Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

[Michael Kenny]

and in return a German guarantee of Polish terriotrial integrity, had been known to the Polish Government for the past 10 months.

Just like Hitler had 'guaranteed' that Czechoslovakia was his last territorial demand in Europe...............

Hitler's word was worthless and no amount of excuse making can change this awkward fact.

I am also puzzled by the way the word 'negotiation' is being used by Mr Mills.
It appears to be a type of 'negotiation' unknown to me in which all the demands of an aggessor are to be complied with 'or else'. More of a threat than a serious attempt to resolve matters peacefully

[David Thompson]

Michael -- You wrote (at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 8#p1722838 ):

The note from Hitler to the British Government of 29 August, requesting the latter to arrange the despatch of a Polish plenipotentiary to Berlin before midnight of the following day, stated that a copy of the proposals being prepared by the German Government for presentation to that plenipotentiary would be given to the British Government if possible.

Obviously that copy could not be given to the British Government until

1. the proposals were ready in their final form, as endorsed by Hitler, and

2. the response of the British Government had been received.

There was no point in handing over a copy of the proposals until the British Government had given its official response to the Hiutler note of 29 August.

Hitler's note of 29 Aug 1939 did not require, or even solicit a British response, nor did it request the British "to arrange the despatch of a Polish plenipotentiary to Berlin before midnight of the following day." See the text of the note, at pp. 413-15 of Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-45, Series D, vol. 7, August 9 - September 3 1939:

AUGUST, 1939 413

No. 421
147/78841-50
The Führer and Chancellor to the British Government[1]
August 29, 1939.

His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin has submitted to His Majesty's Government suggestions[2] which I felt bound to make in order:

(1) To give expression once more to the will of the Reich Government for sincere German-British understanding, cooperation and .friendship;

(2) To leave no room for doubt as to the fact that such an understanding could not be bought at the price of a renunciation of vital German interests, let alone the abandonment of demands which are based as much upon common human justice as upon the national dignity and honour of our people.

The German Government have noted with satisfaction from the reply of His Majesty's Government,[3] and from the oral explanations given by His Majesty's Ambassador, that His Majesty's Government for their part are also prepared to improve the relationship between Germany and England and to develop and extend it in the sense of the German suggestions.

In this connection, His Majesty's Government are similarly convinced that the removal of the German-Polish tension, which has become unbearable, is the prerequisite for the realization of this hope.

Since the autumn of the past year, and on the last occasion in March, 1939, there were submitted to the Polish Government proposals, both oral and written, which, having regard to the friendship then existing between Germany and Poland, offered the possibility of a solution of the questions in dispute, acceptable to both parties. His Majesty's Government are aware that the Polish Government saw fit, in March last, finally to reject these proposals. At the same time, they used this rejection as a pretext or an occasion for taking military measures which have since been continuously intensified. Already in the middle of last month, Poland was in effect in a state of mobilization. This was accompanied by numerous encroachments in the Free City of Danzig due to the instigation of the Polish authorities; threatening demands in the nature of ultimata, varying only in degree, were addressed to that City. A closing of the frontiers, at
_________________________________________________________
[l] This memorandum was handed to Henderson by Hitler on Aug. 29 in the presence of Ribbentrop, the time being, according to Henderson's account of his interview with Hitler, 7:15 p.m. (see British Documents, Third Series, vol. vii, Nos. 490 and 498). No separate German record of this interview has been found, but see document No. 334 and footnote 1 thereto. See also document No. 470.
[2] See document No. 265.
[3] See document No. 884, enclosure.

414 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

first in the form of a measure of customs policy but extended later to military and traffic and communications matters, was imposed with the object of bringing about the political exhaustion and economic destruction of this German community.

To this were added barbaric acts of maltreatment which cry to Heaven, and other kinds of persecution of the large German national group in Poland, which extended even to the killing of many Germans living there or to their forcible removal under the most cruel conditions. This state of affairs is unbearable for a Great Power. It has now forced Germany, after remaining a passive onlooker for many months, in her turn to take the necessary steps for the safeguarding of just German interests. And indeed the German Government can but assure the British Government in the most solemn manner that a condition of affairs has now been reached which can no longer be accepted or observed with indifference.

The demands of the German Government are in conformity with the revision of the Versailles Treaty, which from the beginning has been recognized as being necessary in regard to this territory : viz. the return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, and the safeguarding of the existence of the German national group in the territories remaining to Poland.

