Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

[Michael Kenny]

Thus, Hitler's decision to invade Poland was made for preventive and deterrent reasons, rather than from the motive of rather than from the motive of territorial conquest

Poor Adolph. He had a great number of these pressing 'preventive and deterrent reasons' that forced him to invade/absorb:

Czechoslovakia.
Austria
Poland
Norway
France
Belgium
Holland
Denmark
Greece.
Russia

as well as engaging the Armies of:

The United States.
Finland
Rumania
Italy.



'Territorial conquest' was indeed anathema to Hitler!

[michael mills]

as well as engaging the Armies of:

The United States.
Finland
Rumania
Italy.

Well, Germany did declare war on the United States on 11 Decembver 1941, but the historical fact is that the United States had been waging an undeclared naval war on Germany since Roosevelt's "shoot on sight" order of 11 September of that year.

Germany did not declare war on Finland, Romania or Italy. Those states declared war on Germany under pressure from the Allies.

Thus, hostilities between the armed forces of Germany and those of the United States, Finland, Romania and Italy were initiated by the latter, not by Germany.

[michael mills]

Of course the fact that Poland finally started to liquidate the net of German espionage & sabotage in Poland (which had been prepared already since March 1939 at least) not before August 1939 - was happily & eagerly exploited by Goebbels' Propaganda, who made up its fantasy claims that Poland was persecuting German minority...

Fantasy claims?

Have a look at this excerpt from FRUS Document 760C.6212/42, the report of 27 January 1937 from the US Ambassador to Poland, Cudahy, on developments in the German-Polish relationship.

Another cause of disturbances between Poland and Germany is the situation in Upper Silesia. The Voivode, Dr. Michal Grazynski, makes the most of his almost unlimited autonomous authority to make life miserable for German residents, and under his leadership the "Polonization" of this rich industrial region has gone on with vigorous, ruthless despatch. This Embassy has, in a number of despatches, reported the loss of German capital by Polish confiscatory tax methods and the coercive measures which have forced many Germans out of work in Upper Silesia. During my first month's residence in Poland I was at a shooting party given by the President near Cieszyn with Herr von Moltke the German Ambassador who, in a surprising outburst, told me that the situation in Upper Silesia violated "every principle of justice" and strained his patience to the breaking point. The openly hostile discriminatory tactics of Polish governmental authorities toward German industry and German residents in Upper Silesia have for many years been the cause of much tension between the German and Polish Foreign Offices.

So, according to the US Ambassador in Poland, the persecution of the ethnic German minority in that country was very real. It was no fantasy. By August 1939 that persecution was far worse than it had been in January 1937, when Ambassador Cudahy made his report back to Washington.

[David Thompson]

Michael -- You wrote:

So, according to the US Ambassador in Poland, the persecution of the ethnic German minority in that country was very real. It was no fantasy. By August 1939 that persecution was far worse than it had been in January 1937, when Ambassador Cudahy made his report back to Washington.

Polish nationals -- particularly Polish Jews -- weren't very well-treated in Germany either. The British government proposed a population exchange on 28 Aug 1939 (item 10, below), but Hitler was non-committal. Note the escalation of German demands to include the whole of the Polish corridor and territory bounding Silesia (Item 6, "nothing else than the return of Danzig and the whole of the Corridor would satisfy him, together with a rectification in Silesia"). In fact, Hitler even tried to nip the allies for a colony or two across the seas, presumably as a sweetener (No. 76, at the end of this quote). From The British Blue Book (1939):

No. 75.

Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 2:35 a. m. August 29).
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 28, 1939.

I SAW the Chancellor at 10:30 this evening. He asked me to come at 10 p. m., but I sent word that I could not have the translation ready before the later hour. Herr von Ribbentrop was present, also Dr. Schmidt. Interview lasted one and a quarter hours.

2. Herr Hitler began by reading the German translation.

166 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

When he had finished, I said that I wished to make certain observations from notes which I had made in the conversations with the Prime Minister and His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In the first place I wished to say that we in England regarded it as absurd that Britain should be supposed by the German Government to consider the crushing of Germany as a settled policy. We held it to be no less astonishing that anyone in Germany should doubt for a moment that we would not fight for Poland if her independence or vital interests were menaced.

3. Our word was our word, and we had never and would never break it. In the old days Germany's word had the same value, and I quoted a passage from a German book (which Herr Hitler had read) about Marshal Blucher's exhortation to his troops when hurrying to the support of Wellington at Waterloo: "Forward, my children, I have given my word to my brother Wellington, and you cannot wish me to break it."

4. Herr Hitler at once intervened to observe that things were different 125 years ago. I said not so far as England was concerned. He wanted, I said, Britain's friendship. What value would he place on our friendship if we began it by disloyalty to a friend? Whatever some people might say, the British people sincerely desired an understanding with Germany, and no one more so than the Prime Minister (Herr von Ribbentrop remarked that Mr. Chamberlain had once said to him that it was his dearest wish). To-day the whole British public was behind the Prime Minister. The recent vote in the House of Commons was an unmistakable proof of that fact. The Prime Minister could carry through his policy of an understanding if, but only if, Herr Hitler were prepared to co-operate. There was absolutely no truth in the idea sometimes held in Germany that the British Cabinet was disunited or that the country was not unanimous. It was now or never, and it rested with Herr Hitler. If he was prepared to sacrifice that understanding in order to make war or immoderate demands on Poland, the responsibility was his. We offered friendship but only on the basis of a peaceful and freely negotiated solution of the Polish question.

5. Herr Hitler replied that he would be willing to negotiate, if there was a Polish Government which was prepared to be

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 167

reasonable and which really controlled the country. He expatiated on misdoings of the Poles, referred to his generous offer of March last, said that it could not be repeated and asserted that nothing else than the return of Danzig and the whole of the Corridor would satisfy him, together with a rectification in Silesia, where 90 per cent. of the population had voted for Germany at the post-war plebiscite but where, as a result of Haller-Korfanti coup, what the Plebiscite Commission had allotted had nevertheless been grabbed by Poland.

