Nazi occupation policies for the USSR

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David Thompson
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#31

Post by David Thompson » 12 Oct 2004, 08:03

19411013 Document: 342-PS; Description: Decree, 10/13/1941, concerning confiscation of Jewish property.

"Document 342-PS: Decree, 10/13/1941, concerning confiscation of Jewish property [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume III: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1946. pp. 961-963.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 342—PS

Reichs Commissioner for the East [Ostland]
Sect. II h

Directions concerning the Treatment of Jewish Property in the Reich Commissariat Ostland of 13 October 1941

Par. 1

The total, movable and immovable properties of the Jewish population in the territories governed by the Reich's Commissioner for Eastern areas are placed under confiscation by the administration for the commission and the seizure according to the following regulations.

Par. 2

Property is defined as movable and immovable objects along with all accessories, claims, commissions, rights and interests of all types.

Par. 3

1. The confiscation will be carried out by the Reich's commissioner for the East or those officers who have been authorized by him. It can be carried out by directives to individual persons or in general by a proclamation and can be limited to in-

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342—PS

dividual objects of wealth.

2. The following shall be excluded from confiscation:

a. That part of the household furniture which will take care of the base essentials of life.

b. Cash, bank and savings credit, as well as bonds, up to a total value of one hundred Reichsmarks.

Par. 4

1. With the confiscation the previous owner loses all rights to dispose of the confiscated property.

2. Whoever has confiscated property in possession or custody, will administer it until further notice. The changing or disposal of the property or of its profits will only be allowed inside the bounds of orderly management. All other measures taken beyond this will need the approval of the Reichs commissioner for the East or those agencies authorized by him.

Par. 5

1. The property that is placed under confiscation can be brought under the administration of the commission, so far as it is necessary for orderly management.

2. The assuming of control by the administrative commission will at the same time be looked upon as confiscation.

3. The Reichs commission for the East will issue directives about the arrangement and management of this administration.

Par. 6

1. Confiscated property can be called in by the Reichs commissioner for the East or by the agencies authorized by him.

2. The disposal of the confiscated property will be left to the authorized agencies.

3. These agencies will decide with finality, using administrative means, on the debts which belong to the confiscated property. The responsibility will be limited to the sales value of the confiscated property.

Par. 7

Bids for the purchase of the property which comes under confiscation can be publicly advertised.

Par. 8

The responsible authorities can demand information from everyone to carry out their task.

Par. 9

1. The following will be punished with a prison sentence and monetary fine or one of those punishments.

a. Those who will undertake to withdraw an object of value from the offices of the civil authorities or those installed with

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342-PS

the authority for disposal, or in any other manner to thwart, to evade, or to impair the action of confiscation.

b. Those who intentionally or carelessly do not fulfill in due time or completely one of those directives imposed upon him such as an order of execution or other directive of execution, and the report and information obligations concerning it.

2. In severe cases the punishment is penal servitude. If the accused is charged with willful disobedience or should it be any other especially severe case the death sentence is authorized.

Par. 10

The Reichs commissioner for the East will issue the necessary measures to carry out those directives.

Par. 11

The directive will go into effect on the day of its publication.

Riga, the 13 October 1941
The Reichs Commissioner for the East
Signed: LOHSE

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#32

Post by David Thompson » 12 Oct 2004, 08:20

19411015 Document: *L-180; Description: Report by SS Brigade Commander Stahlecker to Himmler, "Action Group A", 10/15/1941. (USA 276)

"Document L-180: Action-Group A: Comprehensive Report Up To 10/15/1941, [partial translation]", Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume VII, US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1947. pp. 978-996.
Action-Group A

[Pencilled] Personal property of SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Wv. 31.1.1942

[Rubber-stamp] Secret matter of the Reich 40 copies copy nr. 23.

I. Table of Contents: Page 1
II. Activities in police matters
A. Measures of organization: Page 13
B. Cleansing and securing the action area: Page 21
C. Counteraction against espionage: Page 39
D. Control of persons and indexing: Page 40
E. Criminal police work: Page 41
III. Report on the Situation
A. Situation before the invasion by German forces ...
B. General conditions in the inhabited areas up to 15.10.1941: Page 47
C. Jewish influence on the general conditions of life in the Eastern territory: Page 107
IV. Nuisances and proposals for their removal: Page 134

Action-Group A, after preparing their vehicles for action proceeded to their area of concentration as ordered on 6/23/1941, the second day of the campaign in the East. Army Group North consisting of the 16th and 18th Armies and Panzer-Group 4 had left the day before. Our task was to hurriedly establish personal contact with the commanders of the Armies and with the commander of the army of the rear area. It must be stressed from the beginning that co-operation with the Armed Forces was generally good, in some cases, for instance with Panzer Group 4 under Col. Gen. Hoeppner, it was very close, almost cordial. Misunderstandings which cropped up with some authorities in the first days, were cleared up mainly through personal discussions.

* * *

At the start of the Eastern Campaign it became obvious with regard to the Security Police that its special work had to be done not only in the rear areas, as was provided for in the original agreements, with the High Command of the Army but also in

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the combat areas, and this for two reasons. On the one hand, the development of the rear area of the armies as delayed because of the quick advance and on the other hand, the undermining communist activities and the fight against partisans was most effective within the area of actual fighting -- especially when the Luga sector was reached.

To carry out the duties connected with security police, it was desirable to move into the larger towns together with the armed forces. We had our first experiences in this direction when a small advance detachment under my leadership entered Kowno together with the advance units of the Armed Forces on 6/25/1941. When the other larger towns, especially Libau, Mitau, Riga, Dorpat, Reval, and the larger suburbs of Leningrad were captured, a detachment of the Security Police was always with the first army units. Above all, communist functionaries and communist material had to be seized, and the armed forces themselves had to be secured against surprises inside the towns; the troops themselves were usually not able to take care of that because of their small numbers. For this purpose the Security Police immediately after capture formed volunteer detachments from reliable natives in all three Baltic provinces; they carried out their duties successfully under our command. For example, it may be mentioned that the armed forces suffered not inconsiderable losses through guerillas in Riga, on the left of the Duena river; on the right bank of the Duena river, however, after these volunteer detachments had been organized in Riga not a single soldier was injured, although these Latvian detachments suffered some killed and wounded in fighting with Russian stragglers.

Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were included to start pograms against Jews during the first hours after capture, though this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following out orders, the Security Police was determined to solve the Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But it was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German circles. It had to be shown to the world that the native population itself took the first action by way of natural reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades and against the terror exercised by the Communists during the preceding period. After reaching the Duena river and therewith Riga, the Action-Group detached itself at first from the further advance of the Army Group North, and concentrated its forces on the pacification of

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the Lithouanian and Latvian area, and later of the old-Russian area which was reached at Opotschka.

The work in this connection took on many shapes. In view of the constant changes in German troops and the fluctuation within the German authorities, which was caused by the transfer of the rear-area of the Wehrmacht to the rear-area of the Armies, and later to the civil administration and to the Commander of the Armed Forces the personnel and thus the opinions of the German authorities changed far too often and far too quickly. In the Security Police this had to be avoided, which led us to adopt the policy of keeping the same commanders in the same locality as far as possible. Thereby the Security Police gained a considerable advantage above all other comers, because it knew facts and people. As a matter of fact, they alone amongst all authorities may claim to have achieved a certain steadiness on the German side. The Lithouanians, Latvians, and the Esthonians, who have a fine feeling for such matters, came soon to acknowledge this fact and acted accordingly. Under these circumstances the Security Police tried to guide political, economic, and cultural matters according to definite policies, and to advise the other German authorities on these subjects. In the political sphere particularly the several competent authorities followed different viewpoints. It was regrettable that the Ministry for Eastern Affairs had not given clear directions from the beginning, so that up to date and in spite of our efforts the situation in the Baltic provinces is not clear. The example of Esthonia is significant for this fluctuation. In agreement with the RSHA the Action-Group brought with them the Esthonian Dr. Mae as presumptive political adviser for the Esthonians. In order to avoid a pernicious muddle, as happened in Lithouania and Latvia, and in order to obtain the appointment of Dr. Mae or to avoid his removal, negotiations had to be carried out with, one after the other, the Army division capturing Reval, the Army Corps competent for Reval, the Garrison commander Reval, the Field Commandatura Reval, the 18. Army Group, North, the Commander of the Rear Army Area at the Army Group North, the General Commissioner and his deputy, and with the representative of the Ministry for Eastern Affairs. After the conquest of Lithouania and Latvia, the Action-Detachments 2 and 3 were separated from the Commander of the Rear-Area of the Armed Forces and were left in Lithouania and Latvia respectively for essential assignments. The Commanders of Action-Detachments 2 and 3 have been staying permanently in Kowno and Riga since the beginning of July. Contact was established also with the Reich Commissioner

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as soon as he was appointed and likewise with the General Commissioners, i.e. by the Action-Group and by the Action-Detachments. Co-operation with the Reich Commissioner depended on:

a. a delay in the inquiry addressed to the RSHA as to how the interpolation (sc. of the Security Police) at the Reich Commissioner's should be effected, and

b. on the negotiations of the Superior SS- and Police Fuehrer who on his own account had initiated negotiations with the Reich commissioner with regard to the interpolation of the police.

No initiative of our own was admissible therefore until the questions to a) and b) had been settled. It was intended to get in touch with the Reich Commissioner with regard to this question at a convenient moment. There are plenty of special occasions. When the advance of the Army Group North was halted in Esthonia and at Luga and when heavy fighting and strong Russian attacks against the centre and the right wing ensued, the Action-Group again teamed up with the armies, in particular the 4. Panzer Group, because the struggle against the partisans who now began to appear in great numbers, was and still is a job for the Security Police. The area to the North of Pleskau and between the Peipus and Ilmen lakes with far extending forest and swamps was really an ideal area for Russian partisan warfare. The difficulties of the terrain further impeded activities even for the smaller units. After the failure of purely military activities such as the placing of sentries and combing through the newly occupied territories with whole divisions, even the Armed Forces had to look out for new methods. The Action Group undertook to search for new methods. Soon therefore the Armed Forces adopted the experiences of the Security Police and their methods of combatting the partisans. For details I refer to the numerous reports concerning the struggle against the partisans. The activities of the Security Police were rendered more difficult during the further course of the struggle against the partisans because the vehicles either could not be used or were to be preserved for the advance on Leningrad, which was always expected at that time. Special difficulties arose for the Command of the Action-Group at this time. Whilst the larger parts of the Security Police, in action in Lithouania and Latvia, were 700 km to the rear, the other parts were in action against the partisans behind the frontline, extending for nearly 600 km. For the transmission of signals we had only a wireless truck stationed in Riga, and one medium and one light wireless truck for this vast area. Even the use of army telephones failed over distances of more than 200 km. The Action-Group as a whole

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could be led only by personal contacts, although the ways and roads, including the army highways, were in an extremely bad state. Even on the army highway an hourly average speed of 10 km could not be exceeded. In spite of this, my own motorcar had to do 15.000 km during this time. Similar difficulties because of the vast areas arose for the Commanders of the Action-detachments, so that even messenger trips become a serious problem.

For some time this situation became even more difficult, when the further attack against Leningrad no longer followed the great road from Pleskau via Lungau, but had to bend far to the West, so that the centre of the counter-attacks against partisans was transferred to the forest and swamp areas East of the Peipus Ilke and the areas to the West of the Ilmen Lake."

