The Russian side

Discussions on WW2 in Eastern Europe.
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Michate
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Re: The Russian side

#76

Post by Michate » 01 Oct 2010, 05:27

My own uni uses 'Keine Kamerade: Die Wehrmacht und die Sowjetischen Kriegsgfangenen, 1941-1945, 1978' as its source on Soviet POW losses: of the 5.7 million POWs taken 3.3 million died from whatever reason. The particular section the source is used in is written by professor Clive Emsley.

I would have to agree with Michate "poppycock" comment as the initial posters unsourced figures (that has been repeated in various posts) appearz to be at least 300,000 over inflated in regards to pow losses.
Unfortunately, "Keine Kameraden" is by no means above all doubts as a source, as has been pointed out on this forum, see e.g. here: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... t#p1279102.

Though academia loves it, so it has attained gospel status - it is much more simple to rehash other author's conclusions than to delve into the records onself.

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Re: The Russian side

#77

Post by bf109 emil » 01 Oct 2010, 06:09

Domen 121 wrote'
If I remember correctly cases of sending Russian soldiers into battle without rifles took place in WW1. But in WW2 this probably didn't take place because the Soviets had enough rifles to equipp all soldiers at every stage of war.
unfortunately IMHO this is true....
As concerns Suvorov, my personal opinion is that he is either a cinycal faslifier or an idiot (mostl likely the first), but I have little desire to discuss him here.
Art as I have never met Suvorov, it is impossible for myself to claim him as an idiot other then others teaching me, telling me, or hatred for him forcing me to come to this conclusion. So we must look at him as a falsifier of History, much like perhaps David Irving was tried and found guilty of, yet much of Irvings work notes him to be historically correct
In general you mistake is that you think that anything written in a book becomes trustworthy.
Not really as written works are word, which form sentences into paragraph placed with a chapter and a collection of these become boos or writings, no more, no less...no when I hear something so astounding as sending troops into battle without arms, I look to many sources to back this up...

I understand national pride by both yourself and Sovieteurope now force or have to claim these as wrong by an idiot writer, fine I find another souce being Andrrew nargoski and I am met with bought of "In general you mistake is that you think that anything written in a book becomes trustworthy." Hey fine by me, so I keep digging and find another source, perhaps another falsifier or history, perhaps but i doubt it...something read making me believe it as trustworthy, not really (just makes me search harder)...

Do either yourself (Art) or Sovietreurope have any issues with David Glantz being a notable author or historian? Perhaps he is a falsifier of history like Suvorov as stated earlier i have never met him so can't make an informative conclusion and likewise i was not taught or forced to simply ignore his works by perhaps a bias education system, who knows...

but Glantz states...The 13th Guards, always described as an elite force, was destroyed two months before; they're sent in half-trained and one-third equipped. The 284th Rifle Division, popularized in the film Enemy at the Gates—only one of its three regiments has rifles. It's like Muhammad Ali's rope-a-dope. It was so brutal that Stavka, the Soviet high command, forbade A. I. Eremenko, Stalingrad front commander, and his commissar, Nikita Khrushchev, from crossing the river into the city: Stavka was afraid they'd develop an affinity with the poor troops dying there and decide to abandon it.

Now I now the earlier comments of Soviet troops being sent into battle where directed upon the Batttle of Moscow and debunked as falsified or an idiot writer as well as my believing anything written, now 10 month or so after debating the sending men into battle without arms we have David Glantz citing 2 incidents of this happening in Stalingrad :idea: :idea: perhaps if we see Glantz as a non-idiot or falsifier and take his work at par...could it not perhaps have occurred in Moscow even if the 2 sources, 1 hated by what seems of most Russian members on this forum and the other being me sucked into believing anything, might just possibly be, perhaps a tad, as having a grain of truth to it?

source for Glantz taken from David M. Glantz Fights for the Truth About Stalingrad http://www.historynet.com/david-m-glantz.htm/2