The German Government note with satisfaction that His Majesty's Government also are in principle convinced that some solution must be found for the situation which has arisen. They further feel justified in assuming that His Majesty's Government too can have no doubt that it is a question now of conditions, for the elimination of which there no longer remain days, still less weeks, but perhaps only hours. For in the disorganized state of affairs obtaining in Poland, the possibility of incidents supervening, which it might be impossible for Germany to tolerate, must at any moment be reckoned with.

While His Majesty's Government may still believe that these grave differences can be resolved by way of direct negotiations, the German Government unfortunately can no longer share this view as a matter of course. For they have made the attempt to embark upon such peaceful negotiations, but, instead of receiving support from the Polish Government, they were rebuffed by the sudden introduction of measures of a military character in the form of the development alluded to above.

His Majesty's Government attach importance to two considerations :

(1) that the existing danger of a threatening explosion should be eliminated as quickly as possible by direct negotiation, and

(2) that the existence of the Polish State, in the form in which it would then continue to exist, should be adequately safeguarded in the economic and political spheres by means of international guarantees.

AUGUST, 1939 415

On this subject the German Government make the following declaration:

Though sceptical as to the prospects of a successful outcome, they are nevertheless prepared to accept the British proposal and to enter into direct discussions. They do so, as has already been emphasized, solely as the result of the impression made upon them by the written statement received from His Majesty's Government that they too desire a pact of friendship in accordance with the general lines indicated to Ambassador Henderson.

The German Government desire in this way to give His Majesty's Government and the British people a proof of the sincerity of Germany's intentions to enter into a lasting friendship with Great Britain.

The Government of the Reich feel, however, bound to point out to His Majesty's Government that in the event of a territorial rearrangement in Poland they would no longer be able to bind themselves to give guarantees or to participate in guarantees without the U.S.S.R. being associated therewith.

For the rest, in making these proposals the German Government have never had any intention of attacking Poland's vital interests or questioning the existence of an independent Polish State. The German Government, accordingly, in these circumstances agree to accept His Majesty's Government's offer of their good offices in securing the despatch to Berlin of a Polish emissary with full powers. They count on the arrival of this emissary on Wednesday, August 30, 1939.

The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves and will, if possible, place these at the disposal of His Majesty's Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator.

[wm]

One would have thought that the Polish Government would have been only too glad to have the issue causing the conflict between itself and Germany referred for settlement to a commission on which powers sympathetic to Poland (Britain and France) would have equal representation with those sympathetic to Germany (Italy and the Soviet Union).

What politician on earth would put to arbitration the fate of territories that have belonged to or were a dependency of his country from 997?

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Michael,

You write, "Despite the Polish Government's refusal to receive the proposals officially, The German Government did not withhold them, since it could be taken for granted that the Polish Government would receive them unofficially from the British."

Now that is not true, is it?

1) You also write, "The German Government did not officially present a copy of the Marienwerder Proposals to the Polish Government....", so necessarily the Polish Government was never in a position to refuse them officially.

2) The German Government did withold the proposals. Ribbentrop had them on him during his meeting with the British Ambassador but, for whatever reason, did not hand a hard copy over then or at any other time thereafter. Instead, Germany seemed to think that releasing them later verbally via second parties was an adequate substitute for actually addressing the Poles directly. Sorry, but Chinese Whispers is not an accountable diplomatic tool!

3) Germany should not have taken it "for granted that the Polish Government would receive them unofficially from the British". With so much at stake, Germany should not have assumed that the British would act as a branch of Germany's foreign ministry.

Germany should have transmitted the proposals to the Poles directly. What was Germany mainitaining an Embassy in Warsaw for, if not to handle just this sort of communication? After all, as you wrote, "they (the proposals) were a matter for negotiation between Germany and Poland."

If Germany was genuinely anxious to avoid a war that it was unilaterally about to initiate, why did it not try to send its own plenipotentiary to Warsaw with full powers to negotiate? Ribbentrop had managed to find his way to Moscow only ten days before without getting lost. Heck, Britain had sent its own Prime Minister to Munich in order to avert war - successfully, at least in the short term.

You write, "The Polish Government..... remained totally intransigent and unwilling to enter into any negotiations whatever on the issues in dispute with Germany....."