6. I told Herr Hitler that he must choose between England and Poland. If he put forward immoderate demands there was no hope of a peaceful solution. Corridor was inhabited almost entirely by Poles. Herr Hitler interrupted me here by observing that this was only true because a million Germans had been driven out of that district since the war. I again said the choice lay with him. He had offered a Corridor over the Corridor in March, and I must honestly tell him that anything more than that, if that, would have no hope of acceptance. I begged him very earnestly to reflect before raising his price. He said his original offer had been contemptuously refused and he would not make it again. I observed that it had been made in the form of a dictate and therein lay the whole difference.

7. Herr Hitler continued to argue that Poland could never be reasonable: she had England and France behind her, and imagined that even if she were beaten she would later recover, thanks to their help, more than she might lose. He spoke of annihilating Poland. I said that reminded me of similar talk last year of annihilation of the Czechs. He retorted that we were incapable of inducing Poland to be reasonable. I said that it was just because we remembered the experience of Czecho-Slovakia last year that we hesitated to press Poland too far to-day. Nevertheless, we reserved to ourselves the right to form our own judgment as to what was or what was not reasonable so far as Poland or Germany were concerned. We kept our hands free in that respect.

8. Generally speaking, Herr Hitler kept harping on Poland, and I kept on just as consistently telling Herr Hitler that he had to choose between friendship with England which we offered him and excessive demands on Poland which would put an end

168 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

to all hope of British friendship. If we were to come to an understanding it would entail sacrifices on our part. If he was not prepared to make sacrifices on his part there was nothing to be done. Herr Hitler said that he had to satisfy the demands of his people, his army was ready and eager for battle, his people were united behind him, and he could not tolerate further ill-treatment of Germans in Poland, &c.

9. It is unnecessary to recall the details of a long and earnest conversation in the course of which the only occasion in which Herr Hitler became at all excited was when I observed that it was not a question of Danzig and the Corridor, but one of our determination to resist force by force. This evoked a tirade about the Rhineland, Austria and Sudeten and their peaceful reacquisition by Germany. He also resented my references to 15th March.

10. In the end I asked him two straight questions. Was he willing to negotiate direct with the Poles and was he ready to discuss the question of an exchange of populations? He replied in the affirmative as regards the latter (though I have no doubt that he was thinking at the same time of a rectification of frontiers). As regards the first, he said he could not give me an answer until after he had given reply of His Majesty's Government the careful consideration which such a document deserved. In this connexion he turned to Herr von Ribbentrop and said: "We must summon Field-Marshal Goring to discuss it with him."

11. I finally repeated to him very solemnly the main note of the whole conversation so far as I was concerned, namely, that it lay with him as to whether he preferred a unilateral solution which would mean war as regards Poland, or British friendship. If he were prepared to pay the price of the latter by a generous gesture as regards Poland, he could at a stroke change in his favour the whole of public opinion not only in England but in the world. I left no doubt in his mind as to what the alternative would be, nor did he dispute the point.

12. At the end Herr von Ribbentrop asked me whether I could guarantee that the Prime Minister could carry the country with him in a policy of friendship with Germany. I said there was no possible doubt whatever that he could and would, provided Germany co-operated with him. Herr Hitler asked whether England would be willing to accept an alliance with Germany.

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 169

I said, speaking personally, I did not exclude such a possibility provided the developments of events justified it.

13. Conversation was conducted in quite a friendly atmosphere, in spite of absolute firmness on both sides. Herr Hitler's general attitude was that he could give me no real reply until he had carefully studied the answer of His Majesty's Government. He said that he would give me a written reply to-morrow, Tuesday. I told him that I would await it, but was quite prepared to wait. Herr Hitler's answer was that there was no time to wait.

14. I did not refer to the question of a truce. I shall raise that point to-morrow if his answer affords any real ground for hope that he is prepared to abandon war for the sake of British understanding.

No. 76.

Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 4:55 p. m.).

(Telegraphic) Berlin, August 29, 1939.

Following are additional points in amplification of my telegram of 28th August*:-

Herr Hitler insisted that he was not bluffing, and that people would make a great mistake if they believed that he was. I replied that I was fully aware of the fact and that we were not bluffing either. Herr Hitler stated that he fully realised that that was the case. In answer to a suggestion by him that Great Britain might offer something at once in the way of colonies as evidence of her good intentions, I retorted that concessions were easier of realisation in a good rather than a bad atmosphere.

http://ibiblio.org/pha/bb/bb-169.html#70

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

The excerpt that Michael quoted refers only to Upper Silesia which was an autonomous region, with its own Parliament. The Polish government had no direct influence on internal affairs of Upper Silesia.

Moreover - the excerpt that Michael quoted mentiones the policy of Michal Grazynski (voivode of Upper Silesia) - Grazynski became the voivode of Upper Silesia in 1926 after Pilsudski's Coup d'Etat - because Pilsudski supported his candidacy. Considering that Pilsudski was extremely pro-German, it is hard to believe that he would choose an anti-German person for a voivode - which puts in heavy doubts what Michael's account claims.

Using Michael style of argumentation about "pro" and "anti" things.

Another issue is that the excerpt quoted by Michael describes no any details about that alleged "mistreatment" of Volksdeutsche in Upper Silesia. The only things which this excerpt mentions regarding this issue, are empty slogans - such as "Polonization" or "making life miserable for Volksdeutsche". But it does not say how exactly life was being made miserable for German minority, or how exactly was that alleged "Polonization" conducted.

In fact voivode Grazynski did not carry out any action aimed at depriving the German minority in Upper Silesia of its national culture, language, or any other minority rights, or civil & political rights of Polish citizens.

The only thing which could be interpreted as "Polonization" - but surely in fact was nothing close to "Polonization" - was supporting and actively promoting Polish culture in Upper Silesia - for example by promoting the creation of Polish museums, Polish theatres and various Polish cultural organizations & institutions.