P.S. as i look more and more into Suvorov works, he does seem a tad extreme in his conclusions and such...but hey had it not been for Suvorov writings of sending unarmed troops and both Sovieteurope and Art raising concerns over Suvorov as being a reliable source...I would have stopped there perhaps and not also found Glantz writings showing the same scenario occurred at Stalingrad


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Re: The Russian side

#78

Post by The_Enigma » 01 Oct 2010, 10:19

Michate wrote:
My own uni uses 'Keine Kamerade: Die Wehrmacht und die Sowjetischen Kriegsgfangenen, 1941-1945, 1978' as its source on Soviet POW losses: of the 5.7 million POWs taken 3.3 million died from whatever reason. The particular section the source is used in is written by professor Clive Emsley.

I would have to agree with Michate "poppycock" comment as the initial posters unsourced figures (that has been repeated in various posts) appearz to be at least 300,000 over inflated in regards to pow losses.
Unfortunately, "Keine Kameraden" is by no means above all doubts as a source, as has been pointed out on this forum, see e.g. here: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... t#p1279102.

Though academia loves it, so it has attained gospel status - it is much more simple to rehash other author's conclusions than to delve into the records onself.
While its room for thought, having not read through the entire topic due to lack of time, there appears to be one persons critique of the work and thats about it so far?

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Re: The Russian side

#79

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 01 Oct 2010, 11:17

If I remember correctly cases of sending Russian soldiers into battle without rifles took place in WW1. But in WW2 this probably didn't take place because the Soviets had enough rifles to equipp all soldiers at every stage of war.
unfortunately IMHO this is true....
According to these two threads on a Polish history forum if it comes to WW2 this is a myth:

http://www.dws.org.pl/viewtopic.php?f=77&t=120282

http://www.dws.org.pl/viewtopic.php?f=2 ... 0#p1331992

But losses of small arms in period 22.06.1941 - 31.12.1941 were indeed heavy:

revolvers and pistols: 0,44 million (32,1% of stocks, i.e. initial number + deliveries)
rifles: 5,55 million (59,6%)
machine pistols: 0,1 million (50%)
LMG: 134,7 thousand (62,4%)
HMG: 54,7 thousand (64,6%)
12,7mm - 20mm MG: 14 thousand (38,9%)

But if they lacked rifles they would take them from rear units, artillery and support units first.

Not from first line infantry.

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Re: The Russian side

#80

Post by Art » 01 Oct 2010, 17:33

bf109 emil wrote: but Glantz states...The 13th Guards, always described as an elite force, was destroyed two months before; they're sent in half-trained and one-third equipped. The 284th Rifle Division, popularized in the film Enemy at the Gates—only one of its three regiments has rifles. It's like Muhammad Ali's rope-a-dope.

