Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

[Ypenburg]

Henderson was not a subject of any proposed negotiation and deserved to be thrown out as a bouncer would a troublemaker without ID going where he was not supposed to. Alas, diplomacy! The rest of the story is his outstaying his welcome like a true Island champ (which I nearly misspelled as something else).

For those who missed it 'Island champ/Island chimp' is a clear play on the German derogative term for an Englishman 'Inselaffe'

According to Wiki: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Inselaffe

The word is generally used fondly and as part of the friendly and often humorous, competitive banter between the two countries.

The actual meaning behind it refers to the German (and other European countries) stereotypical image of the English as heavy drinking, violent, criminalistic and yobbish. These characteristics of the English are regularly witnessed by Europeans when visiting the UK, while on holiday elsewhere or at football matches, where many Europeans have been victim to the internationally infamous English hooliganism.

[Michael Kenny]

Henderson was not a subject of any proposed negotiation and deserved to be thrown out as a bouncer would a troublemaker without ID going where he was not supposed to. Alas, diplomacy! The rest of the story is his outstaying his welcome like a true Island champ (which I nearly misspelled as something else).

For those who missed it 'Island champ/Island chimp' is a clear play on the German derogative term for an Englishman 'Inselaffe'

According to Wiki: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Inselaffe

The word is generally used fondly and as part of the friendly and often humorous, competitive banter between the two countries.

The actual meaning behind it refers to the German (and other European countries) stereotypical image of the English as heavy drinking, violent, criminalistic and yobbish. These characteristics of the English are regularly witnessed by Europeans when visiting the UK, while on holiday elsewhere or at football matches, where many Europeans have been victim to the internationally infamous English hooliganism.

Despite that I can tell you the term is an insult and in no way a 'friendly' joke.

I first came across the term a long time back on a German Forum where one poster used it against me.
The resulting chaos as the more civilised posters forced the insulter to appologise (or be banned) made me realise this was not seen as acceptable behaviour.
Do a deeper Google and you will find more revealing explainations.
Given the way in which the British Diplomat was being disparaged throughout the post in question I have no hesitation in saying it was meant as an insult.

And any Wiki article that seriously claims:

the same stereotype is not recognised in the people of the regions Scotland, Ireland and Wales, who, it is considered, have a much less violent and aggressive nature

has no credibility (my joke and I am Irish!)

[Terry Duncan]

Despite that I can tell you the term is an insult and in no way a 'friendly' joke.

It would not usually be a friendly 'joke' insult unless as one that would maybe only be used between close friends, nor would it be likely to appear in a German newspaper. Like so often it is in the tone of how it is said and used that makes all the difference. It has no place here really, in the same way people would object if posters referred to Germans by the abbreviation for a type of food popular in southern Germany.

[David Thompson]

For interested readers -- the British Cabinet notes for meetings held in the 21 Jun-2 Sept 1939 period are available in a burly 117 MB pdf download at http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 23-100.pdf. For those who want to learn more about the 12 days leading up to the British declaration of war against Germany, here are some quick references to those cabinet meetings:

22 Aug pdf p. 627/ Bates-stamped p. 313
24 Aug pdf p. 703/ Bates-stamped p. 350
26 Aug pdf p. 739/ Bates-stamped p. 368
27 Aug pdf p. 785/ Bates-stamped p. 390
28 Aug pdf p. 815/ Bates-stamped p. 405
30 Aug pdf p. 841/ Bates-stamped p. 419
1 Sept pdf p. 889/ Bates-stamped p. 441
2 Sept pdf p. 925/ Bates-stamped p. 459

Unfortunately, the irregular key strikes of the typewriter used to keep these records don't scan very well on my optical character recognition program, but they are clearly legible to the eye.

[michael mills]

Presumably, if the peripheral USA had such details, (necessarily from a German source?), then a Germany genuinely concerned to avoid war had already transmitted them to the only party they directly concerned - Poland?

Also, (I may have missed this in weight of material on this thread), when did Germany formally present the UK and France with their hard copies of the so-called Marienwerder Proposals?

Sid,

The German Government did not officially present a copy of the Marienwerder Proposals to the Polish Government, since the latter refused to receive any proposals at all.

