Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

[michael mills]

From the examination of the interpreter Dr Schmidt at the IMT by Dr Horn, the counsel for Ribbentrop:

DR. HORN: Was Ambassador Henderson able to speak German fluently?

SCHMIDT: Ambassador Henderson's knowledge of German was rather good, but not perfect. Hence it could happen that in moments of excitement he did not quite understand certain points, as is proved by an incident which occurred during the conference just mentioned; and it was not always easy for him to express himself in German; but when speaking to Germans he usually preferred to conduct these discussions in German.

DR. HORN: In the course of the conference Herr Von Ribbentrop read out to Henderson a memorandum containing the German proposals for a settlement of the questions pending between Germany and Poland. And now I am asking you, Witness, did Henderson ask you during that discussion to translate to him the contents of the memorandum Ribbentrop had read out?

SCHMIDT: No, he did not do that.

196
28 March 46

DR. HORN: Did you get the impression from his attitude that Sir Nevile Henderson had fully understood the contents of the memorandum?

SCHMIDT: That is, of course, very hard to say. You cannot tell what goes on inside a person's mind, but I doubt whether he understood the document in all its details.

DR. HORN: Did Ribbentrop, when he read out the document to Sir Nevile Henderson, give him any explanations?

SCHMIDT: Yes, while reading out the document the Foreign Minister now and then commented to Henderson about some points might not have been quite clear.

DR. HORN: Did Sir Nevile Henlderson himself ask for such explanations?

SCHMIDT: No, Sir Nevile Henderson sat and listened to the document being read out and the comments which were made.

The testimony of Schmidt refutes the myth that Ribbentrop, on Hitler's orders, tried to avoid conveying to Ambassador Henderson the text of the Marienwerder proposals.

The testimony shows that Ribbentrop, on his own initiative, while reading out the proposals in German gave Hnederson explkanations of particular points. That was hardly the action of someone trying to avoid giving information.

The reason why Ribbentrop declined to hand over to Henderson the paper from which he was reading was given by him in the notes he wrote during his trial before the IMT, and which were later published by his widow. That explanation is that the proposals typed on the paper were not in their final form, and had been amended by Hitler by hand.

The proposals read out by Ribbentrop were the final form as amended by Hitler. but Ribbentrop did not want to let Henderson see Hitler's handwritten amendments.

From the examination of Dahlerus by Dr Stahmer:

DR. STAHMER: I have one more question for the witness. What about the map of Poland which had just been shown and which allegedly was drawn by Göring?

DAHLERUS: I have the original of that map in my possession.

DR. STAHMER: And what was the explanation given to you?

DAHLERUS: That it was a territory that held a majority of Germans, and not Poles.

DR. STAHMER: How do you explain, then, the difference between the later offer and that map?

DAHLERUS: I can only assume that the question had not been thoroughly discussed and various proposals had been made before the definite proposal was submitted.

Here Dahlerus probably got it right.

After Hitler had seen Ambassador Henderson on 29 August, and requested that Britain arrange for Poland to send a plenipotentiary to negotiate on the basis of the proposals that Germany would make, he and other members of the German Government must have got together to discuss exactly what those proposals would be.

Apparently, a number of different proposals were made for the area to be covered by the referendum. One proposal must have been for the referendum area to be as large as possible, and that area was reflected in the map given by Göring to Dahlerus.

(It needs to be pointed out that the area sketched on the map by Göring indicated the territory to be covered by the proposed referendum not territory that Germany was demanding be immediately ceded by Poland. That point was concealed in the aggressive questioning by Maxwell-Fyfe.)

It appears that Hitler eventually decided to limit the referendum area to the territory north of the Marienwerder-Konitz line, and that would be the reason why a final clear copy of the proposals was not ready by midnight on 30 August, only a copy with Hitler's handwritten amendments.

[David Thompson]

Michael -- You wrote:

The reason why Ribbentrop declined to hand over to Henderson the paper from which he was reading was given by him in the notes he wrote during his trial before the IMT, and which were later published by his widow. That explanation is that the proposals typed on the paper were not in their final form, and had been amended by Hitler by hand.

and

It appears that Hitler eventually decided to limit the referendum area to the territory north of the Marienwerder-Konitz line, and that would be the reason why a final clear copy of the proposals was not ready by midnight on 30 August, only a copy with Hitler's handwritten amendments.