But, as we have established already, Poland had NO issues in dispute with Germany and was making no claims on Germany. Therefore, as you have already conceded, "There is no objective reason why he (Lipski) should have.... entered any concrete negotiations" on behalf of Poland.

It was Germany that had issues in dispute with Poland, not vice versa. It was Germany that had been fully mobilized for nearly a week and it was Germany that had fixed a date and time to attack Poland. Therefore, the issue of whether there should be peace or war rested entirely with Nazi Germany. It chose war.

Cheers,

Sid.

[wm]

Germany should have transmitted the proposals to the Poles directly. What was Germany mainitaining an Embassy in Warsaw for, if not to handle just this sort of communication?

Ribbentrop recalled the German ambassador - Hans Adolf von Moltke, to Berlin on August 10, 1939. They say because he wanted to derailed the German-Polish diplomatic talks, and Moltke was trying too hard to find a solution to the crisis.
But maybe he saved his life by doing this. The German embassy in Warsaw was bombed by the Luftwaffe a few weeks later.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi wm,

Thanks.

That was hardly a move likely to lubricate the wheels of diplomacy, but it still leaves such options as returning the old Ambassador, appointing a new one, using the First Secretary instead, sending a plenipotentiary, making a phone call or a radio broadcast, sending a telegramme or a diplomatic courier, etc., etc.

This is all presuming that Hitler and Ribbentrop actually wanted a peaceful outcome.

However, Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, says in his diaries, "In the Summer of 1939 Germany advanced her claim against Poland, naturally without our knowledge; indeed, Ribbentrop had several times denied to our Ambassador that Germany had any intentions of carrying the controversy to extremes. Despite these denials I remained in doubt; I wanted to make sure for myself, and on August 11th I went to Salzburg. It was in his residence at Fuschl that Ribbentrop informed me, while we were waiting to sit down at the table, of the decision to start the fireworks, just as he might have told me about the most unimportant and commonplace administrative matter.

'Well, Ribbentrop,' I asked him, while we were walking in the garden, 'What do you want ? The Corridor, or Danzig ?'

'Not any more', and he stared at me through those cold Musee Grevin eyes, 'We want war.'[/b]"

Interestingly, this conversation took place the day after you say Ribbentrop recalled the German Ambasador from Warsaw.

While a self-serving Ciano may not be the most reliable of witnesses (as Michael will no doubt tell us) his testimony is nevertheless undoubtedly that of an eyewitness.

Cheers,

Sid.

[michael mills]

Hitler's note of 29 Aug 1939 did not require, or even solicit a British response, nor did it request the British "to arrange the despatch of a Polish plenipotentiary to Berlin before midnight of the following day."

Huuh?????????

From that note:

On this subject the German Government make the following declaration:

Though sceptical as to the prospects of a successful outcome, they are nevertheless prepared to accept the British proposal and to enter into direct discussions. They do so, as has already been emphasized, solely as the result of the impression made upon them by the written statement received from His Majesty's Government that they too desire a pact of friendship in accordance with the general lines indicated to Ambassador Henderson.

The German Government desire in this way to give His Majesty's Government and the British people a proof of the sincerity of Germany's intentions to enter into a lasting friendship with Great Britain.

The Government of the Reich feel, however, bound to point out to His Majesty's Government that in the event of a territorial rearrangement in Poland they would no longer be able to bind themselves to give guarantees or to participate in guarantees without the U.S.S.R. being associated therewith.

For the rest, in making these proposals the German Government have never had any intention of attacking Poland's vital interests or questioning the existence of an independent Polish State. The German Government, accordingly, in these circumstances agree to accept His Majesty's Government's offer of their good offices in securing the despatch to Berlin of a Polish emissary with full powers. They count on the arrival of this emissary on Wednesday, August 30, 1939.

The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves and will, if possible, place these at the disposal of His Majesty's Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator.

So the German Government did ask the British Government to "secure the despatch" of a Polish emissary with full powers.

The British Government, in its note of 28 August, had offered to facilitate direct talks between Germany and Poland. The German Government had interpreted direct talks between Germany and Poland as meaning that a Polish emissary would come to Berlin with full powers to negotiate on the basis of proposals that the German Government undertook to prepare.

On the basis of its interpretation of the British offer made on 28 August, the German Government requested the British Government to "secure the despatch" of a Polish emissary with full powers.

The British Government did not hand over its official reponse to the German note of 29 August until very late on the evening of 30 August. The handover was made by Ambassador Henderson at his famous midnight meeting with Ribbentropo.

