Proof of Einsatzgruppen

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WalterS
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#46

Post by WalterS » 23 Sep 2004, 05:43

Michael Mills wrote:
Further to my previous message, I am posting for the information of those interested a copy of a comment I prepared for David Irving in the context of his court action against Penguin Books.
Readers should remember that Irving lost decisively in his attempt to silence his critics. He was proven to be a liar, a fraud, a disreputable historian, an anti-Semite, a Nazi apologist and a Holocaust denier.
They [Einsatzgruppen] were given orders to take executive action against a number of specifically defined categories of persons
"Executive action" is code for murder.


Michael Mills also wrote:
My interpretation of this memo is that Einsatzgruppe A would continue with the exterminatory actions directed against the communist apparatus, in accordance with the orders issued to the Einsatzgruppen by Heydrich, which included the killing of the Jewish intelligentsia and Jewish men of military age
Even Mr Mills can't avoid a derivative of the word "extermination" when discussing the Einsatzgruppen. What Mr Mills is attempting to do is to cloud the issue with semantics and word-smithing. He is trying to have you believe that the Germans were only interested in murdering suspected Bolsheviks (without trial of course) and in murdering educated Jews (without trial of course) and in murdering all Jewish men of military age (without trial of course). His argument is that that was OK and it wasn't genocide because they didn't try to murder every single Jew. Mr Mills's posts are full of Orwellian doublespeak where up means down and yes means no. I caution readers of this forum to read his posts very carefully and with a great deal of skepticism.

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#47

Post by michael mills » 23 Sep 2004, 08:02

I advise members of this forum not to read the posts of WalterS at all.

They do not contain any useful information, simply polemics against other posters, and hence are a waste of time.


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#48

Post by WalterS » 23 Sep 2004, 08:11

Please notice that Mr Mills, once again, dodged the main issues. He admitted that the Einsatzgruppen engaged in "extermination," but his clumsy attempts to justify this have fallen flat, and merely served to expose his pro-Nazi bias. Remember that Mr Mills seriously argued in another thread that the Wannsee conference was called merely to establish Jewish camps on the White Sea. That's all. Just camps.

Mr Mills's intellectual dishonesty has shone through once again.

Please also note that I did not advocate that readers of this forum should NOT read Mr Mills's posts. I merely stated that readers should view his posts with skepticism. Contrast that, if you will, with Mr Mills's Irving-like response which was to advocate the silencing of his critics.

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#49

Post by michael mills » 23 Sep 2004, 08:57

Since WalterS has chosen to bring up the proposed deportation of Jews to camps in the White Sea region, I will draw readers' attention to this quote from the book "Heydrich: The Pursuit of Total Power", by Günther Deschner (Orbis Publishing, London, 1981).

Page 176:
In the summer of 1941, as an interim solution, the concentration of the Jews in Russia, which it was believed would shortly be conquered, was openly under discussion. And on February 4 1942 Heydrich himself was still making final reference to this plan. In a secret confidential address to the heads of the Security Police in Prague he touched on the Final Solution - without the constraint of propagandist considerations or camouflage. 'In the future development of the polar region' he argued, 'where the concentration camps will henceforth make an ideal homeland for Europe's eleven million Jews', efficient Czech skilled workers who 'cannot be Germanised', and whom he wishes to evacuate from Bohemia and Moravia, might perhaps be employed 'as foremen and overseers, etc., provided they show positive evidence of a pro-German tendency'.
Note the figure of eleven million Jews, the same grossly exaggerated number that appears in the protocol of the Wannsee Conference, which had taken place only two weeks previously. It is proof positive that Heydrich was talking about the same group of people, and that the plan revealed by Heydrich to the assembled State Secretaries at the conference was for the deportation of the Jews of Europe to concentration camps in the White Sea area.

