Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

[Appleknocker27]

The war games were held AFTER Hitler signed Weisung 21.

Your point? Hitler signed Dir 16 which had no plan and was never executed, no? So what point do you have?

Besides, you're wrong anyway:
"On 21 July, after discussing the invasion of England with his mili-tary advisers, Hitler asked Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch,the Commander in Chief of the Army, to study the Russian problemand submit plans for a campaign against the Soviet Union."
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/ ... 104-21.pdf

As there were no indications available that the planning of Barbarossa as a short campaign was feasable, it is obvious that informations from FHO were not involved into the decision and the planning

.

"On the basis of data provided by Kinzel on 26 July (1940), Halder concluded that an attack launched from assembly areas in East Prussia and northern Poland toward Moscow would offer the best chances for success."

You lump the decision and planning together when one obviously precedes the other. Is your English failing you and leading to more odd logic? The "decision" as it pertains to military doctrine in the context I used it refers to the doctrinal orders production process. The final product of the Barbarossa operational plan was produced after a thorough analysis of information provided by German Intel and also taking into account the Paulus wargames, thus the DECISION was made on a specific course of action. This affected the German OOB, deployment and initial movements as well as changes to the make up and deployment of the Grosstransprotatraum and plan Otto.

The war games concluded as following : if the Red Army was not destroyed west of the DD line, the Germans would not succeed east of the DD line,even against weak resistance .

Source for this? You paraphrase rather than quote anything and in so doing distort, twist and oversimplify the original source.

But the war games did not say that victory west of the DD line was posible, because there were no indications that the Red Army was weaker than the WM, that the Red Army would go west and that after the destruction of the Soviet forces west of the DD line,the regime still would be able to raise additional forces .

"4. The Army would need approximately 80-100 combat divisions; the Soviet Union had some 50-75 good Russian divisions in Europe."
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/ ... 104-21.pdf

As there were no informations that the strategy that was adopted would be successful, it is obvious that the strategy was chosen without taking into account the informations .

Obvious to who, you? Or obvious if we ignore the facts?

The strategy that was adopted was adopted because the other option had no chance to succeed .

Yes, your simpleton assumption that you repeat over and over and over.... :roll:

You have given no proof that the feasibility was found to be very possible because of information provided by FHO and others . Where is the statement of a senior German general that intelligence from FHO has proved that Barbarossa as it is planned will succeed ?

Read above and the source linked, also look at the underlying sources within it....

[steverodgers801]

The stop and argument about direction during the Smolensk pause were because it was clear the Germans did not have the means to go after all three objectives at the same time but no decision was made.

[ljadw]

Well-known statement from Hitler : If I had known that the Soviets had so many tanks, I would not have attacked them.

1) He was wrong : he still would attack, the number of tanks was irrelevant for the decision to attack

2) He attacked without informations about the number of tanks of the opponent .

Thus the importance of informations of FHO is not what some people are claiming .


Other (less-known ) statement from Brauchitz who said that the PLANS were BASED on the ASSUMPTION (not the information) that the Soviets would accept the battle west of the DD line . Kinzel was not mentionned .

That it was an assumption (=a guess) was confirmed by Halder who said, when asked "what ,if they didn't " : IT MIGHT EASILY TURN OUT DIFFERENT.

Easily : that means that Brauchitz was guessing and that there was no certainty about one of the three conditions for a possible success . And Halder did not say what theGerman answer would be in that case, because, he and the others, knew that there was no answer possible : if it turned out different, the campaign was lost . Thus it was better not to talk and not to think about it .



And a third statement from Hitler also indicates that Barbarossa was decided and planned as it was (without considering the informations of Kinzel) because there was no reliable information and because there was no alternative ,Hitler said in the autumn the following :

On 22 june, a door opened before us and we did not know what was behind it .

In other words :we started and planned a war without reliable information about the opponent .

Imagine that Eisenhower would have said in october 1944 : On 6 june, a door opened before us and we did not know what was behind us .

This was the difference between 6 june and 22 june :

6 june : decision and planning influenced by the available information (although it was not always correct)

22 june : decision and planning taken without serious information (although this did not caused the failure) .

[ljadw]

The stop and argument about direction during the Smolensk pause were because it was clear the Germans did not have the means to go after all three objectives at the same time but no decision was made.

Before 22 june there was a decision for a logistical stop,but the stop was made because of the Soviet resistance .

[Appleknocker27]

Well-known statement from Hitler : If I had known that the Soviets had so many tanks, I would not have attacked them.

1) He was wrong : he still would attack, the number of tanks was irrelevant for the decision to attack

2) He attacked without informations about the number of tanks of the opponent .

Thus the importance of informations of FHO is not what some people are claiming .

-snip-


Still no sources, links, quotes, etc. Just more of your own homegrown logic.
Your argument has no basis...