The German intention was to present the proposals to a Polish plenipotentiary at a meeting in Berlin on 30 August. However, the Polish Government declined to send a plenipotentiary.

The next chance for the proposals to be presented directly to a representative of the Polish Government was at the meeting between Ribbentrop and Polish ambassador Lipski on the evening of 31 August, a meeting requested by LIpski on the instructions of the Polish Government.

However, Lipski had been specifically ordered by the Polish Government not to enter into any negotiations, nor to receive any official German proposals. The only reason the Polish Government instructed its ambassador to meet Ribbentrop was because the British Government had asked to make contact with the German Government.

The German Government was well aware of the Polish Government's orders to LIpski, since they had been intercepted by Göring's wiretapping operation, the so-called Forschungsamt. Accordingly, the Germans knew that Poland would refuse to receive an official copy of the proposals, and that the meeting requested by LIpski was just a sham to give the appearance of acceding to a British request (which might itself have been a sham, although that is not certain).

Despite the Polish Government's refusal to receive the proposals officially, The German Government did not withhold them, since it could be taken for granted that the Polish Government would receive them unofficially from the British.

The German Government did not make an official presentation of the proposals to the British Government, since they were a matter for negotiation between Germany and Poland. However, it made the content of them known to the British representatives in Berlin at the earliest possible opportunity, which was when Ambassador Henderson came to see Ribbentrop shortly before midnight on 30 August.

It should be pointed out that the German Government launched its diplomatic initiative on 29 August, officially requesting the British Government to arrange for a Polish plenipotentiary to arrive in Berlin by midnight on the next day, ie allowing more than 24 hours, for the purpose of negotiating on the basis of official proposals that would be presented to that plenipotentiary.

However, the British Government did not send its negative response to Ambassador Henderson until the next day, and delayed authorising him to present that negative response to the German Government until late in the evening of the 30th. The British action gives the appearance of wanting to delay giving its negative response until after the time allowed for the arrival of the Polish plenipotentiary had expired.

Despite those apparent British delaying tactics (which were none of Ambassador Henderson's doing), the German Government made two attempts to convey the content of the proposals to the Britisah representatives.

First, Ribbentrop read out the entire set of proposals to Ambassador Henderson at their meeting at midnight on 30 August, in the German original, speaking at a normal speed and adding explanations at various points. The German official interpreter, Schmidt, was present at the meeting, and was ready to translate what Ribbentrop had read, at dictation speed so that Henderson could write down the translation.

If Henderson failed to understand the proposals in their entirety, it was because of his insufficient command of German and his failure, perhaps due to his unwillingness to admit that insufficiency, to request a dictated translation.

Secondly, shorty after the above meeting, Göring gave Dahlerus a written copy of the proposals, which Dahlerus read out over the phone to the British Embassy, where Ogilvie-Forbes copied them down and then forwarded copies to various recipients, including the Polish and United States diplomatic representatives, who had received them by 4:00 Am on 31 August at the latest.

The bottom line is that, by the time the Polish Government on the morning of 31 August instructed Ambassador LIpski not to receive officially any German proposals, or to enter into negotiations, it must have been well aware of the content of those proposals. The Polish Government, despite an official request from the British Government to enter into talks, remained totally intransigent and unwilling to enter into any negotiations whatever on the issues in dispute with Germany, despite the balanced nature of the German proposals.

Sid, the above is my intepretation of the course of events. You are entirely at liberty to accept or reject that interpretation, as your fancy takes you. But whatever you decide, be happy!

[Terry Duncan]

The German Government did not officially present a copy of the Marienwerder Proposals to the Polish Government, since the latter refused to receive any proposals at all.

Or to the British and French governments as Sid actually specified.

It should be pointed out that the German Government launched its diplomatic initiative on 29 August, officially requesting the British Government to arrange for a Polish plenipotentiary to arrive in Berlin by midnight on the next day, ie allowing more than 24 hours, for the purpose of negotiating on the basis of official proposals that would be presented to that plenipotentiary.

Why such a tight deadline unless to fit into the short time left before military operations were planned to start? Danzig was not going to vanish in the next day or two, so the deadline looks to be an artificial limit to ensure failure.

Can you tell of any other diplomatic incident that was so close to a potential war where a nation failed to provide all others concerned official hard copies of proposals it hoped would achieve a peaceful solution? I am not aware of any.