Page 231-2:
After Heydrich had rendered the protectorate 'free of Jews', he would go on to rid it of the remaining Czechs. For them too he had in mind, in February 1942 - about a fortnight after the Wannsee Conference - a suitable settlement area. In confidence he told his staff what would happen to the Jews. They were to open up the Arctic Ocean area [Note by me: This is a mistake by the translator - the German "Eismeer" denotes the White Sea, not the Arctic Ocean] ('where the concentration camps will later on provide a perfect homeland for the eleven million Jews of Europe'). That was also where he would have liked to send the residual Czechs at the end of the war, 'with a positive mission, a pro-German task'. He planned to use the well-trained Czech craftsmen as foremen or overseers, 'with the opportunity of bringing their families out later'. He did not mean this at all cynically. He spoke at length about the prospects of this area. The Arctic territory [note by me ; actually "White Sea territory"] was by no means as barren as people thought. Certainly it had a long winter, but also 'very good intensive agriculture and an excellent basis of raw materials'. From enquiries made by the Security Police in Russia it had been noted that the Arctic area had become practically self-sufficient agriculturally in the last few years and was no longer dependent on supplies from the Ukraine.
I trust readers will note the difference between my posts, based on solid historical data, and the emotional outbursts of a WalterS.

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#50

Post by Topspeed » 23 Sep 2004, 09:31

The problem for them would have been how to conquer White Sea area. Finns had to order 2 battallions to help Nord troops because they had no combat experience. Also 163. Division that was fighting close to finns in Carelia was reinforced with finns since their advance in that area was less than satisfactory.

I doubt the german troopers never even saw the White Sea where one of liguistically related finnish-karelian tribe lived. White Sea area was famous for its archipelago of Gulags in USSR.

WalterS is clearly annoyed for the extence of your detailed information mr.Mills.

I am also of the opinion that the poor advance of the germans in new terrain in Karelia and Kola and over all defeat in Leningrad and Stalingrad meant that no asylym for jews was available and because of shortage of food and medication etc. caused the hoffifying enormity of the holocaust. Of course also each ss-leader did they own decicions. Also the allied bombings made KZ-camps imates life difficult as can be read here:
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?la ... d=10005337

As far as I know the BARBAROSSA was supposed to be over and done in 1941, but soviets proved to be more battle hardened than germans ever expected. Possibly because the march to conquer countries in Europe had been too easy for nazis they expected USSR to be even easier "snack". Possibly also the miracle of Finlands Winter War gave a wrong idea for the germans. It is also possible like Göring had expressed that USSR only fought a fake war against finns and was actually preparing hectically for the confrontation against nazi Germany. Winter in Russia was a catastrofy for Wehrmacht. As Hitler in June 4th 1942 in Finland-visit expressed: " Our tanks and equipment are made for good weather conditions and unfortunately are not fit for winter operations."

Just my two cents in the matter,

rgds,

Juke
Last edited by Topspeed on 23 Sep 2004, 09:48, edited 1 time in total.

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#51

Post by WalterS » 23 Sep 2004, 17:10

Once again, Mr Mills indulges in misrepresentation. The entire discussion about Mr Mills's White Sea fantasy can be found at

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... c&start=15

I brought this up not to re-argue an argument that Mr Mills already lost, but to point out to readers his penchant for misrepresentation and denial of facts that don't support his views. We see that here in the discussion of the Einsatzgruppen. Mr David Thompson and others have quoted many sources which show that the primary purpose of the Einsatzgruppen was "to kill Jews and sieze their property." Mr Mills would have us believe that their purpose was rather benign and that they only carried out "executive action" against commies and intelligent Jews.

Notice Mr Mills's use of euphemisms such as "executive action," which is code for murder. It reminds one of the notes of the Wannsee Conference where "evacuation" was code for extermination.

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#52

Post by Marcus » 23 Sep 2004, 17:26

A post by Topspeed that was not on topic in this thread was removed.

/Marcus

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#53

Post by paul 278 » 24 Sep 2004, 05:58

I know i said i wasnt going to reply further to this thread, because i thought it was degenerating, but I must say that some very useful infomation has been posted to further my knowledge of Einsatzgruppe.

What I have learn is:

1.
That there is alot more to this subjects than meets the eye...........I now feel that Einsatzgruppen sole purpose was not to just kill people, I actually allways beleieved that all they did was kill people!!

2.
I now find that there there is alot more infomation out there to study than i first thought, I noticed that some members depth of knowledge was quite incrediable, much so that I really dont have the time at the moment to get into such depth to debate it further point for point, although i would like too........maybe when i know more....

3.
The hostility that some members showed me on my first post here, which was quite disturbing, for I find it hard to understand the motivations behind being so biased (like were your family members killed by EG's or something)
It seems like this group does not appreciate the need to depth for reasearch or respectful debate of opinions, yet the moderators put up with this behaviour which is also questioable.


