Can't but quote here what Carl O. Nordling has written on his site. The text is quite long, but I hope people read it through anyway. The part about the Hanko base especially. Note that Finland was willing to cede the southernmost tip of the Suursaari Island (and IIRC was ready to cede it all had Stalin dropped the idea of a base at the Finnish shoreline).
The Cape Porkkala, to which Nordling refers to, is the cape west of Helsinki, which in the map (
http://www.winterwar.com/other/History/HankoDemands.gif) has the coastal fort "Mäkiluoto" at its tip.
The text comes from Nordlings site :
http://home.swipnet.se/nordling/StalinFin.html
"On 5 October 1939 Molotov sent an invitation to Finland's foreign minister, Mr. Eljas Erkko, to come to Moscow for the discussion of "certain political questions". Molotov required an answer within 48 hours. Erkko was late answering and did not go to Moscow. Instead he sent the 69-year-old diplomat, Mr. Juho Kusti Paasikivi to carry out the discussions with Mr. Molotov. Soon it became clear that Stalin wanted Finland to give up part of her territory on the Karelian Isthmus and to cede the Hangö Peninsula as a naval base to the Soviet Union. He was cautious enough to offer Finland territorial compensation (in eastern Karelia) for these claims. With these precautions Stalin must have hoped to get at least much of the proposed concessions from Finland.
The ostensible reasons given by Stalin for the demands on Finland were:
(a) Securing the safety of Leningrad;
(b) Becoming satisfied that Finland will have firm, friendly relations with the USSR.
These reasons are legitimate enough. Every government should, of course, try to secure the safety of the biggest cities in the country. Also, the government of any state, big or small, should pursue friendly relations with all neighboring nations.
Therefore, let us consider what should a considerate leader have done in order to achieve the two ends stated by Stalin.
Leningrad's northern defense line (on the Karelian Isthmus) was short and strong--, as subsequent events were to prove--and Stalin certainly knew that. The safety of Leningrad was, however, to a certain degree dependent on the safety of the Red Banner Fleet (the Baltic section of the Navy). If an enemy should at some time dominate the main part of the Gulf of Finland, the Fleet would be more or less confined to its base at Kronshtadt off Leningrad. (This actually happened within two months of the German attack in 1941.) There the warships would become attractive targets for air attacks and, if it came to the worst, also for field artillery. Therefore, the military safety of the Fleet and of Leningrad would have been enhanced if the Soviet Union were able to shut out enemy warships from a large part of the Gulf of Finland. In order to accomplish this, it would be necessary to block the passage through the Gulf by means of mine fields and anti-submarine nets. To be effective, such nets and mine fields would have to be defended by land-based batteries that could sink any number of minesweepers. The batteries in turn would have to be able to defend themselves against attack from the sea, from the air and from the ground.
There exists just one spot in the Gulf of Finland where such mine fields and defending batteries could be located in order to block the main part of the Gulf from outside penetration. This is the area between the island of Naissaar off Estonia and the group of small islands off the Porkkala Promontory on the Finnish side. (Map 1.) The open space is just 37 kilometers (km) wide at that spot, and thus a minefield could have been defended by forts on each side armed with 6-inch guns (a very common type of the period), which had a firing range of 18 km. A single battery of 10-inch guns on Naissaar would have covered the middle part of the water space and another of 16-inch guns with a range of about 50 km placed on the same island could have defended both forts against battleships. Since the fort islands would have been separated by more than 1,000 meters (m) of water from the mainland and from other islands, the defense against overland attacks would not have been much of a problem. The conditions for building harbors and airfields for maintenance transports are favorable in both places.
A certain advantage of the Porkkala-Naissaar defense line is the possibility of using fire control towers not exceeding 28 m in height in order to cover the space of water between the forts. Even though a sleight haze is common in these waters, the visibility seldom falls below 18 km. Since the Soviet Union did not have access to any kind of radar at the time, these circumstances were important when selecting the place for a barrier across the Gulf.