* * *

During the process of capturing Estonia the Action-Group 1a was transferred definitely to Estonia, except for the detachment with the 18th Army. The pacification of Estonia had to be considered as especially important because of the good racial composition of the population. After Action-Group B had transferred parts of White Ruthenia to Action Group A, Action-detachment 1b reinforced by parts of Action-detachment 2 and-3 took over this area. For the investment of Leningrad, the Security Police aside from the heavily increased activities against the partisans, received the further assignment to observe carefully the population which was slowly returning from the woods. As trench warfare developed around Leningrad, it was recommended to the armies to evacuate wholly a zone around Leningrad, a measure which had been carried out already whenever possible by the Security Police together with units of Armed SS and the uniformed police. In this area a network for information is being established which is to be as complete as possible. From the very beginning, the Security Police systematically collected information about Leningrad in all aspects. The 18th Army asked us to take over in addition military reconnaissance of Leningrad of resp. the area of the 8th Russian Army which was invested in the area around Oranienburg. * * * This description of the over-all situation showed and shows that the members of the Stapo (the Secret State Police), Kripo and SD (Security Service) who are attached to the Action-Group, are active mainly in Lithouania, Latvia, Esthonia, White-Ruthenia and to a smaller part in front of Leningrad. It shows further that the forces of the uniformed police and the armed SS are active mainly in front of Leningrad, in order to take measures against the returning population and under their own officers.

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This is so much easier because the Action detachments in Lithouania, Latvia and Esthonia have at their disposal native police units, as described in encl. 1 and because so far 160 Latvian reinforcements have been sent to White-Ruthenia. The distribution of the leaders of Security Police and SD during the individual phases can be gathered from encl. 2, the advance and the activities of the Action-Group and the Action-detachments from encl. 3. It should be mentioned that the leaders of the Armed-SS and of the uniformed police who are reserves have declared their wish to stay on with the Security Police and the SD.

A. The Baltic Area.

I. Organization Measures.

1. Formation of auxiliary police and of police. In view of the extension of the area of operations and the great number of duties which had to be performed by the Security Police, it was intended from the very beginning to obtain the co-operation of the reliable population for the fight against vermin that is mainly the Jews and Communists. Beyond our directing of the first spontaneous actions of self-cleansing, which will be reported elsewhere, care had to be taken that reliable people should be put to the cleansing job and that they were appointed auxiliary members of the Security Police. The difference of the situation in each part of the area of operations also had to be taken into account. In Lithouania activist and nationalist people formed themselves into so-called partisan-units at the beginning of the Eastern Campaign, in order to take active part in the fight against Bolshevism. According to their own report they suffered 4,000 casualties.

* * *

2. Reconstruction of prisons. The prisons in the Baltic countries were found to be either empty or occupied by Jews or Communists who had been arrested by Self-Protection Units. * * *

Whenever the prisons were too small because of the large number of people who were to-be arrested, provisional concentration camps were established. The construction of large concentration camps is in preparation. The schedules attached as encl. 5 show the present occupancy of the prisons.

II. Cleansing and Securing the Area of Operations.

1. Instigation of self-cleansing actions. Considering that the population of the Baltic countries had suffered very heavily under the government of Bolshevism and Jewry while they were incorporate in the USSR, it was to be expected that after the liberation from that foreign government, they i.e. the population themselves)

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would render harmless most of the enemies left behind after the retreat of the Red Army. It was the duty of the Security Police to set in motion these self-cleansing movements and to direct them into the correct channels in order to accomplish the purpose of the cleansing operations as quickly as possible. It was no less important in view of the future to establish the unshakable and provable fact that the liberated population themselves took the most severe measures against the Bolshevist and Jewish enemy quite on their own, so that the direction by German authorities could not be found out.

In Lithouania this was achieved for the first time by partisan activities in Kowno. To our surprise it was not easy at first to set in motion an extensive pogrom against Jews. Klimatis, the leader of the partisan unit, mentioned above, who was used for this purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment acting in Kowno, and in such a way that no German order or German instigation was noticed from the outside. During the first pogrom in the night from 25. to 26.6 the Lithouanian partisans did away with more than 1.500 Jews, set fire to several Synagogues or destroyed them by other means and burned down a Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During the following nights about 2,300 Jews were made harmless in a similar way. In other parts of Lithouania similar actions followed the example of Kowno, though smaller and extending to the Communists who had been left behind.

These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army authorities who had been informed showed understanding for this procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only the first days after the occupation would offer the opportunity for carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans the self-cleansing actions ceased necessarily.

It proved much more difficult to set in motion similar cleansing actions in Latvia. Essentially the reason was that the whole of the national stratum of leaders had been assassinated or destroyed by the Soviets, especially in Riga. It was possible though through similar influences on the Latvian auxiliary to set in motion a pogrom against Jews also in Riga. During this pogrom all synagogues were destroyed and about 400 Jews were killed. As the population of Riga quieted down quickly, further pogroms were not convenient.

So far as possible, both in Kowno and in Riga evidence by film and photo was established that the first spontaneous executions

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of Jews and Communists were carried out by Lithouanians and Latvians.

In Estonia by reason of the relatively small number of Jews no opportunity presented itself to instigate pogroms. The Esthonian self-protection units made harmless only some individual Communists whom they hated especially, but generally they limited themselves to carrying out arrests.

2. Combating Communism. Everywhere in the area of operation counteractions against communism and Jewry took first place in the work of the Security Police.

The Soviet officials and the functionaries of the Communist Party had fled with the Soviet Army. In view of the experiences made during the Bolshevist oppression which lasted more than one year, the population of the Baltic countries realized that all remainders of Communism left behind after the retreat of the Red Army had to be removed. Such basic opinion facilitated essentially the work of the Security Police with regard to cleansing in this sphere, especially since active nationalist people cooperated in this cleansing, viz. in Lithouania the partisans, in Latvia and Esthonia the self-protection units.

* * *

b. Search for an Arrest of Communists. Aside from these searching activities, a systematic search was made for Communist functionaries, Red-Army soldiers, and persons more seriously suspect because of their activities for Communism and who had been left behind. In some places the Self-Protection Units themselves had rendered harmless the most infamous Communists already spontaneously. Using all available units of the Detachments and Self-Protection Formations, and with the help of the German uniformed police, large scale actions were carried out in the larger towns resulting in many arrests and search actions.

* * *

3. Action against Jewry. From the beginning it was to be expected that the Jewish problem in the East could not be solved by pogroms alone. In accordance with the basic orders received, however, the cleansing activities of the Security Police had to aim at a complete annihilation of the Jews. Special detachments reinforced by selected units in Lithouania partisan detachments, in Latvia units of the Latvian auxiliary police therefore performed extensive executions both in the towns and in rural areas. The actions of the execution detachments were performed smoothly. When attaching Lithouanian and Latvian detachments to the execution squads, men were chosen whose relatives had been murdered or removed by the Russians.

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Especially severe and extensive measures became necessary in Lithouania. In some places -- especially in Kowno -- the Jews had armed themselves and participated actively in franc tireur war and committed arson. Besides these activities the Jews in Lithouania had collaborated most actively hand in glove with the Soviets.

The sum total of the Jews liquidated in Lithouania amounts to 71.105.

During the pogroms in Kowno 3.800 Jews were eliminated, in the smaller towns about 1.200 Jews.

In Latvia as well the Jews participated in acts of sabotage and arson after the invasion of the German Armed Forces. In Duensburg so many fires were lighted by the Jews that a large part of the town was lost. The electric power station burnt down to a mere shell. The streets which were mainly inhabited by Jews remained unscathed.

In Latvia up to now 30.000 Jews were executed in all. 500 were made harmless by pogroms in Riga.

Most of the 4.500 Jews living in Esthonia at the beginning of the Eastern Campaign fled with the retreating Red Army. About 2.000 stayed behind. In Reval alone there lived about 1.000 Jews.

The arrest of all male Jews of over 16 years of age has been nearly finished. With the exception of the doctors and the Elders of the Jews who were appointed by the Special Commandos, they were executed by the Self-Protection Units under the control of the Special Detachment la. Jewesses in Pernau and Reval of the age groups from 16 to 60 who are fit for work were arrested and put to peat-cutting or other labor.

At present a camp is being constructed in Harku, in which all Esthonian Jews are to be assembled, so that Esthonia will be free of Jews within a short while.

After the carrying out of the first larger executions in Lithouania and Latvia it became soon apparent that an annihilation of the Jews without leaving any traces could not be carried out, at least not at the present moment. Since a large part of the trades in Lithouania and Latvia are in Jewish hands and others carried on nearly exclusively by Jews (especially those of glaziers, plumbers, stovebuilders, cobblers) many Jewish partisans are indispensable at present for repairing installations of vital importance for the reconstruction of town destroyed and for work-of military importance. Although the employers aim at replacing Jewish labor with Lithouanian or Latvian labor, it is not yet possible to displace all employed Jews especially not in the larger towns. In co-operation with-the labor exchange offices, however,

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all Jews who are no longer fit for work are being arrested and shall be executed in small batches.

In this connection it may be mentioned that some authorities of the Civil Administration offered resistance, at times even a strong one, against the carrying out of larger executions. This resistance was answered by calling attention to the fact that it was a matter of carrying out basic orders.

Apart from organizing and carrying out measures of execution, the creation of Ghettos was begun in the larger towns at once during the first days of operations. This was especially urgent in Kowno because there were 30.000 Jews in a total population of 152.400. Therefore, at the end of the first pogrom a Jewish Committee was summoned who were informed that the German authorities so far had not seen any reason to interfere in the quarrels between Lithouanians and Jews. The sole basis for creating a normal situation would be to construct a Jewish Ghetto.

Against remonstrations made by the Jewish Committee, it was declared that there was no other possibility to prevent further pogroms. On this the Jews at once declared themselves ready to do everything in their power to transfer their co-racials to the town district of Viriampol which was intended as a Jewish Ghetto and with the greatest possible speed. This own district lies in the triangle between the Mamel river and a tributary; it is connected with Kowno by one bridge only and can, therefore, easily be locked off.

In Riga the so-called "Moskau suburb" was designated as a Ghetto. This is the worst dwelling district of Riga, already now mostly inhabited by Jews. The transfer of the Jews into the Ghetto-district proved rather difficult because the Latvians dwelling in that district had to be evacuated and residential space in Riga is very crowded. 24,000 of the 28,000 Jews living in Riga have been transferred into the Ghetto so far. In creating the Ghetto, the Security Police restricted themselves to mere policing duties, while the establishment and administration of the Ghetto as well as the regulation of the food supply for the inmates of the Ghetto were left to Civil Administration; the Labor Offices were left in charge of Jewish labor.

In the other towns with a larger Jewish population Ghettos shall be established likewise.

Marking of the Jew by a yellow star, to be worn on the breast and the back which was ordered in the first instance by provisional orders of the Security Police, was carried out within a short time on the basis of regulations issued by the Commander of the Rear area and later by the Civil Administration.

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The number of Jews executed up to the present may be seen in the schedule on encl. 8.

* * *

Copies of the latest experience report are attached as encl. 9. [This enclosure reveals the name of the Commander of the Action-Group: Dr. Stahlecker, SS-Brigade Commander and Major General of the Police.]

5. Other jobs of the Security Police.

1. Occasionally the condition prevailing in the lunatic asylums necessitated operations of the Security Police: Many institutions had been robbed by the retreating Russians of their whole food supply. Often the guard and nursing personnel had fled. The inmates of several institutions broke out and became a danger to the general security; therefore in Aglona (Lithouania), 544 lunatics; in Mariampol (Lithouania), 109 lunatics and; in Magutowo (near Luga) 95 lunatics were liquidated.

Sometimes authorities of the Armed Forces asked us to clean out in a similar way other institutions which were wanted as billets. However, as interests of the Security Police did not require any intervention, it was left to the authorities of the Armed Forces, to take the necessary action with their own forces.

2. The Action-Commandos dealt to a large extent with the search for persons who had been deported and with the exhumation of people who had been murdered by the Russians. For reasons of propaganda the propaganda squadrons of the Armed Forces and sometimes of the foreign press were made to participate.