4. Having said all that , does anybody actually know anyone who was known somebody who was in a Einsatzgruppe , or is it , it seems a very touchy subject as they may get hunted down............ Or have there ever been any books published by former members of Einsatzgruppen which seem realistic............... A book which is maybe more biased towards security work instead of killling stuff ?

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#54

Post by ajk74 » 24 Sep 2004, 06:39

I would agree that it is unlikely that by August 6, Stahlecker was aware of a general directive for extermination. Such complete directives were given gradually, although I would contend the EG were charged with evaluating possibilities for solving the Jewish question, and ultimately were encouraged or permitted to use murder as a primary means. However, are you suggesting the "radical solution" that had for the first time become possible in the east was deportation? Taking all the evidence into consideration, he was most likely given some general task regarding the Jews around the outset of the campaign, and then the directives were expanded and harsher methods were encouraged. Internment and murder were the primary means and murder was increasingly used as 1941 progressed. They were clearly given the task of using various means for cleansing the territories of Jews and the wartime reports make that abundantly clear.
"The instructions that were not to be put into writing might well have been an unofficial assurance from Himmler that his men, the police, could act on their own authority and ignore the civilian authorities, Rosenberg’s men; that is something that he would not have wanted to put into writing at this early stage. "
How did the draft touch upon these issues? Browning in fact interprets Stahlecker's comments as a hoped for authority to proceed with harsher methods against the Jews.

In Stahlecker's later directives,
Stahlecker intended to take control of the ghettoisation of the surviving Jews planned by Lohse.
How do the "measures totally different" from those planned by Lohse refer to Stahlecker taking over the ghettos? "ganz anderen Mitteln" doubtful refers to jurisdiction over the ghettos.


Later on, Stahlecker stated what the conflict with Lohse was about. October 15 1941 Gesamtbericht: "Erwähnt sei in diesem Zusammenhang noch der stellenweise erhebliche Widerstand der Dienstellen der Zivilverwaltung gegen die Durchführung von Exekutionen grösseren Umfanges, denen überall mit dem Hinweis darauf, dass es sich um die Durchführung grundsätzlicher Befehle handele, entgegengetreten wurde."[/quote] The authenticity of this document was confirmed by Tschierschky, who worked on it.

The Oct. 15 report also states: "Es war von vornherein zu erwarten, dass allein durch Progrome [sic.] das Judenproblem im Ostlande nicht gelöst werden würde. Andererseits hatte die sicherheitspolizei Säuberungsarbeit gemäss den grundsätzlichen Befehlen eine möglichst umfassende Beseitigung der Juden zum Ziel." I would agree with Streim that they were not ordered to shoot all Jews at the outset, and that this report contained some hindsight perspective, but it clearly states that 'solving the Jewish problem' was one of their tasks

"Befehlsgemäss war die Sicherheitspolizei entschlossen, die Judenfrage" mit allen Mitteln und aller Entscheidenheit zu lösen."

"Schon nach Durchführung der ersten grösseren Exekutionen in Litauen und Lettland zeigte es sich, dass eine restlose Beseitigung der Juden nicht durchführbar ist, zumindest nicht im jetzigen Zeitpunkt."
On page 21, the report mentions the "gesteckte Säuberungsziel" to be achieved "so schnell wie möglich."

The February 1942 report states: "Die systematische Säuberungsarbeit im Ostland umfasste gemäss den grundsätzlichen Befehlen die möglichst restlose Beseitigung des Judentums. Dieses Ziel ist mit Ausnahme von Weissruthenien im wesentlichen durch die Exekutionen von bislang 229 052 Juden erreicht."

The Jäger Report of December 1 1941 stated: "Ich kann heute feststellen, dass das Ziel, das Judenproblem für Litauen zu lösen, vom EK. 3 erreicht worden ist. In Litauen gibt es keine Juden mehr, ausser den Arbeitsjuden incl. ihrer Familien." "Das Ziel, Litauen judenfrei zu machen, konnte nur erreicht werden durch die Aufstellung eines Rollkommandos mit ausgesuchten Männern unter der Führung des SS-Obersturmführers Hamann, der sich meine Ziele voll und ganz aneignete und es verstand, die Zusammenarbeit mit den litauischen Partisanen und den zuständigen zivilen Stellen zu gewährleisten."
All of these quotes can only be understood if the EG understood their tasks as cleansing the territory. Furthermore, the Jäger report also shows the beginning of mass executions of women and children starting in mid-August.