In the meantime, before handing over its response to the German Government, the British Government informed the Polish Government of the German request for a Polish emissary with full powers to be sent to Berlin, but stated that it would not request the Polish Government to act accordingly. In other words, the British Government declined to "secure the despatch" of a Polish emissary to Berlin.

The German Government had not given an unconditional undertaking to the British Government to present the latter with a copy of the proposals prepared by it before the arrival of the Polish negotiator. Rather it had undertaken to do so "If possible", which condition may be read as meaning that the presentation of the German proposals would be dependent on a positive British response. That is to say, the British responded by undertaking to "secure the despatch" of a Polish emissary, if it showed that it had actually done so, and if the Polish Government indicated that its emissary was in process of being despatched, then the German Government would hand over its proposals to the British representatives.

The fact is that as soon as the British Government presented its official (negative) response to the German note of 29 August, which was done by Henderson at the midnight meeting with Ribbentrop, the German Government informed the British representative of its proposals by reading them out, with the option of a dictated translation. That was followed up by a telephoned dictation of the proposals to the British Embassy.

At the time the German proposals were read to Henderson and to the British Embassy, no Polish emissary had arrived. Accordingly, the German Government had fulfilled its conditional undertaking to the British Goovernment to the letter; it had placed its proposals at the disposal of the British Government before the arrival of a Polish emissary, which latter event did not actually occur.

[michael mills]

It was Germany that had issues in dispute with Poland, not vice versa. It was Germany that had been fully mobilized for nearly a week and it was Germany that had fixed a date and time to attack Poland. Therefore, the issue of whether there should be peace or war rested entirely with Nazi Germany. It chose war.

Sid,

An historically more precise formulation would be to say that the German Government chose to take the initiative in a situation where the British Government had given Poland a blank cheque to create a state of war between Britain and Germany over anything it claimed to be an "indirect threat" to its independence.

Germany had not rushed into a pre-emptive strike against Poland immediately after the issuing of the blank cheque, even though Poland began to act very aggressively toward Danzig, threatening war, and eventually issuing an ultimatum on 4 August. Hitler reacted to the blank cheque and Polish threats of war by ordering contingency planning for a full-scale preventive strike against Poland, but set the notional date for it at the very end of the campaigning season, after 1 September, with left only a very brief period before the onset of bad weather.

In setting the notional date for a strike against Poland so late, the German Government was leaving open the opportunity for Britain to cancel its blank cheque, or for Poland to independently abandon its megalomaniacally intransigent stance and negotiate on the basis of the extremely modest German proposals.

In the course of the summer of 1939, Hitler came to the conclusion that Britain and Poland were merely stalling, delaying any resolution of the issues in contention between German and Poland until after the end of the campaigning season, at which point, so Hitler suspected, Poland would cash in the blank cheque by sending its forces into Danzig and perhaps also East Prussia, at a time when bad weather would hamper a full-scale German response and negate the German superiority in armour and air power.

Hitler's suspicions were not unjustified. Non-governmental anti-German organisations within Poland were openly calling for war against Germany for the purpose of achieving the Piast goal of westward expansion by seizing German eastern territory; for that purpose they had been disseminating propagandistic material such as that which has been posted earlier on this thread.

Eventually Hitler decided that Britain and Poland would continue to stall, so after the Polish ultimatum to Danzig of 4 August, he finally issued the order for the plan for a full-scale attack on Poland to be implemented on 26 August. The aim was to knock Poland out quickly with one mighty blow, with the object of presenting Britain and France with a fait accompli which might deter them from making war on Germany and encourage them to negotiate a settlement between Germany and Poland, which would include the elimination of the anti-German elements in Poland and installation of a government friendly to Germany.

However, Hitler was prepared to make one last attempt to achieve a negotiated settlement, by offering the Marienwerder Proposals, even though he was skeptical of success. When Britain and Poland continued to play for time, Hitler gave the final go-ahead for invasion on 1 September.

[ljadw]

I don't see the wisdom of repeating things,which had been proved to be wrong,as :
-the aim of the attack on Poland being to deter Britain and France from making war on Germany
-that the order to attack Poland was "influenced" by the Polish "ultimatum" against Danzig .