All those actions - however - were not followed by any hostility towards German culture. Although he did not promote German culture - he clearly did not fight against it and did not prevent its development.

So it seems like US Ambassador was clearly "oversensitive" or biased, and he exaggerated the problem.

I don't know what else can be expected for a national minority in a foreign country.

Promoting German culture by a Polish patriot (such as Grazynski)? Please let's be serious. Great Britain somehow doesn't promote Polish culture nowadays, does not build Polish museums and Polish theatres in London - despite the fact that Polish national minority in Great Britain is very significant since Poland joined the EU.

Germany neither does promote Polish culture - or ever was - despite having numerous Polish minority.

By August 1939 that persecution was far worse than it had been in January 1937, when Ambassador Cudahy made his report back to Washington.

An unsupported claim by Michael Mills.

This Embassy has, in a number of despatches, reported the loss of German capital by Polish confiscatory tax methods and the coercive measures

The loss of German capital had of course been the case - but it was the loss of FOREIGN German capital - i.e. capital of businessmen from Germany, not capital of local Polish citizens of German nationality.

Combating "invasion" of foreign capital by establishing more demanding tax methods and coercive measures - was something normal for any country which wanted to promote local, national businesses.

The European Union did not exist at that time, the European Economic Community did not exist too.

which have forced many Germans out of work in Upper Silesia.

Well - but also many Poles who worked in foreign, German factories.

However - I suppose he refers to forcing out of work Germans from eastern regions of Germany who worked in Polish Upper Silesia (as you probably remember majority of factories were in that part of Upper Silesia which was Polish after 1921 - the German part of Upper Silesia, although larger, had fewer factories).

Polish citizens of German nationality had exactly the same prospects of finding work in Upper Silesia, as Polish citizens of Polish or any other nationality - so it was definitely not discrimination of German minority.

It could be "discrimination" of immigrants from Germany who wanted to work in Poland - but this was perfectly justifiable, as no state had any obligation to allow hordes of foreign immigrants to work on its territory.

He claims writing about discrimantion of minority, while in fact he writes about discrimination of German capital - and foreign German capital, to be precise - not capital of Polish citizens of German nationality.

These are completely different things and while discriminating minorities in your country was perceived as something bad also at that time - in early 20th century - then favouring national capital over foreign was certainly not something unusual and not something perceived as bad at that time - there was no EU or EEE in 1937.

During my first month's residence in Poland I was at a shooting party given by the President near Cieszyn with Herr von Moltke the German Ambassador who, in a surprising outburst, told me that the situation in Upper Silesia violated "every principle of justice" and strained his patience to the breaking point. The openly hostile discriminatory tactics of Polish governmental authorities toward German industry and German residents in Upper Silesia have for many years been the cause of much tension between the German and Polish Foreign Offices.

I am not surprised that von Moltke was angry. However, he was so blinded by his anger that he forgot that it was Germany - not Poland - who first started the "economic war" against the Polish state.

It was Germany (already before Hitler came to power - Weimar Germany) who first refused to import Polish coal from Upper Silesia - which forced Poland to export all of its coal via the Baltic Sea.

Thus I don't understand why Germany was later angry that foreign German industry (and of course national German - not Polish industry ran by ethnic German citizens) was treated in a "hostile" way.

Germany started the Polish-German economic war. They got what they wanted.

That economic war was indeed the cause of tensions already during times of Weimar Germany.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

On pages 120-122 of that book, Suchcitz writes:

Read further pages, where he describes how the plan was abandoned and "Intervention Corps" dissolved.

The essays are written from the right-wing nationalist standpoint typical of the post-war Polish exiles in Britain.

So why you quote them if you admit on your own that they are not credible sources.

Why not learning Polish and reading what the Polish Chief of Staff Waclaw Stachiewicz wrote himself - for example his "Pisma, Tom II: Rok 1939" ("Records, Volume II: Year 1939"), Instytut Literacki, Paris 1979.

You always specifically underline, that you quote Polish nationalist sources. This way you discredit yourself - because you admit on your own that you base your conclusions on completely unreliable sources, mate.

I would never quote a source that I consider as Polish right-wing nationalist, mate.

in no way represented a derogation of Poland's sovereignty, any more than did Poland's alliance with France in 1921.

Actually Poland's alliance with France in 1921 did indeed dimnish Poland's sovereignity when it comes to military matters to a significant extent. For example, Poland was obliged to maintain constantly - also during peacetime - 30 infantry divisions and 9 cavalry brigades - which was a considerable burden for Poland's budget.

[David Thompson]

Peter K -- You wrote:

So it seems like US Ambassador was clearly "oversensitive" or biased, and he exaggerated the problem.

I don't know what else can be expected for a national minority in a foreign country.

US Ambassador Cudahy is not the only observer who mentions the problem of Polish oppression of ethnic Germans in diplomatic correspondence from the 1930s, but that's not the topic of this thread. The historical accuracy of the IMT judgment on aggressive war is what we're discussing here. Given Hitler's apparent indifference to the obvious solution -- a population exchange with Poland -- the mistreatment is obviously a pretext for the German invasion, and should be treated as such. Under the supervision of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (VoMi), the German population had become overtly subversive of the Polish state, and the German diplomatic correspondence reflects this as well. Finally, the "New Germany's" treatment of Polish nationals was hardly a beacon to the world. Let's leave it at that.

[michael mills]

Polish nationals -- particularly Polish Jews -- weren't very well-treated in Germany either. The British government proposed a population exchange on 28 Aug 1939 (item 10, below), but Hitler was non-committal.

Jews of Polish nationality resident in Germany were not subject to any worse treatment by the German Government than Jews of German antionality.

In fact, it was the Polish Government that in 1938 attempted to strip such Jews of their Polish citizenship, thereby rendering them stateless, without any right to return to Poland.

