by David Thompson on 01 Oct 2004 17:19 [Complete testimony is recorded in the mimeographed transcript, 10/28-31/1947, 11/3/1947; pp. 5126-5472.]
DR. FRITSCH (counsel for the defendant Rendulic): General, how did your assignment in the northern area come about? I think, to begin with, you were sent to northern Finland. How did that come about?
DEFENDANT RENDULIC: In the spring of 1944, the Finns had entered into negotiations with the Russians, and these negotiations did not lead to any results. In 6/1944, a Russian offensive had started. This had taken place on the southern Finnish frontier along Lake Ladoga and the Finnish border. This offensive had a number of successes in the beginning. The morale in Finland had so far been quite a depressed one, and it was to be expected that the Finns would enter into new negotiations with the Russians. In this situation General Dietl had an airplane accident. Up till then he had been the Commander in Chief of the 20th Mountain Army in Lapland. General Dietl was a personality who was much esteemed in Finland. I believe all this took place on 6/23/1944. During the night, on 6/24/1944, I received the order to report on 6/24/1944 to the Fuehrer's headquarters. On that day I was given the post of the Commander in Chief of the 20th Mountain Army in Lapland.
Q. What was the relation between Germany and Finland at that time?
A. Germany and Finland waged a common war against Russia. The German mountain army and the Finnish Army fought side by side on the Finnish eastern border. In spite of this there was no pact or alliance between these two countries. The two countries only acted out of a common interest against the common enemy on the basis of military agreements.
Q. What was the military situation generally when you arrived in Finland?
A. On a front of about 1200 km. east of the Finnish eastern border there was the 20th Mountain Army from the Arctic Sea toward the middle of Finland, and then came the Finnish Army There was no common leadership. The Finnish Army was led by the Marshal of Finland, Baron von Mannerheim. The front of the mountain army was comparatively quiet.
A war of position of a normal kind was going on here. The army itself was stationed in two large groups, with one corps in the south of Lapland, that is, the middle of Finland; and one corps was on the coast of the Arctic Sea. Between those two large groups there were no other forces. The width and depth of this area was 400 km. and was rocky or jungle-like. For all practical purposes it was not possible to cross it.
Q. Was this question of terrain which you just mentioned of any special significance and importance concerning the battles and the later events?
A. Yes, it was of quite decisive importance. In the whole area of Lapland, that is, the northern part of Finland, and the area of my army, three-fourths of the country was covered with impassable jungles. The area was rocky or swampy. Toward the north, up to the Arctic Sea, there was tundra and entirely rock areas. It was very important, considering the fact that the area was impassable, that there were only very few roads in this area. In Lapland there were, for all practical purposes, only three highways - the so-called Arctic Sea highway which ran from north to south through Lapland and which was about 600 km. long; and in the south of Lapland there were two highways, each of which led to one of the corps stationed there. All these highways met in Rovaniemi in southern Lapland, a locality which is situated near the polar circle; and from there two roads led to the Swedish frontier, to the so-called frontier highway which went along the Swedish frontier to Norway, to the Lyngsfjord.
Q. How did the political situation in Finland develop after all that?
A. At the beginning of 8/1944 the Finnish Government had resigned, and the Finnish President had founded a new government. The head of this government was Mannerheim. This government soon entered into new negotiations with Russia. The Finns loyally informed us of this pact. We expected that this time the negotiations with the Russians would lead to success. We expected that Finland would leave the alliance.
Q. What would be the situation then confronting the 20th Mountain Army?
A. The situation had necessarily to be extremely difficult if one considers the fact that from the Arctic Sea, on the eastern coast of Finland, the front led down to the south and that in the center of Finland the German mountain army was joined by the Finnish Army, then in the event of Finland's leaving the alliance very suddenly a deep, open, uncovered flank would arise, which was 400 km. deep. This would be even more dangerous because the best roads from southern Finland led to the unprotected road junction of Rovaniemi and to the Swedish frontier highway. The loss of Rovaniemi to strong Russian motorized forces and the fact that these forces might reach the Swedish frontier highway, which is the shortest distance to Norway, had to lead to a catastrophe for the mountain army.