The Reich Foreign Minister gave two different versions in his IMT testimony of why he did not give Ambassador Henderson the note, and neither track the story you have given. Certainly von Ribbentrop made no effort to explain it to Ambassador Henderson at the time, either -- a very strange, even insulting, procedure, as Dahlerus and Schmidt noted in their testimony.

From IMT proceedings vol. 10, p. 274:

DR. HORN: Is it true that the British Government then practically withdrew their offer to mediate by suggesting that Germany take immediate and direct steps to prepare negotiations between Germany and Poland?

VON RIBBENTROP: You mean on the 30th?

DR. HORN: Yes, on the 30th.

VON RIBBENTROP: That is so. As I said before, we had been waiting on the 30th, but the Polish negotiator had not arrived. In the meantime, Hitler had prepared the proposals which he wanted to hand to a Polish negotiator who, as he had expressly promised Sir Nevile Henderson, would be able to negotiate with Germany on the basis of complete equality. Not until shortly before midnight, or at least in the late evening, a call came through saying, that the British Ambassador wanted to transmit a communication from his government. This meeting, I believe, was then postponed once more; at any rate at midnight on 30 August the well-known conversation between Henderson and me took place.

p. 275:

. . . I then read to Henderson the proposals given to me by the Führer. I should like to state here once more under oath that the Führer had expressly forbidden me to let these proposals out of my hands. He told me that I might communicate to the British Ambassador only the substance of them, if I thought it advisable. . . .

. . . DR. HORN: What did the German Government do after the contents of the note were made known to Ambassador Henderson?

VON RIBBENTROP: After my conversation with the British Ambassador I reported to the Führer. I told him it had been a serious conversation. I told him also that in pursuance of his instructions I had not handed the memorandum to Sir Nevile Henderson despite the latter's request. . . .

and at p. 367:

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, on the 30th you have told us that your reason for not giving a copy of the terms to Sir Nevile was, first, because Hitler had ordered you not to give a copy. And I think your reason given at the time was that the Polish plenipotentiary had not arrived, and therefore it was no good giving a copy of the terms. That's right, isn't it?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.

In other words, the "Marianwerder proposal" wasn't serious – it was only read to Ambassador Henderson for the purpose of immediately withdrawing it. It might as well be called the "Marianwerder dangle." The motive is obvious, too. Hitler and von Ribbentrop were trying to drive a wedge between Great Britain and Poland immediately before Germany attacked Poland. And if von Ribbentrop wasn't going to give a written copy to Ambassador Henderson, there's no telling what would have been delivered to the Polish plenipotentiary.

For interested readers – von Ribbentrop's IMT testimony on the "Marianwerder proposal(s)" is now posted on "The Eleventh Hour" thread at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=6&t=191512

[michael mills]

The Marienwerder Proposals were real. By 4 AM on 31 August the US chargé in Berlin, Kirk, had a copy of them, and was able to cable them to Washington at that time.

They were still on the table on 31 August, when Polish ambassador Lipski came to see Ribbentrop. No doubt they could have served as the basis for negotiations if Lipski had been given authority to enter into negotiations, but he had been directed by the Polish Government not to enter into negotiations, nor to receive any German proposals.

The transcript of the IMT is not the sole source for the events of the last days of August 1939, since the tribunal often prevented the presentation of material it deemed irrelevant.

As Ribbentrop explained in his notes, the reason why Hitler forbade him to hand over to Henderson the copy of the proposals from which he was reading was because it contained Hitler's handwritten amendments.

But Göring soon afterward gave Dahlerus a clean copy of the proposals, so that the latter could phone them through to Ogilvie-Forbes at the British Embassy. It is hardly likely that Göring would have disobeyed an order by Hitler not to give the British any copy of the proposals; accordingly, the fact that Göring gave a copy to Dahlerus indicates that Hitler had forbidden only the handing over of the copy which he had amended, not of the proposals as such.