[David Thompson]

Michael -- You wrote, quoting me:

Hitler's note of 29 Aug 1939 did not require, or even solicit a British response, nor did it request the British "to arrange the despatch of a Polish plenipotentiary to Berlin before midnight of the following day."

Huuh?????????

That's what I thought when I read your characterization of Hitler's 29 Aug note as a "request." This (using your orthographic style):

The German Government, accordingly, in these circumstances agree to accept His Majesty's Government's offer of their good offices in securing the despatch to Berlin of a Polish emissary with full powers. They count on the arrival of this emissary on Wednesday, August 30, 1939.

is a demand, not a "request." In fact, it looks very much like an ultimatum, as representatives of the British government told Hitler to his face when the note was delivered, and told the German Foreign Ministry twice on the morning of 30 Aug. Since Hitler and von Ribbentrop assured the British Ambassador (Sir Nevile Henderson) that it was not an ultimatum, there was no reason for the British to assume that the German government would later treat the note as exactly that – an ultimatum.

The British also told the Germans, on all three occasions mentioned above, not to count on the Polish plenipotentiary showing up by midnight. If that was the British response the Germans were supposedly waiting on, they had it before noon on 30 Aug. And, as I have already pointed out, Hitler's note of 29 Aug 1939 did not require, or even solicit a British response.

Here's the British proposal of 28 Aug 1939, from The British War Blue Book (1939). Note that the terms of the British offer differ from the terms Hitler purported to accept on 29 Aug:

No. 74.
Reply of His Majesty's Government dated August 28, 1939, to the German Chancellor's Communications of August 23 and 25, 1939.*

HIS Majesty's Government have received the message conveyed to them from the German Chancellor by His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin, and have considered it with the care which it demands.

They note the Chancellor's expression of his desire to make friendship the basis of the relations between Germany and the British Empire and they fully share this desire. They believe with him that if a complete and lasting understanding between the two countries could be established it would bring untold blessings to both peoples.
_______________________________________
* Nos. 60 and 68.

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 163

2. The Chancellor's message deals with two groups of questions: those which are the matters now in dispute between Germany and Poland and those affecting the ultimate relations of Germany and Great Britain. In connexion with these last, His Majesty's Government observe that the German Chancellor has indicated certain proposals which, subject to one condition, he would be prepared to make to the British Government for a general understanding. These proposals are, of course, stated in very general form and would require closer definition, but His Majesty's Government are fully prepared to take them, with some additions, as subjects for discussion and they would be ready, if the differences between Germany and Poland are peacefully composed, to proceed so soon as practicable to such discussion with a sincere desire to reach agreement.

3. The condition which the German Chancellor lays down is that there must first be a settlement of the differences between Germany and Poland. As to that, His Majesty's Government entirely agree. Everything, however, turns upon the nature of the settlement and the method by which it is to be reached. On these points, the importance of which cannot be absent from the Chancellor's mind, his message is silent, and His Majesty's Government feel compelled to point out that an understanding upon both of these is essential to achieving further progress. The German Government will be aware that His Majesty's Government have obligations to Poland by which they are bound and which they intend to honour They could not, for any advantage offered to Great Britain, acquiesce in a settlement which put in jeopardy the independence of a State to whom they have given their guarantee.

4. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government a reasonable solution of the differences between Germany and Poland could and should be effected by agreement between the two countries on lines which would include the safeguarding of Poland's essential interests, and they recall that in his speech of the 28th April last the German Chancellor recognised the importance of these interests to Poland.

But, as was stated by the Prime Minister in his letter to the German Chancellor of the 22nd August, His Majesty's Government consider it essential for the success of the discussions which

164 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

would precede the agreement that it should be understood beforehand that any settlement arrived at would be guaranteed by other Powers. His Majesty's Government would be ready if desired to make their contribution to the effective operation of such a guarantee.

In the view of His Majesty's Government it follows that the next step should be the initiation of direct discussions between the German and Polish Governments on a basis which would include the principles stated above, namely, the safeguarding of Poland's essential interests and the securing of the settlement by an international guarantee.

They have already received a definite assurance from the Polish Government that they are prepared to enter into discussions on this basis, and His Majesty's Government hope the German Government would for their part also be willing to agree to this course.

If, as His Majesty's Government hope, such discussion led to agreement the way would be open to the negotiation of that wider and more complete understanding between Great Britain and Germany which both countries desire.