As a matter of fact, the German and Finnish naval forces succeeded in locking up the Red Banner Fleet during a large part of World War II by means of a barrier in the Porkkala-Naissaar position. Incidentally, 22 years before, two czarist forts placed precisely in this position had guarded the Gulf of Finland (as parts of the so-called Peter the Great Sea Fortress). There had been a 10-inch battery on either side.11
Stalin, however, had acquired a base at Paldiski on the Estonian coast and followed suite by demanding that Finland lease the Hangö Peninsula (with adjacent islands) 76 km opposite Paldiski. Without radar there were no practical possibilities to keep this stretch of water under surveillance from the bases at each end, not even under optimum weather conditions. In order to keep mine fields safe from enemy sweepers, warships or airplanes would have been needed to patrol the waters day and night. Thus the barrier would have been almost as effective whether or not it contained batteries at Hangö. We may note in this connection that the British did not succeed in stopping or sinking the two German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the cruiser Prinz Eugen when they passed through the Channel on 12 February 1942. The width of the Channel is 34 km at its narrowest point, i.e., at Dover, where the British then controlled the passage with radar and long range artillery.
Any competent naval officer could have informed Stalin of the worthlessness of the Hangö-Paldiski barrier. Stalin probably realized this himself, since it is known that he amazed government officials and generals with his knowledge about things like tanks, airplanes and cannons.12 And at the end of July 1939, Zhdanov, the architect of the German Pact, had invited Admiral Kuznetsov for a brief cruise in the Baltic. During this cruise the two senior commanders, L.M. Galler and N.N. Nesvitsky (who had served in the Imperial Navy in World War I), pointed out to Zhdanov "the area in which mine fields had been laid down in 1914, from the island of Naissaar off Estonia to the Porkkala Peninsula in Finland".13 These mine fields had actually, as intended, barred German access to the Russian base at Kronshtadt during the entire World War I. In the summers of 1943 and 1944 the Germans were able to keep even Soviet submarines from passing the Porkkala-Naissaar barrier (by means of deep and double wire netting).14
If Stalin and Zhdanov had intended the claims on Estonia and Finland as a means of improving the defense of Leningrad and Kronshtadt, they could not have afforded to miss such an opportunity as the Porkkala-Naissaar line. They would rather have given up all other claims in order to convince the respective governments of the utmost importance of these bases for the Soviet Union.
It seems, however, that during the protracted and difficult negotiations between the Soviet Union and Finland, Naissaar and Porkkala were mentioned just once, on 14 October 1939. Stalin then said that Czarist Russia had possessed 12-inch guns at these spots. He went on to say: "we don't ask for Porkkala, nor for Naissaar, since these places are too close to the capitals of Finland and Estonia, respectively. […] It is a law of naval strategy that passage into the Gulf of Finland can be blocked by the cross fire of batteries on both shores as far out as the mouth of the Gulf".15
The truth is that a flotilla of small minesweepers could easily operate in the middle of a minefield between Hangö and Paldiski--or anywhere else at the mouth of the Gulf. Battleships and heavy cruisers could then have made a successful dash into the Gulf, just as demonstrated by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau on 12 February 1942. As it happened, the Paldiski base, as situated on the mainland, had to be abandoned when German ground forces approached it less than a month after the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. The fact that the Hangö base held on for another four months made no difference for the defense of Leningrad.
It is obvious that Stalin did not speak the truth when he explained the reasons for his claims to the Finnish delegation on 14 October 1939. Most certainly he knew that the Gulf of Finland could not be effectively blocked by means of the bases he claimed. He also deliberately forwent the existing possibility to create an effective barrier across the Gulf.