[michael mills]

From the testimony of Ribbentrop:

DR. HORN: When did the German Government find out that Poland had been promised support by England and France?

VON RIBBENTROP: That became known, I cannot tell you the date precisely, but it was, at any rate, during the latter part of March. Anyway, I know, and we all were convinced of what, I believe, is an established fact today, that these relations taken up during the latter part of March between Warsaw and London determined the answer which was, to our surprise, communicated to us by memorandum on 26 March, I believe.

DR. HORN: Is it correct that this memorandum stated that a further pursuit of German aims regarding a change in the Danzig and Corridor questions would mean war as far as Poland was concerned?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. That was a great surprise to us. I know that I read the memorandum, and for a moment I simply could not believe that such an answer had been given, when one considers that for months we had tried to find a solution, which—and I wish to emphasize this—only Adolf Hitler, at that time, with his great authority over the German people could bring about and be responsible for.

I do not want to get lost in details, but I do want to say that the Danzig and Corridor problem, since 1919, had been considered by statesmen of great authority the problem with which somehow the revision of Versailles would have to start. I should like to remind you of the statement by Marshal Foch and other statements by Winston Churchill, who also elaborated on this subject, as well as by Clemenceau, et cetera. All these statesmen were undoubtedly of the opinion that a territorial revision of this Corridor would really have to be undertaken. But Hitler, for his part, wanted to make it an over-all settlement and reach an understanding with Poland on the basis of his putting up with the Corridor and taking only Danzig back into the Reich, whereby Poland was to be afforded a very generous solution in the economic field. That, in other words, was the basis of the proposals which I had been working on for 4 to 5 months on Hitler's order. All the greater was our surprise when, suddenly, the other side declared that a further pursuit of these plans and solutions, which we regarded as very generous, would mean war. I informed Hitler of this, and I remember very well that Hitler received it very calmly.

That testimony is crucial, in that it demonstrates that Poland was the first to threaten war over Danzig.

Until 26 March 1939, Germany had made no threats whatever to Poland in regard to Danzig or any of the other issues it wished to resolve. It had set no deadlines, or attempted to exert any pressure, and had taken legitimate Polish economic concerns into account.

Nevertheless, as soon as the Polish Government realised that it would have the unconditional support of Britain in any armed conflict with Germany, it began to threaten war. That shows that elements in the Polish Government, in particular the military, were not afraid of war with Germany, since they believed they would have the full support of Britain and France.

Indeed, some elements in the Polish ruling class, for example the group around Sikorski, desired war against Germany in alliance with Britain and France, since that would enable achievement of the Piast goal of Polish westward expansion to and beyond the Oder.

[michael mills]

I have remembered where I read that the copy of the Marienwerder Proposals that Ribbentrop read aloud to Henderson contained Hitler's handwritten amendments.

It was the book by A J P Taylor, "The Origins of the Second World War".

The relevant passage from that book, with my emphases:

The deadlock lasted until 29 August. Then it was broken by Hitler. He was in the weaker position, though the British did not know it. There was not much time left before 1 September for him to pull off diplomatic success. At 7.15 p.m. he made to Henderson a formal offer and a formal demand: he would negotiate directly with Poland if a Polish plenipotentiary arrived in Berlin the following day. This was a retreat from the position Hitler had rigorously asserted since 26 March, that he would never again deal directly with the Poles. Though Henderson complained that the demand was perilously near an ultimatum, he was eager to accept it; it constituted in his opinion the "sole chance of preventing war". Henderson pressed the demand on his own government; he urged the French government to advise an immediate visit by Beck; he was most insistent of all with the Polish ambassador Lipski.4 Lipski took no notice - apparently he did not even report Hitler's demand to Warsaw. The French government responded as clearly in the opposite direction - they told Beck to go to Berlin at once. But the decision rested with the British government. Here was the proposal which they had always wanted and which they had repeatedly hinted at to Hitler: direct negotiations between Poland and Germany. Hitler had
now done his part; but they could not do theirs. They had the gravest doubt whether the Poles would thus present themselves in Berlin at Hitler's behest. Kennedy reported Chamberlain's feeling to Washington: "Frankly he is more worried about getting the Poles to be reasonable than the Germans".5 The British gnawed over the problem throughout 30 August. Finally they hit on a sort of solution. They passed Hitler,s demand on to Warsaw at 12.25 a.m. on 31 August - that is to say, twenty-five minutes after the German ultimatum, if such it were, had expired. The British had been correct in their apprehension of Polish obstinacy. Beck, when informed of Hitler,s demand, at once replied: "if invited to Berlin he would of course not go, as he had no intention of being treated like President Hacha".6 Thus the British, by acting too late, could still claim that they had offered something which they knew they could not deliver: a Polish plenipotentiary in Berlin.