In Esthonia the exhumation of Esthonians murdered by the Russians was organized more extensively. In view of the extent of the work which had been done here, a central office was established in Reval, in order to organize searches for the whereabouts of removed and murdered persons, under the systematic guidance of the Security Police.

The extent of this work is shown by the fact that from Reval alone 30.000 men had been reported missing.

* * *

V. Work of the Police concerning Crime Detection.

* * *

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In order to eliminate the most heavy cases of crime until preventive measures can be introduced, professional criminals are being taken into the care of the Action-detachments and executed whenever the case warrants such measures.

* * *

Action-Group B liquidated so far 7620 Jews in Borrissow.

* * *

III. Report on the Situation

* * *

A. The Situation in Lithouania. As the population did not receive any information with regard to their future fate, the national-minded part (sc. of the population) is still thinking of a future Lithouanian State of their own. No effort can be noticed to approach the Lithouanian
people to the German.

The active anti-Semitism which flared up quickly after the German occupation did not falter. Lithouanians are voluntarily and untiringly at our disposal for all measures against Jews, sometimes they even execute such measures on their own.

* * *

The faculties of Arts and Sciences should be closed altogether. There is some need though for the Medical faculty and some of the technical branches. More than 60% of the dentists were Jews; more than 50% of the other doctors as well. The disappearance of these brings about an extreme shortage of doctors which cannot be overcome even by bringing in doctors from the Reich.

* * *

B. The Situation in Latvia. In Courland the ordinance of the Naval Commander in Libau, Captain Dr. Kavelmacher of the German Navy had caused some unrest. This ordinance announced measures of reprisal against the population of Libau in case of attacks against German soldiers. It reads as follows:

'For each and every case of a known or unknown culprit firing on German soldiers, certain people of Libau shall be arrested and shot at once under Martial Law.' 'Similarly' runs the ordinance 'for each and every attempt of sabotage whether effective or not, part of the Latvian population living near the place of the act of sabotage shall be arrested and shot under Martial Law'. This ordinance was published in the Libau paper "Das Kurlaendische Wort". The Libau population is quite excited, as may be understood. The fear is abroad that further actions may be provoked by hostile people (Communist or Jewish).

* * *

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Table of Enclosures

Enclosures:

1. a. Survey of the whole Personnel of the Action-Group A.
1. b. Map of Distribution of the Members of Action-Group A on action commandos.
2. (Headquarters) of Commanders of Action-Group.
3. Lines of Advance of Action-Group A.
4. Strength and Distribution of the Auxiliary Police.
5. Figure on Prison-Inmates.
6. Special Report on the GPU in Latvia.
7. Survey of the Supreme Authorities of the Esthonian Socialist Soviet-Republic.
8. Report on the Number of Executions.
9. Report on Experiences in Counteractions against Partisans.
10. Schedule concerning Organization and Distribution of department's of the Crime Detective Force in Latvia.
11. Report on the Work of the Crime Detective Force in Latvia.
12. Schedule of the Crime Detective Force in Esthonia.
13. The Peoples of the Baltic Countries.
14. Map showing Employees in the Baltic Countries according to Economic Branches.
15. Number of Employees of the Main Economic Groups in the Baltic Countries.
16. Number and Distribution of Jewish Population in the Areas.
17. Share of the Jews in the Economy.
18. Share of Jews in Number of Latvian Trade Establishments.

********************************************
Encl. 1a

Total Strength of Action Group A

Total: 990
Waffen-SS: 340 34.4%
Motor Bicycle-Riders: 172 17.4%
Administration: 18 1.8%
Security Service (SD): 35: 3.5%
Criminal Police [Kripo]: 41: 4.1%
State Police [Gestapo]: 89: 9.0%
Auxiliary Police: 87: 8.8%
Order Police: 133: 13.4%
Female Employees: 13: 1.3%
Interpreters: 51: 5.1%
Teleprinter-Operators: 3: 0.3%
Wireless-Operators: 8: 0.8%

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******************************************
Enclosure 1 b

Composition of the Action-detachments

Action-detachments:
Interpreters: 1b: 15: 13.7%; 1b: 6: 5.4%; 2: 18: 10.8%; 3: 8: 5.6%
Wireless Operators: 1b: 2: 1.9%; 1b: 1: 0.9%; 2: 2: 1.2% 3: 1: 0.7%
Teleprinter Operators 2: 1.8%
Reservists: 1b: 25 24%; 1b: 26: 23.7%; 2: 41: 23.6%; 3: 32: 22.9%
Motorbicycle-Riders: 1b: 23: 22.1%; 1b: 34: 30.9%; 2: 50: 29.4%; 3: 34: 24.3%
Administration: 1b: 3: 2.9%; 1b: 2: 1.8%; 2: 4: 2.4%; 3: 1: 0.7%;
Security Service: 1b: 8: 7.8%; 1b: 3: 2.7%; 2: 8: 4.8%; 3: 10: 7%;
Criminal Police: 1b: 11: 10.5%; 1b: 6: 5.4%; 2: 13: 7.8% 3: 10 7.%
State Police Gestapo: 1b: 18 16.2% 1b: 12 11.% 2: 26 15.6% 3: 29 20.6%
Auxiliary 1b: 20 26% 3: 15 10.5%
Female Employees: 1b: 1 0.9% 2: 2.4% 3: 1 0.7%

Total 1b: 105 110; 2: 170 [sic] 3: 141
* * *

***************************************
Enclosure 5. Occupation of Prisons.

Prisons in Lithouania. Action-detachment 3 at present in ascertaining the number of occupants of prisons in Lithouania.
In Kowno are under arrest:
in the central prison: 520 persons, including 50 Jews
in the police prison: 69 persons, including 3 Jews
* * *

********************************************

991
Enclosure 8.

Survey of the number of executed persons.
Area:

Lithouania:
Kowno town and surroundings (land): Jews: 31.994; Communists: 80; Total: 31914
Schaulen: Jews: 41.382; Communists: 763; Total: 42.145
Wilna: Jews: 7.015; Communists: 17; Total: 7032
[Total for Lithouania]: Jews: 80.311; Communists: 86; Grand Total: 81.171

Latvia:
Riga town and surroundings (land): 6.378
Mitau: 3.676
Libau: 11.860
Wolmar: .209
Dueanaburg: Jews: 9.256; Communists: 589; Total: 9.845
Total for Latvia: Jews: 30.025; Communists: 1843; Grand Total: 31868

Esthonia: Jews: 474; Communists: 684; Total: 1.158

White-Ruthenia: Jews: 7.620; Grand Total: 7.620

Lithouania: Jews: 80.311; Communists: 860; Total: 81.171
Latvia: Jews: 30.025; Communists: 1.845; Total: 31.868
Esthonia Jews: 474; Communists: 684; Total 1.158
White-Ruthenia: Jews: 7.620; Total 7.620

Total Killed
Jews: 118.430
Communists: 3.387
Total: 121.817

To be added to these figures:

In Lithouania and Latvia Jews annihilated by pogroms: 5.500 Jews,
Communists and partisans executed in old-Russian area: 2.000
Lunatics executed: 748 [Total:] 122.455

Communists and Jews liquidated by State Pol. and Security Service Tilsit during search actions: 5.502
[Combined Grand Total:] 135.567
992
Map showing "Number of persons liquidated in the Baltic countries as per 10/25/1941."

The following figures have been entered into the map:
District of Libau in area of Courland: 11.860
District of Mitau in area of Semgslen: 3.576
District of Riga town in area of: 6.378
District of Riga town in area of Livland: 209
District of Fellin: 1.158
District of Dueanburg in area of Lettgslen: 9.845
in area of Shcaulen: 42.145
District of Kowno: 31.994
in area of Wilna-land: 7.032
additionally pogrom in Lithouania and Latvia about: 5500 border area Lithouania: 5.502


******************************************************************************
Enclosure 9: Report on Activities and Experience in Counteractions against Partisans.

First Report:

Action Group A of the Security Police and the Security Service. (Gen-) Staff 7/17/1941

Report on activities and Experiences in Counteractions against Partisans.

When it was decided to extend the German operations to Leningrad and also to extend the activities of Action Group A to this town, I gave orders on 7/18/1941 to parts of Action Detachments 2 and 3 and to the Staff of the Group to advance to Novosselje, in order to prepare these activities and to be able to advance as early as possible into the area around Leningrad and into the city itself. The advance of the forces of Action Group A which were intended to be used for Leningrad, was effected in agreement with and on the express wish of Panzer Group 4.

The detachment which was formed for action towards Leningrad was trained for operations in Leningrad during the first days after the advance to Novosselje. However, as an advance to Leningrad is not to be expected at the time planned previously, the parts of Action detachments 2 and 3 which were concentrated in Novosselje were used for extensive operations of cleansing and pacifying in the area of Panzer-Group 4, in agreement with this Group. This is done mainly in the area limited by the connection-line between Pog-Gora-Novosselje-Osjerjewo.

In their operations it was intended to arrest in the first instance any remaining Communist functionaries, and other active Communists and Jews. As nearly all Jews and Communist functionaries had fled with the retreating Soviet forces, only 6 Jews and 10 Communists were arrested and executed."

* * *

993

At the start the following procedure was followed:

In villages, in the area where partisans had not been ascertained before, one behaved friendly towards the population. In view of the generally known shortage of bread one usually succeeded very quickly in finding one or several villagers who could be used as persons of confidence.

They were promised to get bread provided they would give information concerning partisans or if they would inform the nearest units of the German Army or Police of any partisans appearing in the future. The network of information, thus built up yielded much information for the Action-Group, thus enabling them to surround more narrowly the quarters of the partisans.

There was especially information concerning villagers who had given good or provisional shelter to partisans. On the basis of these reports a great many villages were combed out. After a village had been surrounded, all the inhabitants were forcibly shepherded into one square. The persons suspected on account of confidential information and other villagers were interrogated, and thus it was possible in most cases to find the people who helped the partisans. These were either shot off-hand or if further interrogations promised useful information, taken to headquarters. After the interrogation they were shot.

In order to get a deterring effect, the houses of these who helped the partisans were burned down on several occasions. The population which had congregated was told of the reasons for the punitive measures. At the same time they were threatened that the whole village would be burned down if partisans were helped once more and if partisans appearing in the village were not reported as quickly as possible.

The tactics, to put terror against terror, succeeded marvelously. From fear of reprisals, the peasants came a distance of 20 km and more to the headquarters of the detachment of Action Group A on foot or on horseback in order to bring news about partisans, news which was correct in most of the cases. During the cleansing operations which were made on account of these reports, 48 helpers of partisans, including 6 women, were shot so far.

In this connection a single case may be mentioned, which proves the correctness of the principle "terror against terror". In the village of Jachnowa it was ascertained on the basis of a report made by the peasant Jemeljanow and after further interrogations and other searches that partisans had been fed in the house of Anna Prokoffjewa. The house was burnt down on 8/8/1941 at about 21 hours, and its inhabitant arrested.

994

Shortly after midnight partisan set alight the house of the informer Jemeljanow. A detachment sent to Jachnowa on the following days ascertained that the peasant woman Ossipowa had told the partisan that Jemeljanow had made the report which had caused our action.

Ossipowa was shot and her house burnt down. Further two 16 year old youths from the village were shot because according to their own confession, they had rendered information and courier-services to the partisans. Obviously, it was on account of these punitive measures that the partisans left the forest camp near the village. The camp was found during this operation.

Dr. Stahlecker SS Brigade Commander and Maj Gen of the Police.


**************************************************************
(Second report)

The Commander of the Security Police and the Security Service Action Group A.
Riga 9/29/1941

* * *

Report on Experiences in Counteractions against the Partisans

Action detachment of Action Group A of the Security Police participated from the beginning in the fight against the nuisance created by partisans. Close collaboration with the Armed Forces and the Exchange of experiences which were collected in the fight partisans, brought about a thorough knowledge of the origin, organization, strength, equipment and system used by the Red partisans as time went on.