Some random quotes from the Ereignismeldungen detailing their general directives and their program:
EG A in EM 24“Die Aktionen gegen die Juden gehen stärker weiter […] Die jüdischen Familien werden durch die Lettern aus der Stadt vertreiben, während sie [die Litauer] die Männer festsetzen.”

EG D in EM 28, July 29 “In Shitomir gab es ca. 30 000 Juden, d.h. etwas mehr als 30% der Gesamtbevölkerung. Der weitaus grössere Teil von ihnen ist vor der Besetzung durch deutsche Truppen geflüchtet. Nach vorsichtigen Schätzungen befinden sich zur Zeit noch etwa 5 000 Juden (9% der Gesamtbervölkerung) in Shitomir. Viele Juden, insbesondere die Intelligenzschicht, betätigen sich weitgehendst als Zuträger und Angeber des NKWD.” They must have considered it important to report on the Jewish situation, and despite linking them to bolshevism, they are not synonymous. As time went on, less mention is made of Jews being shot on as communists or saboteurs.
EG C in EM 97 “Angeblich 150 000 Juden vorhanden. überprüfung dieser Angaben noch nicht möglich. Bei erster Aktion 1 600 Festnahmen, Maßnahmen eingeleitet zur Erfassung des gesamten Judentums, Exekution von mindestens 50 000 Juden vorgesehen. Wehrmacht begrüßt Maßnahmen und erbittet radikales Vorgehen.”
“Das Sonderkommando 4a hat in Zusammenarbeit mit Gruppenstab und zwei Kommandos des Polizei-Regiments Süd am 29. und 30.9.41 in Kiew 33.771 Juden exekutiert.”

EG B in EM 32 of July 23 “Eine Lösung der Judenfrage während des Krieges erscheint in diesem Raum undurchführbar, da sie bei der übergroßen Zahl der Juden [ca. 500 000] nur durch Aussiedlung erreicht werden kann.” This statement indicates Nebe was thinking not only of the Jewish question being solved during the war, but by saying it could only be solved by post-war deportation implies some other partial means were also envisaged during the war.

EG D in EM 63 of August 25 “Auch die Lösung der Judenfrage als eines der wichtigsten Probleme ist bereits, wenn auch zögernd, in Angriff genommen." Because the passage goes on to discuss work details also, obviously shooting all Jews immediately was not a foregone conclusion. The EG had some degree of latitude.

EM 86 EG C “Es gibt nur die eine Möglichkeit, die die deutsche Verwaltung im Generalgouvernement lange Zeit verkannt hat: Lösung der Judenfrage durch umfassenden Arbeitseinsatz der Juden. Das würde eine allmähliche Liquidierung des Judentums zur Folge haben – eine Entwicklung, die den wirtschaftlichen Gegebenheiten des Landes entspricht”. This suggestion would only have been made if murder was generally expected and a general destruction order was not a foregone conclusion, i.e. a strict, binding order.

EG D in EM 117: “Die von Kommandos neu besetzten Räume wurden judenfrei gemacht. In Berichtszeit wurden 4 891 Juden und 46 Kommunisten exekutiert. Gesamtzahl 40 699.”

EG C in EM 128 of November 1941: “Wenn auch bis jetzt auf diese Weise insgesamt etwa 75 000 Juden liquidiert worden sind, so besteht doch schon heute Klarheit darüber, dass damit eine Lösung des Judenproblems nicht möglich sein wird. Es ist zwar gelungen, vor allem in kleineren Städten und auch in den Dörfern eine restlose Bereinigung des Judenproblems herbeizuführen, in grösseren Städten dagegen wird immer die Beobachtung gemacht, dass nach einer solchen Exekution zwar sämtliche Juden verschwunden sind, kehrt aber alsdann nach einer bestimmten Frist ein Kommando nochmals zurück, so wird immer wieder eine Anzahl von Juden festgestellt, die ganz erheblich die Zahl der exekutierten Juden übersteigt.”

Furthermore, because no mention is made of a binding order from above and also indicates a fair degree of initiative, which can only indicate some general directive. But the directive (usually referred to as grundsätzliche Befehle or Weisungen by many documents) was not a simple binding order to shoot all Jews. The suggestions and discussion of other methods in the wartime docs make a binding total order unlikely.