5. His Majesty's Government agree with the German Chancellor that one of the principal dangers in the German-Polish situation arises from the reports concerning the treatment of minorities. The present state of tension, with its concomitant frontier incidents, reports of maltreatment and inflammatory propaganda, is a constant danger to peace. It is manifestly a matter of the utmost urgency that all incidents of the kind should be promptly and rigidly suppressed and that unverified reports should not be allowed to circulate, in order that time may be afforded, without provocation on either side, for a full examination of the possibilities of settlement. His Majesty's Government are confident that both the Governments concerned are fully alive to these considerations.

6. His Majesty's Government have said enough to make their own attitude plain in the particular matters at issue between Germany and Poland. They trust that the German Chancellor will not think that, because His Majesty's Government are scrupulous concerning their obligations to Poland, they are not anxious to use all their influence to assist the achievement of a

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 165

solution which may commend itself both to Germany and to Poland.

That such a settlement should be achieved seems to His Majesty's Government essential, not only for reasons directly arising in regard to the settlement itself, but also because of the wider considerations of which the German Chancellor has spoken with such conviction.

7. It is unnecessary in the present reply to stress the advantage of a peaceful settlement over a decision to settle the questions at issue by force of arms. The results of a decision to use force have been clearly set out in the Prime Minister's letter to the Chancellor of the 22nd August, and His Majesty's Government do not doubt that they are as fully recognised by the Chancellor as by themselves.

On the other hand, His Majesty's Government, noting with interest the German Chancellor's reference in the message now under consideration to a limitation of armaments, believe that, if a peaceful settlement can be obtained, the assistance of the world could confidently be anticipated for practical measures to enable the transition from preparation for war to the normal activities of peaceful trade to be safely and smoothly effected.

8. A just settlement of these questions between Germany and Poland may open the way to world peace. Failure to reach it would ruin the hopes of better understanding between Germany and Great Britain, would bring the two countries into conflict, and might well plunge the whole world into war. Such an outcome would be a calamity without parallel in history.

[David Thompson]

The official German and British versions of the outbreak of the war over Poland are now posted on "The Eleventh Hour" thread at:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0#p1723180
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 2#p1723182

[michael mills]

The guts of the British note of 28 August, once all the verbiage is cut away, is this:

In the view of His Majesty's Government it follows that the next step should be the initiation of direct discussions between the German and Polish Governments on a basis which would include the principles stated above, namely, the safeguarding of Poland's essential interests and the securing of the settlement by an international guarantee.

They have already received a definite assurance from the Polish Government that they are prepared to enter into discussions on this basis, and His Majesty's Government hope the German Government would for their part also be willing to agree to this course.

The German response, made on 29 August, was, in essence, if the Polish Government claims that it is prepared to enter into discussions on the basis of the British principles, let it send a plenipotentiary urgently, ie tomorrow, to negotiate on proposals that we will prepare.

The German Government justified its requirement for negotiations to begin immediately by the fact that the situation was very tense, with the German and Polish armies poised for hostilities, which could break out at any moment.

Note that the German Government did not demand that the Polish Government accept the German proposals that had not yet been formulated. It just asked the Polish Government to indicate its willingness to begin negotiating seriously by sending a plenipotentiary to Berlin urgently.

The real issue is not whether the Polish Government had enough time to consider the German proposals, but whether it was ever at any time prepared to consider them seriously and to enter into negotiations on the basis of them.

A broadcast made by Radio Warsaw at 11 PM on 31 August, rejecting the proposals out of hand, suggests that the Polish Government would never have been prepared to negotiate seriously, no matter how much time it was given, and that it preferred war to negotiation, preferably after delaying conflict for as long as possible.

A German-language translation of that broadcast was published as Document 16 on page 23 in the German White Book, which can be found online here:

http://archive.org/stream/Weissbuch-Urk ... 1/mode/2up

Here is the German-language text of Document 16, with my translation:

16. Meldung des polnischen Rundfunksenders Warschau vom 31. August 1939, abends 23 Uhr

(Übersetzung)