IV. Counteractions against the Partisans.

As it was vitally necessary, though, to obtain hints and information concerning abode and direction of the partisans from the population, the latter had to be forced by the use of the most severe measures, to supply useful information and reports. In the knowledge that the Russian has been accustomed from old to ruthless measures on the part of the authorities, the most severe measures were applied. He who helped the partisans to obtain food and helter, rendered them information services or who have knowingly false information, was shot or hanged. Houses where partisans obtained food or shelter were burnt down. Where a larger number of villagers helped the partisans in such

995

a way, the whole village was burnt down as punishment and in order to create terror.

Escaped Red Armists who have found their way through the German lines procure civilian clothes as quickly as possible and get in touch with partisans. It has been ascertained that these Red Armies form the fighting back-bone of the partisan units. It does not seem, therefore, expedient to treat Red-Armists found in civilian clothing as prisoners of war without further ado and to collect them in prisoner-of-war camps. But an interrogation and survey has to be carried out as thoroughly as possible. It has further to be considered in each and every case, whether Red Armists found in civilian clothes should be separated from regular prisoners of war, and should be brought into the assembly camps for civilian internees. It seems further suitable to exhort escaped Red-Armists by posters to give themselves up at the nearest Army Unit within a short time after the posting of such posters, say within 3 days. Should they not comply with this order they should be dealt with as partisans, that means they should be shot, without making such exception dependent of proof that they actually knew of the order.

To conclude, attention should be drawn to the necessity of interrogating captured partisans thoroughly before they are liquidated so that we increase our knowledge on organization, abode, strength, armament and plans of the partisans. Sometimes it may become necessary to take advantage of the opportunity to use third degree interrogation methods.

Signed: Dr. Stahlecker SS-Brigade-Commander.


996


David Thompson
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#33

Post by David Thompson » 12 Oct 2004, 08:26

19411031 Document: *R-102; Description: Report on activities of The Task Forces of SIPO and SD in USSR, 10/1/1941-10/31/1941. (USA 470)

"Document R-102: Activity And Situation Report No. 6. Of The Task Forces [Einsatzgruppen] Of The Security Police And The SD In The USSR [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume VIII: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1947.
pp. 96-103.
[Rubber Stamp] TOP SECRET
100 copies Copy No. 42.
(Time covered by report: 10/1-31/1941)

Table of Contents

I. Stations. ... Page 1

II. Activities.

A. Eastern Territory (Ostland)
a. Partisan activity and counteraction ... Page 1
b. Situation in Leningrad ... Page 2
c. Jews ... Page 7

B. White Ruthenia.

a. Partisan activity and counteraction ... Page 8
b. Arrests and executions of communists, officials and criminals ... Page 11
c. Jews ... Page 12
d. Enemy propaganda activity ... Page 14
e. Material seized ... Page 15

C. Ukraine

a. Partisan activity and counteraction ... Page 16
b. Arrests and executions of communists, officials and criminals Page 17
c. Jews ... Page 18
d. Enemy propaganda activity ... Page 19
e. Material seized ... Page 20

III. Economy. Commerce and Culture.

A. White Ruthenia

a. Economy and commerce ... Page 20
b. Supplies and provisions ... Page 21
c. Agriculture ... Page 21
d. Culture, Church ... Page 22

B. Ukraine
a. Economy and commerce ... Page 23
b. Supplies and provisions ... Page 24
c. Agriculture ... Page 25
d. Culture
1. Schools ... Page 25
2. Church ... Page 26

IV. Attitude of foreign groups

A. White Ruthenians Attitude towards Germanism. ... Page 27

B. Ukrainians

a. Attitude towards Germanism ... Page 28
b. Tendencies to autonomy. ... Page 29
c. Attitude towards Bolshevism. ... Page 29

V. The German Racial Group in the area around Landau. ... Page 30

I. STATIONS.

During the period covered by this report the stations of the Task Forces of the Security Police and the SD have changed only in the Northern Sector.

The present stations are:

Task Force A: since 10/7/1941 Krasnowardeisk.
Task Force B: continues in Smolensk. Task Force
C: since 9/27/1941 in Kiew.
Task Force D: since 9/27/1941 in Nikolajew.

The Action and Special Commandos [Einsatz und Sonder Commandos] which are attached to the Task Force continue on the march with the advancing troops into the sectors which have been assigned to them.

II. ACTIVITIES.

A. Eastern Territory (i. e. Baltic area)

a. Partisan activity and counteraction.

The activity of the Bolshevist partisans in area of task force A has quieted down somewhat. Nevertheless, intelligence work as been further extended through the dispatching civilian agents, and the enlistment of the village elders and of the population. The results of the preliminary intelligence work served as a basis for several actions in the active combatting of the partisans. From a captured activity report of a partisan group, it can be ascertained that the partisans anticipate, in view of the approaching winter season, that they will not be able to hold out longer than the middle of November.

c. Jews. In 1940 there were in Estonia approximately 4500 Jews almost exclusively in Reval, Dorpot, Narwa and Pernau. There were only a few Jews in the country districts. After the occupation of the Eastern territory by German troops there were still approximately 2000 Jews. The larger part had left the country in an easterly direction together with the Soviet authorities and the Red Army.

Spontaneous demonstrations against Jewry followed by pogroms on the part of the population against the remaining Jews have not been recorded, on account of the lack of adequate indoctrination.

However, the Estonian Protective Corps [Selbstschutz], formed at the time of the entry of the Wehrmacht, immediately started a comprehensive arrest action of all Jews. This action was under the direction of the task force of the Security Police and the SD.

The measures taken were:

1. Arrest of all male Jews over sixteen.

2. Arrest of all Jewesses from 16-20 years, who lived in Reval and environments and were fit for work; these were employed in peat cutting.

3. Comprehensive detention in the synagogue of all Jewesses living in Dorpot and its environments.

4. Arrest of the Jews and Jewesses fit for work in Pernau and environments.

5. Registration of all Jews according to age, sex, and capacity for work for the purpose of their detention in a camp is being prepared.

The male Jews over 16 were executed with the exception of doctors and the elders. At the present time this action is still in progress. After completion of this action, there will remain only 500 Jewesses and children in the Eastern territory.

As an immediate action the following has been ordered by the task force of the Security Police and the SD:

1. Identification of all Jews.

2. The prohibition to carry on a public trade.

3. Prohibition of use of sidewalks and public transportation as well as of visits to theaters, cinemas and restaurants.

4. Prohibition of attendance at schools.

5. Seizure of all Jewish property.

B. WHITE RUTHENIA

a. Partisan activity and Counteraction.

Contrary to the situation in the North sector, the activity of the partisans in the area of task force B has increased slightly. In Welikij Luki alone, 19 reports of attacks by partisans were received. However, the main weight of partisan activity lately has been shifting over to the perpetration of acts of sabotage. It has been noted, that the strongest groups divide themselves into smaller ones. This results in a better camouflage and mobility. How far this camouflage goes, is shown by three cases where partisans married into three villages, in order to appear unsuspected. Furthermore, Red Army men were unmasked as partisans; they had obtained certificates surreptitiously from units of the Wehrmacht, showing them to be unsuspected as political prisoners who were to be left at large. When interrogated by the Action Commandos of the Security Police and the SD, they admitted after long denials that the had received the order to pass themselves off as political prisoners or as forced laborers, and to take up the fight again as partisans behind the front.

Again and again it can be observed, that the population refuses to support the partisans, and in several instances they have even acted actively against the partisans, if by this action the destruction of their property could be prevented.

In several actions against smaller partisan groups, a number of partisans would be shot.

At Choslawitschi 4 partisans who had shot at a German soldier were apprehended and liquidated.

Southeast of Demidow, five partisans were captured after a search of the forests; they admitted to have killed 14 German soldiers. They were liquidated.

In several actions northwest of Welish 27 partisans were apprehended and shot.

In the village Michalowo, after careful reconnaissance through civilian agents, 8 partisans were surprised in a house by the same Commando of the Security Police and the SD, they were arrested and hanged the next day in this particularly partisan-infested village.

The president of the District Region Soviets in Tarenitsch and his secretary were shot because of their connections with partisans.

During an action approximately 70 kilometers south of Mogilew, 25 Armenians, Kirghizs and Mongols were apprehended with false identification papers with which they tried to conceal the fact that they belonged to a partisan group. They were liquidated.

In the same district two partisan leaders were captured and shot.

An Action Commando of the Security Police and the SD shot 3 partisans at Iwniki, who shortly before capture had thrown their weapons into a brook.

In Wultschina 8 juveniles were arrested as partisans and shot. They were inmates of a children's home. They had collected weapons which they hid in the woods. Upon search the following were found: 3 heavy machine guns, 15 rifles, several thousand rounds of ammunition, several hand grenades, and several packages of poison gas Ebrit.

b. Arrests and executions of Communists, Officials and Criminals.

A further large part of the activity of the Security Police was devoted to the combatting of Communists and criminals. A special Commando in the period covered by this report executed 63 officials, NKVD agents and agitators.

In the vicinity of the Tytschinino railway station 4 girls were shot because they attempted to derail a train by loosening the fish-plates.

Three communist officials and one Politruk were liquidated at Gorodnia.

18 persons were executed at Mogilew; they had acted as political officials and Politruk. Weapons were found in their possession.

An Action Commando convicted a member of the Supreme Council of the White Russian Soviet Republic of arson in Witebsk. He was shot.

Blood-Cellar in Tschernigow. In the NKVD building in Tschernigow a blood cellar was discovered. It was soundproof and lightproof. One room served as the place for executions. The wall was covered with boards serving as butts with sawdust strewn in front of it which was completely soaked with blood.

Lunatics. The Red Troops had opened the insane asylum at their departure and had armed some of the inmates. 21 insane persons were apprehended in the meantime and liquidated. In Minsk 632 and in Mogilew 836 persons were shot.

In Mogilew in addition 33 looters were executed.

The liquidations for the period covered by this report have reached a total of 37,180 persons.

* * *

Now as ever, it is to be noted that the population on their own part refrains from any action against Jews. It is true that the population reports collectively of the terror of the Jews to which they were exposed during the time of the-Soviet regime, or they complain about new encroachments of the Jews, but nevertheless, they are not prepared to take part in any pogroms.

All the more vigorous are the actions of the task forces of the Security Police and the SD against the Jews who make it necessary that steps be taken against them in different spheres.

In Gorodnia 165 Jewish terrorists and in Tschernigow 19 Jewish Communists were liquidated. 8 more Jewish communists were shot at Beresna.

It was experienced repeatedly that the Jewish women showed an especially obstinate behavior. For this reason 28 Jewesses had to be shot in Krugoje and 337 at Mogilew.

In Borissow 321 Jewish saboteurs and 118 Jewish looters were executed.

In Bobruisk 380 Jews were shot who had engaged to the last in incitement and horror propaganda (Hetz- und Greuelpropaganda) against the German army of occupation.

In Tatarsk the Jews had left the Ghetto of their own accord and returned to their old home quarters, attempting to expel the Russians who had been quartered there in the meantime. All male Jews as well as 3 Jewesses were shot.

In Sadrudubs the Jews offered some resistance against the establishment of a Ghetto so that 272 Jews and Jewesses had to be shot. Among them was a political Commissar.

* * *

In Mogilew too, the Jews attempted to sabotage their removal to the Ghetto. 113 Jews were liquidated.

* * *

Moreover, four Jews were shot on account of refusal to work and 2 Jews were shot because they had ill-treated wounded German soldiers and because they did not wear the prescribed markings.

In Talka 222 Jews were shot for anti-German propaganda, and in Marina Gorka 996 Jews were shot because they had sabotaged orders issued by the German occupation authorities.

At Schklow 627 more Jews were shot, because they had participated in acts of sabotage.