There is actually more speicific information on the shape of the 13 Guards Division, when it was committed to action in Stalingrad. As of 13 September 1942 it had 9 603 men, 7 745 rifles, 170 SMGs, 30 light and 16 heavy machineguns (Isaev, 2008. Rifle regiments had circa 2000 men and 1800 rifles. The units with one rifle per two men were autotransport company (132 men, 59 rifles) and field bakery (69 men, 27 rifles). In general situation with rifles was satisfactory, while the number of automatic weapons was very small, although Isaev writes that by 15 September it improved considerably (the division had 36 heavy and 325 light MGs and 720 SMGs on that day). For comparison, that is info of three other divisions sent ot Stalingrad in early October from Isaev (as of 25 September 1942):
39 Guards Rifle Division: 4082 men, 2978 rifles, 695 SMGs, 24 light, 12 heavy and 2 AA MGs, 114 AT rifles, 13 field and 7 AT guns
308 Rifles Divisions: 4248 men, 5513 rifles, 476 SMGs, 106 light and 33 heavy MGs, 119 AT Rifles, 45 field and 20 AT guns
37 Guards: 6695 men, 5842 rifles, 1157 SMGs, 154 light, 82 heavy and 10 AA MGs, 254 AT Rifles, 41 field and 29 AT guns.
It might be seen that situation with perosonal weapons was good as opposed to lack of machineguns and artillery in the 39 Guards.
Isaev doesn't provide info on 284 Division, but I would like to check availability of weapons before making any conclusions.
In general IMO Glatnz overdramatize things. The statement on divisions down from 10000 men to 500 in just one is a certain exaggeration, though losses were heavy of course. For example, already mentioned 13 Guards Division 6 906 men on 25 September, 6076 on 1 October, 6053 on 10 October and 5201 on 20 November 1942. These data due to their nature include wounded and sick in divisional medical units, but they usually didn't make up a large percentage.
I can find some examples when unarmed units went to combat (17 Mechanized Corps, which didn't finish formation, in June 1941 or some construction battalions on the Mozhaisk defense line facing armoured spearheads) but that was a result of force major rather than some deliberate policy.
It was so brutal that Stavka, the Soviet high command, forbade A. I. Eremenko, Stalingrad front commander, and his commissar, Nikita Khrushchev, from crossing the river into the city: Stavka was afraid they'd develop an affinity with the poor troops dying there and decide to abandon it.
Here I can't help remebering an old anecdote about academician Aganbegyan winning a car in a lottery :-). See Khruschev's memoirs (they are available in English) for an original story, is essence Kruschev writes that Stalin was against moving the front HQ to the easterns side of Volgafrom the city, because he thought that it would create an unfavourable impression on troops.

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Re: The Russian side

#81

Post by John Hilly » 01 Oct 2010, 18:09

Back to 1941.
How were things in grouping "Workers' militia divisions" (propably the naming of the divisions isn't correct) in Leningrad and Moscow? :?
With best regards
Juha-Pekka :milwink:
"Die Blechtrommel trommelt noch!"

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Re: The Russian side

#82

Post by bf109 emil » 02 Oct 2010, 00:00

Art wrote'
There is actually more speicific information on the shape of the 13 Guards Division, when it was committed to action in Stalingrad. As of 13 September 1942 it had 9 603 men, 7 745 rifles, 170 SMGs, 30 light and 16 heavy machineguns (Isaev, 2008.
along with
In general IMO Glatnz overdramatize things.
which does not show Glantz writings to be wrong or overdramtic as IMHO Glantz has equal and access to Archives and documentation that Isaev.
The statement on divisions down from 10000 men to 500 in just one is a certain exaggeration, though losses were heavy of course. For example, already mentioned 13 Guards Division 6 906 men on 25 September, 6076 on 1 October, 6053 on 10 October and 5201 on 20 November 1942.
which is a huge difference of statistics, and no reason to reach a different conclusion of so vast a number, unless one is perhaps writing the truth and the other for national pride, who knows...but what it does no include is the continued number of replacements sent to the 13th guard units which might end in the err that losses as sourced in Soviet archives by Glantz are indeed correct and painted by others as minimal by easily showing simply a total of different days of troop numbers while refraining to also show reinforcement used to obtain said numbers.
According to these two threads on a Polish history forum if it comes to WW2 this is a myth:

http://www.dws.org.pl/viewtopic.php?f=77&t=120282

http://www.dws.org.pl/viewtopic.php?f=2 ... 0#p1331992
does any source in these forums show links to declassified soviet documents to verify this as but a myth?
For comparison, that is info of three other divisions sent ot Stalingrad in early October from Isaev (as of 25 September 1942):
39 Guards Rifle Division: 4082 men, 2978 rifles, 695 SMGs, 24 light, 12 heavy and 2 AA MGs, 114 AT rifles, 13 field and 7 AT guns
308 Rifles Divisions: 4248 men, 5513 rifles, 476 SMGs, 106 light and 33 heavy MGs, 119 AT Rifles, 45 field and 20 AT guns
37 Guards: 6695 men, 5842 rifles, 1157 SMGs, 154 light, 82 heavy and 10 AA MGs, 254 AT Rifles, 41 field and 29 AT guns.
may i as where Isaev sourced this info from? as the earlier link you provide for Isaev notes his grandiose scale for describing Soviet Victories and battles above those of other previous authors :wink: and sense a source which is apt to refrain from showing accuracy when Russian prestige might be questioned! :idea:

