKW has just gone out for
the attention of the proper Government and Party officers.
Party Comrade Gutterer stated that at one time it was politically
absolutely good and proper that the German "people reacted considerably
to this slogan, "the Soviet is a Beast." The consequences
must now be drawn fram present conditions and he suggested that
Gauleiters be instructed and all speakers of the Party informed.
Gen. von Go mentioned a draft of an information sheet, against
which no fundamental objections were offered. However, Party Comrade
Gutterer considered it necessary that it be changed in matters of
form. It is now being recast and a further vote will be taken later on
Immediately after the conference, I informed Party Comrade Passe of
this matter.
I
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Party Comrade Gutterer stated that he had no jurisdiction to
take a position with respeot to the wishes of the Ministry of
Munitions, German Industry, the DAF and the Ministry of Eoonomios
ooncerning improvements in nutrition, clothing, and wage scale.
The task of propaganda consists merely in making such improvements
acceptable to the population.
The speaker from the Ministry of Food Supply stated that
negotiations were pending respecting an inorease in the food rations
for the soviets. The issue of the proposed information sheet should,
therefore, be delayed until details bad been worked out.
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Re: Christian Streit, 'Keine Kameraden' for download
Document 081-PS, Reich Ministry for the occupied Eastern territories report on Prisoners of War dated 28 Feb 1942, in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. III, US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1946, pp. 126-130:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 48#p572248Since the beginning of its existence, the Reich Ministry for the occupied Eastern territories has taken the viewpoint, that: the large number of Soviet prisoners of war constitute a highly valuable material for propaganda. The treatment of Soviet prisoners of war must be considered differently than the treatment of prisoners of war of other nations, for various reasons:
1. The war in the East has not been concluded, and the treat-
126
081-PS
ment of the prisoners of war must have far-reaching results on the will-to-desert of the Red Army man who is still fighting.
2. Germany intends to keep a large part of the former Soviet Union occupied, even after the end of the war, and to develop it industrially for her purposes. Therefore she depends on a far-reaching cooperation of the population.
3. Germany is conducting the fight against the Soviet Union because of ideological viewpoints. Bolshevism must be overthrown and something better must be put in its place. Even the prisoners of war themselves must realize that national socialism is willing and in the position to bring them a better future. They must return later to their homes from Germany with a feeling of admiration and esteem for Germany and German institutions; and thus become propagandists for the cause of Germany and national socialism.
This attempted goal has not been attained so far. The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is on the contrary a tragedy of the greatest extent. Of 3.6 millions of prisoners of war, only several hundred thousand are still able to work fully. A large part of them has starved, or died, because of the hazards of the weather. Thousands also died from spotted fever. It is understood, of course, that there are difficulties encountered in the feeding of such a large number of prisoners of war.
Anyhow, with a certain amount of understanding for goals aimed at by German politics, dying and deterioration could have been avoided in the extent described. For instance, according to information on hand, the native population within the Soviet Union are absolutely willing to put food at the disposal of the prisoners of war. Several understanding camp commanders have successfully chosen this course. However in the majority of the cases, the camp commanders have forbidden the civilian population to put food at the disposal of the prisoners, and they have rather let them starve to death. Even on the march to the camps, the civilian population was not allowed to give the prisoners of war food. In many cases, when prisoners of war could no longer keep up on the march because of hunger and exhaustion, they were shot before the eyes of the horrified civilian population, and the corpses were left. In numerous camps, no shelter for the prisoners of war was provided at all. They lay under the open sky during rain or snow. Even tools were not made available to dig holes or caves. A systematic delousing of the prisoners of war in the camps and of the camps themselves has apparently been missed. Utterances such as these have been heard : "The more of these prisoners die, the better it is for us". The consequence
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081-PS
of this treatment is now this, that spotted fever is spreading due to the escape and discharge of prisoners and has claimed its victims among the armed forces as well as among the civilian population, even in the old part of Germany.