Q. Were any provisions prepared for these events and, if so, which ones?
A. Naturally, everything possible was prepared. The proper forces were withdrawn and put up in preparedness. We had to block the roads which led from southern Finland. We had to dynamite all bridges and mine the roads to the greatest possible extent. All this we had to do to prevent, wherever possible, the army breaking into the practically unprotected flank of the army. Of course this could only be prepared in order not to provoke the Finns and also if possible not to provoke the Russians. But it was prepared in the smallest detail.
Q. Now was anything known about the armistice conditions which were to be expected on the basis of the negotiations?
A. No, unfortunately nothing was known about this. We did know, from the negotiations which had taken place earlier, that they had not been successful because of two conditions which the Russians had imposed. The first condition was that the Russians wanted to occupy Finland; the second condition was that the Russians demanded that the Finns were to fight against us. We tried to do everything to get clues about the terms of the armistice because that would be extremely important to know in good time. We were not successful in our attempts, and as late as 9/2/1944, the day when the Finnish Army signed the armistice conditions, I had a long talk with Mannerheim, in which, of course, we did not discuss the armistice which was already a fact. But I thought that I was right in the impression that the Finns would this time accept the condition to fight against us.
Q. And how did the situation actually develop?
A. On 9/3/1944, the armistice between Finland and Russia was concluded. Finland broke off all relations with Germany and demanded that the German troops be withdrawn from Finland within 14 days.
Q. Was this demand to withdraw the troops within 14 days feasible from a military point of view?
A. That demand could not be carried out. The demand obviously had the purpose of forcing the Finns to fight against us. In order to evacuate Finland, the troops had to carry out marches of 800 to 1000 km. on foot. This would have meant marching unceasingly for 5 to 6 weeks. Such an enormous effort could not be expected of the troops in such a climate, and at that time of the year, and in such a terrain as I have described. The soldiers would have been able to bear up under this effort, but the horses would not have been able to do it. And the mountain army had very many horses because everything had to be carried on horse-back. In addition we have to consider the fact that there were many stores which had to be carried off and, finally, we have to consider that the troops just cannot march off like that. The enemy would prevent them from marching off and involve them in combat actions which actually did take place. The combat actions which took place, in order to get the mountain army out of that area, took 5 to 6 weeks, and if one is fighting one cannot, after all, march. It was more than 3 months until finally the last man of the German Army had left Finland, and we tried to expedite matters as much as we possibly could, especially in consideration of the approaching winter.
Q. General, you will remember that a representative of the prosecution has stated here that this period of 14 days was better than no time at all? Would you consider that statement correct?
A. Anybody who had any insight into the conditions of the roads there, the fighting situation, and what the leadership of an army needed, would probably not have made such a remark. Those 14 days to us only meant that we could evacuate to Germany the depots and the medical stores which we had in southern Finland. We could not do anything with these stores there because we had so much that we didn't know what to do with it all. After all, the army had been provided for for a period of 9 months. These 14 days had no influence at all on the condition of the army; it had even less influence because the Russians did not feel themselves bound by this time limit. They attacked as early as 9/8/1944.
Q. General, will you, very briefly, indicate the next event which occurred so that we may gain a picture of the situation?
A. As peculiar as this might sound, when we were concerned with a retreat we were, first of all, busily engaged in building up a new front, a front with a depth of 400 km. We succeeded in doing this in 4 to 5 days. Then, we started transporting and evacuating. On 9/7/1944 the first troop movement was carried out. We succeeded in withdrawing the southern corps without the Russians knowing it. The Russians followed, and from that date on they attacked continuously. Crises developed. The troops which had already marched off had to return in order to relieve the others. But, on the whole, our movement was successful. The obvious purpose of the Russian attacks was to tie us and army down, to force us to fight, and to destroy us with their superior forces. From the point of view of military leadership the Russian actions were entirely correct. It was the Russian endeavor to use all available means to reach the road junction of Rovaniemi, in order to overtake us from the rear and thus reach the highway near the Swedish frontier before we could. The battle to prevent this Russian intention, which sometimes lasted for hours, meant to us the existence or nonexistence of the army. And it succeeded.
Q. Did the Russian attack now remain restricted to the southern parts of the army?
A. No. Three weeks later an attack with especially superior forces was made against the XIX Corps on the Arctic Sea. This was a mistake on the part of the Russian leadership, which was incomprehensible to me. It was a mistake to carry out these two attacks at different times so that it became possible for us to counter the Russian superiority by withdawing forces from the southern group and putting them at the disposal of the corps near the Arctic Sea, and thus support this corps. These forces succeeded in relieving the XIX Corps and getting it out of the Russian encirclement.