[wm]

Secondly, shorty after the above meeting, Göring gave Dahlerus a written copy of the proposals, which Dahlerus read out over the phone to the British Embassy, where Ogilvie-Forbes copied them down and then forwarded copies to various recipients, including the Polish and United States diplomatic representatives, who had received them by 4:00 Am on 31 August at the latest.

At 4 AM people are usually in bed, at least in Europe, and that copy was unauthorized:

Early the next morning I obtained from another source in touch with Göring more definite, if unauthorized, details of the German proposals; and these I at once communicated through the Counselor of His Majesty’ Embassy to the Polish Ambassador, who spent that morning on the telephone to Warsaw.

from Nevile Henderson's book Failure of a Mission: Berlin 1937-1939, published in 1940


the rest of the text:
It was M. Lipski's last chance to telephone; for, when evening came, the German Government saw to it that that and all other methods of communication with the Polish Government were denied to him.
His Majesty’: Government, too, were using all their influence at Warsaw; and about the middle of the day I transmitted to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs a further message from His Majesty's Government to the German Government notifying them that the Polish Government were taking steps to establish contact with them through the Polish Ambassador at Berlin and asking them to agree to an immediate provisional modus vivendi at Danzig, for which purpose M. Burclthardt was suggested as intermediary. To this communication I never received any reply. There was, however, a further delay of some twelve hours. The Polish Povernment had, it was announced, authorized their Ambassador to establish contact with Ribbentrop; and Hitler waited to learn what message M. Lipski would bring. The question, in fact, was whether his qualifications would be those of a plenipotentiary empowered by the Polish Government, in spire of its ignorance of the exact terms of the German proposals, to conduct and conclude negotiations or not. On no other terms was Hitler prepared to postpone action. His army was ready, and Poland must be taught a lesson. She must crawl or get her whipping.

[wm]

The source may be the following quote, in which Hitler is talking of himself in the Third Person. It is from notes purportedly dictated to Martin Bormann by Hitler in early 1945 for his political testament:

I suppose it is a conflation of one of his last conversations with Goebbels:

For a while Hitler and Goebbels reminisced about the mistakes they now realized they had made in not liquidating their enemies in 1933. That was the hidden snag about being elected legally to office. In Vienna too, in 1938, the sheer peacefulness of the revolution had robbed them of the chance to liquidate all their enemies. Next time, they both resolved in this grotesque conversation, if there ever was a next time, they would not act Mr Nice Guy with their opponents.

Apr 27, 1945 - Goebbels. Mastermind of the Third Reich.

and his desire for war with Czechoslovakia, even after the Munich Agreement:

Over dinner the next day he again revealed his unshatterable resolve to destroy Czechoslovakia, as Goebbels recalled his words. He doggedly argued that London and Paris would not have intervened. Goebbels still differed on that score.

Goebbels. Mastermind of the Third Reich.

The Munich settlement thus deprived Hitler of the great satisfaction—to which he was ardently looking forward—of giving his army a little experience, of appearing himself in the role of a conquering hero, and of wreaking vengeance on Benes and the Czechs. In one sense he may have been not ungrateful to Mr. Chamberlain for having prevented a world war to which his army and people were opposed; in another, any gratitude which he may have felt was far outweighed by resentment at having been compelled to change his mind and at being deprived of his local war. The unanimity with which the French Chamber (unlike the House of Commons in this respect) approved of the Munich Agreement certainly helped to confirm him in this opinion.
In yet another sense, too, Hitler felt irritated with himself. A section of his followers were always egging him on to fight England while the latter was still militarily unprepared. They reproached him for having accepted the Munich settlement and thus having missed the most favorable opportunity. An uneasy feeling lest they might have been right contributed to Hitler's ill humor.
Nor was Munich in itself an agreeable experience for him. He found himself there for once in the company of three men who were his equals, instead of being surrounded by sycophants obedient to his slightest gesture. The experience confirmed his dislike for settlement by negotiation.

Failure of a Mission: Berlin 1937-1939

[David Thompson]

The IMT testimony of Reichsmarschall Göring and Gen. Bodenschatz are now posted in "The Eleventh Hour" thread at viewtopic.php?f=6&t=191512.