Hitler had not anticipated this. He had expected that negotiations would start; and he then intended them to break down on Polish obstinacy. On his instructions detailed demands were at last prepared. These were principally the immediate return of Danzig, and a plebiscite in the Corridor7 -the very terms which the British and French governments had themselves long favoured. But, failing a Polish plenipotentiary, the Germans had difficulty in making their terms known. At midnight on 30 August Henderson brought to Ribbentrop the news that a Polish plenipotentiary was not coming that day. Ribbentrop had only the rough draft of the proposed German terms, scribbled over with Hitler's emendations. It was not in a condition to be shown to Henderson; and Ribbentrop had instructions from Hitler not to do so. He therefore read the terms over slowly. Later a myth grew up that he had "gabbled" them, deliberately cheating Henderson with terms that were only for show. In fact Henderson got the gist clearly, and was impressed. Taken at their face value, he thought, they were "not unreasonable". On his return to the British embassy, he summoned Lipski at 2 a.m., and
urged him to seek an interview with Ribbentrop at once. Lipski took no notice, and went back to bed.

The Germans were now anxious that their terms had not gone properly on record with Henderson. They once more employed Dahlerus as an allegedly unofficial emissary. Göring, claiming to be acting in defiance of Hitler, showed the terms to Dahlerus, who in turn telephoned them to the British embassy about 4 a.m. Since Göring knew that all telephone conversations were monitored by at least three government agencies (one of them his own), his defiance of Hitler was of course a fiction. The next morning Göring abandoned it. Dahlerus was given a copy of the German terms, and took it round to the British embassy.

A further passage from Taylor, backing up my statment that the Germans had intercepted the instructions to Lipski not to accept the Marienwerder proposals:

At 12.40 p.m. on 31 August Hitler decided that the attack should proceed. At 1 p.m. Lipski telephoned, asking for an interview with Ribbentrop. The Germans, who had intercepted his instructions, knew that he had been told not to enter into "any concrete negotiations". At 8 p.m. Weizsacker telephoned Lipski to ask whether he was coming as a plenipotentiary. Lipski replied: "No, in his capacity as an ambassador". This was enough for Hitler. The Poles, it seemed, were remaining obstinate; he could go forward to the gamble of isolating them in war. At 4 p.m. the orders for war were confirmed. At 6.30 p.m. Lipski at last saw Ribbentrop. Lipski said that his government were "favourably considering" the British proposal for direct Polish-German negotiations. Ribbentrop asked whether he was a plenipotentiary. Lipski again answered No. Ribbentrop did not communicate the German terms; if he had tried to do
so, Lipski would have refused to receive them. Thus ended the only direct contact between Germany and Poland since 26 March. The Poles had kept their nerve unbroken to the last moment. At 4.45 a.m. on the following morning the German attack on Poland began. At 6 a.m. German aeroplanes bombed Warsaw.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Michael,

So when did Germany actually formally present the finalized Marienwerder Proposals to the UK, then? Presumably with the aid of a good stenographer the un-anotated text could have been ready within about half an hour. Was it immediately rushed over to the British Embassy?

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Why should Lipski have entered "any concrete negotiations"?

Poland was bringing no claims against Germany and Germany had long since signed up to the status quo regarding the Corridor and Danzig.

What, therefore, was there to negotiate from the Polish point of view?

A mystified Sid.