* * *

On account of the extreme danger of an epidemic, a beginning was made to liquidate the Jews in the ghetto at Witebsk. This involved approximately 3000 Jews.

* * *

a. Partisan activity and counteraction.

Although partisan activity in the south sector is very strong too, there is nevertheless the impression that spreading and effective partisan activity are strongly affected by the flight of higher partisan leaders, and by the lack of initiative of the subordinate leaders who have remained behind. Only in one case a commando of the Security Police and the SD succeeded in a fight with partisans in shooting the Secretary of the Communist Party for the administration district of Nikolajew-Cherson, who was at the time Commissioner of a partisan group for the district Nikolajew-Cherson-Krim.

The leader of a partisan group of five was captured after an exchange of shots near Odessa. He had the task of spotting artillery positions and of reporting them to a Soviet command post.

An action against partisans near Kostromka resulted in the arrest of 16 persons, among them a Politruk, a Unit leader of an annihilation brigade, as well as 3 communist revolutionaries.

The Jew Herschko Salomon, who had belonged to a parachute Defense-Assault battalion, was located at the city hospital in Nikolajew. The screening of PWs resulted in the discovery of 3 Jews who were members of a partisan company.

In Belabanowka the former president of the village soviet, who had attempted to form a partisan group of his own, was arrested.

Furthermore a member of the Polit. Bureau and president of a workers union, at present organizer of partisan groups, was arrested and liquidated.

14 partisans were shot at Kiew.

In the course of an action at Cherson, 2 persons were apprehended who attempted to carry information behind the Bolshevist lines. At the same time the leader of a band of partisans was shot after a lengthy fight.

b. Arrests and Executions of Communists and Officials.

The search for leading communists resulted in the arrest of Kaminski, former GPU chief of Cherson. In the years 1919/21, he had carried out the liquidation of the Czarist officers. The head of the prison work shops of the NKVD was also caught.

In Kiew a number of NKVD officials and political commissars were rendered innocuous.

* * *

The embitterment of the Ukrainian population against the Jews is extremely great, because they are thought responsible for the explosions in Kiew. They are also regarded as informers and agents of the NKVD, who started the terror against the Ukrainian people. As a measure of retaliation for the arson at Kiew, all Jews were arrested and altogether 33,771 Jews were executed on the 29th and the 30th September. Money, valuables and clothing were secured and put at the disposal of the National-Socialist League for Public Welfare [NSV], for the equipment of the National Germans [Volksdeutschen] and partly put at the disposal of the provisional city administration for distribution to the needy population.

* * *

In Shitomir 3145 Jews had to be shot, because from experience they have to be regarded as bearers of Bolshevist propaganda and saboteurs.

* * *

In Cherson 410 Jews were executed as a measure of retaliation for acts of sabotage. Especially in the area east of the Dnjepr the solution of the Jewish question has been taken up energetically by the task forces of the Security Police and the SD. The areas newly occupied by the Commandos were purged of Jews. In the course of this action 4891 Jews were liquidated. At other places the Jews were marked and registered. This rendered it possible to put at the disposal of the Wehrmacht for urgent labor, Jewish worker groups up to 1000 persons.

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#34

Post by David Thompson » 12 Oct 2004, 08:39

19411121 Document: *1104-PS; Description: Memorandum, 11/21/1941, enclosing copies of report concerning anti-Jewish action in Minsk. (USA 483)

"Document 1104-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Agression. Volume III: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1947. pp. 783-789.
The Personal Reviewer of the Permanent Deputy of the Minister of the Reich Berlin, 19/21/1941

Bi/T Nl SX 1/41
Secret
To Dr. Marquart

Enclosed herewith I transmit to you the copy of an incident regarding the measures against the Jews in the general-district of Minsk, with the request to submit the same to the Minister of the Reich.

On order of the Gauleiter I have sent one copy to Lieutenant General of the SS, Heydrich, with the request for investigation of the incident.

signed: BIGENWALD

3 enclosures

*******************************************
The Commissioner General for White Ruthenia
Dept Gauleiter/Ka

Minsk, 11/1/1911

To the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories, Gauleiter Hinrich Lohse, Riga

Today, money, valuables and other objects were deposited at the cashier of my office against receipt, in the present of Government Councillor Dr. Idelberger of the Police Battalion 11. These matters were from Sluzk and other regions which the Police Battalion 11 had included in its action without my order and without my knowledge. All objects and the money have been safely deposited by officials of Commissariat General with the Reich Credit Institute [Reichskreditanstalt] and are held at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner. Reserve officer 1st Lieutenant of the Police Brodeck attempted in the course of this incident to purchase gold for private purposes in order to use it for a personal affair, as witnessed by Government Councillor Dr. Idelberger, my adjutant, SS-2nd Lt Wildenstein and myself.

I have immediately reported the case to the responsible field command post at Minsk and requested the arrest of the police officer. 1st Lt Brodeck was immediately set free by the investigating court martial officer as the court martial officer did not find any basis for charges in this incident. This is contrary to the legal conception of my office. Any private dealing in gold is prohibited in the German Reich. Aggravating in this case is further more the fact that an officer of the same unit is involved which has effected the liquidation of the former possessors of gold.

The Commissioner General for White Ruthenia
signed: KUBE
******************************************
The Commissioner General for White Ruthenia
Dept Gauleiter/Ka

Minsk, 11/1/1941 Personal

To the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories Gauleiter Hinrich LOHSE Riga

Enclosed I submit a report of the Commissioner for the territory of Sluzk, party member Carl, with the request not to let this matter rest. Herewith I propose to prosecute the guilty officers commencing with the battalion commander of the security police to the last lieutenant.

For about the last three weeks, I have discussed the Sluzk action against the Jews with the responsible SS-Brigadier General and Brigadier-General of the Protection Police, Zenner, Member of the Reichstag, and I have pointed out that the tradesmen should be spared by all means and that the commissioner responsible for the territory should be contacted prior to the action. Above all, any act lowering the prestige of the German Reich and its organizations in the eyes of the White Ruthenian population should be avoided.

The police battalion No 11 from Kauen has as a unit, directly subordinate to the armed forces, taken independent action without informing me, the SS-Brigadier-General or any other office of the Commissariat General, thereby impairing most seriously the prestige of the German nation. I request to have the commissioner of the territory Carl and all his officials and collaborators from Riga questioned under oath and to record the hearing. Then, in order to set an example, I request to grant my motion to prosecute the entire staff of officers of the police battalion 11.

I am submitting this report in duplicate so that one copy may be forwarded to the Reich Minister. Peace and order cannot be maintained in White Ruthenia with methods of that sort. To bury seriously wounded people alive who worked their way out of their graves again, is such a base and filthy act that this incident as such should be reported to the Fuehrer and Reich Marshal. The civil administration of White Ruthenia makes very strenuous efforts to win the population over to Germany in accordance with the instructions of the Fuehrer. These efforts cannot be brought in harmony with the methods described herein.

The Commissioner General for White Ruthenia
signed: KUBE


******************************************
Riga 11/11/1941

Original with two enclosures to the Reich minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories Berlin with the request for consideration. It is deemed necessary that higher authority take immediate steps.

By order of The Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories
signed: WICHMANN
******************************************
Copy/T of the copy

The Commissioner of the Territory of Sluzk
Sluzk, 10/30/1941

To the Commissioner General Minsk

Subject: Action against Jews

Referring to the report made by phone on 10/27/1941 I now beg to inform you in writing of the following:

On 10/27/in the morning at about 8 o'clock a first lieutenant of the police battalion No 11 from Kauen (Lithuania) appeared and introduced himself as the adjutant of the battalion commander of the security police. The first lieutenant explained that the police battalion had received the assignment to effect the liquidation of all Jews here in the town of Sluzk, within two days. The battalion commander with his battalion in strength of four companies, two of which were made up of Lithuanian partisans, was on the march here and the action would have to begin instantly. I replied to the first lieutenant that I had to discuss the action in any case first with the commander. About half an hour later the police battalion arrived in Sluzk. Immediately after the arrival the conference with the battalion commander took place according to my request. I first explained to the commander that it would not very well be possible to effect the action without previous preparation, because everybody had been sent to work and that it would lead to terrible conclusion. At least it would have been his duty to inform me a day ahead of time. Then I requested him to postpone the action one day. However, he rejected this with the remark that he had to carry out this action everywhere and in all towns and that only two days were allotted for Sluzk. Within these two days, the town of Sluzk had to be cleared of Jews by all means. I immediately protested violently against it, pointing out that a liquidation of Jews must not be allowed to take place in an arbitrary manner. I explained that a large part of the Jews still living in the towns were tradesmen and families of tradesmen respectively. But these Jewish tradesmen were not simply expendable because they were indispensable for maintaining the economic life. Furthermore, I pointed out that White Ruthenian tradesmen are so to say non-existent, that therefore all vital plants had to be shut down all at once, if all Jews would be liquidated. At the end of our conference, I mentioned that all tradesmen and specialists, inasmuch as they were indispensable, had papers of identification and that these should not be pulled out of the factories. Furthermore, it was agreed that all Jews still living in the town should first be brought into the ghetto in order to segregate them, especially with regard to the families of tradesmen which I did not want to have liquidated either. Two of my officials should be assigned to segregate them. The commander did not in any way contradict my idea and I had therefore the firm belief that the action would be carried out accordingly. However, a few hours after the beginning of the action the greatest difficulties already developed. I noticed that the commander had not at all abided by our agreement. All Jews without exception were taken out of the factories and shops and deported in spite of our agreement. It is true that part of the Jews was moved y way of the ghetto where many of them were processed and still segregated by me, but a large part was loaded directly on trucks and liquidated without further delay outside of the town. Shortly after noon complaints came already from all sides that the factories could not function any more because all Jewish tradesmen had been removed. As the commander had proceeded on his way to Baranowitschi I got in touch with the deputy commander, a captain, after searching a long time, and demanded to stop the action immediately because my instructions had been disregarded and the damage done so far with respect to the economic life could not be repaired any more. The captain was greatly surprised at my idea and stated that he had received orders from the commander to clear the whole town of Jews without exception in the same manner as they had done in other towns. This mopping up had to be executed on political considerations and economic reasons had never played a role anywhere. However, due to my energetic intervention, he finally halted the action toward evening.

For the rest, as regards the execution of the action, I must point out to my deepest regret that the latter bordered already on sadism. The town itself offered a picture of horror during the action. With indescribable brutality on the part of both the German police officers and particularly the Lithuanian partisans, the Jewish people, but also among them White Ruthenians, were taken out of their dwellings and herded together. Everywhere in the town shots were to be heard and in different streets the corpses of shot Jews accumulated. The White Ruthenians were in greatest distress to free themselves from the encirclement. Regardless of the fact that the Jewish people, among whom were also tradesmen, were mistreated in a terribly barbarous way in the face of the White Ruthenian people, the White Ruthenians themselves were also worked over with rubber clubs and rifle butts. There was no question of an action against the Jews any more. It rather looked like a revolution. I myself with all my officials have been in it without interruption all day long in order to save what could yet be saved. In several instances I literally had to expel with drawn pistol the German police officials as well as the Lithuanian partisans from the shops. My own police was employed for the same mission but had often to leave the streets on account of the wild shooting in order to avoid being shot themselves. The whole picture was generally more than ghastly. In the afternoon a great number of abandoned Panje carriages with horses were standing in the streets so that I had to instruct the municipal administration to take care of the vehicles immediately. Afterwards it was ascertained that they were Jewish vehicles ordered by the armed forces to move ammunition. The drivers had simply been- taken off the carriages and led away, and nobody had worried in the least about the vehicles.