Good point made by Steve.

[ljadw]

The source is : The German campaign in Russia:planning and operations ;as the statement is well-known,why do you ask a source ?

[ljadw]

On 26 july 1940 there was no decision to invade the SU, thus the proposals from Halder are irrelevant, besides, they were not accepted . The plan that was used was a totally different one .

[Appleknocker27]

More info on the German effort to gather information on the SU prior to Barbarossa:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_and_ ... telligence

500 aerial reconnaissance flights over 10 months revealed a very accurate picture of Soviet forces up to a depth of 500 km (Smolensk).

[Appleknocker27]

The source is : The German campaign in Russia:planning and operations ;as the statement is well-known,why do you ask a source ?

Then quote it in proper context as support for your theory. As I previously stated, you paraphrase rather than quote, thus twisting the original text to meet your agenda. All you've proven so far by your well known debate tactics is that your logic is trash and your agenda false.
No one is buying what you're selling.

[Appleknocker27]

The source is : The German campaign in Russia:planning and operations ;as the statement is well-known,why do you ask a source ?

Why do I ask you to quote a source?
See below.

You don't get it,because you start from a wrong assumption = that the planning of Barbarossa was based on information from FHO,etc,which was not so .

I proved your statement false, used a source, quoted and linked it. Your response; IGNORE that it happened (as usual).

The decision to invade the SU was taken without involving the intelligence community (FHO).

I proved your statement false, used a source, quoted and linked it. Your response; IGNORE that it happened (as usual).

As there were no informations that the strategy that was adopted would be successful, it is obvious that the strategy was chosen without taking into account the informations

I proved your statement false, used a source, quoted and linked it. Your response; IGNORE that it happened (as usual).

The strategy that was adopted was adopted because the other option had no chance to succeed

I proved your statement false, used a source, quoted and linked it. Your response; IGNORE that it happened (as usual).

In 10+ years you have yet to EVER admit to being wrong on any point, not a single solitary time. You simply ignore evidence and twist the conversation or simply quibble. What do you contribute? A ban should be in order for fraud...

[Max Payload]

There were 2 options :
a long campaign : this was rejected because it would not be successful and if it was,it would not help Germany but hinder Germany .
a short campaign : ther were no indications that this would be successful and no one asked FHO if it would be successful;it had to be successful .

3 conditions were needed for a successful short campaign and as there were no proofs for success or for failure, the OKH started from the principe that everything that was needed for a success,would happen .
First : the Red Army would go to the border and accept the battle : there was no proof at all that this would happen,but as it was necessary,every one assumed that it would happen ;when it happened Halder was very relieved in his diary .
Second : the Soviet Army would be defeated because it was very weaken : there was no proof for this,but every one assumed that it would happen .
Third : after the destruction of the Red Army on the border,the SU could not mobilize additional forces,and the regime would collaps : here again,there was no proof ,but as it was necessary for victory, it had to happen .

The decision and planning of the attack did not happen in function of the available informations,but the informations were of little account,there were no informations about the 3 conditions needed to succeed, nobody falsified them, but nobody searched for them,because the decision was already taken .The informations had to justify the decision,as they couldn't do it;nobody cared about them . There were no informations saying that it was possible and no informations saying it was not possible . Thus the informations were useless .

I do not agree with your basic assumption that Hitler perceived a prolonged war with the SU as unwinnable and that consequently all planning had to be based on an assumption of a short victorious war irrespective of any evidence one way or the other.
Even at the time, Barbarossa must have been seen as a massive gamble. But Hitler was a gambler on a roll with a sense of manifest destiny and with a huge potential prize up for grabs. Irrespective of what he subsequently told Mannerheim, my sense is that even if he had had a clearer picture of the Red Army’s size and dispositions in the spring of ’41 his contempt for its quality of leadership and the perceived combat effectiveness of its formations would have remained unchanged, and he would have invaded anyway, though perhaps with a different operational plan based on a longer-term campaign and with a refocussing of resources on the longer-term needs of the army. I also doubt that Hitler would have been much interested in an economic cost-benefit analysis of what a prolonged campaign might imply.
However, what OKW/OKH was asked to do was base a plan on what was known and what might be reasonably assumed about the disposition and combat capability of the Red Army. You have offered no evidence that they did otherwise.
Your '3 conditions for a successful short campaign' seem highly simplistic, but taking them in turn:

“First : the Red Army would go to the border and accept the battle : there was no proof at all that this would happen”
But for the armies west of the DD line (the only ones the Germans had information about) that is pretty much what did happen.

“Second : the Soviet Army would be defeated because it was very weaken : there was no proof for this”
Proof, no. But there were indications from the Polish campaign and the Winter War, and for the armies west of the DD line, defeated they pretty much were.