[David Thompson]

Here's how Dr. Schmidt described von Ribbentrop's handling of the "Marianwerder dangle" at the 30 Aug meeting with Ambassador Henderson, from a contemporaneous file memorandum prepared for von Ribbentrop, dated 31 Aug 1939 (Document No. 461) in Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-45, Series D, vol. 7, August 9 - September 3 1939, p. 452:

Henderson, referring to the last paragraph of the German reply of the previous day, asked if the German proposals had already been formulated and whether these proposals could be handed to him.

The Foreign Minister replied that (1) so far British mediation had produced only one definite result, namely, Polish general mobilization. (2) Germany had expected a Polish representative to arrive today. This had not been an ultimatum, as the British Ambassador had wrongly supposed, but, as the Führer had already explained the day before, a practical proposal dictated by the requirements of present circumstances. Up to midnight, Germany had heard nothing from the Poles. The question of possible proposals therefore no longer arose. But in order to show what proposals Germany had intended to make if the Polish representative had arrived, the Reich Foreign Minister read out the German proposals contained in the enclosure.'"

Henderson replied that the Foreign Minister's statement that the non-arrival of the Polish representative by midnight on Wednesday nullified the proposals which Germany had originally intended to make, seemed to confirm his interpretation that the proposal was an ultimatum.

The Foreign Minister again vehemently contradicted this view and referred to the Führer's statement of the previous day that speed was required owing to the fact that two mobilized armies were facing each other within firing range and an incident might at any moment start a serious conflict.

In conclusion Henderson proposed that the Foreign Minister should summon the Polish Ambassador and hand him the German proposals.

The Foreign Minister refused to do this himself and closed the conversation, having reserved all decisions for the Führer.

Von Ribbentrop's postwar explanation, that the proposal had the Führer's handwriting on it, wasn't mentioned at the meeting in 1939 nor in von Ribbentrop's 1946 IMT testimony, so it has every indication of having been a later "What I should have said was ----" fabrication.

[David Thompson]

See also Dr. Schmidt's memorandum of this 31 Aug 1939 "don't bother" conversation (No. 478) of Hitler with the Italian Ambassador, found at Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-45, Series D, vol. 7, August 9 - September 3 1939, p. 465:

AUGUST, 1939 465

No. 478
147/78814-15
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
BERLIN, September 1, 1939.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, ATTOLICO, AT 7 P.M. ON AUGUST 31, 1939

The Führer handed the Italian Ambassador a copy of the German proposals and a press notice, observing that, owing to the attitude of the Polish Government, the proposals no longer held good. The British attempt at mediation must thus be regarded as having failed.

Ambassador Attolico then mentioned that, on the occasion of an offer to mediate made by Mussolini some days previously, the Führer had stated that Britain had just made a proposal and that it was desired first to wait and see its effect. Now that the Führer had himself stated that the British proposal must be looked upon as having failed, the question arose whether the Duce could not for his part undertake mediation. He therefore asked the Führer whether he would agree to the Duce now acting as mediator.

The Führer answered that we must first await the course of events. He had no desire to expose himself to repeated slaps in the face from the Poles, and did not want to place the Duce in an awkward position by accepting his mediation. He was convinced that in their present frame of mind the Poles would pay no attention to the Duce either.

To Attolico's question as to whether everything was now at an end, the Führer replied in the affirmative.[1]

Submitted to the Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions.
DR. SCHMIDT Minister
_______________________________________________
[1] For Attolico's account of this conversation, see D.D.I., Eighth Series, vol. xiii, No. 507.

These documents make the purpose of the "Marianwerder dangle" crudely obvious. There had to be a war because, even though the Führer's call for a plenipotentiary to arrive within 24 hours was not an ultimatum, the Poles kept the Führer waiting.

[wm]

Indeed, some elements in the Polish ruling class, for example the group around Sikorski, desired war against Germany in alliance with Britain and France, since that would enable achievement of the Piast goal of Polish westward expansion to and beyond the Oder.

But before the Polish invasion of Germany begins, they advocated the expansion after the WWII had started as a punishment for the Germany aggression.
In 1939 most of the group around Sikorski was in exile because of the hostile efforts of the Polish ruling class, they had zero influence over Polish foreign policy decisions and the political programs of their parties - the Labor Party and the Front Morges didn't mention the desire of this achievement at all.