Finally, the shooting of prisoners of war must be mentioned ; these were partly carried out according to viewpoints which ignore all political understanding. For instance, in various camps, all the "Asiatics" were shot, although the inhabitants of the areas, considered belonging to Asia, of Transcaucasia and Turkestan especially, are among those people in the Soviet Union who are most strongly opposed to Russian subjugation and to Bolshevism. The Reich ministry of the occupied Eastern territories has repeatedly emphasized these abuses. However, in November for instance, a detail [Kommando] appeared in a prisoner of war camp in Nikolajew, which wanted to liquidate all Asiatics.
The treatment of prisoners of war appears to be founded for a great part on serious misconceptions about the people of the Soviet Union. One finds the opinion that the people become more inferior the further one goes East. If the Poles already were given harsh treatment, one argues, it should therefore be done to a much greater extent to the Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, Russians, and finally the "Asiatics".
It was apparently completely ignored, in the treatment of prisoners of war, that Germany found, in contrast to the West (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway), a people who went through all the terror of Bolshevism, and who now, happy about their liberation, put themselves willingly at the disposal of Germany. A better gift could not come to Germany in this war, which requires every last man. But instead of accepting this gift, the people of the East are being treated more contemptibly and worse than the people of the West, who do not hide their enmity towards Germany.
It was a basic mistake that no difference was made between real prisoners of war and deserters. It is known that German propaganda deposited millions of leaflets beyond the lines, and encouraged the Red soldiers to desert, whereby good treatment and sufficient food was specifically assured to them. These promises were not kept. The deserters were beaten and left to starve the same as so many prisoners of war. A natural consequence of this politically and militarily unwise treatment was not only a paralyzing of the will to desert, but a plain deadly fear to get into German captivity. It would be naive to assume that the occurrences in the prisoner of war camps could be kept hidden from the Soviet government. As can be seen in Molotov's cir-
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081-PS
cular, the Soviets have in fact an excellent knowledge of the conditions described above, and naturally they have done everything in their power to influence the Soviet population and Red soldiers accordingly. It can be said without exaggeration that the mistakes in the treatment of prisoners of war are to a great extent the cause for the stiffening power of resistance of the Red Army, and therefore also cause for the death of thousands of German soldiers.
After the Reich ministry for occupied Eastern territories was finally successful in overcoming the prejudice against Soviet prisoners of war partially, and when the prisoners of war were to come to Germany to a great extent for work, it was found that of 3.6 million only several hundred thousand were still able to work. Thus, German economy and armament industry also must suffer for the treatment of prisoners of war.
The above explanations are not intended to be a belated, fruitless criticism, nor are they directed against any official agency, especially since very many objective situations came into play, as has been mentioned, and the responsibility is shared. They should only become the basis for a new policy toward the prisoners of war which corresponds more to our military and civilian interests. The Reich ministry for the occupied Eastern territories is endeavoring with all its powers to assist the fighting troops by effective propaganda for the deterioration of the enemy's military forces. All propaganda will be useless, however, if there is more fear of captivity than of death and wounds on the battlefield.
The primary demand is that the treatment of the prisoners of war ensues according to the laws of humanity and according to the dignity of the German nation. It is understandable that inhuman treatment, proven many times, of German prisoners of war, by members of the Red Army has embittered the German troops so much that they retaliate with the same treatment. However, such retaliatory measures do not improve the situation of German prisoners of war by any means, but must have as their last consequence the fact that neither side will take any more prisoners, thus that they conduct the war in a most inhuman manner. At any rate, as much as is known, such retaliatory measures have not been able up to now to cause the enemy to change. They were therefore without purpose.
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Re: Christian Streit, 'Keine Kameraden' for download
Rosenberg was a very sensible man, with very rational ideas for the treatment of the anti-Bolshevik parts of the Soviet population, in particular the Ukrainians.
After Spring 1942, many of his ideas were adopted, and treatment of Soviet POWs, at least of those considered to be least influenced by Bolshevism, improved. Due to that improved treatment, something like one million POWs ended up in German service, in one capacity or another, including in armed military or police formations. To that extent, Rosenberg's aim of encouraging collaboration by the Soviet population had at least partial success.