“Third : after the destruction of the Red Army on the border,the SU could not mobilize additional forces,and the regime would collaps :” This was the key flawed assumption of the plan. (Which is not to suggest that an alternative plan would necessary have been a whole lot more successful.)

As I previously stated, you [ljadw] paraphrase rather than quote, thus twisting the original text to meet your agenda. All you've proven so far by your well known debate tactics is that your logic is trash and your agenda false.
No one is buying what you're selling.

Well, let's hope not.

[ljadw]

1) Most of the Soviet forces were located east of the DD line ,and for the Germans it was imperative that they would go west, but nothing was certain ,that's why Halder was relieved when this happened. First gamble.

2) The Germans had no notion at all how weak the Soviet Army was : it collapsed immediately,the vaunted Tank Crps broke down without having seen a German . Second gamble .

3) If the Soviets could continue the war east of the DD line, it was over for the Germans . Third gamble .

Everything on German side was based on these 3 gambles:if ONE of them proved to be wrong, the Germans could close the books .

The OKH was asked to make a plan based on what was ASSUMED about the disposition and combat capability of the Red Army :assumptions areguesses, and the whole thing was a gamble, not because intelligence was failing (it was failing) but because failure or success of intelligence played no role . Barbarossa could only succeed if ALL three conditions were fulfilled ,and thus the success depended totally on what the Soviets could and would do : the Germans had no influence at all on these conditions,they could only hope that what was needed would happen . An other planning would change nothing .
Reality is that the Germans had no influence on the outcome of Barbarossa .

[ljadw]

More info on the German effort to gather information on the SU prior to Barbarossa:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_and_ ... telligence

500 aerial reconnaissance flights over 10 months revealed a very accurate picture of Soviet forces up to a depth of 500 km (Smolensk).

No : they did not ,because they could not reveal how weak were the Soviets .

[Appleknocker27]

More info on the German effort to gather information on the SU prior to Barbarossa:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_and_ ... telligence

500 aerial reconnaissance flights over 10 months revealed a very accurate picture of Soviet forces up to a depth of 500 km (Smolensk).

No : they did not ,because they could not reveal how weak were the Soviets .

So, you didn't bother to read the link (as usual)?

The Germans had a high degree of accuracy in knowing how many troops, aircraft and the locations of their concentrations and airfields. Its a fact.
It is also a fact that German assumptions regarding Soviet force generation and industrial potential were way off (as I stated pages ago). Putting those 2 together you end up with the operational plan for Barbarossa, in which the Wehrmacht destroyed the Red Army in the Western Districts as planned and then ran up against unforeseen reserves (after which the campaign was pure improvisation, as I stated many times).

To further demolish your foolish argument:
"German strategic planning for the invasion of the Soviet Union, which was referred to under the code names Otto, Fritz, and finally, Barbarossa, began in early July 1940, or shortly after the fall of France{1}. It is unclear exactly when Hitler decided to wage war against the USSR, but it can be said that by July 21, 1940, the German army was committed to finding a military solution for the growing series of problems posed by the Soviet Union{2}. On this date. Hitler held a conference with his service chiefs Brauchitsch (army), Jeschonnek (Goring's representative from the Luftwaffe), Raeder (navy), Keitel, and Jodi (Armed Forces High Command, or OKW) in attendance. During this conference the general framework was established for a future eastern campaign."

"The figures regarding Soviet strength used in the July 21 conference (presumably by Brauchitsch) were provided by Colonel Kinzel's General Staff Intelligence Department (Fremde Heere Ost)"

Can you read that aloud to yourself???

The final step in making the Soviet Union a military target was taken by Hitler at a conference with the OKH and OKW staffs at his palatial Berghof command post high in the Bavarian Alps on July 31, 1940. "
http://militera.lib.ru/h/fugate/02.html

You understand this timeline, no? 21 July is BEFORE 31 July. Admit your error.

[Appleknocker27]

More info on the German effort to gather information on the SU prior to Barbarossa:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_and_ ... telligence

500 aerial reconnaissance flights over 10 months revealed a very accurate picture of Soviet forces up to a depth of 500 km (Smolensk).

No : they did not ,because they could not reveal how weak were the Soviets .

"In general[edit]

The Luftwaffe's general picture of the VVS was entirely correct in many aspects in the military field; this was later confirmed in the early stages of Barbarossa and in post-war British and American studies, and also in the Eastern Bloc. Soviet sources confirm that the VVS was in a state of reorganisation before the attack, and were retraining on modern machines which made it unready for a major conflict. The deductions about Soviet tactical-operational limitations were to a large degree, accurate. In aircraft types, equipment and training, ground organisation, supply system at the operational level, the dispersal of effort and the operational commands immobility, gave the impression of an air force with limited striking power."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_and_ ... ganisation

The Wehrmacht was also similarly correct in its general picture of the Red Army in the Western Districts.