but alas it remains Glantz shows soviet loses to be extreme using sourced and recently released Soviet archive documents and Isaev claiming minimal loses claiming the same sourced material...I'll wait for the truth...Glantz has no reason to be viewed as dramatic or extreme...only accurate...Isaev requires his works to be sold within the nation which he might be offended and result in pressure to refrain from such evidence ever coming to light...I'll stick with Glantz's conclusion, free from outside pressure that Isaev does not have the luxury to allow :wink:
Last edited by bf109 emil on 02 Oct 2010, 00:16, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: The Russian side

#83

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 02 Oct 2010, 00:12

does any source in these forums show links to declassified soviet documents to verify this as but a myth?
No.
correct and painted by others as minimal
Minimal?

From 9603 men (13.09.1942) to 6906 (25.09.1942) and 6076 (01.10.1942) is minimal?!

You have never seen what is "minimal" probably. :roll:
when Russian prestige might be questioned!
What does having enough rifles or not enough rifles have to do with prestige?

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Re: The Russian side

#84

Post by bf109 emil » 02 Oct 2010, 00:31

Minimal?

From 9603 men (13.09.1942) to 6906 (25.09.1942) and 6076 (01.10.1942) is minimal?!
who says their minimal...and we have no way to determine if these are the actual and only loses in the number of 13th Guards as reinforcement totals are not given, only combat alive members of the 13th Guards :wink:

but if reinforcements are indeed large and statistic do not show the number of KIA as Isaev does not do, but instead shows the opening number of troops, i.e.9603 men and on Oct.1 1942 shows the 13th Guards as numbering 6076 personal...sure loses are now to be considered minimal of the actual number of 13th Guards whom where indeed KIA :roll:

then again Glantz using the same records as Isaev point to differnt conclusions :idea:
when Russian prestige might be questioned!



What does having enough rifles or not enough rifles have to do with prestige?
:lol: :lol: :lol: again nice use of an incorrect paste and text to switch a posters words...good one...and really what does rifles number have to do with prestige as prestige would mean not painting a negative view of Soviet History by an author residing in the Soviet union and requiring his prestige into refraining from showing anything less then heroic...

but prestige would account for Isaev showing enough rifles available to counter what Glantz researches from the same archives show a vast difference of opinion...any word of the polish forum showing this to still be a myth using credible sources or documents? Glantz does, an ahem need no prestige to tell otherwise :wink:

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Re: The Russian side

#85

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 02 Oct 2010, 01:09

but if reinforcements are indeed large
I don't think reinforcements were large during such a short period (13 - 25 September or 1 October).

Usually you reinforce a unit after withdrawing it from the frontline when it's no longer capable of combats.
Michate wrote:Until the end of 1944, a little over 1 million German soldiers were killed in action on Eastern front, while during 1945, a little over half a million were killed in action on both eastern and western front. Additionally several hundred thousand smaller axis army soldiers killed in action.
Michate, even reported losses were higher than you claim.

Heeresarzt reported on the Eastern Front from 22.06.1941 to 31.12.1944:

890,556 KIA
1,110,427 MIA
3,459,568 WIA (is this number close to correct?)

Total number of KIA and MIA = 2,000,983.

This doesn't include losses of SS, Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine.

But yet "Wehrmacht Zentralstatistik" reported (Gesamtausfälle der Wehrmacht) on the Eastern Front until 30.11.1944:

1,419,728 dead (this also includes non-combat losses but it was a very small percentage*)
997,050 MIA

Total number of Heer dead + MIA = 2,416,778.