[wm]

Von Ribbentrop's postwar explanation, that the proposal had the Führer's handwriting on it, wasn't mentioned at the meeting in 1939 nor in von Ribbentrop's 1946 IMT testimony, so it has every indication of having been a later "What I should have said was ----" fabrication.

In the David Irwing's biography of Göring he says that Ribbentrop's senior official revealed to Göring that: Ribbentrop had merely “gabbled through” the long document in German, had declared it überholt (out of date) since no Pole had arrived, and tossed it on to the table, where it remained unread.

Göring was so mad at the Ribbentrop's handling of the negotiations that on September 3, according to Albert Kesselring, after the Anglo-French declaration of war, phoned Ribbentrop purple with rage screaming: Now you’ve got your %!#@% war! You are alone to blame!

[David Thompson]

Here's another extract from a contemporaneous German document on the "Marianwerder dangle," No. 513 in Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-45, Series D, vol. 7 August 9 - September 3 1939, prepared for von Ribbentrop by Dr. Schmidt on 2 Sept 1939. The quoted portion of this memorandum of a conversation between von Ribbentrop and British Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson on 1 Sept 1939 can be found at p. 493:

The Foreign Minister replied that there had actually been no occasion to bring the German proposals to the notice of the British Government, as the non-appearance of a Polish negotiator had rendered these proposals invalid. Nevertheless he (the Foreign Minister) had read out these proposals to Henderson in the secret hope that Britain would after all bring Poland to see reason. The Führer had waited another whole day in vain. Nothing had come from the Polish side but further acts of serious provocation.

Sir Nevile Henderson replied that he deeply regretted that, at his last conversation, the Foreign Minister had refused to give him (Henderson) the text of the proposals. It was understandable that when the German text was read quickly he had not grasped the greater part of this rather long and complicated document.

The Foreign Minister pointed out that he had read the document slowly and clearly, and had even given oral explanations on the main points (Danzig, plebiscite in the Corridor, protection of minorities). He had not been authorized to hand him the document and had therefore read it out in the hope that at least the following day Poland would yet agree to it. The Führer had waited another whole day and in the end had gained the impression that Britain was unwilling to do more.

When Henderson again expressed his regret that in spite of his request the proposals had not been handed to him, the Foreign Minister repeated that he had read out the document slowly and had explained individual points, so that he could suppose Henderson had understood everything.

See also the IMT testimony of Dr. Schmidt, IMT proceedings vol. 10, p. 199:

When Henderson requested that the document containing the German proposals be submitted to him, the Foreign Minister said: "No, I cannot give you the document." These are the words he used. This of course was a somewhat unusual procedure because normally Sir Nevile Henderson had the right to expect that a document which had just been read out would be handed to him. I myself was rather surprised at the Foreign Minister's answer and looked up because I thought I had misunderstood. I looked at the Foreign Minister and heard him say for the second time: "I cannot give you the document." But I saw that this matter caused him some discomfort and that he must have been aware of the rather difficult position in which he found himself by this answer, because an uneasy smile played on his lips when he said in a quiet voice to Sir Nevile Henderson these words, "I cannot give you the document." Then I looked at Sir Nevile Henderson as I of course expected him to ask me to translate the document, but this request was not forthcoming. I looked at Henderson rather invitingly, since I wanted to translate the document, knowing how extraordinarily important a quick and complete transmission of its contents to the British Government was. If I had been asked to translate I would have done so quite slowly, almost at dictation speed, in order to enable the British Ambassador in this roundabout way to take down not merely the general outline of the German proposal, but all its details and transmit them to his Government. But Sir Nevile Henderson did not react even to my glance so that the discussion scion came to an end and events took their course.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 3#p1720953

[michael mills]

The material posted by the moderator shows that the Marienwerder Proposals were real, despite his attempt to dismiss them as a "dangle".

The course of events is:

On 29 August, the German Government officially requested the British Government to persuade the Polish Government to send to Berlin a plenipotentiary with powers to negotiate on the basis of proposals which the German Government was in the process of preparing. It asked that the plenipoteniary arrive on the next day, 30 August, due to the urgency of the situation.