Instead Stalin insisted on Hangö, the port and the peninsula, and certainly he had some good reason for wanting these objects. Let us consider the military value of Hangö. Its harbor was excellent for ships of all drafts, free from ice in practically all winters, and equipped with 1,500 m of quays, with warehouses, cranes, railroads etc. The town had 7,000 inhabitants (all of whom were expected to move from their homes in case of cession) and could thus easily accommodate 25,000 troops or more. In April 1918 a German division landed at Hangö and advanced along the railroad and the highway taking Helsinki on the tenth day. If Stalin planned to invade Finland, Hangö would have proved an ideal bridgehead for a couple of armored divisions attacking the Finnish army in the rear. And when Stalin finally got the coveted peninsula after the Winter War, he equipped it with much more mobile than stationary artillery. The former included three 12-inch guns (with a range of 50 km), four 7-inch guns and three 4-inch guns, all mounted on flatcars.16 The latter (coast artillery proper) consisted of thirteen 5-inch guns. This means that one volley from the mobile batteries weighed about five times as much as one volley from the stationary batteries. Apparently about 80 percent of the total firepower was thus intended for use along some stretch of railroad! In comparison with Hangö, the Porkkala skerries were totally unusable as a takeoff for an invasion. Even the Porkkala Peninsula lacked a harbor and railroads, and could therefore not have served as a springboard for a swift advance toward Helsinki. Instead, the 12-inch mobile guns at Hangö could have begun bombarding Helsinki after having advanced just half way along the Hangö-Helsinki railroad.
Stalin's claims concerning the areas adjacent to the Soviet border on the Karelian Isthmus were of the same nature as those concerning Hangö. Besides removing the border 30 to 40 km from the Gulf of Kronshtadt along its entire length, they included Berezoviy Island with its fort and part of the peninsula of Primorsk, both areas about 100 km from Leningrad and 65 km from Kronshtadt. (Map 2.) Part of Finland's main defense line, the so-called Mannerheim Line, run through the claimed area, and would have been chopped off if the claims had been accepted. Even more important was the fact that the claimed areas included the artillery forts of Saarenpää (six 10-inch guns with a range of 23 km) and Humaljoki (six 6-inch guns, range 18 km). These forts could not interfere with the traffic on the Gulf of Kronshtadt fairway, but they could give badly needed artillery support to the troops defending the right flank of the Mannerheim Line. (Deficient artillery power proved to be the weakest point of the Finnish defense system in the 1939-40 war.) Giving up these forts and part of the Mannerheim line would have been tantamount to giving up most of the Karelian Isthmus right from the beginning of a defensive war. On the other hand it is obvious that both forts would have been completely useless for any enemy attempting to invade the Soviet Union by way of the Isthmus. From a military point of view it would have been reasonable to ask for a strip of land along the northern coast of the Gulf of Kronshtadt. By insisting on Berezoviy Island and on part of the Mannerheim line to the very end of the negotiations, Stalin revealed that he wanted to break up the Finnish defense and place the Government of Finland in a position of Soviet dependency.
The idea of dependency based on fear of reprisals seems to have been Stalin's notion of the state of "friendly relations" that he wanted to exist between Finland and the Soviet Union. And as much as Stalin was willing to bargain about territorial details, as much he was determined to get the idea of dependency through. Therefore, in addition to all the claims ostensibly motivated by some kind of "military necessity" (that might have been mistaken for something that he really thought was necessary), Stalin included just one little claim not motivated in this way. He asked that Finland cede her part of the "Fisherman's Peninsula" (Rybachiy) on the Arctic coast. This peninsula has four bays, two on either side, and the frontier was drawn in such a way that the Soviet Union had got two bays and Finland two--all very good fishing grounds. This part of the Finno-Soviet border had been agreed upon less than 20 years before, i.e., it derived its origin from the peace negotiations with Lenin's Government in 1920. Stalin had been People's Commissar for Nationalities in this Government and the Finnish delegates discussing Stalin's claims had also taken part in the 1920 negotiations. Therefore both Stalin and the Finns knew perfectly well the real reason of the exact position of this stump of the frontier--which was, of course, to grant fair fishing possibilities to both countries. Now Stalin wrote in the Soviet Memorandum of 14 October 1939: "A separate question arises with regard to the Fisherman's Peninsula in Petsamo, where the frontier is unskillfully [!] drawn and has to be adjusted in accordance with the annexed map".17 If Finland had accepted this obviously false motivation and ceded her part of the Peninsula, it would have been tantamount to saying: "We don't dare oppose you; if you do wrong, we will call it right and pretend that we believe it to be right." Such was the conduct Stalin wanted from a government he would call having "firm, friendly relations with the Soviet Union".