[David Thompson]

Some more chronology, using Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-45, Series D, vol. 7, August 9 - September 3 1939:

29 Aug – Hitler's note of 29 Aug to Ambassador Henderson is reproduced in Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-45, Series D, vol. 7, August 9 - September 3 1939 as Document No. 421, at pp. 413-415. Footnote 1 to the document, at p. 413, says that the note was delivered at 7:15 pm on 29 Aug. This puts the "short fuse" on the ultimatum for a Polish plenipotentiary to appear in Berlin at about 28 hours.

The note concludes (at p. 415):

The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves and will, if possible, place these at the disposal of His Majesty's Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator.

This is confirmed in a cable (Document No. 440, at p. 435) from State Secretary von Weiszäcker to the German Ambassador in Moscow, sent at 1:40 am on 30 Aug. No such proposal was sent to the British during the day or evening of 30 Aug. In fact, the German proposal does not appear to have been delivered until Reich Foreign Minister read it to the British Ambassador and said that it had been withdrawn, at midnight on 30/31 Aug.

30 Aug – That morning, beginning at 4 am, the British government informed the German Foreign office, in two separate communications (see Document No. 445, at p. 438), that

"the German reply [Hitler's 29 Aug note] was couched in very categorical terms and was something in the nature of an ultimatum. The British Government must point out that they were not certain whether they would succeed in persuading the Polish Government to send a plenipotentiary to Berlin this very day."

At 5:30 pm the British Ambassador's First Secretary delivered this note to the German Foreign Office (Document No. 450, p. 441):

"We are considering the German Note with all urgency and shall send an official reply later in the afternoon.

"We are representing at Warsaw how vital it is to reinforce all instructions for the avoidance of frontier incidents and I would beg you to confirm similar instructions on the German side.

"I welcome the evidence in the exchanges of views which are taking place of that desire for Anglo-German understanding of which I spoke in Parliament yesterday."

At 9:15 pm on 30 Aug and 00:40 am on 31 Aug, the German Foreign Office telegraphed an "FYI" copy of the midnight proposal von Ribbentrop simultaneously read and withdrew, to the German Chargé d'Affaires in London. The second of these telegrams was sent at the same time von Ribbentrop was meeting with Ambassador Henderson, when the German Foreign Minister refused to provide Sir Nevile with a copy. (Document No. 447, pp. 447-50).

A note for thoughtful readers -- if von Ribbentrop's story as to why he couldn't give Ambassador Henderson a copy of the proposal at their midnight meeting on 30 Aug was true (it was the only copy he had and Hitler's handwriting was on it), that means Germany had no written proposal to give to the Polish plenipotentiary no matter what time he showed up, right up to the time the deadline for negotiations expired at midnight. The readers can make up their own minds about the credibility of the tale, as well as its implications if true.

[Terry Duncan]

You have answered your own question: to fit into the short time left before military operations were planned to start as rescheduled, unless diplomatic breakthroughs occurred.

So Germany wanting war was the only reason any time limit needed to be specified. Given the purpose of this thread is to discuss German aggressive intent, it would appear you accept the IMT was perfectly correct in its findings.

A question sufficiently qualified to make it of a sui generis nature, at least for me; I cannot think of any other such events. Assuming you believe Germany had no intention of a peaceful solution, but Poland did, and Poland failed to provide hard copies of proposals hoped to achieve such, are you referring to Poland as the "nation" in question?

Poland was not the nation demanding anothers territory or threatening war, so it should have been rather obvious that I referred to Germany. The Marienwerder Proposals were German in origin and therefore the onus was upon Germany to provide hard copies of its suggestions to other interested powers. Poland could hardly be expected to provide hard copies of a German proposal. It would appear the proposals were never a serious consideration from a German perspective, and that you do not dispute that fact, you only bemoan the fact the British did not consider them serious either.

[wm]

Combining bluster and delusion similarly to a certain summertime Rydz-Śmigły painting, a Warsaw state-controlled radio is reported by the German Government's official account of the breakout of the war to have broadcast on late 31 August a strong rebuke of the German proposals, described in substance but framed as badly as possible, citing their unreasonable and unconscionable aggression against Polish interests. Less hay was made by their withdrawal than the utter gall of the Huns to reflect open aggression against Poland and plans for European domination in their demands, which abridge Polish self-determination and clearly show that the Polish Government's war mobilisation had been justified.