The British Government did not allow its ambassador, Henderson, to present any official response to the German request until late in the evening of 30 August. In the meantime it sent a message to the Polish Government, saying that it considered that representatives of the latter should be prepared to meet with German representatives, but that it did not require the Poles to negotiate on the basis of any German proposals.

Emboldened by the British response, declining to push it into negotiations, the Polish Government ordered the commencement of a concealed mobilisation, without making a public announcement.

Late on the evening of 30 August, Henderson finally requested a meeting with Ribbentrop to present the official British response to the German request of 29 August. At that meeting, which took place around midnight, Ribbentrop read to Henderson the proposals that the German Government had intended to present to the Polish plenipotentiary.

Henderson had agreed to the proposals being read to him in German. He declined to have them orally translated, even though the interpreter, Schmidt, was ready to do so.

Shortly after that meeting, Göring provided Dahlerus with a written copy of the proposals, which were then telephoned through to the British Embassy.

The actions of the German Government in providing the British representatives in Berlin with the text of the Marienwerder Proposals, at first orally, with the option of translation, and then in written form, actions that must have had Hitler's approval, indicate that it wanted to convince the British Government of the reasonableness of the proposals, in the hope that it would finally agree to exert pressure on the Polish Government to accept the them.

Hitler had probably always been skeptical of a successful outcome to any negotiations on the basis of the Marienwerder Proposals, but what finally convinced him of the continuing intransigence of the Polish Government was the interception early on 31 August of that government's instructions to Ambassador Lipski to meet German representatives but not to enter into negotiations or receive any German proposals. That is what induced him to give the go-ahead for the attack on Poland early in the afdternoon of 31 August, and to confirm that order in the evening.

We know from Halder's diary that even though the target date of 1 September had been set for the attack on Poland, the instructions given to the Wehrmacht left open the possibility that the attack might be postponed until 2 September if negotiations began, and be cancelled altogether if the negotiations proceeded successfully.

The totality of the evidence suggests that Hitler was leaving two options open:

1. Attacking Poland at the latest possible date in the campaigning season, namely 1 September, if the Polish Government continued to refuse to negotiate on the basis of any German proposals; and

2. Cancelling the attack if Poland accepted the German proposals.

The Polish Government continued to refuse to accept the German proposals, presumably pursuing a strategy of delaying any decision until the end of the campaigning season, and as a result the German attack went ahead as planned.

The British historian A J P Taylor obviously considered the Marienwerder Propsals to be a genuine German attempt at negotiation, and I see no reason to reject his view.

[Terry Duncan]

Michael,

You seemed to attach some importance to the following passage from AJP Taylor;

Ribbentrop had only the rough draft of the proposed German terms, scribbled over with Hitler's emendations. It was not in a condition to be shown to Henderson

Are we to presume that not a single typist could be found in Berlin at this time, or that Ribbentrop himself could not have produced a typed copy given an hour to do so? As others have commented it was not uncommon for Hitler to demand a very quick response from others, so how come it was impossible to provide a proper draft if this proposal was intended to be taken seriously - diplomatic proposals are almost always committed to paper, even if an initial verbal proposal is made it is usually written up within an hour or so.

On 29 August, the German Government officially requested the British Government to persuade the Polish Government to send to Berlin a plenipotentiary with powers to negotiate on the basis of proposals which the German Government was in the process of preparing. It asked that the plenipoteniary arrive on the next day, 30 August, due to the urgency of the situation.

Why is there such urgency? From later in your post;

1. Attacking Poland at the latest possible date in the campaigning season, namely 1 September

This would seem the only real urgency, diplomatically there was no reason discussions could not have lasted far longer. Therefore it would seem logical to conclude that either Hitler gets his way or goes to war, a crass example of brinksmanship that expects the other side to back down to the threat of force.

Hitler had probably always been skeptical of a successful outcome to any negotiations on the basis of the Marienwerder Proposals, but what finally convinced him of the continuing intransigence of the Polish Government was the interception early on 31 August of that government's instructions to Ambassador Lipski to meet German representatives but not to enter into negotiations or receive any German proposals.

Given there was no actual good reason for Poland to hand over a section of her own territory, it would appear Nazi intransigence over modifying their tactic of demanding chunks of other nations was at least as responsible as the Polish attitude of not wanting to give away parts of their nation!