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#55

Post by David Thompson » 24 Sep 2004, 07:28

Interested readers may get additional perspective by looking at the Einsatzgruppe A comprehensive report authored by Stahlecker and covering the period 22 Jun-15 Oct 1941. The report is posted at:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=60197

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#56

Post by David Thompson » 24 Sep 2004, 07:49

paul 278 -- You said:
The hostility that some members showed me on my first post here, which was quite disturbing, for I find it hard to understand the motivations behind being so biased (like were your family members killed by EG's or something)
It seems like this group does not appreciate the need to depth for reasearch or respectful debate of opinions, yet the moderators put up with this behaviour which is also questioable.
You have no apologies coming. Ignorance may be understandable, but self-righteous ignorance is not.

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#57

Post by michael mills » 24 Sep 2004, 10:35

The concept that the EK des CdSPuSD were tasked with solving the Jewish Problem in the Occupied Eastern Territories cannot really be supported.

Such a small force, of which a large component was support personnel such as drivers, interpreters and secretaries, could not possibly cover such a wide area and such a huge population.

What they did do, as part of their intelligence-gathering and security function, was to report on the nature of the "Jewish problem" in the conquered areas, and to suggest solutions.

The "sharp end" of the EG des CdSPuSD, the personnel drawn from the Sipo and seconded from the Schupo, was sufficient to carry out the specific "executive actions" ordered by CdSPuSD, that is the weeding out and summary execution of the nominated categories of enemies, including Jews in high Party and State positions. But it was nowhere near enough to carry out a wholesale extermination.

Where various EK or SK organised large-scale executive actions at particular localities, it was usually in response to requests by other German authorities to achieve a particular purpose in that locality, eg a reprisal in the case of the Kiev massacre. In other localities, large concentrations of Jews were seen as a security risk, or simply too large a burden to look after and feed.

Thus, the reports on the numbers of Jews remaining in various localities occupied, on the huge evacuation of Jews by the Soviet authorities, and on the flight of Jews across the Urals (which is stated to be a major step toward the solution of the problem) are all a product of the intelligence-gathering function.

Stahlecker's memorandum of 6 August 1941 demonstrates that an interim solution of the problem posed by the remaining Jewish population was already envisaged; as he clearly says, it consists of confining the jews on reservations in isolated rural areas and using them for forced labour such as forestry and road-building. Those measures were indeed "totally different" from those planned by Lohse, which involved leaving the Jews of Ostland where they were, in the current urban location, but confining them in ghettos.

Based on the experience gathered, Nebe subsequently reports back to Berlin that the number of Jews remaining in the occupied areas, despite the evacuation of the majority, is still too large to deal with by confining them to reservations of the sort mentioned by Stahlecker. He recommends a post-war resttlement (post-war being early in 1942, according to the German expectations about an early victory), which probably menas expelling the Jewish population across the Urals, to join those already evacuated by the Soviet authorities.

With regard to Stahlecker's reports of October 1941 and february 1942, they need to understood within the context of developing german policy in regard to the future of the Baltic States.

In the immediate aftermath of the precipitate Soviet retreat from Lithuania and Latvia, there was a power vacuum for a week or so, during which period local nationalist groups took control, and carried out reprisal actions against collaborators with the former Soviet regime, and also made moves toward setting up autonomous governments. (Many of the collaborators killed were Jews, but not all).

The German authorities moved swiftly to establish their own firm control, and the local nationalist groups were brought to heel, either dissolved (in some cases arrested) or incorporated into the German administrative structure under close supervision.

In October 1941 and February 1942, Stahlecker wanted to avoid any hint that there was any period, however short, during which he was not in complete control of all security activities in the occupied cities, and during which local groups were able to act on their own initiative. That is why in his reports he claimed that all the pogroms carried out by the local groups were in response to his orders, and in conformity with the "fundamental instructions".

With regard to Jäger and his report, I recommend the following book by Knut Stang:

"Kollaboration und Massenmord : die litauische Hilfspolizei, das Rollkommando Hamann und die Ermordung der litauischen Juden" ( Frankfurt am Main ; New York : P. Lang, c1996).

Stang paints the picture of Jäger as an incompetent who tried to cover his failings and impress his superiors through an excessive concentration on apparent numerical exactitude, which made him a laughing stock to his colleagues.