The same report (which brokes down losses by campaign) gives total Heer losses as:

1,710,869 dead
1,540,795 MIA

Total number of Heer dead and MIA = 3,251,664.

* Heer losses on all fronts according to a similar report from 30.11.1944 (which brokes down losses by type):

1,540,829 MIA (including 242,100 confirmed POWs)

And total reported Heer deaths - 1,709,739 *

This includes:

1,554,066 KIA or DOW
147,640 DOS, DIA, Suicides
7,810 Executed
223 Unknown cause

So as you can see 91% of all reported deaths of Heer were combat deaths (either KIA or DOW).

Thus we can assume that numbers from this report include:

1,419,728 (of whom up to ca. 127,800 were non-combat deaths, while ca. 1,292,000 were combat deaths).

Which gives us:

1,292,000 KIA or DOW
997,050 MIA

Total = 2,289,050.

And now let's check Soviet reported POW figures, which are given here in this chart:

http://www.dws.org.pl/viewtopic.php?f=2 ... 5#p1470891

Small legend for this chart:

The chart provides figures for POWs from German, Romanian, Hungarian, Italian and Finnish armies who rolled over POW camps of Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs during the Great Patriotic War.

Thus all POWs who entered these POW camps are included in the report.

Number of POWs inside these camps and changes:

przybyło = increased / came / entered (depends how you want to translate "przybyło")
ubyło = decreased
w tym zmarło = of them died
stan na = number on

Razem = total
A. Niemiecka = German Army
w tym Austriacy = of them Austrians
A. Rumuńska = Romanian Army
A. Węgierska = Hungarian Army
A. Włoska = Italian Army
A. Fińska = Finnish Army
Hiszpanie = Spaniards

So as you can see, the following number of POWs from the German Army was reported in POW camps:

1941 - 9,147
1942 - 79,004
1943 - 102,196
1944 - 473,418

In total until the end of 1944: 663,765.

While in the same period (even shorter - without December 1944) German Heer alone reported 997,050 MIA.

This indicates, that some 333,285 of the reported MIA, were in fact also deaths (most probably battle deaths).

This gives us 1,625,285+ Heer reported battle deaths (KIA, DOW, MIA presumed dead) until 30.11.1944.

And this does not include Waffen SS, Luftwaffe ground troops, Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine and others.

Now take into consideration the fact that reported casualties are usually to some extent incomplete.

As R. Overmans shows (however I don't say that I support everything what he claims).

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Re: The Russian side

#86

Post by Michate » 02 Oct 2010, 07:54

While its room for thought, having not read through the entire topic due to lack of time, there appears to be one persons critique of the work and thats about it so far?
Yep, and this person is not you or me, but has actually gone the stoney way to compile a very large number of records and sources, analyze them and make the results visible to anyone in a well organized manner for free. So this criticism deserves to be taken more seriously than two dozen rehashs from Mr. Everybody who doesn't know anything else.

BTW, newer works from German scholars, like Keller and Otto, are critizising Streit for similar reasons.

Michate, even reported losses were higher than you claim.
Yawn. You really think I do not know these figures?

I talked about KIA, not about the totality of deaths, and also not DoW. For the very simple reason keeping the separate reporting classifications allows better comparison, e.g. with comparable Soviet figures, or with the (unfortunately very scarce) occasional breakdown of figures in Overmans.
1,419,728 dead (this also includes non-combat losses but it was a very small percentage*)
This figure includes not only KIA and non combat losses, but also DoW, which were technically treated a little bit different (as reporting was partially through different channels). Plus a few of the initially reported MIA seem to have been reclassified as dead.
1941 - 9,147
1942 - 79,004
1943 - 102,196
1944 - 473,418

In total until the end of 1944: 663,765.
The detailed monthly GUPVI(?) figures appended to Hilger's book show 398,000 German PoWs in Soviet custody in December 1944, IIRC. However they seem not to include PoWs from Austria and annexed parts of Greater Germany, so it may be 10-20% or so higher.
Overmans assumes 430,000 German PoWs in Soviet hands at the end of 1944, but unfortunately his way of calculation is less than clear.