The British historian A J P Taylor obviously considered the Marienwerder Propsals to be a genuine German attempt at negotiation, and I see no reason to reject his view.

The timescale gives away the intent as in 48 hours there is no time to do anything constructive, only submit or fight. Hitler's intent was to create a the facade of an attempted diplomatic solution that he could say had not been accepted. The only genuine facet is the one of submitting to Hitler's will within a very limited rigid timescale or face war.

[David Thompson]

Michael -- You wrote:

The material posted by the moderator shows that the Marienwerder Proposals were real, despite his attempt to dismiss them as a "dangle".

and

The British historian A J P Taylor obviously considered the Marienwerder Propsals to be a genuine German attempt at negotiation, and I see no reason to reject his view.

The best reasons for rejecting A. J. P. Taylor's view are the surrounding facts and circumstances of the "Marianwerder dangle," which we have already reviewed. Even David Irving -- who almost certainly would have made a case for the sincerity of the "Marianwerder dangle" if there was a case to be made -- treats it as a brutal trick by Hitler (‘Tonight I’m going to hatch something diabolical for the Poles -- something they’ll choke on!’ [p. 385]), which was bungled by von Ribbentrop.

Interested readers can see for themselves David Irving's views on the "dangle" ("Under his [Göring's] admiring gaze Hitler dictated a final 'offer to Poland,' which would, they agreed, surely sunder the enemy alliance. Couched in sixteen points, the new offer was a document of suffocating reasonableness; it banked on Poland’s stubbornness and pride." [p. 386]). Mr. Irving treats the "dangle" as nothing more than an insincere wedge proposal for Germany to split the Anglo-Polish alliance. For Mr. Irving's treatment, see Göring: A Biography, pp. 380-93 online at http://www.fpp.co.uk/books/Goering/Goering_better.pdf

The way the gag was supposed to work was, as a wedge. Hitler makes a reasonable offer with an unreasonable deadline, knowing it would not be met. This joke plays out offering 3 possible results:

(1) Great Britain's government think the offer is reasonable, and pressure Poland into hurredly accepting it. The result is another Munich, and Poland buys itself perhaps 6 months as an independent nation.

(2) If the British accept the offer, but the Poles don't concede, the Anglo-Polish alliance cracks. Then Hitler invades, blaming Poland for starting the war, and Great Britain refuses to help Poland, or takes no active part in the war.

(3) If the British and Poles both reject the offer, Hitler denounces the two countries as unreasonable, and attacks Poland, blaming the war on both.

The problem in the way the "dangle" actually played out was that the deadline was obviously unreasonable, and Hitler and von Ribbentrop's clumsy and churlish efforts to rush the matter made that obvious to everyone. The "short fuse" nature of the offer, von Ribbentrop's withdrawal of the offer as soon as he read it, and Hitler and von Ribbentrop's refusal to give Ambassador Henderson a written copy made it obvious to all governments that the offer had been insincere from the beginning. Consequently, there was not enough time involved for the wedge effect to mature, or bring about "a second Munich," and the circumstances of the "dangle" left nearly all neutral countries blaming Germany.

An extract from a report of the German charge d'affaires in the United States, dated 1 Sept 1939, from Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-45, Series D, vol. 7, August 9 - September 3 1939, p. 521:

Characteristic of the feelings in official circles here are the following remarks made by the deputy of the Press Chief in the State Department to the DNB representative :

"The position is no Ionger as in 1914, nor even 1917—there is no division of opinion; no for and against. We only pity your people, your Government already stand convicted; they are condemned from one end of the earth to the other; for this bloodbath, if it now comes to war between Britain, France and Germany, will have been absolutely unnecessary. The whole manner of conducting negotiations was as stupid as it could possibly be."

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Michael,

While I appreciate you are under rather effective siege by others at the moment, I would still appreciate an answer to my earlier question:

Why should Lipski have entered "any concrete negotiations"?

Poland was bringing no claims against Germany and Germany had long since signed up to the status quo regarding the Corridor and Danzig.

What, therefore, was there to negotiate from the Polish point of view?

A still mystified Sid.