Q. General, is this the XIX Army Corps which was east of Kirkenes?
A. Yes, this was the XIX Corps which was east of Kirkenes, out 150 km. east of Kirkenes.
GPO, 1950. pp. 1127-1130.
Q. Who commanded it?
A. Lieutenant General [of the Mountain Troops] Jodl, who appeared here as a witness for the prosecution.
Q. And now when did the first order arrive to evacuate northern Norway?
A. To the best of my recollection that must have taken place towards the latter half of 9/1944.
Q. And how was this order carried out?
A. We carried out this order very loosely. The army order at that time was to retreat towards approximately the center of Lapland, and there to halt. We felt strong enough to defeat all attacks in this position, and we made this evacuation a voluntary one by supporting those northern Norwegians who wanted to get away.
Q. Did this situation change later on and, if so, for what reasons?
A. This situation changed later for several reasons. Principally on 10/4/1944 we received an order saying that we were not to remain in Lapland, but instead the army was to be led back to a position near the Lyngsfjord in Norway. That meant to us a movement of about 800 to 1000 km. which would necessarily last far into the Arctic winter. Then, when in 10/1944 the attacks against the XIX Corps started, we were, after all, quite surprised that the Russians were in a position to successfully commit their great numerical superiority, even in that barely negotiable terrain. And just around that date, a further order arrived. The four best mountain divisions were to be sent to the Continent, which meant more than half of the strength of the army. These were events which could not possibly have been anticipated, and they naturally influenced our judgment of all problems at hand.
Q. General, this order - to distinguish between concepts which you mentioned - did the action which was to take place on the basis of the order of 9/4/1944 have a code name?
A. This movement was called "Nordlicht."
Q. You were talking about the influence which became effective through the new situation which confronted you?
A. This influence was seen particularly in the fact that the army could not deny that the second evacuation order which had come in on 10/20/1944 was fully justified. Only the OKW was in a position to know what would be demanded of the army in the future and which forces would be at my disposal for those purposes.
Q. If you knew, a long time before the second evacuation order arrived, the Russian strength and counted on the Russians' moving up on you, why did you then not demand this order for evacuation and destruction?
A. I never waited for orders which were a matter of course, and I never asked for orders in matters which I thought I could regulate myself. I knew quite well what I would have to do in accordance with the situation. If I had not received this second evacuation order of 10/28/1944, then I intended to concentrate the population in a tolerable area of living space. The necessary sanitary installations were to be left for them, but everything else - the quarters which would have become available, the highways which existed, all bridges and harbor installations, and everything else would have been destroyed. The necessity of these measures was never doubted for a single instant by anybody.
Q. One question in between, General. Were the Russian troops up to standard in a military respect?
A. In the extreme north the Russians had to have excellent troops because the terrain and the climate were so very difficult, and because the German and the Finnish troops which confronted them were some of the best units which existed throughout this whole war. The Russians were excellent fighters, especially in rocky and forest areas. Their special units, such as the "ski brigades" which comprised people from Siberia were excellent, and they gave us considerable trouble.
Q. General, how did you imagine the Russians would follow you up?
A. There were two possibilities as to how this could be done. First of all, it was possible they could follow up on highway 50, which led from Kirkenes via Tana, then it was possible that they would move along the highway via Ivalo, and finally there was the possibility to follow along the so-called frontier highway along the Finnish-Swedish frontier.
Q. General, would you be kind enough to look at the map and show us the most important points on it?
A. One possibility would be to follow up along highway 50.
Q. At this opportunity may I point out to the Tribunal that that is the highway which the Tribunal saw and used when it went to Norway, along Kirkenes to Hammerfest.
A. Then it was possible to use the road to Ivalo, which joined highway 50. The third possibility was to push along via Rovaniemi, along the Swedish frontier highway to the Lyngenfjord. Those were the three possibilities on the land route. A further possibility as to follow up by a sea operation starting in the area Murmansk-Kola Bay, which is roughly about here. [Indicating] The most suitable places for landing were the Fjords of Alta and Varanger in the southern part of Finmark. Into this area the roads lead from Finland, which the Finns could have used on the land route.