And that a large part of the PoWs were actually dead is a very old hat.
This gives us 1,625,285+ Heer reported battle deaths (KIA, DOW, MIA presumed dead) until 30.11.1944.
No, this figure was surely not reported. It may only result from ex post calculations including cross comparisons with Soviet PoW figures. It is certainly valid for what it is, though I would put it higher, approaching nearly two million. However it is therefore not suited for comparison with Soviet figures of their reported KIA or DoW.

You simply seem to have thoroughly misunderstood my point.
Last edited by Michate on 02 Oct 2010, 08:35, edited 6 times in total.

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Re: The Russian side

#87

Post by bf109 emil » 02 Oct 2010, 07:55

Art writes'
In general IMO Glatnz overdramatize things. The statement on divisions down from 10000 men to 500 in just one is a certain exaggeration,
Art i find your opinion biased and as a site moderator to be shocking...As your duties i suspect are to moderate the actions of this site, fine, but to attempt to downplay an authors works by using and manipulating data in order to do so is both shocking and appaling...
though losses were heavy of course. For example, already mentioned 13 Guards Division 6 906 men on 25 September, 6076 on 1 October, 6053 on 10 October and 5201 on 20 November 1942. These data due to their nature include wounded and sick in divisional medical units, but they usually didn't make up a large percentage.
and as in order to do so and appear as legit, you cite figures for the 13th Guards in an attempt to paint and falsify history as well as try to deceive others whom use this site for sources such as my wife does for teaching children...

I therefore ask and plead with you to change your views and tactics and allow true and accurate data be told...without felling it necessary to try and downplay an accurate work or history by personally attacking the credibility of an author which doesn't meet your standards...the Cold War is over and as such the truth should be told...

Glantz works and writings are in fact actual, you know this as do I. The 13th Guards Unit which entered Battle on the 15 of September in Battle at the Mamaev Kurgan Park continued with Control of the park's summit will change hands numerous times over this period. They then fought in the cauldron that was Stalingrad, on the slopes of the Mamayev Kurgan, in the Red October Tractor plant and in "Pavlov's house"(Sergeant Jakob Pavlov was part of the Division)....

What Glantz states is that of the ORIGINAL members of the Guards Unit that went into battle on the 15th and ending with less then 500 original members!! Other works claim even less...

Remember the 13th Guards continuing fighting right through until the end of Stalingrad and continually saw new troops and replacements being sent in to bolster this units fighting ability...You do not relay this information but simply quote number taken from Isaev as an attempt to minimize Soviet Loses while allowing a personal claim to downplay works by Glantz when and as scene fit by yourself...Shame on You...

Their are numerous sites regarding the 13th Guards Unit which back up Glantz works...perhaps looking into these might be a better by a forum moderator on a Historical Forum then the erroneous attempt to downplay Soviet historical loses by attempting lure people using this site for information/sources into a disbelief of an authors works!

Thank You

Jim Snowden (bf109 emil)

http://sites.google.com/site/13thguardshistory/...http://13guards.bravehost.com/history.html

After the Kharkov operation, the 13th Guards are pulled from the line for refit & resupply.

September 13-14 - 4:45am - German infantry divisions make their first advance into Stalingrad, with the German 71st Infantry reaching the city centre, north of the Tsarita gorge. A direct Stavka (Soviet Supreme General Staff) directive orders the 13th Guard Division (in the midst of it's re-fit) to the Volga and Stalingrad as reinforcements. The 13th arrives in pieces, its men straight from a grueling forced march. Due to being in the midst of re-fit & resupply, one thousand of its men have no rifles, and the rest are short of ammunition.


accounts state that of the 10,000 men of the 13th that crossed the Volga, only between 280 and 320 of them came out alive.