Die heutige Bekanntmachung des deutschen offiziellen Communiques hat die Ziele und Absichten der deutschen Politik klar gezeigt. Es beweist die offenen Aggressionsabsichten Deutschlands gegenüber Polen. Die Bedingungen, unter denen das Dritte Reich bereit ist, mit Polen zu verhandeln, lauten: Danzig kehrt sofort zum Reich zurück. Pommerellen mit den Städten Bromberg und Graudenz unterliegt einem Plebiszit, wobei alle Deutschen, die nach dem Jahre 1918 aus irgendwelchen Gründen von dort ausgewandert sind, hineingelassen werden sollen. Polnisches Militär und Polizei evakuiert Pommerellen. Die Polizei Englands, Frankreichs, Italiens und der Sowjetunion übernimmt die Gewalt. Nach Ablauf von 12 Monaten findet das Plebiszit statt. Das Gebiet der Halbinsel Hela wird vom Plebiszit gleichfalls erfaßt. Gdingen ist als polnische Stadt ausgeschlossen. Unabhängig vom Ausgang des Plebiszits wird eine exterritoriale Straße in der Breite eines Kilometers gebaut ...

Die deutsche Agentur gibt bekannt, daß der Termin für die Aufnahme dieser Bedingungen gestern abgelaufen ist. Deutschland hat vergeblich auf einen Abgesandten Polens gewartet. Die Antwort waren die militärischen Anordnungen der polnischen Regierung.

Keine Worte können jetzt mehr die Aggressionspläne der neuen Hunnen verschleiern. Deutschland strebt die Herrschaft über Europa an und durchstreicht mit einem bisher nicht dagewesenen Zynismus die Rechte der Völker. Dieser unverschämte Vorschlag beweist deutlich, wie notwendig die militärischen Anordnungen der polnischen Regierung gewesen sind.

My translation:

16. Announcement by the Polish radio station Warsaw on 31 August, at 11:00 PM

The proclamation today of the official German communiqué has clearly revealed the goals and intentions of German policy. It proves the openly aggressive intentions of Germany toward Poland. The conditions under which Germany is prepared to negotiate with Poland read: Danzig returns immediately to the Reich. Pomerelia with the cities Graudenz (Grudziadz) and Bromberg (Bydgoszcz) is subject to a plebiscite to which are admitted all Germans who emigrated from there after 1918 for any reason whatever. Polish military and police evacuate Pomerelia. The police of Britain, France, Italy and the Soviet Union assume power. The plebiscite takes place after the elapse of 12 months. The area of the Hela peninsula is likewise included in the plebiscite. Gdynia is excluded as a Polish city. Independently of the result of the plebiscite, an extraterritorial road one kilometre wide will be built........

The German agency announces that the period for the acceptance of these conditions expired yesterday. Germany waited in vain for a Polish emissary. The answer was the military ordinances of the Polish Government.

No words can conceal any more the plans for aggression of the new Huns. Germany is striving for domination over Europe and is cancelling the rights of the peoples with a cynicism that has never existed until now. This shameless proposal proves clearly how necessary were the military ordinances of the Polish Government.

The full text of the German proposals can be found on pages 21 and 22 of the German White Book, at the link above. Participants in this discussion may read them and decide for themselves the degree to which those proposals were reasonable and balanced, and took account of the legitimate Polish interest in access to a seaport. I can provide a translation if required.

It is clear that the Polish Government would have rejected the German proposals, no matter when they were presented or how much time it had to consider them, since it described them as a "shameless proposal", and as an indication of an aggressive intent toward Poland and of an intent to dominate Europe.

Furthermore, the Polish Government falsified the nature of the German proposals, claiming that Germany required Polish acceptance of them as a precondition for negotiations. The German Government had done no such thing; it had put forward proposals to the British Government, which had offered to facilitate German-Polish talks, to serve as a basis for negotiation. The proposals represented Germany's desired outcome, but the Polish side could have put forward counter-proposals, if it had been prepared to negotiate seriously, which it quite clealry was not, since it categorically refused to enter into negotiations or to accept any German proposals.

[michael mills]

On Friday 10 at 6.29 AM, wm made this statement:

And Rydz-Śmigły was better painter than Hitler...

Readers might be mystified by that statement, which appears to come out of the blue, but that is because it was a response to a post by Danielt that was subsequently deleted by the moderator on the grounds of irrelevance.

For the information of readers, that post referred to a claim that General Edward Rydz-Śmigły, the Supreme Leader (Naczelny wódz), around whom a cult of personality was blossoming, in the summer of 1939 had himself painted, oil on canvas, on horseback overseeing a Polish victory parade before the Brandenburg Gate of Berlin, and that the painting is displayed in Warsaw, in a National Museum.