The picture painted by Rosenberg in the quoted memorandum does not suggest a German Government program of exterminating the Soviet POWs by starvation. If that had been the case, then there would have been no POW camp commanders who allowed the local people to provide food for the prisoners in their camps, thereby saving them from starvation. It seems to have been more a case of a general prejudice against the Soviet population which led some POW camp commanders to be unnecessarily harsh, on their own initiative. Furthermore, allowing POWs to starve was obviously contrary to Hitler's order issued in September 1941, to keep the Soviet POWs in a condition fit for use as labour.
Perhaps one reason why the majority of POW camp commanders refused to let the local people provide food to the POWs under their control was that the German Army itself had to live off the land, and those commanders feared that if part of the produce of local peasants were provided to the POWs, that would leave insufficient for requisitioning for german Amry needs. That is only a surmise however.
To be sure, there was a German Government program of summary execution of those Soviet POWs assessed a "dengerous Communists" or otherwise as an unacceptable security risk. The number of those summarily executed was relatively low, between 100,000 and 200,000, compared with the total of over five million POWs. Rosenberg is of course not protesting about the summary executions per se, but rather about their misapplication, ie executing POWs who because of their background were most anti-Bolshevik, and doing so purely on the grounds of racial prejudice toward "Asiatics".
After Spring 1942, many of his ideas were adopted, and treatment of Soviet POWs, at least of those considered to be least influenced by Bolshevism, improved. Due to that improved treatment, something like one million POWs ended up in German service, in one capacity or another, including in armed military or police formations. To that extent, Rosenberg's aim of encouraging collaboration by the Soviet population had at least partial success.
The picture painted by Rosenberg in the quoted memorandum does not suggest a German Government program of exterminating the Soviet POWs by starvation. If that had been the case, then there would have been no POW camp commanders who allowed the local people to provide food for the prisoners in their camps, thereby saving them from starvation. It seems to have been more a case of a general prejudice against the Soviet population which led some POW camp commanders to be unnecessarily harsh, on their own initiative. Furthermore, allowing POWs to starve was obviously contrary to Hitler's order issued in September 1941, to keep the Soviet POWs in a condition fit for use as labour.
Perhaps one reason why the majority of POW camp commanders refused to let the local people provide food to the POWs under their control was that the German Army itself had to live off the land, and those commanders feared that if part of the produce of local peasants were provided to the POWs, that would leave insufficient for requisitioning for german Amry needs. That is only a surmise however.
To be sure, there was a German Government program of summary execution of those Soviet POWs assessed a "dengerous Communists" or otherwise as an unacceptable security risk. The number of those summarily executed was relatively low, between 100,000 and 200,000, compared with the total of over five million POWs. Rosenberg is of course not protesting about the summary executions per se, but rather about their misapplication, ie executing POWs who because of their background were most anti-Bolshevik, and doing so purely on the grounds of racial prejudice toward "Asiatics".
Re: Christian Streit, 'Keine Kameraden' for download
bf109 emil – you wrote:
Klaus Jochen Arnold, in his thesis published under the title "Die Wehrmacht und die Besatzungspolitik in den besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion", gives some more interesting insights (from primary sources!) on the question of shootings of exhausted POWs during the marches. Two examples (sorry for not translating, I believe most of you understand some German):
"Beim Transport ist dafür zu sorgen, daß Entkräftete mit LKW oder Panjewagen abtransportiert werden. Es darf keinesfalls vorkommen, daß Entkräftete nur deshalb, weil sie nicht mehr laufen können, erschossen werden." (221th Sich.Div./Ia, 25th Sep. 1941)
"Schon bei der Übernahme durch die Division hatte die Masse der Gefangenen infolge der Einschließung mehrere Tage kaum Verpflegung gehabt. Da ihnen bei dem stoßweisen Massenanfall auch bei größter Bemühung des Begleitpersonals und in Anspruchnahme der Bevölkerung nur wenig geboten werden konnte, ferner erschwerend die Frosttage hinzukamen, waren zahlreiche Gefangene infolge Entkräftung den Marschleistungen nicht gewachsen. Die Züge verlängerten sich um ein Mehrfaches und zahlreiche Leute mußten als völlig marschunfähig in Ortschaften zurückgelassen werden." (137th Inf.Div./Ia, 25th Oct. 1941)
10000 or more POWs were guarded by just 15-20 German soldiers (a 500:1 ratio) so that a large number could escape to the partisans (Korück 559/Ic, 20th Oct. 1941).