The German Government's response to that move was to expel Jews with Polish nationality back to Poland. However, the Polish border guards refused to allow the expelled Jews to enter Poland (despite their Polish nationality), and they were trapped for some time in no-man's land at Zbaszyn.

That event is sometimes reckoned as a case of German crueltly, but in fact it was initiated by the Polish Government, through the cancellation of the Polish passports of the Polish Jews resident in Germany.

The hsitory of the Polish Jews resident in Germany is intructive. For the most part they had emigrated to Germany from the Austrian province of Galicia before the First World War, and had been Austrian citizens at the time of their migration.

Under the provisions of the Treaty of St Germain, those emigrants lost their Austrian citizenship, since they were natives of a territory that had been removed from Austrian sovereignty by the provisions of that treaty. Since their place of origin, the province of Galicia, had been transferred to the sovereignty of the restored Polish state, the emigrants were supposed to receive Polish citizenship, but the Polish Government refused to recognise Jews living outside the territory of the new Polish state as Polish citizens.

The matter was resolved in 1923, when the Polish Government was forced by the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers to grant citizenship to all Jews who originated from the former Austrian provinces that had been transferred to Polish sovereignty, in return for Allied recognition of Polish sovereignty over the entire province of Galicia. That is how the Jewish emigrants from former Austrian Galicia now resident in Germany camne to acquire Polish citizenship.

That acquisition had been very much against the wishes of the Polish Government, which wanted to limit to the greatest possible extent the number of Jews with Polish citizenship and the concomitant right to reside in Poland, and in 1938 it tried to cancel the sitizenship of the emigrants, thereby precipitating the crisis.

As for German citizens of Polish ethnicity (as determined by native language), they were not subject to any discrimination or persecution by the German Government. They retained their full rights as German citizens (Reichsbürger), unlike Jews, who were stripped of their citizenship and reduced to the lower status of "protected residents" (Schutzangehörige).

As for the question of an exchange of populations, Henderson's description of his meeting with Hitler on 28 August 1939 shows that the latter did not reject such an exachange. Here is what Henderson said in that note:

10. In the end I asked him two straight questions. Was he willing to negotiate direct with the Poles and was he ready to discuss the question of an exchange of populations? He replied in the affirmative as regards the latter (though I have no doubt that he was thinking at the same time of a rectification of frontiers).

In other words, Hitler said "yes" to the second of the two questions asked by Henderson, ie he said "yes" to the question "was he ready to discuss the question of an exchange of populations".

Furthermore, the Marienwerder Proposals made by Germany specifically included a possible exchange of populations, dependent on the outcome of the proposed plebiscite in the Corridor. See pages 393-394 of FRUS, a note of 31 August 1939 from the US Charge in Berlin, Kirk, to the Secretary of State, outlining the Marienwerder Proposals:

http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bi ... 01&isize=M

Note on page 394 point 6 at the very top of the page, which states:

6. After the plebiscite an exchange of population is to take place if found necessary.

That demonstrates conclusively that Germany had not rejected the British proposal of an exchange of population.

Accordingly, this statement by the moderator:

Given Hitler's apparent indifference to the obvious solution -- a population exchange with Poland -- the mistreatment is obviously a pretext for the German invasion, and should be treated as such

is not supported by the documented evidence of the Marienwerder Proposals.

[David Thompson]

The German "Marienwerder proposal" you refer to was simultaneously made and withdrawn by Germany on 30 August 1939. Whether or not such a proposal is serious I will leave the the sound judgment of the readers. Here's how the British Ambassador described it (from The British Blue Book, 1939), with von Ribbentrop first reading the lengthy proposal "at top speed" and then refusing to provide the British diplomat with a copy because Germany had withdrawn it ("When I asked Herr von Ribbentrop for text of these proposals in accordance with undertaking in the German reply of yesterday, he asserted that it was now too late as Polish representative had not arrived in Berlin by midnight."):

No. 92.

Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 9:30 a. m. August 31).

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 30, 1939.

I TOLD Herr von Ribbentrop this evening that His Majesty's Government found it difficult to advise Polish Government to accept procedure adumbrated in German reply, and suggested
______________________________
*No. 85.

188 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

that he should adopt normal contact, i.e., that when German proposals were ready to invite Polish Ambassador to call and to hand him proposals for transmission to his Government with a view to immediate opening of negotiations. I added that if basis afforded prospect of settlement His Majesty's Government could be counted upon to do their best in Warsaw to temporize negotiations.

2. Herr von Ribbentrop's reply was to produce a lengthy document which he read out in German aloud at top speed. Imagining that he would eventually hand it to me I did not attempt to follow too closely the sixteen or more articles which it contained. Though I cannot therefore guarantee accuracy the main points were: restoration of Danzig to Germany; southern boundary of Corridor to be line Marienwerder, Graudenz, Bromberg, Schönlanke; plebiscite to be held in the Corridor on basis of population on 1st January, 1919, absolute majority to decide; international commission of British, French, Italian and Russian members to police the Corridor and guarantee reciprocal communications with Danzig and Gdynia pending result of the plebiscite; Gydnia to be reserved to Poland; Danzig to be purely commercial city and demilitarised.

3. When I asked Herr von Ribbentrop for text of these proposals in accordance with undertaking in the German reply of yesterday, he asserted that it was now too late as Polish representative had not arrived in Berlin by midnight.

4. I observed that to treat matter in this way meant that request for Polish representative to arrive in Berlin on 30th August constituted, in fact, an ultimatum in spite of what he and Herr Hitler had assured me yesterday. This he denied, saying that idea of an ultimatum was figment of my imagination. Why then I asked could he not adopt normal procedure and give me copy of proposals and ask Polish Ambassador to call on him, just as Herr Hitler had summoned me a few days ago, and hand them to him for communication to Polish Government? In the most violent terms Herr von Ribbentrop said that he would never ask the Ambassador to visit him. He hinted that if Polish Ambassador asked him for interview it might be different. I said that I would naturally inform my Government so at once. Whereupon he said while those were his personal views he would

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 189

bring all that I had said to Herr Hitler's notice. It was for Chancellor to decide.