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#58

Post by David Thompson » 24 Sep 2004, 11:23

Michael -- You said:
Stahlecker's memorandum of 6 August 1941 demonstrates that an interim solution of the problem posed by the remaining Jewish population was already envisaged; as he clearly says, it consists of confining the jews on reservations in isolated rural areas and using them for forced labour such as forestry and road-building. Those measures were indeed "totally different" from those planned by Lohse, which involved leaving the Jews of Ostland where they were, in the current urban location, but confining them in ghettos.
If your point of view is accurate, Stahlecker's report of Einsatzgruppe A's activities between 22 Jun-15 Oct 1941 (posted at:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=60197 ) would have ruined his career, by exposing him as a bungler and a blowhard who, in an official report, claimed a demonstrably false foreknowledge for himself. He would have been the object of ridicule by his fellow Einsatzgruppen commanders and the RSHA. Probably ever one of the 40 recipients of Stahlecker's report would have known he was "puffing," since they'd been following the activities of all of the Einsatzgruppen since Operation Barbarossa began. Once exposed, how much trust would be afterwards reposed in his services? For that reason, I am inclined to take Stahlecker's representations in the comprehensive report as true, and his statements to the contrary as dissimulations meant to deceive those who did not need to know, like Lohse and Kube, who were "out of the loop" as late as Oct 1941. See the thread "Official Resistance to War Crimes" at:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=14313

You also said:
Such a small force, of which a large component was support personnel such as drivers, interpreters and secretaries, could not possibly cover such a wide area and such a huge population. What they did do, as part of their intelligence-gathering and security function, was to report on the nature of the "Jewish problem" in the conquered areas, and to suggest solutions.
(1) It is well-established that Einsatzgruppen units could expect and did receive assistance from Waffen-SS units, police battalions, and SD units, among others. The JuNSV summaries of war crimes charges involving specific Einsatzgruppe massacres show the diversity of units which assisted the Einsatzgruppen in their murder-expeditions. There are a number of easily-checked "click here" references at: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=23398 as well as a table of police battalions participating in mass executions, with dates beginning Jun 1941.

(2) It seems to me that Stahlecker's taking credit for executing 135,567 persons in 3 1/2 months, the overwhelming majority of which were Jews, negates your idea that the task of the Einsatzgruppen "was to report on the nature of the "Jewish problem" in the conquered areas, and to suggest solutions." From Stahlecker's 22 Jun-15 Oct 1941 report, Einsatzgruppe A appears to be implementing pre-determined solutions, not suggesting solutions for future discussion, analysis and decision.

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#59

Post by Topspeed » 24 Sep 2004, 11:54

WalterS wrote:Once again, Mr Mills indulges in misrepresentation. The entire discussion about Mr Mills's White Sea fantasy can be found at

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... c&start=15

Notice Mr Mills's use of euphemisms such as "executive action," which is code for murder. It reminds one of the notes of the Wannsee Conference where "evacuation" was code for extermination.
Well there was in northern Finland was also the SS-group Nord... untrained for combat, what were they doing there ? I heard it consisted of ex-watchmen of KZ-camps.

I wonder if finnish HQ knew anything about Heydrichs plans. I know Himmler made a visit to Finland in 1942. Met also Mannerheim and did not get a change to deport finnish jews. OTOH some say it was minister Tanner that did not give the approval of deporting the finnish jews.

Hmmm...what would the AKS people in Finland have thought if their devoted Eastern-Karelia became the asylym for jews. Pretty bizarre plans and certainly not the promissed land of the bible.

For some reason finns did not advance into White Sea area, but remained in the Olonets Karelia. That is strange because White Sea Karelians actually spoke the same language. Anyway by the 1941 they were all very russianized, altough being finnish-karelians in White Sea area. For instance they did not give shelter for finns escaping from Gulags, but turned them in to NKVD. I just read this recently from a Gulag book.

Maybe mr.Mills's speculation has some ground ?

rgds,

JUke

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#60

Post by Earldor » 24 Sep 2004, 15:18

Topspeed wrote:
WalterS wrote:Once again, Mr Mills indulges in misrepresentation. The entire discussion about Mr Mills's White Sea fantasy can be found at

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... c&start=15

Notice Mr Mills's use of euphemisms such as "executive action," which is code for murder. It reminds one of the notes of the Wannsee Conference where "evacuation" was code for extermination.
Maybe mr.Mills's speculation has some ground ?
Please read the discussion that WalterS was referring to before making such rash judgements.

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