A sensible leader of a great power would certainly have been able, in the circumstances, to acquire friendly relations with Finland in the normal meaning of the word. First he would have refrained from territorial claims other than those required for establishing an island-based barrage across the Gulf of Finland and a protected fairway through the Gulf of Kronshtadt. Then he could have encouraged Finland to sign a defense treaty with Sweden and given his blessing to a joint Finno-Swedish fortification of Åland (which would have barred foreign warships from entering the Gulf of Bothnia). And the ruthless Stalin could have done even more to make the Finnish Government feel safe and friendly toward him. Just as he had dismissed Maksim Litvinov to placate Hitler and had liquidated thousands of officers for the same or other reasons, he could have liquidated the Finnish Communist leaders Otto Kuusinen and Tuure Lehén or turned them over to the Finnish authorities for prosecution.
By insisting on claims that were utterly harmful to the defense of Finland Stalin did not obtain firm and friendly relations with Finland. Instead the Finnish Government became even more wary and offered only very limited cessions in exchange for territorial compensation. Stalin then decided to create "friendly relations" in his own way and attacked Finland along the entire frontier with his Army, Navy and Air Force, on 30 November 1939.
The Finnish Government never analyzed Stalin's behavior to the extent that has been done above. They did not quite realize the absurdity of Hangö as a barrage base. But they happened to draw the right conclusions, anyhow. They thought it would be dangerous to give Stalin the little finger (e.g., Hangö or any adjacent island) lest he should take the hand. The Baltic States, Churchill and Roosevelt were later to learn this truth the hard way.
A couple of weeks before the attack, on 13 November 1939, the very day when the Finnish delegation went back home, Otto Kuusinen and Comintern Secretary-General Georgi Dimitrov sent a letter to Arvo Tuominen in Stockholm ordering him to return immediately to Moscow. A commission involving great responsibility was awaiting him there, so they said. In another letter Tuominen was told that the commission would be connected with a new arrangement of the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union. Tuominen did not go. He defected publicly from Stalin and from Bolshevism.18 This was another disappointment to Stalin. If Tuominen had been in Moscow in November 1939, he would not have been able to refuse the commission as Prime Minister in a Soviet Government of Finland, the government that Stalin would set up after having conquered the first square kilometer of Finnish territory.19 In the actual situation, it was obviously a disadvantage to have Tuominen in Stockholm instead of Moscow. Therefore, we can rest assured that Stalin had originally planned the whole advance on Finland otherwise than it turned out. President Paasikivi later testified that "judging from the discussion at the last conference it looks like Stalin was disposed to reach an amicable settlement".20
The Soviet treatment of Lithuania gives an idea of what kind of amicable settlement Stalin had in mind for Finland. Lithuania was given large areas in exchange for a treaty that granted the stationing of 20,000 Soviet troops at certain bases on Lithuanian territory. The local authorities had no means to check the number of troops actually entering the bases. On 7 June 1940 Molotov demanded the dismissal of Lithuania's Minister of the Interior and on 14 June he presented Lithuania with an ultimatum, demanding a new government, one that would "possess the confidence of the Soviet Union". Molotov rejected President Smetona's proposal to nominate the new Prime Minister and made sure that some Lithuanian Communist like Tuominen got the office.21 Had an "amicable settlement" of this type been arranged with Finland, Arvo Tuominen could have arrived from Stockholm and taken over the office of Prime Minister, looking as if he had nothing to do with Moscow at all."
Cheers,
Sami
by Topspeed on 16 Aug 2004 11:05 
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