5. We parted on that note, but I must tell you that Herr von Ribbentrop's whole demeanour during an unpleasant interview was aping Herr Hitler at his worst. He inveighed incidentally against Polish mobilisation, but I retorted that it was hardly surprising since Germany had also mobilised as Herr Hitler himself had admitted to me yesterday.

http://ibiblio.org/pha/bb/bb-199.html#78

The next day, the German Foreign Ministry delivered a note to the British Ambassador confirming that the proposal had been withdrawn. The note, set forth in the form of a "broadside" for public release, contained the purported text of what von Ribbentrop had read "at top speed" to Sir Neville Henderson but had refused to provide him with a written copy. Here is the text of the German note, along with the claimed "proposal":

No. 98.

Message which was communicated to H.M. Ambassador in Berlin by the State Secretary on August 31, 1939, at 9:15 p. m.

(Translation.)

HIS Majesty's Government informed the German Government, in a note dated the 28th August, 1939,** of their readiness to offer their mediation towards direct negotiations between
__________________________________________
*Conveying the substance of No. 74.
**No. 74

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 193

Germany and Poland over the problems in dispute. In so doing they made it abundantly clear that they, too, were aware of the urgent need for progress in view of the continuous incidents and the general European tension. In a reply dated the 28th August,* the German Government, in spite of being sceptical as to the desire of the Polish Government to come to an understanding, declared themselves ready in the interests of peace to accept the British mediation or suggestion. After considering all the circumstances prevailing at the time, they considered it necessary in their note to point out that, if the danger of a catastrophe was to be avoided, then action must be taken readily and without delay. In this sense they declared themselves ready to receive a personage appointed by the Polish Government up to the evening of the 30th August, with the proviso that the latter was, in fact, empowered not only to discuss but to conduct and conclude negotiations.

Further, the German Government pointed out that they felt able to make the basic points regarding the offer of an understanding available to the British Government by the time the Polish negotiator arrived in Berlin.

Instead of a statement regarding the arrival of an authorised Polish personage, the first answer the Government of the Reich received to their readiness for an understanding was the news of the Polish mobilisation, and only towards 12 o'clock on the night of the 30th August, 1939, did they receive a somewhat general assurance of British readiness to help towards the commencement of negotiations.

Although the fact that the Polish negotiator expected by the Government of the Reich did not arrive removed the necessary condition for informing His Majesty's Government of the views of the German Government as regards possible bases of negotiation, since His Majesty's Government themselves had pleaded for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Ribbentrop, gave the British Ambassador on the occasion of the presentation of the last British note precise information as to the text of the German proposals which would be regarded as a basis of negotiation in the event of the arrival of the Polish plenipotentiary.
_____________________________
*No. 78.

194 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

The Government of the German Reich considered themselves entitled to claim that in these circumstances a Polish personage would immediately be nominated, at any rate retroactively.

For the Reich Government cannot be expected for their part continually not only to emphasise their willingness to start negotiations, but actually to be ready to do so, while being from the Polish side merely put off with empty subterfuges and meaningless declarations.

It has once more been made clear as a result of a démarche which has meanwhile been made by the Polish Ambassador that the latter himself has no plenary powers either to enter into any discussion, or even to negotiate.

The Führer and the German Government have thus waited two days in vain for the arrival of a Polish negotiator with plenary powers.

In these circumstances the German Government regard their proposals as having this time too been to all intents and purposes rejected, although they consider that these proposals, in the form in which they were made known to the British Government also, were more than loyal, fair and practicable.

The Reich Government consider it timely to inform the public of the bases for negotiation which were communicated to the British Ambassador by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Ribbentrop.

The situation existing between the German Reich and Poland is at the moment of such a kind that any further incident can lead to an explosion on the part of the military forces which have taken up their position on both sides. Any peaceful solution must be framed in such a way as to ensure that the events which lie at the root of this situation cannot be repeated on the next occasion offered, and that thus not only the East of Europe, but also other territories shall not be brought into such a state of tension. The causes of this development lie in: (1) the impossible delineation of frontiers, as fixed by the Versailles dictate; (2) the impossible treatment of the minority in the ceded territories.

In making these proposals, the Reich Government are, therefore, actuated by the idea of finding a lasting solution which will remove the impossible situation created by frontier delineation, which may assure to both parties their vitally important line of

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 195

communication, which may as far as it is at all possible-remove the minority problem and, in so far as this is not possible, may give the minorities the assurance of a tolerable future by means of a reliable guarantee of their rights.

The Reich Government are content that in so doing it is essential that economic and physical damage done since 1918 should be exposed and repaired in its entirety. They, of course, regard this obligation as being binding for both parties.

These considerations lead to the following practical proposals:-

(1) The Free City of Danzig shall return to the German Reich in view of its purely German character, as well as of the unanimous will of its population;

(2) The territory of the so-called Corridor which extends from the Baltic Sea to the line Marienwerder-Graudenz-Kulm-Bromberg (inclusive) and thence may run in a westerly direction to Schönlanke, shall itself decide as to whether it shall belong to Germany or Poland;

(3) For this purpose a plebiscite shall take place in this territory. The following shall be entitled to vote: all Germans who were either domiciled in this territory on the 1st January, 1918, or who by that date have been born there, and similarly of Poles, Kashubes, &c., domiciled in this territory on the above day (the 1st January, 1918) or born there up to that date. The Germans who have been driven from this territory shall return to it in order to exercise their vote with a view to ensuring an objective plebiscite, and also with a view to ensuring the extensive preparation necessary therefor. The above territory shall, as in the case of the Saar territory, be placed under the supervision of an international commission to be formed immediately, on which shall be represented the four Great Powers -- Italy, the Soviet Union, France and England. This commission shall exercise all the rights of sovereignty in this territory. With this end in view, the territory shall be evacuated within a period of the utmost brevity, still to be agreed upon, by the Polish armed forces, the Polish police, and the Polish authorities;