Thanks for pointing at this important German document (or the English translation of it, but the original can be found in the Donovan collection, too). This document is, as far as I can see, unknown to German historians. Pohl, for example, in his book from 2009 still states that the death figure for the winter of 1941/42 is not known for the OKH zone of operations. And you just provide this information! Another piece in the puzzle…I did happen to find a German source which lists exhaustion as the main cause for the thousands of deaths… The numbers as of 1 February 1942 are as follows: In the zone of operation 587,000 Soviet prisoners died
Klaus Jochen Arnold, in his thesis published under the title "Die Wehrmacht und die Besatzungspolitik in den besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion", gives some more interesting insights (from primary sources!) on the question of shootings of exhausted POWs during the marches. Two examples (sorry for not translating, I believe most of you understand some German):
"Beim Transport ist dafür zu sorgen, daß Entkräftete mit LKW oder Panjewagen abtransportiert werden. Es darf keinesfalls vorkommen, daß Entkräftete nur deshalb, weil sie nicht mehr laufen können, erschossen werden." (221th Sich.Div./Ia, 25th Sep. 1941)
"Schon bei der Übernahme durch die Division hatte die Masse der Gefangenen infolge der Einschließung mehrere Tage kaum Verpflegung gehabt. Da ihnen bei dem stoßweisen Massenanfall auch bei größter Bemühung des Begleitpersonals und in Anspruchnahme der Bevölkerung nur wenig geboten werden konnte, ferner erschwerend die Frosttage hinzukamen, waren zahlreiche Gefangene infolge Entkräftung den Marschleistungen nicht gewachsen. Die Züge verlängerten sich um ein Mehrfaches und zahlreiche Leute mußten als völlig marschunfähig in Ortschaften zurückgelassen werden." (137th Inf.Div./Ia, 25th Oct. 1941)
10000 or more POWs were guarded by just 15-20 German soldiers (a 500:1 ratio) so that a large number could escape to the partisans (Korück 559/Ic, 20th Oct. 1941).
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Re: Christian Streit, 'Keine Kameraden' for download
As I just stumbled over it, here an example, the composition of the Kommando für den Gefangenenabschub of 4.Panzer-Division:
Jan-Hendrik
Jan-Hendrik
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Re: Christian Streit, 'Keine Kameraden' for download
From KTB HGr. Süd:
Jan-HendrikBericht über die Versorgungslage der 11.Armee 31.01.1942
[....]
Kriegsgefangene
Bestand: am 30.1.42 etwa 25000 Kgf.
Abschub: im Januar 1942 wurden ins Dulag 120 Chersson (O.Qu.Schwarzes Meer) etwa 12000 Gefangene abgeschoben.
Die Ernährung der Kgf. bereit große Schwierigkeiten. Die Armee wird auch weiterhin Abschub nicht benötigter Kgf. mit Nachdruck durchführen. Die mit Vfg. OKH Gen Qu IVa (III,2) AZ 960 Nr.I/36 761/41 geh. v.2.12.41 für Kgf. festgesetzte Verpflegung kann (abgesehen von Brot, Hirse und Salz) dem Lande nicht entnommen werden, da die Vorräte erschöpft sind. Ab 1.2.42 wird die Armee daher Fett, Zucker und Nährmittel je nach Nachschublage aus Nachschubbeständen an die Kgf. zur Erhaltung ihrer Arbeitsfähigkeit und zur Vermeidung von Seuchen verausgaben. Die in der oben angezogenen Vfg. aufgeführten Verpflegungsarten, wie Magerkäse, Quark, Marmelade, Frischgemüse und Sauerkohl können weder aus dem Lande beschafft noch aus Nachschubbeständen an die Kgf. abgegeben werden