I cannot vouch for the accuracy of that claim, since I have never heard of it before. Even if true, it does not tell us anything about the actual plans of the Polish Government in the summer of 1939.

Nevertheless, in the summer of 1939 anti-German nationalist extremist elements in Poland, which were not part of the government but nevertheless had the sympathy and tacit support of the faction in the Sanacja regime led by Rydz-Śmigły, were agitating for a war of conquest against Germany, and were loudly propagating the idea of invading Danzig, East Prussia, Silesia and Pomerania.

It is therefore highly possible that Rydz-Śmigły did harbour a fantasy of leading the Polish Army in triumph through the Brandenburg gate in Berlin, as Napoleon had led the French Army in 1806. Such a fantasy clearly underlay the documented statement of Ambassador Lipski on the early morning of 31 August to Ogilvie-Forbes of the British Embassy, to the effect that in the event of a German-Polish war the Polish Army would enter Berlin within a week.

The Polish army commander had made a similar statement to his French counterparts at Franco-Polish military discussions in May 1939.

Whether Rydz-Śmigły actually had his fantasy of leading the Polish army on a victory parade in Berlin committed to hard copy in the form of an oil-painting is something I do not know, but it is definitely within the bounds of possibility that he did have that fantasy.

[David Thompson]

Let's get back on topic.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Michael,

You write, "An historically more precise formulation would be to say that the German Government chose to take the initiative in a situation where the British Government had given Poland a blank cheque to create a state of war between Britain and Germany over anything it claimed to be an "indirect threat" to its independence."

1) The first part is correct. The German Government did choose to take the initiative. Unfortunately, the initiative it chose was war!

The German Government was so unprepared for a peacful resolution that, as you yourself write, "the German proposals..... had not yet been formulated" as late as 29 August (three days after Germany had originally intended to attack Poland) and when they were formulated they proved totally incapable of transmitting them directly to the Poles by any of the numerous direct means available to them.

2) The second part is incorrect. There was no "blank cheque" and five times I have quoted to you evidence to this effect from a source you yourself recommended! Your selective memory on this point does your argument no credit. However, to help you, I repeat it below for a sixth:

".....the Committee on Foreign Policy resolved that the guarantee was to be implemented on two conditions: (1) if Poland resisted a threat to her independence; (2) if she did not indulge in "provocative or stupid obstinacy", either generally, or on Danzig in particular....... at noon Chamberlain told the Cabinet that: "it would, of course, be for us to determine what action threatened Polish independence. This would prevent us from becoming embroiled as a result of a frontier incident."

3) Even if the Poles had believed they had a "blank cheque", they certainly didn't use it. It wasn't the Poles who crossed the German-Polish and Danzig-Polish borders early on 1 September 1939, it was the Germans.

You write of "the resolution of the issues in contention between German and Poland". There were no "issues" so far as Poland was concerned. The status of Danzig and the Polish-German frontier had already been guaranteed by Germany by treaty. The "issues" were entirely on the German side, had only been raised in the last year and were a moving target. The Germans became more demanding by the month - first an extra-territorial highway across Polish territory. Then Danzig. Then the northern part of the "corridor", then the whole "corridor". Where would it stop? With the total annihilation of the Polish state, perhaps? (For anyone not familiar with the history, Prussia had already once taken part in the complete annihilation of the Polish state in the 1780s. Nazi Germany would do so again over 1939-44)

I think your point that "Hitler's suspicions were not unjustified" is rather undermined by having to pray in aid the attitude of "Non-governmental anti-German organisations within Poland". By very definition, non-governmental organizations cannot be held to represent the Polish state!

You refer to a Polish ultimatum of 4 August, but fail to mention the circumstances in which it was delivered. The Poles were addressing Danzig, not Germany. The Danzig Senate had ordered the dismantling of Polish customs posts on the border with East Prussia. This was in contravention of the Danzig Settlement to which Poland, Germany, Britain and France were all party. The Poles were therefore fully entitled to protest forcefully.

They also had pragmatic reasons. The closing of these posts would allow Germany openly to send in arms and men to Danzig without being checked. My main criticism of the Poles is that they probably acted too slowly. By the end of June there were already 186 German Army officers secretly in Danzig and by 4 August they had already secretly set up six infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, an armoured-car equipped reconnaissance group and heavy and light artillery batteries in a city that all powers, including Germany, had agreed was to be demilitarized.

Cheers,

An ever mystified Sid.