(4) The Polish port of Gdynia, which fundamentally constitutes Polish sovereign territory so far as it is confined territorially to the Polish settlement, shall be excluded from the

196 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

above territory. The exact frontiers of this Polish port should be determined between Germany and Poland, and, if necessary, delimited by an international committee of arbitration;

(5) With a view to assuring the necessary time for the execution of the extensive work involved in the carrying out of a just plebiscite, this plebiscite shall not take place before the expiry of twelve months;

(6) In order to guarantee unrestricted communication between Germany and East Prussia and between Poland and the sea during this period, roads and railways shall be established to render free transit traffic possible. In this connexion only such taxes as are necessary for the maintenance of the means of communication and for the provision of transport may be levied;

(7) The question as to the party to which the area belongs is to be decided by simple majority of the votes recorded;

(8) In order to guarantee to Germany free communication with her province of Danzig-East Prussia, and to Poland her connexion with the sea after the execution of the plebiscite -- regardless of the results thereof -- Germany shall, in the event of the plebiscite area going to Poland, receive an extra-territorial traffic zone, approximately in a line from Butow to Danzig or Dirschau, in which to lay down an autobahn and a 4-track railway line. The road and the railway shall be so constructed that the Polish lines of communication are not affected, i.e., they shall pass either over or under the latter. The breadth of this zone shall be fixed at 1 kilometre, and it is to be German sovereign territory. Should the plebiscite be favourable to Germany, Poland is to obtain rights, analogous to those accorded to Germany, to a similar extra-territorial communication by road and railway for the purpose of free and unrestricted communication with her port of Gdynia;

(9) In the event of the Corridor returning to the German Reich, the latter declares its right to proceed to an exchange of population with Poland to the extent to which the nature of the Corridor lends itself thereto;

(10) Any special right desired by Poland in the port of Danzig would be negotiated on a basis of territory against similar rights to be granted to Germany in the port of Gdynia;

(11) In order to remove any feeling in this area that either

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 197

side was being threatened, Danzig and Gdynia would have the character of exclusively mercantile towns, that is to say, without military installations and military fortifications;

(12) The peninsula of Hela, which as a result of the plebiscite might go either to Poland or to Germany, would in either case have similarly to be demilitarised;

(13) Since the Government of the German Reich has the most vehement complaints to make against the Polish treatment of minorities, and since the Polish Government for their part feel obliged to make complaints against Germany, both parties declare their agreement to have these complaints laid before an international committee of enquiry, whose task would be to examine all complaints as regards economic or physical damage, and any other acts of terrorism. Germany and Poland undertake to make good economic or other damage done to minorities on either side since the year 1918, or to cancel expropriation as the case may be, or to provide complete compensation to the persons affected for this and any other encroachments on their economic life;

(14) In order to free the Germans who may be left in Poland and the Poles who may be left in Germany from the feeling of being outlawed by all nations, and in order to render them secure against being called upon to perform action or to render services incompatible with their national sentiments, Germany and Poland agree to guarantee the rights of both minorities by means of the most comprehensive and binding agreement, in order to guarantee to these minorities the preservation, the free development and practical application of their nationality (Volkstum), and in particular to permit for this purpose such organisation as they may consider necessary. Both parties undertake not to call upon members of the minority for military service;

(15) In the event of agreement on the basis of these proposals, Germany and Poland declare themselves ready to decree and to carry out the immediate demobilisation of their armed forces;

(16) The further measures necessary for the more rapid execution of the above arrangement shall be agreed upon by both Germany and Poland conjointly.

http://ibiblio.org/pha/bb/bb-199.html#78

[michael mills]

The text of the Marienwerder proposals that Ribbentrop read out to Henderson was the only hard copy that he possessed, and it contained Hitler's hand-written amendments.

That is the reason why Ribbentrop declined to hand it over to Henderson.

Henderson claimed that Ribbentrop read it aloud to him at top speed, but the interpreter Schmidt, who was present at the meeting, stated in his post-war account that Ribbentrop read from the written copy at a normal, comprehensible speed.

In any case, Henderson's summary of the proposals in his report to Halifax shows that he fully and correctly understood them.

Furthermore, the full text of the proposals was later phoned through to Ogilvie-Forbes at the British Embassy on the orders of Göring. That text was then forwarded to the Poles, who were therefore fully aware of its content.

And the fact is that the proposals were not withdrawn, They remained open for discussion on 31 August, when Ambassador Lipski came to see Ribbentrop on the orders of his Government. Unfortunately, Lipski had been also ordered not to accept or negotiate on those or any other German proposals.

[David Thompson]

The text of the Marienwerder proposals that Ribbentrop read out to Henderson was the only hard copy that he possessed, and it contained Hitler's hand-written amendments.

So Hitler and von Ribbentrop had been waiting all day for the arrival of the Polish plenipotentiary that they demanded to see, but had made no copies of the 3 1/2 page proposal to give to him or the British Ambassador, and von Ribbentrop was only kidding Sir Neville when the German Foreign Minister told the British Ambassador that the proposals had been withdrawn, but Göring had a copy of his own, too. All of the typists at the Chancellery and the Foreign Office must have gone home during this eve-of-war crisis. But the next day they all had copies for the newspapers. That's interesting.

Here's the German account of the meeting between von Ribbentrop and Lipski on 31 Aug 1939, from the British Blue Book (1939):

No. 476
F14/348-48

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RM 42 BERLIN, September 1, 1939.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE POLISH AMBASSADOR, LIPSKI, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON AUGUST 31, 1939, AT 6:30 P.M.

Ambassador Lipski read out the following instructions from his Government:

August 31, 1939.

During the past night the Polish Government were informed by the Government of Great Britain of the exchange of views with the German Government regarding the possibility of direct conversations between the Reich Government and the Polish Government.