I was not present at the shooting before the town. Therefore I cannot make a statement on its brutality. But it should suffice, if I point out that persons shot have worked themselves out of their graves some time after they had been covered. Regarding the economic damage I want to state that the tannery has been affected worst of all. 26 experts worked there. Of them, fifteen of the best specialists alone have been shot. Four more jumped from the truck during the transport and escaped, while seven others were not apprehended after they fled.
The plant barely continues to operate today. Five wheelwrights worked in the wheelwright shop. Four of them have been shot and the shop has to keep going now with one wheelwright. Additional tradesmen such as carpenters, blacksmiths, etc. are still missing. Up till now it was impossible for me to obtain an exact survey. I have mentioned already in the beginning, that the families of tradesmen should be spared too. But now it seems that almost in all families some persons are missing. Reports come in from all over, making it clear that in one family the tradesman himself, in another family the wife and in the next one again the children are missing. In that way, almost all families have been broken up. It seems to be very doubtful whether under these circumstances the remaining tradesmen will show any interest in their work and produce accordingly, particularly as even today they are running around with bloody and bruised faces due to the brutality. The White Ruthenian people who had full confidence in us, are dumbfounded. Though they are intimidated and don't dare to utter their free opinion, one has already heard that they take the viewpoint that this day does not add to the glory of Germany and that it will not be forgotten. I am of the opinion that much has been destroyed through this action which we have achieved during the last months and that it will take a long time until we shall regain the confidence of the population which we have lost.

In conclusion I find myself obliged to point out that the police battalion has looted in an unheard of manner during the action, and that not only in Jewish houses but just the same in those of the White Ruthenians. Anything of use such as boots, leather, cloth, gold and other valuables, has been taken away. On the basis of statements of members of the armed forces, watches were torn off the arms of Jews in public, on the street, and rings were pulled off the fingers in the most brutal manner. A major of the finance department reported that a Jewish girl was asked by the police to obtain immediately 5000 rubles to have her father released. This girl is said to have actually gone everywhere in order to obtain the money.

Also within the ghetto, the different barracks which had been nailed up by the civil administration and were furnished with Jewish furniture, have been broken open and robbed. Even from the barracks in which the unit was quartered, window frames and doors have been forcibly removed and used for campfires. Although I had a discussion with the adjutant of the commander on Tuesday morning concerning the looting and he promised in the course of the discussion that none of the policemen would enter the town any more, yet I was forced several hours later to arrest two fully armed Lithuanian partisans because they were apprehended looting. During the night from Tuesday to Wednesday the battalion left the town in the direction of Baranowitschi. Evidently the people were only too glad when this report circulated in the town.

So far the report. I shall come to Minsk in the immediate future, in order to discuss the affair personally once again. At the present time, I am not in a position to continue with the action against the Jews. First, order has to be established again. I hope that I shall be able to restore order as soon as possible and also to revive the economic life despite the difficulties. Only, I beg you to grant me one request: "In the future, keep this police battalion away from me by all means."

signed: CARL

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#35

Post by David Thompson » 12 Oct 2004, 08:54

19411126 Document: *D-411; Description: Letters of 11/26/1941 and 11/28/1941, enclosing orders concerning protection of troops against Partisans and sabotage. (USA 556)

"Document D-411: Protection Of Troops Against Partisans And Sabotage [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume VII: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1947. pp. 49-53.
SECRET.

12th Infantry Division
Int. Sec. No. 607/41
Secret

Int 54/816/41 Secr.
Received 11/27/1941.
Div. H.Q. 26th Nov. 1941.

To: The General Command of H.Q. 2nd Army Corps Ic.

Enclosed the divisional intelligence section sends a secret order dated 11/17/1941 concerning combatting of partisans. For information.

For Div. H.Q. Chief of the General Staff [Signed] WEISER [ ?] Adj.

1 enclosure.

**************************************************
Div. H.Q. 11/17/1941.

12th Infantry Division
Section Ic/Ia/Adj.
No. 607/41 sch.

Subject: Protection of Troops against Partisans and Sabotage.

Reference: C.-i-C. ArmyGen. Staff of the Army. "Ausb." section (Ia) No. 1900/41 dated 10/25/1941.

I. The conduct of the troops in the Eastern territories (see enclosure: secret order by Field Marshal v. Reichenau, dated 10/10/1941)

II. Herewith enclosure 1, a blueprint of a captured map 1:100000 Sheet no. 0-36-XI (West) Demjansk (the original was not sent to H.Q. 2nd Army Corps).

This print contains the defence areas allotted to regiments and independent detachments of the Division.

The Commanders of the units in question are responsible for the carrying and of the cleaning up of partisans in these areas and their permanent control. They regulate the employment of troops at their disposal in the area. In case of the appearance of partisans, Ic and neighbour will be notified. The anti-tank company in Igoghewo and 12 Detachment of the field military police --excluding the squad attached to the Adjutant -- will be at the disposal of Quartermaster Section in their area.

2. The surrounding area of villages, paths and roads will be kept under control also at night by patrols and occasional snap controls.

3. The Commanders will consider the employment of local commanders in the occupied villages and will submit their names to the division.

In all places of their defence area even when not occupied, after scrutinizing the local conditions, village elders (natschalniks) will be installed, if this has not yet been done. The notifications handed out by the Ic Section of the division will be hung up even in places which are not occupied. The exhibition of these notifications must be constantly checked.

4. The village-elders will be directed to compile lists of the population in which all strangers -- with the date of their arrival -- will be shown particularly. The houses of every place are to be numbered in an easily visible manner, and the number of their inhabitants to be listed with special columns for men, women and children. Check through snap roll calls. Strangers will be reported to the competent Command by the village elders. Collective punitive measures will be carried out immediately for noncompliance with these orders (in serious cases the shooting of the responsible inhabitants, in lighter cases their arrest and the confiscation of foodstuff etc.) For this the order of a Commander (C.O. BN) is necessary.

5. The travelling of Russians -- men, women or children -- on roads will be stopped. The leaving of villages is allowed only in exceptional cases (of economic nature) with the written approval of the Garrison Commander. Such permits must bear the date of the day, the route to be covered and place to be visited. The validity of the pass will on principle be not longer than one day. A record of issued permits is to be kept. The permits will be returned on the day of expiration. Threat of penalties for the nonreturning of permits! All persons found on the high roads without a permit will be arrested. Every soldier has the duty of arresting civilians. Caution when approaching. Every suspected civilian in the battle area will be ruthlessly shot.

6. Civilians living in dug-outs in the woods will be accommodated in inhabited localities or in certain cases in dugouts in the immediate vicinity of inhabited localities.

7. The following will be shot as partisans: Russian soldiers in uniform and mufti who did not report to the nearest Garrison Command or to the military authorities by the 20.11. and those civilians who are found on the high roads without a permit and who do not belong to the nearest
village.

Apart from that, those civilians found in possession of arms of any kind or explosives.

8. The population is to be encouraged to cooperate -- by rewards. (See special orders concerning supplies No. 60 dated 8/30/1941)

9. The shooting or hanging of partisans and such elements who support partisans and who are in possession of arms will take place in the locality where they have been encountered. If possible, persons concerned should be interrogated first -- about their organization and leaders.

Special distribution: 39

Appendix to 12 Inf.Div. I.c/Adj.

******************************************
No. 607/41
Secret date 11/17/1941.
Copy of a Copy
High Command of the Army
Gen. Staff of the Army/Quarter
Master General Branch Admin.

H.Qu. High Command of the Army
10/28/1941.

(Qu.4/B) II. 7498/41 g.

Subject: Conduct of Troops in the Eastern Territories

By order of the C.in C. Army, an enclosed copy of an order by G.O.C. 6th Army on the conduct of the Troops in eastern territories which has been described by the Fuehrer as excellent, is being forwarded with the request to issue corresponding instructions on the same lines if this has not already been done.

By order.
[signed] Wagner
Army H.Q., 10.10.41

************************************************
Army Command 6.
Sec. IaAZ.7

Subject: Conduct of Troops in Eastern Territories.

Regarding the conduct of troops towards the bolshevistic system, vague ideas are still prevalent in many cases. The most essential aim of war against the Jewish-bolshevistic system is a complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination of asiatic influence from the European culture. In this connection the troops are facing tasks which exceed the one-sided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the eastern territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of the art of war but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted upon German and racially related nations.

Therefore the soldier must have full understanding for the necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The Army has to aim at another purpose, i.e. the annihilation of revolts in hinterland which, as experience proves, have always been caused by Jews.

The combatting of the enemy behind the front line is still not being taken seriously enough. Treacherous, cruel partisans and unnatural women are still being made prisoners of war and guerilla fighters dressed partly in uniforms or plain clothes and vagabonds are still being treated as proper soldiers, and sent to prisoner of war camps. In fact, captured Russian officers talk even mockingly about Soviet agents moving openly about the roads and very often eating at German field kitchens. Such an attitude of the troops can only be explained by complete thoughtlessness, so it is now high time for the commanders to clarify the meaning of the present struggle.

The feeding of the natives and of prisoners of war who are not working for the Armed Forces from Army Kitchens is an equally misunderstood humanitarian act as is the giving of cigarettes and bread. Things which the people at home can spare under great sacrifices and things which are being brought by the Command to the front under great difficulties, should not be given to the enemy by the soldier not even if they originate from booty. It is an important part of our supply.

When retreating the Soviets have often set buildings on fire. The troops should be interested in extinguishing of fires only as far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of billets. Otherwise the disappearance of symbols of the former bolshevistic rule even in the form of buildings is part of the struggle of destruction. Neither historic nor artistic considerations are of any importance in the eastern territories. The command issues the necessary directives for the securing of raw materials and plants, essential for war economy. The complete disarming of the civil population in the rear of the fighting troops is imperative considering the long and vulnerable lines of communications. Where possible, captured weapons and ammunition should be stored and guarded. Should this be impossible because of the situation of the battle so the weapons and ammunition will be rendered useless. If isolated partisans are found using firearms in the rear of the army drastic measures are to be taken. These measures will be extended to that part of the male population who were in a position to hinder or report the attacks. The indifference of numerous apparently anti-soviet elements which originates from a "wait and see" attitude, must give way to a clear decision for active collaboration. If not, no one can complain about being judged and is treated a member of the Soviet System.

The fear of the German counter-measures must be stronger than the threats of the wandering bolshevistic remnants. Being far from all political considerations of the future the soldier has to fulfill two tasks:

1. Complete annihilation of the false bolshevistic doctrine of the Soviet State and its armed forces.

2. The pitiless extermination of foreign treachery and cruelty and thus the protection of the lives of military personnel in Russia.

This is the only way to fulfill our historic task to liberate the German people once for ever from the Asiatic-Jewish danger.

Commander in Chief
[signed] von Reichenau
Field Marshal.

Certified Copy:
signed [illegible]
Captain.

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#36

Post by David Thompson » 12 Oct 2004, 09:10

19411214 Document: *1517-PS Memorandum from Rosenberg concerning discussion with the Fuehrer, 14 December 1941. (USA 824)

"Document 1517-PS [translation]" in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume IV: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1947. pp. 55-58.
TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM About Discussions [of Rosenberg] with the Fuehrer on 14 December 1941

To begin with, I [Rosenberg] asked the Fuehrer about my speech in the Sportpalast and referred to several points which seemed to call for further discussion. The Fuehrer was of the opinion that the speech was given prior to the declaration of war by Japan and therefore under different suppositions, but in view of this, still desires to think over several points. It probably would not be appropriate if I were to officially say that the provinces in the East were to remain under Germany. I said thereupon that I, too, had considered this point, that one can probably only say that the Eastern Provinces [Ostland] will remain under German protection. The Fuehrer was of the opinion, only to go so far that the provinces never would come under communism now from the German side appear as secured.

I remarked on the Jewish question that the comments about the New York Jews must perhaps be changed somewhat after the conclusion (of matters in the East). I took the standpoint, not to speak of the extermination [Ausrottung] of the Jews. The Fuehrer affirmed this and said that they had burdened the war upon us and that they had brought the destruction; it is no wonder if the results would strike them first.