The false flag Operation Himmler attacks commenced on 31st of August, 1939 at 8.00 p.m. so surprisingly you are right, the WWII started on 31 of August.
The order for the attacks was given at noon.

And Rydz-Śmigły was better painter than Hitler...

[David Thompson]

Two unsourced opinion posts from dantielt, self-indulgent in tone and uninformative in content, were removed by the moderator - DT.

danielt -- Our rules are posted for all to see at viewtopic.php?f=6&t=53962. Please read them carefully before posting here again.

[David Thompson]

Another off-topic post from danielt was removed by the moderator - DT.

danielt -- The topic is Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment. If you can't stay on it, stay off it.

[michael mills]

Some more chronology, using Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-45, Series D, vol. 7, August 9 - September 3 1939:

What does this chronology demonstrate?

The note from Hitler to the British Government of 29 August, requesting the latter to arrange the despatch of a Polish plenipotentiary to Berlin before midnight of the following day, stated that a copy of the proposals being prepared by the German Government for presentation to that plenipotentiary would be given to the British Government if possible.

Obviously that copy could not be given to the British Government until

1. the proposals were ready in their final form, as endorsed by Hitler, and

2. the response of the British Government had been received.

There was no point in handing over a copy of the proposals until the British Government had given its official response to the Hiutler note of 29 August.

That official British response was conveyed to Ambassador Henderson early on 30 August, but he was instructed not to hand it over to the German Foreign Office until he received authorisation to do so. That authorisation was not given to Henderson until the evening of that day, at which point Henderson went off to his famous midnight meeting with Ribbentrop, to make the official handover of the British response.

That is the most probable reason why, as of the time of the midnight meeting, no copy of the German proposals had been handed over to the British representatives; the German Government was still waiting for the official British response to the Hitler note of the 29th.

At the midnight meeting, Ribbentrop, upon receipt of the British response delivered by Henderson, read out to the latter the German proposals, giving explanations of the most important points. The German interpreter, Schmidt, was present at the meeting to give Hnederson an interpretation of the oral proposals, at dictation speed, if requested.

Henderson asked Ribbentrop to give him the written copy of the proposals from which the latter was reading. Ribbentrop could not do so as that copy contained Hitler's handwritten amendments.

The problem of Henderson's failure to fully comprehend the proposals read to him by Ribbentrop, and the explanations given, due to his deficient understanding of German, compounded by his failure to ask for a translation, was rectified very soon after the midnight meeting by a second reading of the proposals by telephone to the British Embassy.

Thus, as soon as the British response to the Hitler note of 29 August was officially handed over to the German Government, the latter informed the British diplomatic representatives of the content of the proposals that it had wanted to present to the Polish plenipotentiary. There was no German attempt to conceal those proposals, nor can the German side be blamed for any failure of the British representatives to comprehend them.

What is being forgotten in all this concentrated whining about the short notice given for Polish agreement to negotiate on the basis of the Marienwerder Proposals is that the main components of those proposals, Polish agreement to the reunification of Danzig with Germany and to the grant of an extraterritorial corridor to East Prussia, and in return a German guarantee of Polish terriotrial integrity, had been known to the Polish Government for the past 10 months.

The only new element in the Marienwerder Proposals was the suggestion of taking the issue out of the German-Polish bilateral sphere and elevating it to the multilateral level through the placing of the defined Corridor area under the control of an international commission for a period of one year, at the end of which the sovereignty over that area would be decided by a plebiscite under the supervision of that international commission.

One would have thought that the Polish Government would have been only too glad to have the issue causing the conflict between itself and Germany referred for settlement to a commission on which powers sympathetic to Poland (Britain and France) would have equal representation with those sympathetic to Germany (Italy and the Soviet Union).

However, the Polish Government, tacitly encouraged by Britain, refused in advance to consider any German proposals, whatever they might be. By the morning of 31 August, the German Government was aware of that refusal, having intercepted the instructions to that effect from the Polish Government to Ambassador Lipski. Since the Polish Government from 30 August onward, after being informed of the negative British response to the Hitler note of 29 August, refused to even look at any German proposals, there was no point in trying to present it officially with a copy of them.