The Polish Government are favourably considering the suggestions of the Government of Great Britain and will make them a formal reply on the subject within the next few hours.

Ambassador Lipski replied in the negative to the question repeatedly put to him[1] by the Foreign Minister as to whether he was empowered to negotiate. He only had instructions to remit to the Foreign Minister the instructions already read out, which he thereupon handed to him in writing.[2]

The Reich Foreign Minister then briefly outlined the exchange of views between the German and British Governments, and Germany's proposal that in the course of August 30 a Polish representative should come to Berlin. The Führer had waited throughout the whole day, but only in the evening had he received a somewhat non-committal statement from the British Government.

In reply to a further question by the Foreign Minister as to the possibility of Lipski being empowered to negotiate, the latter again stated that he had no plenary powers for any negotiations.

Submitted to the Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions.

DR. SCHMIDT
Minister
_____________________________________
[1] See also document No. 475.
[2] The written communication (52/35385) is identical with the text cited above; see also the Polish White Book, Nos. 110 and 112, and British Documents, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 630.

and this British correspondence, also from The British Blue Book, shows the Polish government's promised response:

No. 97.

Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax (received 6:30 p. m.)
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw, August 31, 1939.

FOLLOWING is text of Poland's reply dated 31st August, 1939:

"(1) Polish Government confirm their readiness which has previously been expressed for a direct exchange of views with the German Government on the basis pro-

192 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

posed by British Government and communicated to me by Lord Halifax's telegram of 28th August addressed to the British Ambassador, Warsaw.*

"(2) Polish government are also prepared on a reciprocal basis to give a formal guarantee that in the event of negotiations taking place Polish troops will not violate the frontiers of the German Reich provided a corresponding guarantee is given regarding non-violation of frontiers of Poland by troops of the German Reich.

"(3) In the present situation it is also essential to create a simple provisional modus vivendi in the Free City of Danzig.

"(4) As regards the suggestions communicated to Polish Government on 28th August through the intermediary of the British Ambassador at Warsaw, an explanation of what the British Government understands by international guarantee would be required in regard to relations between Poland and the German Reich. In default of an answer to this fundamental question the Polish Government are obliged completely to reserve their attitude towards this matter until such time as full explanations are received.

"(5) Polish Government express hope that in the event of conversations with the German Reich being initiated, they will continue to be able to take advantage of good offices of His Majesty's Government."

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Guys,

One has to wonder why Hitler was apparently prepared to go to war over Danzig.

Was it to make it German? It already was 95% ethnically German and this was not under threat. Indeed, the forcing out of 80% of its Jews over 1937-39 had reinforced its Germaness.

Was it to ensure the Nazi Party's writ ran there?

It already did. On 23 May 1933 the Danzig Nazis got 50,2% of the local vote and 38 out of 72 seats on the senate - a higher proportion than Hitler himself had got in Germany. Despite this, pre-war Nazi support in the city was less than total and only reached 59.3% and 43 seats in the next election on 7 April 1935. As it required a two-thirds majority to modify Danzig’s constitution, this left the Nazis in less than total control, so during 1937 all opposition parties were banned. Thereafter, the only constraint on them was international pressure.

On 22 March 1939, while the international community was impotently focused on Hitler’s coups in Bohemia-Moravia and Memel, the Danzig senate announced that, as it already represented the will of the population, it would not be holding due elections and voted itself another four years in office.

Was it to introduce German policies in Danzig?

They already had been. For example, in August 1937 Greiser ordered all Danzig public employees of the appropriate year groups to volunteer for two years of conscription in Germany Danzig and by the end of that year some 2,000 Danzigers were in Germany either as soldiers or students.

Official restrictions on Jews began on 16 July 1936 and the full Nuremberg Laws were introduced on 21 October 1938.

Even Danzig's main industry, shipbuilding, was already employed by the Kriegsmarine. Over 1937-39 it built four of the largest German naval supply ships: Nordmark (10,850t), Westerwald (10,850t), Dithmarschen (10,816t) and Ermland (11,232t) [sister ships of the better known Altmark]. All were also convertible into auxiliary cruisers. Indeed, Danzig was the largest single supplier of such vessels.

Danzig was already German and Nazi on so many levels, one has to wonder whether securing Danzig for the Reich was either necessary, beneficial, or worth the risk of war.

Cheers,

Sid.

P.S. In late March 1939 Admiral Raeder thought the operation to reintergrate Danzig into the Reich so imminent that he ordered planning begun for a mass naval demonstration there similar to that mounted the week before at Memel. If the head of the German Navy thought an operation to secure Danzig was plausibly imminent, can it be wondered that the Poles thought the same and prepared against it?

[michael mills]

Danzig was already German and Nazi on so many levels, one has to wonder whether securing Danzig for the Reich was either necessary, beneficial, or worth the risk of war.

One might also wonder why the Polish Government opposed its full integration into the Reich, since it was already so German and Nazi.

And also no longer vital to Poland's overseas trade, the most valuable part of which was going through Gdynia by 1939, with only low-value bulk cargoes going through Danzig.

So why not just let Germany have it? Why threaten war to retain it?

Was it that the Polish Government wanted to turn Danzig into a casus belli? Particularly once it knew, from 20 March onward, that the British Government was eager to include Poland in an anti-German alliance.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

And also no longer vital to Poland's overseas trade, the most valuable part of which was going through Gdynia by 1939, with only low-value bulk cargoes going through Danzig.

So one might wonder why was von Moltke defending German industry in Upper Silesia, while it was only a very low-value capital compared to entire German industry and only a minimal fraction of all German industry?

OTOH, despite the supremacy of Gdynia, Danzig in 1938 still exported 23.5% of Polish export value (40.6% via Gdynia) and 5.583.866 of tonnage (7.646.902 via Gdynia) - which means Danzig was still very important for Poland.

the most valuable part of which was going through Gdynia by 1939

Only 40.6% - less than half of the total value - was going through Gdynia.