Q. You are talking about landing operations, General; did you count on the possibility of such landing operations?
A. Landings had a great deal of advantage for the enemy, because to march through these rugged surroundings in winter time through the whole of Finmark is extremely strenuous, and the Russians could have saved themselves this effort if they had carried out a pursuit operation at sea, which would have been considerably simpler. Such an operation had to be anticipated. The OKW also expected landings, even from the British, and they thought they would take place somewhere near Narvik, and at least half a dozen times we were told the opinion of the OKW concerning these landings. That can be frequently found in the war diary of the army which arrived here from Washington.
Q. Were the prerequisites for such a landing good for the Russians, such a landing as you expected would take place?
A. Yes, we knew that in the Kola Bay there was a great number of ships, hundreds of thousands of tons which were part of the convoys which came through the Arctic Sea to Murmansk about twice a month. Those were convoys of about 50 to 60 freighters, protected by battleships, destroyers, aircraft carriers, and other auxiliary vessels. The Kola Bay was reconnoitered towards the end of 9/1944. We saw there a great number of ships, battle ships, cruisers, aircraft carriers, etc., and those, without doubt were British vessels, because it was well known the Russians only had one battleship in the Arctic Sea.
Q. General, if I mention to you the figure 230000 tons of shipping, which I found in one diary, as said to have been assembled in the Kola Bay, would that be sufficient to carry out a large landing operation?
A. Yes, 230000 tons can undoubtedly transport six to eight divisions, but this number of tons reported here is not the maximum of what the Russians would have been in a position to use, because twice a month another convoy of 100000 to 200000 tons of convoy vessels arrived in the Kola Bay. Also, we learned towards the end of 9/1944 or beginning of 10/1944 - I don't remember the exact date, it's in the war diaries - we learned that these convoys, which up until then had been sent by the Russians with British support, were led by the British Admiralty from the end of 9/1944 onward, and a landing operation would have been supported through the fact that the Allies had in the extreme north undoubted supremacy on sea and in the air, and those were the best prerequisites that they could possibly have for a landing.
Q. Were there other factors as well? I am mainly thinking about the question of Swedish neutrality; did you in this respect have to anticipate any difficulties?
A. Yes. We had to anticipate a violation of the Swedish Government. It could not be expected that the Swedes would resist Russian pressure if the Russians demanded from the Swedes to do the same as we had demanded from them in 1941. In that year we had, with the consent of the Swedish Government, moved one infantry division through Sweden to Haparanda, near the Finnish frontier. Of course, that could only have been an operation of secondary importance which would have mainly been directed against the area near Narvik. The main operation was to be expected against southern Finmark.
Q. Is a landing operation in southern Finmark dependent on the season?
A. No, it is not dependent on the climate, because under the influence of the Gulf Stream the fjords do not freeze up. Also, there is not very much snow in those districts in winter, but it is quite cold. It was known that the Russians, as well as the Finns, were extremely well equipped for this winter climate.
Q. General if I may summarize your statements, you said that the army found itself in an extremely difficult position; did the difficult position have any effect on the morale of the troops?
A. Yes, it had a considerable effect on the morale of the troops. Everybody was aware of the difficulty of the position. From censorship of soldiers' mail we learned that the morale of the soldiers sometimes bordered on panic. We found letters written by soldiers in which they said that a "second Stalingrad is in preparation," "the army is doomed," "when we freeze in with the Arctic winter we will freeze as Russian prisoners."
Q. Did the Russian propaganda, and if so to what extent, make use of this situation?
A. The Russian propaganda made very clever use of this situation. Above all they tried to make the men distrust their leaders. Very soon after Finland left the alliance they spread the news, by radio as well as by leaflets, that the commander in chief of the mountain army was an Austrian, and he wanted this army to fall into the hands of the Russians; this fact was discovered and his withdrawal and dismissal was to be expected. In connection with the events of 7/20/1944 and the consequences of this event which had only happened a short time before, this propaganda found fertile soil. There was a very dangerous crisis among the soldiers especially with regard to confidence in their leaders which could have led to a catastrophe if the army or parts of it came into difficult situations. In order to counteract the effects of the Russian propaganda, Hitler, on 9/17/1944, decorated me with the Golden Badge of Honor, and thus the effect of the propaganda was counteracted immediately.