The Fuehrer further said that he did not deem it necessary to order forth the other nations to contribute as yet, since they can produce therein a legal claim for later. He does that from time to time in single negotiations. I told him that I, too, had written that down as a question. I would comply with these instructions to edit more carefully the corresponding paragraphs in my speech. The Fuehrer agreed throughout that I had touched upon the Asiatic conflict.

Following, I laid before the Fuehrer the outline of a religious tolerance decree, to which the Fuehrer consented after careful consideration.

Then I came to talk about the lecture of Professor Schuessler, to whom Dr. Dietrich had given instructions to evaluate the political testament of Peter the Great in an address. Dr. Dietrich had not previously informed me thereon. Upon my indication that this testament is a forgery out of the 18th Century, the Fuehrer thought that the authenticity was contradicted by a German scholar in the 19th Century. Thereupon I pointed out that this so-called testament was written in Polish circles and that it then was converted and changed by Napoleon in the political strife. However, I would make an accurate check. I asked the Fuehrer for a general rule that if the Fuehrer had specific desires over the press to have Dr. Dietrich inform me of these to insure a regulated working arrangement.

The Fuehrer replied to the question by the military commanders in the occupied Eastern territories about the marriage of persons belonging to the Armed Forces with inhabitants of these territories that no marriages will be permitted during this war. After the war a relaxation could be introduced to agree with the political limits and blood relationship.

I then spoke about the relation with Reich Commissioner Koch and told the Fuehrer that Koch had, through various declarations, created the impression among the officers of the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) as if he dealt directly with the Fuehrer and otherwise decided to rule without Berlin. Similar utterances that he made the law were made to collaborators and he also told me once that he regarded himself as coordinated. I made it clear to him that here exists a distinct official relation. I spoke with him regarding the above and I hope that clarification over the cooperation will result. I have only the wish that the Fuehrer no longer will receive Koch alone but only in my presence. The Fuehrer agreed immediately.

Then I told the Fuehrer of the visit by General Kitzinger, who said that he was assigned with the thrashing of the harvest. For this purpose he was promised several divisions which have not yet arrived. Moreover, they took from him other units. The Fuehrer said that he would see to it that a change will be enforced and that divisions will be given him. On the conditions of the captured prisoners Kitzinger remarked that because of malnutrition [Entkraeftung] in the camps in his territory, some 2500 prisoners die daily. Anyhow, they are already unable to consume good food and one must count on it that not very many will remain. Aside from that, the manpower in the country is large enough -- the land even partly over-populated.

I further asked the Fuehrer if he had scrutinized the memoir on the establishment of Turkish legions. What I surmise, since the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) issued an order, is that beside the Turkish-Aserbeidschander Legion, other Caucasian legions will be set up also. The Fuehrer affirmed the question, and I once more referred to the danger of a panturanian movement. I reported further about the petition of the Crimean tartars from Constantinople and the request to visit the prison camps and to inspect the countrymen. I told the Fuehrer that I had denied this request which he absolutely affirmed. The only thing one could do would be to segregate the 250 captured Crimean tartars with respect to Turkey, and to handle them accordingly. In conclusion, the Fuehrer once more emphasized that he later wished to have the Crimea cleaned out. I told him that I, too, had given much consideration to the renaming of the towns and thought to rename Simferopol to Gotenburg and Sevastopol to Theodorichhafen -- this according to the instructions of the Fuehrer himself.

Then I suggested a boundary settlement between Nikolajew and Transministry to the Fuehrer, because the way things are, the Rumanians can look into all the ship-building installations; just an insignificant regulation will prevent this. I had also made this suggestion to General Field Marshal Keitel. The Fuehrer looked at the map and agreed to such a boundary regulation.

Finally, I told the Fuehrer that I had in mind to go to Riga in January and to visit other territories during the next year. I begged the Fuehrer to allow me to obtain several coaches for a special train. I have already started dealings over the procurement of such coaches in Holland. The Fuehrer thought this all right and agreed with my wish.

Thereupon I gave the Fuehrer an aforementioned letter of a Japanese scholar over the Japanese and National Socialistic Philosophy of Life as related to Christianity, over which we talked for a long time. The Fuehrer took the memoir with him, which immediately engrossed him.

Berlin, 16 December 1941 R/H
Last edited by David Thompson on 23 Jan 2005, 00:37, edited 1 time in total.

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#37

Post by David Thompson » 12 Oct 2004, 09:24

19420000 Document: *2273-PS; Description: Extract from a top secret report of Einsatz Group A. (USA 487)

"Document 2273-PS [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume IV: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1947. pp. 944-948.
Draft

TOP SECRET [Geheime Reichssache]

SPECIAL PURPOSE GROUP "A" [Einsatzgruppe A]

* * *
III. Jews

The systematic mopping up of the Eastern Territories embraced, in accordance with the basic orders, the complete removal if possible, of Jewry. This goal has been substantially attained -- with the exception of White Russia -- as a result of the execution up to the present time of 229,052 Jews (see Appendix). The remainder still left in the Baltic Provinces is urgently required as labour and housed in Ghettos.

To attain this object various kinds of measures were necessary in the different areas of the [Ostland].

In the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Jewry did not make itself decisively felt until the Bolsheviks had come into power there. But even before that the Jewish influence on the one hand and the anti-Jewish feeling of the population on the other hand, were very strong.

In the following the various areas of the Eastern Territories will be dealt with separately:

1. Estonia

As Estonia, until the middle of the last century, was part of a closed zone of the Russian Empire, into which it was forbidden for Jews to immigrate, the number of Jews in the country has always been insignificant.

At the beginning of 1940 there were living in Estonia about 4500 Jews out of a total population of 1.2 millions. Their influence on the economic life of the country was considerably stronger than the proportion of Jews to the whole population. For instance 11% of Estonian industry was in Jewish hands. During the Bolshevik time it is true Jewish private property was nationalized, but nevertheless the Jews themselves were almost everywhere left as Directors of their former enterprises. By means of connections with the NKWD the Jews got themselves into a very strong position. They controlled the Press, cultural institutions, forced their way into the open professions, and were the only minority besides the Germans to have the right to cultural autonomy.

With the advance of the German troops the majority of the Jews, together with the Soviet-Russian authorities, left the country. Approx. 2000 Jews remained behind in the country. Out of these almost 1000 lived in Reval alone.

The Estonian Self Protection Movement [Selbstschutz], formed as the Germans advanced, did begin to arrest Jews, but there were no spontaneous pogroms. Only by the Security Police and the SD were the Jews gradually executed as they became no longer required for work.

Today there are no longer any Jews in Estonia.

2. Latvia

The total number of Jews in Latvia amounted in 6/1935 to 93479 or 4.79% of the total population.

When the Bolsheviks came into power in Latvia in 6/1940, their Soviet-Russian racial comrades succeeded in obtaining authoritative influence for the Latvian Jews, who previously had been predominantly Zionist. Whereas before 1940 there were no Jews as State officials in Latvia, in fact were no Jews in the State Administration at all, in the Soviet Russian Republic all the influential State positions were quickly in the hands of the Jews. Half of the total number of Judges were Jewish. The number was up to 80% in the Higher Courts and in particular on the Tribunal. Equally strong was the influence of the Jews on the economy and cultural life.

When the German troops marched in there were still 70000 Jews in Latvia. The remainder had fled with the Bolsheviks. The Jews left behind were actively engaged in sabotage and setting fire to places. In Duenaburg so many fires of this kind were started by the Jews that a large part of the Town was destroyed.

After the terror of the Jewish-Bolshevik rule -- altogether 33038 Letts were transported, imprisoned or murdered -- an extensive pogrom carried out by the population might have been expected. In fact, however, only a few thousand Jews were eliminated by local forces on their own initiative. In Latvia it was necessary to carry out extensive mopping-up operations by means of Sonderkommandos with the help of forces picked from the Latvian Auxiliary Police (mostly relations of the Letts who had been carried off or murdered).

Up to 10/1941 approximately 30000 Jews had been executed by these Sonderkommandos. The remaining Jews who were still indispensable from the economic point of view were collected in Ghettos, which were established in Riga, Duenaburg and Libau.

As a result of punishments instituted for not wearing the Jewish star, black market, thieving, fraud, but also to prevent the danger of epidemics in the Ghettos, further executions were subsequently carried out. In this way 11,034 Jews were executed in Duenaburg on 9.11.41, and, as the result of an action ordered and carried out by high authorities and Police chiefs, 27800 were executed in Riga at the beginning of 12/1941, and, in the middle of 12/1941, 2350 were executed in Libau. At the moment there are in the Ghettos (other than Jews from the Reich) Latvian Jews in Riga approximately 2500 Duenaburg approximately 950 Libau approximately 300.

These are indispensable at the moment as they are specialized workers necessary for maintaining the country's economy.

3. Lithuania

Until the Bolsheviks marched in, according to a census taken in 1923 there were 153743 Jews living in Lithuania, forming 7.58% of the total population. Whereas their influence had previously for the greater part been restricted to the business world, the Lithuanian Jews, who had already been working illegally for Bolshevism, now quickly became a dominating influence in public life. In particular Jews of both sexes supported the activities of the NKWD. The transporting of 40000 Lithuanians to Siberia is traceable to the preliminary work done by the Jews.

When the German troops marched in the Lithuanians expressed their hatred of the Jews in active pogroms, at the same time Jewish communist youths set fire to many towns, through which the German armoured units had passed leaving them little damaged, by means of tins of petrol which they had previously put ready.

As a result of the pogroms carried out by the Lithuanians, who were nevertheless substantially assisted by Sipo and SD, 3800 Jews in Kauen and 1200 in the smaller towns were eliminated.

Where Jews were able to escape they were not infrequently handed over to the authorities by the farmers.

These spontaneous mopping-up actions were, however, insufficient to stabilize this rear section of the Front, and at the same time the enthusiasm of the local inhabitants waned

Therefore by means of selected units -- mostly in the proportion of 1:8 -- first of all the prisons, and then systematically district by district the Lithuanian sector was cleansed of Jews of both sexes. Altogether 136,421 people were liquidated in a great number of single actions. It is worthy of note that many of the Jews used force against the officials and Lithuanian auxiliaries who were carrying this out, and before their execution still expressed their Bolshevik convictions by cheering Stalin and abusing Germany.

As the complete liquidation of the Jews was not feasible as they were needed for labour, Ghettos were formed which at the moment are occupied as follows:

Kauen approximately 15000 Jews.

Wilna approximately 15000 Jews.

Schaulen approximately 4500 Jews.

These Jews are used primarily for work of military importance. For example up to 5000 Jews are employed in 3 shifts on the aerodrome near Kauen on earth-works and work of that sort.

4. White Russia

The White Russian Sector is more thickly populated by Jews than all the other States in the Ostland. In the year 1926, far more than 400000 Jews were counted in the then BSSR. The last Polish census showed more than 500000 Jews in the provinces [Wojwodschaften] of Bialystock, Nowo Grodlek, Polesien and Wilna. These figures are however approximate and most certainly too low, which is further apparent from the fact that far more people have given "Yiddish" as their mother tongue than there were supposed to be Jews counted in the same area. Quite half of the Jews in the White Russian Settlement Area lived at the beginning of the war in the larger towns. Minsk was occupied to a very particular extent by Jews, in 1939 there were approximately 100000 out of a total population of 238000.

The social structure of the Jews shows a broad lower stratum of very poor Jews, both in the area formerly Polish, and in the White Russian Sector which was Bolshevik before the Russo-Polish war.