On the other hand, 23.5% - almost 1/4 - was going through Danzig.

In terms of tonnage the discrepancy was even smaller.

Why threaten war to retain it?

No reason to. And nobody threatened war to retain it.

Poland just defended its rights.

So why not just let Germany have it?

So why not just let it remain a Free City?

As for German citizens of Polish ethnicity (as determined by native language), they were not subject to any discrimination or persecution by the German Government. They retained their full rights as German citizens (Reichsbürger), unlike Jews, who were stripped of their citizenship and reduced to the lower status of "protected residents" (Schutzangehörige).

This is obviously wrong.

You should check the "Eingabe betreffend die Lage der polnischen Volksgruppe im Deutschen Reich" published by the Union of Poles in Germany, Berlin, 1937. It was a protest of Polish minority in Germany against discrimination by the German government. And here also come some statistics from 1937:

Estimated 1,500,000 Polish minority in Germany, they had got:

58 Polish primary schools
2 Polish secondary schools
2 Polish collectives
14 Polish periodicals

Now estimated 700,000 German minority in Poland, they had got:

432 German primary schools
27 German secondary schools
856 German collectives
78 German periodicals

And regarding those 2 Polish secondary schools in Germany - here is their brief history:

http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memoria%C5 ... zkolnictwo

The first Polish high school in Germany was opened on 8 November 1932 under the name "Private School with high school plan of education and Polish language of lectures in Beuthen", which meant the lack of recognition of that school as a high school by the Ministry of Education of the Reich and Preussen, meaning in practice, that graduates of that school were deprived of the right to study at German universities, and high-school certificates acquired by them were not recognized as valid in Germany.

That school was an object of multiple attacks by hit squads of National Socalists. For example on 7 March 1939 they threw stones towards the building, breaking the windows. Despite long lasting efforts of the Union of Poles in Germany that school was never granted the same rights as German high schools had. The Ministry of Education of the Reich refused to grant public rights to that school on 7 March of 1935.

And the other one of 2 Polish secondary schools in Germany:

Similar status - "Private School with plan of high school education and Polish language of lectures" was also gained by a Polish high school in Marienwerder, which was opened on 10 November 1937. Construction of the building was finished in 1936. The entire investment was financed thanks to credits granted by the Slavic Bank. However, the official consession allowing to open the Polish school was issued by the Prussian Ministry of Education not before 31 October 1937, after around 100 urging interventions of the Union of Poles in Germany and the Union of Polish School Circles in Germany. During entire year after it was opened, the school remained empty because teachers and students had to wait for issuing an official permission to start school activties.

It was the second and the last of Polish high schools in Germany, for which an authorization of German authorities was granted. Students of that school in Marienwerder were numerous times attacked by Nazi hit squads and soon before the start of the German invasion of Poland, on 25 August 1939, all students as well as teachers were arrested by Gestapo and transported away to concentration camps.

And more about high shools which never existed because they were not allowed to:

But even the impaired status of Polish high schools compared to German high schools, which was imposed on the existing Polish schools by German authorities, was still an exceptional decision of German authorities, because in majority of cases similar Polish initiatives of establishing Polish schools in Germany were being thwarted by them. For example the planned Polish Woman's High School in Ratibor, foundation of which was built already in 1934 and the teaching staff as well as future students already completed. However, until the outbreak of WW2 that Woman's High School was not granted authorization by German "building police".

"Ein Reich, Ein Volk" - in other words. No place for distinct minorities with equal rights.

[ljadw]

Hi Guys,

One has to wonder why Hitler was apparently prepared to go to war over Danzig.

Was it to make it German? It already was 95% ethnically German and this was not under threat. Indeed, the forcing out of 80% of its Jews over 1937-39 had reinforced its Germaness.

Was it to ensure the Nazi Party's writ ran there?

It already did. On 23 May 1933 the Danzig Nazis got 50,2% of the local vote and 38 out of 72 seats on the senate - a higher proportion than Hitler himself had got in Germany. Despite this, pre-war Nazi support in the city was less than total and only reached 59.3% and 43 seats in the next election on 7 April 1935. As it required a two-thirds majority to modify Danzig’s constitution, this left the Nazis in less than total control, so during 1937 all opposition parties were banned. Thereafter, the only constraint on them was international pressure.

On 22 March 1939, while the international community was impotently focused on Hitler’s coups in Bohemia-Moravia and Memel, the Danzig senate announced that, as it already represented the will of the population, it would not be holding due elections and voted itself another four years in office.

Was it to introduce German policies in Danzig?

They already had been. For example, in August 1937 Greiser ordered all Danzig public employees of the appropriate year groups to volunteer for two years of conscription in Germany Danzig and by the end of that year some 2,000 Danzigers were in Germany either as soldiers or students.

Official restrictions on Jews began on 16 July 1936 and the full Nuremberg Laws were introduced on 21 October 1938.

Even Danzig's main industry, shipbuilding, was already employed by the Kriegsmarine. Over 1937-39 it built four of the largest German naval supply ships: Nordmark (10,850t), Westerwald (10,850t), Dithmarschen (10,816t) and Ermland (11,232t) [sister ships of the better known Altmark]. All were also convertible into auxiliary cruisers. Indeed, Danzig was the largest single supplier of such vessels.

Danzig was already German and Nazi on so many levels, one has to wonder whether securing Danzig for the Reich was either necessary, beneficial, or worth the risk of war.

Cheers,

Sid.

P.S. In late March 1939 Admiral Raeder thought the operation to reintergrate Danzig into the Reich so imminent that he ordered planning begun for a mass naval demonstration there similar to that mounted the week before at Memel. If the head of the German Navy thought an operation to secure Danzig was plausibly imminent, can it be wondered that the Poles thought the same and prepared against it?

Danzig was a symbol,for Germany and for Poland,and,it is impossible to negotiate about a symbol.