Q. General, when were you convinced that the Russians would not follow up on the land route via Northern Finmark?
A. I cannot tell you exactly when I became convinced of that fact. I assume it was toward the latter part of 11/1944.
Q. Well, what was it you ascertained at that time?
A. It had become known that the Russians had only followed us up past Kirkenes with weak forces. At first however, we had to assume that they wanted to wait and gain time in order to allow things to settle down and to consolidate their forces after many weeks of hard fighting which had cost them many losses, and as one is apt to do as a rule when one prepares a new operation.
Q. Was it possible to reconnoiter the Russian positions so that you could be informed about them?
A. During the decisive period of time, the middle of 11/1944, for practical purposes it was no longer possible to reconnoiter. The airbases had all been transferred to Norway. The nearest one was in Butevos, which is about 1000 kilometers distant from the Murmansk railway. Around about that time daylight lasted only a very few hours each day. The Arctic night had already extended over the majority of the 24 hours. Therefore, at such a great distance for a flight and with the very short period of daylight, it was not possible to reconnoiter the movements along the Murmansk railway thoroughly.
Q. General, would you be kind enough to show us on this occasion the distances on the map?
A. Butevos is here [indicating].
Q. I would like to point out, Your Honor, that we made an interim landing in Butevos.
A. That would have been the direction of flight for reconnoitering, and here is the Murmansk railway [indicating].
Q. Therefore, you would have had to fly over parts of Swede and Finland or you would have had to fly around this area?
A. We would have had to fly over the whole of Finland.
Q. When was it certain to you that Russia had withdrawn forces from her former Lapland front?
A. The first news concerning this fact was received toward the beginning of 12/1944. It was a communication from Army Group North which was stationed near the East Prussian frontier, and it had been confronted by a division which up to that time had confronted my front [troops] in Lapland. We did not receive any further news concerning any other forces. My front in Lapland faced about 30 Russian divisions, and the Finnish front faced the same number. These forces would have been, in any case, far too strong in the very restricted area in Finmark. The withdrawal of forces from the Lapland area could not give us any information concerning the real intents of the Russians in Finmark. How many forces the Russians actually did withdraw never became known to us, and I do not know it to this day.
Q. And for what reason did you after that period continue the evacuation and the destruction?
A. The evacuation had, at that date, been actually carried out for all practical purposes. The report concerning the evacuation is dated 11/25/1944. (NOKW-090, Pros. Ex. 506.) [Document reproduced in section B.] Therefore,it can be assumed that around that date it had been concluded. The destruction which was carried out also in the southern area of Finmark had to be continued, because moving up on highway 50 was not the only possibility which was open to the Russians. The even more likely operation as of 11/1944 would have been a landing in southern Finmark.
Q. Why were the destructions which you carried out not restricted to the villages along highway 50?
A. At first sight one might suppose that marching troops would only need the localities along the march route for quarters, that is not the case. Even in districts which are densely populated there were and are many villages, like for instance, in the center of Russia. The villages along the march route were never sufficient for the accommodation of the marching troops.
Instead, these troops also had to use those places which were a good distance away from the march route, and they had to overlook the great strain of the march, when it was necessary to quarter them in houses, etc., and that would have undoubtedly been necessary at that time in Finmark because of the climate. If the weather is good those extra marches can be saved by spending the night in tents right on the road.
Q. May it please the Tribunal, I would like to submit a photostat of this map for information purposes because it is rather difficult to see the map. (Rendulic 100, Rendulic Ex. 44.)
General, how about inhabited locations along the coast and along the fjords?
A. The inhabited localities along the coast and along the fjords were of the same significance. One has to consider the fact that highway 50 led partly immediately along the coast and partly was very near the coast. It further has to be considered that an army does not only march; it also has to live, especially when it is supposed to prepare an attack. Then the army is apt to spread over the whole country. Not only the troops have to be accommodated but there are also many installations to be taken care of such as work shops, hospitals, depots, installations for supply; and for all these installations everything that was there concerning houses, etc., was necessary to accommodate all these operations and that was the military significance of the apparently far distant inhabited localities.
Q. Did that also apply for the fishing villages which were up in Norway?
A. Yes, the same fact applied to them. As a rule, they could only be reached by cutters or boats. These were the most important means of transportation in that district. We also had our bases in the fjords in those isolated localities and we maintained communications with them by boat.