The reason for the re-fit and lack of rifles results from a battle only 2 days prior...Fighting on Mamayev Kurgan, a prominent, blood-soaked hill above the city, was particularly merciless. The position changed hands many times. This division was the 13th Guards Rifle Division, assigned to retake Mamayev Kurgan and Railway Station No. 1, on September 13. Both objectives were successful, only to temporary degrees. The railway station changed hands 14 times in 6 hours. By the following evening, the 13th Guards Rifle Division did not exist

One unit which perhaps sacrificed most in the battle of Stalingrad was the elite 13th Guards division, which was sent across the Volga into Stalingrad just in time to repel a German attack that reached the Volga near the center of the city. 30% of the 10,000 warriors of the 13th division were killed in the first 24 hours of their arrival, and only 320 survived the battle of Stalingrad, a horrible 97% death rate, but they saved Stalingrad in the most critical moment.

Mamayev Hill - Church of All Saints

Image
The Soviet 13th Guards-rifle Division (10,000 men strong) retook Mamayev on 16 September 1942, suffering extreme losses.
Image
This museum is completely devoted to the famous battle of Stalingrad (1942-1943) and consists of 8 halls, 4 diorama's and a central triumphal hall. There are about 4,000 exhibits composed of 20 theme's. On display here there are such artefacts as posters, leaflets, orders of the headquarters, banners, decorations, front newspapers, photos, letters, weapons, personal belongings and maps.
Image
Mamayev Hill - "Memory of the Generations"

Fighting for this hill began on 13 September 1942, when German troops assaulted the fortified Mamayev, which was defended by elements of the Soviet 62th Army. When the Germans took the hill, they began firing on the centre of Stalingrad. The Soviet 13th Guards-rifle Division (10,000 men strong) retook Mamayev on 16 September 1942, suffering extreme losses. The Germans assaulted the hill an avarage of 12 times a day and the hill changed several times of ownership during the battle. The 6th German Army managed to take half of Mamayev hill on 27 September 1942.
Image
This memorial is located at the western side of "Pavlov's House" and is dedicated to the 25-man understrenght Platoon, which defended this building from 23 September to 25 November 1942 and the Soviet defenders of Stalingrad in general.
Image
Mamayev Hill - "The Motherland Calls"
(Russia - Volgograd)
pics sourced from http://panorama.volgadmin.ru/

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Re: The Russian side

#88

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 02 Oct 2010, 10:41

bf109emil:
The 13th arrives in pieces, its men straight from a grueling forced march. Due to being in the midst of re-fit & resupply, one thousand of its men have no rifles, and the rest are short of ammunition.
Have you ever seen a division with as many rifles as men even according to its authorized strength?

Because I didn't. Nor I saw a regiment with as many rifles as men, or even a battalion.
30% of the 10,000 warriors of the 13th division were killed in the first 24 hours of their arrival, and only 320 survived the battle of Stalingrad, a horrible 97% death rate, but they saved Stalingrad in the most critical moment.
Have you ever heard about urban legends, myths, etc.?
30% of the 10,000 warriors of the 13th division were killed in the first 24 hours of their arrival, and only 320 survived the battle of Stalingrad, a horrible 97% death rate, but they saved Stalingrad in the most critical moment.
In a normal battle 30% killed = 60 - 90% more wounded = 90 - 120% battle casualties.

In a normal battle 97% killed = 194 - 288% more wounded = 288 - 382% battle casualties.
a horrible 97% death rate
This is more than Japanese death rates while defending in extreme conditions on cut off and encircled islands.

And here you claim that they lost so many % deaths in a normal battle, mostly while attacking.

Impossible.

=======================

Michate:
For the very simple reason keeping the separate reporting classifications allows better comparison, e.g. with comparable Soviet figures,
But I have doubts if Krivosheev figures are really comparable to these German reports.