Q. I would now like to talk about one specific place and that is Hammerfest. Will you please tell us the significance of Hammerfest?
A. We worked through all the possibilities which the enemy had concerning landings. On that occasion, we again and again were confronted with the fact that Hammerfest would be the best point for supply for troops which had already landed. It would be a good starting point and would be a good place for distribution for the more detailed supplies to the other landing points in the fjords. Further, Hammerfest was situated in the vicinity of highway 50. In order to get there all one had to do was to cross the narrow Kvaenangen Fjord and then one had an excellent road. The place itself could accommodate a strong regiment or even a division if necessary. This double significance of Hammerfest was a fact for an enemy in pursuit. You must not think that we destroyed wantonly or senselessly. Everything we did was dictated by the needs of the enemy. That was its necessity.
Q. And what was your attitude now toward the evacuation order?
A. I was fully aware of the effects of this evacuation order on the population and I also knew that the execution of the evacuation would mean a considerable burden to the army. In spite of this I had to obey the order. Concerning the necessity of carrying out destructions, my opinions coincided with the opinions of the OKW. It was a matter of course to me, and everybody else, that destructions had to be carried out. My opinion deviated from Hitler's opinion in the beginning only in the one factor. I did not think it was absolutely necessary to transfer the population to other areas but I could not close my eyes to Hitler's reasons of military necessity. I could not deny that they were justified.
Jodl warned me too. He said this time I had better follow the evacuation order since Hitler insisted under all circumstances that this order be carried out. Furthermore, I knew - and this is also contained in the OKW order - that the most decisive factor in this whole affair was the Reich Commissioner in Norway. It was well known that he, this man, was very angry because the first evacuation order had not been carried out and now he would closely supervise all activities of the army. It was therefore quite impossible not to obey this second evacuation order.
Finally, I had to tell myself that it would possibly be better for the population to be transferred to other areas rather than to spend the hard winter in the destroyed country. I participated in both winter battles in Russia. Therefore, I know what flight from cold means. I had to realize that the Russians, if they followed us, and if they were confronted with the choice of either saving themselves by using what remained in the way of shelter or sparing the population, it was certain that they would not spare the population. Therefore, in the final analysis it was the best thing for the population that they were removed.
Q. You were talking about the Reich Commissioner for Norway. Will you give us the name of this man, please?
A. His name was Terboven.
Q. That is the same Terboven whom you have already mentioned?
A. Yes, he is.
Q. General, what were the measures you ordered for the evacuation?
A. I have to say something else first. The operation which had to be carried out by the army was possibly the most difficult land operation of the whole war. During those days I said to my chief of staff, "If sometime after this war you have to train general staff officers, then you will have to make this operation a basis of the training because it's impossible to think of anything more difficult." The army was spread over an area of 600 kilometers. That is, it was spread over a wider area than, for instance, the Allied forces in France and those forces were more than a million men strong. The problem was to relieve this army out of an encirclement from three sides and that, in battle with a superior enemy. Then this army would have to be concentrated on two highways and, finally, it would have to march along only one highway. All that would have to be done on foot and in the Arctic winter. That meant an enormous task for my staff, a more difficult task cannot be imagined. I could not burden it further with the extensive work concerning the evacuation. Therefore, I formed a special staff for this operation - that is, the evacuation.
Q. General, can you indicate to us on this map the area over which the army was spread?
A. No, I am afraid I can't. The whole eastern part is missing.
Q. You said the eastern part of that area is not contained on the map?
A. Yes, that is what I said.
Q. Did the evacuation staff receive definite directives?
A. It received certain instructions mainly with respect to cooperation with other agencies of the armed forces and with the Norwegian Government. I am afraid I don't know any details. That was the work of my chief of staff. All I know is that I emphasized particularly that the evacuation had to be carried out with all consideration for the population. Around that time I had learned unofficially, for some time, that after taking the army back to Norway I was to take over the post of the Commander in Chief of Norway, and immediately after the evacuation order I received the official order for this transfer. I attached the greatest importance to good relations between myself and the Norwegian population. For this reason alone I insisted that the evacuation should not give any cause for misgivings among the population. You may also rest assured that if any kind of excesses had become known to me, any unnecessary harshness or any inconsideration, I would have taken countermeasures immediately. I was not a man who would let himself be prevented from carrying out his intentions by some action of a subordinate agency.
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