When Krivosheev writes about "KIA", he most probably includes also DOW and MIA reclassified as KIA.

His figures are not simply taken / quoted directly from reports, but yet after some "treatment".

We know that initially reported Soviet losses were lower than those provided by Krivosheev.
Plus a few of the initially reported MIA seem to have been reclassified as dead.
Even much more than just "a few".

But overall numbers of the "Wehrmacht Zentralstatistik" are higher than those of the Heeresarzt.
1941 - 9,147
1942 - 79,004
1943 - 102,196
1944 - 473,418

In total until the end of 1944: 663,765.
The detailed monthly GUPVI(?) figures appended to Hilger's book show 398,000 German PoWs in Soviet custody in December 1944, IIRC. However they seem not to include PoWs from Austria and annexed parts of Greater Germany, so it may be 10-20% or so higher.
Overmans assumes 430,000 German PoWs in Soviet hands at the end of 1944, but unfortunately his way of calculation is less than clear.
My figures refer to POWs who rolled over through Soviet POW camps until the end of 1944, not POWs who at the moment were in Soviet POW camps in Decemeber 1944. But this 2nd number is also provided by that chart:

On 01.01.1945 there were 452,160 POWs from the Germany Army in Soviet POW camps.

This includes 23,859 Austrians. Without Austrians - 428,301.

From 22.06.1941 to 31.12.1944, as I already wrote above, some 663,765 POWs from the German Army were reported in Soviet POW camps. At the same time number of POWs from the German Army inside these camps decreased (from different reasons, not just deaths) by 211,605.

Total figures of POWs from the German Army for 1941 - 1946 are reported as:

Increased - 2,548,461
Decreased - 1,518,133
Of them died - 369,725
Number on 01.06.1947 - 1,030,328

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Coming back to Krivosheev:

Another thing is that there are still some serious doubts with at least part of Krivosheev data.

For example Krivosheev gives the following data on Polish People's Army losses in Berlin Operation:

1. and 2. Armies combined (16.04.1945 - 08.05.1945) - 2825 irrecoverable + 6067 sanitary.

While Grzelak, Stańczyk and Zwoliński in their book "Armia Berlinga i Żymierskiego" write:

2. Army (01.04.1945 - 01.05.1945) - 4902 killed / 2798 missing / 10532 wounded.

1. Army (16.04.1945 - 06.05.1945) - 2310 killed / 967 missing / 116 confirmed POW / 6992 wounded. *

* Finally after reclassification irrecoverable losses of 1. Army were established as 2958 (including DOW).

How to explain this? Such a discrepancy? :idea:

Meyer
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Re: The Russian side

#89

Post by Meyer » 02 Oct 2010, 19:23

bf109 emil wrote:Glantz works and writings are in fact actual, you know this as do I. The 13th Guards Unit which entered Battle on the 15 of September in Battle at the Mamaev Kurgan Park continued with Control of the park's summit will change hands numerous times over this period. They then fought in the cauldron that was Stalingrad, on the slopes of the Mamayev Kurgan, in the Red October Tractor plant and in "Pavlov's house"(Sergeant Jakob Pavlov was part of the Division)....

What Glantz states is that of the ORIGINAL members of the Guards Unit that went into battle on the 15th and ending with less then 500 original members!! Other works claim even less...

No, he didn't. That's is what he said:
To feed just enough troops into the city to keep it from falling. They are sacrificial lambs. Divisions that come in with 10,000 men have 500 the next day
He is not even pointing at the 13th Guards Div. as an example of that (though he may think it). So to prove that Glantz was right, we have to find a division that their strength drops from 10k to 500 men in one day.

PS: Nice pics :roll:

Piotr Kapuscinski
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Re: The Russian side

#90

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 02 Oct 2010, 19:28

And a drop from 10 k to 500 doesn't mean 9,5 k dead... :roll:

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