The proportionately thin upper stratum dominated simply every sphere of life in the former Polish sector, mainly as a result of its strong economic position, and in the former Soviet-Russian sector as a result of their influence in the leading party positions. The Jew in the area formerly Polish is a particularly dangerous element, because of his intelligence and activity. But even the Soviet-Russian Jew has during the 25 years of Bolshevik domination assumed a very self-sufficient and arrogant air, which he has even retained after the entry of the German troops.

The final and fundamental elimination of the Jews remaining in the White Russian sector after the entry of the Germans is fraught with certain difficulties. Just in this place the Jews form an extremely high percentage of the specialized workers, who are indispensable because of the shortage in other reserves in this area.

Furthermore Einsatzgruppe A did not take over this area until after the heavy frost had set in, which made mass executions much more difficult. A further difficulty is that the Jews live widely scattered over the whole country. In view of the enormous distances, the bad conditions of the roads, the shortage of vehicles and petrol and the small forces of Security Police and SD, it needs the utmost effort in order to be able to carry out shootings in the country. Nevertheless 41000 Jews have been shot up to now. This number does not include those shot in operations by the former Einsatzkommandos. From estimated figures about 19000 partisans and criminals, that is in the majority Jews, were shot by the Armed Forces [Wehrmacht] up to 12/1941. At the moment approximately 128000 Jews must still be reckoned with in the area of the Commissariat-General. In Minsk itself exclusive of Reich Germans -- there are about 1,800 Jews living, whose shooting must be postponed in consideration of their being used as labour.

The Commander in White Russia is instructed to liquidate the Jewish question as soon as possible, despite the difficult situation. However a period of about 2 months is still required -- according to the weather.

The shutting up of all the remaining Jews in special Ghettos is also almost completed in the towns in White Russia too. They will be used for work to the fullest extent by the authorities of the Armed Forces, the Civil Administration and German Authorities.

The feeding of the Jews in the Ghettos causes considerable difficulty, especially in White Russia but also in Lithuania. Together with the general decrease in working capacity, there is increased susceptibility to all contagious diseases.

5. Jews from the Reich.

Since 12/1940 [1941] transports containing Jews have arrived at short intervals from the Reich. Of these 20000 Jews were directed to Riga and 7000 Jews to Minsk. The first 10000 Jews evacuated to Riga were housed partly in a provisionally erected reception camp and partly in a newly established hut encampment near Riga. The remaining transports have for the time being been directed into a separate part of the Riga Ghetto.

The building of the hut encampment, as a result of the employment of all Jews fit for work, is so advanced that all evacuated Jews who survive the winter can be put into this camp in the spring.

Only a small section of the Jews from the Reich is capable of working. About 70-80% are women and children or old people unfit for work. The death rate is rising continually, also as a result of the extraordinarily hard winter.

The amount done by those few Jews from the Reich who are fit for work is satisfactory. They are preferred as Tabour to the Russian Jews, because they are German speaking and because of their comparatively greater cleanliness. Worthy of note is the adaptability of the Jews, with which they attempt to form their life in 'accordance with the circumstances.

The crowding together of the Jews into the smallest space, which occurs in all the Ghettos, naturally causes greater danger of epidemics, which is being combatted as much as possible by the employment of Jewish doctors. In isolated instances sick Jews with contagious diseases were selected under the pretext of putting them into a home for the aged or a hospital and executed.

CHART

[See Chart Number 4 in the last volume of this publication]

Judenfrei free of Jews

Jewish Executions carried out by Special Purpose Group A.

Estimated number of Jews still remaining 128000.

David Thompson
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#38

Post by David Thompson » 13 Oct 2004, 00:29

19420202 Document: 833-PS; Description: Instructions by Admiral Canaris, Head of the Abwehr, 2/2/1942, concerning prosecution of crimes against the Reich or occupying forces in the occupied territories.

"Document 2273-PS [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume III: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1947. pp. 599-602.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 833–PS

SECRET

High Command of the Armed Forces Berlin,
2 February 1942
Foreign Office/Intelligence.
Dept. III No. 570/1.42 g (ZR/ III C 2
Subject: Prosecution of crimes against the Reich or the occupying forces in the occupied territories

Wehrm. High Command
7 Feb. 1942
No. 221 / 42 g

further:
to: 149/10 10 Reference: None
Inclosures: 3

In the enclosure are transmitted

1. a decree of the Fuehrer and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of 7.12.41

2. an executory decree of the same day

3. a circular of the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command of 12.12.41

The decree carries a basic innovation. The Fuehrer and commander in chief of the armed forces commands that crimes of the specified sort committed by civilians of the occupied territories are to be punished by the pertinent courts martial in the occupied territories only when

(a) The sentence calls for the death penalty and

(b) the sentence is pronounced within 8 days after the arrest.

Only when both conditions are met does the Fuehrer and commander in chief of the armed forces hope for the desired deterrent effect from the conduct of punitive proceedings in the occupied territories.

In other cases in the future the accused are to be secretly brought to Germany and the further conduct of the trial carried on here. The deterrent effect of these measures lies

(a) in allowing the disappearance of the accused without a trace,

(b) therein, that no information whatsoever may be given about their whereabouts and their fate.

This decree brings only insignificant changes of their activity to the intelligence [Abwehr] agencies. Now as before the intelligence agencies determine the time for the arrest of the espionage and sabotage suspect. However, in conjunction with es-

600

833–PS

tablishment of the time it must however be considered now that previous to the arrest evidence fully sufficient for the conviction of the perpetrator must if possible be on hand, for further investigation hardly comes into question after the seizure, since a sentence must take place within 8 days, or on the other hand further investigation on the spot by confrontation is made impossible by the evacuation of the prisoners to Germany.
Therefore contact should be made with the pertinent military court previous to the arrest in order to check on the question as to whether or not the collected evidence suffices.
When in the opinion of the pertinent court martial and/or the military commander an immediate conviction on the spot is not possible, and the perpetrators are therefore to be evacuated to Germany, the intelligence agencies will inform Reich security headquarters [Reichssicherheitshauptamt] in Berlin SW 11, Prinz Albrecht-Str. 8, attention of Herr Kriminaldirektor Fischer, directly, with a statement of the exact number of prisoners and the groups that belong together according to the circumstances of the individual case. Insofar as in individual cases the superior commander has an urgent interest in the conviction by a Wehrmacht court, this will be brought to the attention of Reich security head-quarters. A copy of the whole report to Reich security headquarters is to be sent to the Foreign Office/Intelligence, Intelligence Department III.

The Reich security headquarters will determine a state police office, depending on accommodation possibilities, which will take over the prisoners. This state police office makes contact with the proper intelligence office and arranges the details of the evacuation, particularly if it will be handled by the secret military police, military police, or by the Gestapo itself, as well as manner and place of transfer of subjects.
The decree of the Fuehrer is to be applied, to begin with, only in the occupied western territories (Norway, Netherlands, Belgium, and Northern France, France).
The intelligence agencies must make report to the chief of staff on the above regulations decreed by the foreign office intelligencer. For the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command

Signature :
CANARIS

Distribution:
To (Intelligence III) 127
For information:
West (Armed Forces Operational staff.) 1
WR 15

601

833—PS

Foreign Office Intelligence Z, ZR 2
Foreign Department 1
Intelligence III
W, H, M, Air
FPdW, F, C, C1, C2, each 1: 9 [Total]
Wi 1
U 2
Reich Security Headquarters, Department IV E, attention of Kriminaldirektor Fischer 1
Original 1
Supply 40
[Total =] 200

David Thompson
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#39

Post by David Thompson » 13 Oct 2004, 01:26

19420216 Document: *R-112; Description: Orders issued by Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German nationhood, 2/16/1942, 7/1/1942, 7/28/1942. (USA 309)

Title: "Document R-112 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume VIII: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1947. pp. 108-121.
[DOCUMENT A.]

Berlin, 2/16/1942

The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police
The Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood.
S II A 2
Nr. 420/VII/41176


The Reich Governors in the Reich "Gaue" Wartha Country and Danzig-West Prussia, The Province Presidents at Breslau, Katowice and Koenigsberg, The State Police District Offices at Danzig, Poznan and Katowice, The State Police Offices at Tilsit, Zichenau, Allenstein, Grudziaz, Bydgosz, Inowrazlaw, Litzmannstadt, Oppeln.


The Reich Commissioners for the Consolidation of German Nationhood-Staff Headquarters, Department I, Reich Ministry of the Interior, The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer at Koenigsberg, Danzig, Poznan, Breslau, The Security Service Districts at Inowrazlaw, Lwow, Torun Tilsit, Zichenau, The Security Service Districts at Danzig, Katowice, Poznan, The Security Service Main Local Branches at Allenstein, Oppeln, Departments III B 1, IV C 2, IV D 2 of the Security Service Main Office

Subject: Racial Germans who do not apply for entry in the List for Repatriation of German Ethnic Groups ("German Ethnical List")

I. Where Racial Germans have not applied for entry in the -"German Ethnical List", you will instruct the subordinate agencies to turn over their names to the State Police (Superior) Office. Subsequently you will report to me.

II. The Local State Police (Superior) Office, will charge the persons whose names are turned over to them to prove within eight days that they have applied for entry in the "German Ethnical List". If such proof is not submitted, the person in question is to be taken into protective custody for transfer into a Concentration Camp.

(signed) HIMMLER

[seal] A true copy
(signed) Kippsch Clerk
*********************************************************

[DOCUMENT B.]

The Reichs Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police
Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood
II A 2
Nr. 420 VII/41176
Berlin, Feb.16.1942

To

a. The Supreme Reich Authorities, 10 copies
b. The Governments of the German States, Prussia excepted, 10 copies
c. The Reich Governors, 10 copies
d. The "Gauleiters", 10 copies
e. The Presidents of Provinces and Districts in Prussia, 10 copies
f. The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer, 10 copies
g. The State Police (Superior) Offices, 3 copies

INFORMATION TO

h. Department I, Reich Ministry of the Interior, 10 copies
i. The Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood, Staff Headquarters, 10 copies
j. Main Trustee Office East, 10 copies
k. The Inspectors of Security Police and Security Service, 5 copies.
l. Reich Main Security Office for distribution sub-C
m. The Security Service (Superior) Districts
n. The Criminal Police (Superior) Offices.

Subject: Treatment of persons entered in Division 4 of the German Ethnical List.

According to the powers given to me by the Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the Consolidation of German Nationhood of 7.10.89, and exercising furthermore the powers held by me as Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, and attributed to me
by the Decree of the Fuehrer's Deputy A 7/41 of 26.2.1941, and with the consent of the Party Chancery, the Finance Minister and the Main Trustee Office East, I order as follows:

I. In Division 4 of the German Ethnical List (Ordinance concerning the List for the Repatriation of German Ethnic Groups and the German nationality within the incorporated areas in the East of 4.3.1941(German Law Gazette I p. 118))will be entered those racial Germans who had been Polandized on their own instigation. They may acquire German nationality by naturalization with a proviso for revocation. These Germans who were Polandized on their own application and their children are to be won back for Germany. Where this aim cannot be attained, they must at least be prevented from assisting the Polish nation in the future. Numerous persons among those entered in Division 4 deserve to be called "renegades" in the strict sense of the word. Since however, to call them "renegades" might render more difficult the process of winning them back, the term "renegade" will not be used in official communications. The persons in question are rather to be called "Polandized Germans."

The Polandization of these persons took different form, but in every case resulted in persons becoming active enemies of Germany. In particular the following groups have to be distinguished:

a. German Racials living in mixed marriages with foreigners,

b. Children from mixed marriages with foreigner,

c. Persons influenced by the Catholic Church,

d. Persons influenced by the Augsburg Church of Bishop Bursche

e. Persons who renounced their German nationality for the sake of social advance,

f. Persons who renounced their German nationality for reasons of class (nobility, owners of large estates, clergy)

g. Persons who renounced their German nationality because they were isolated in purely Polish surroundings.

II. The Re-Germanization of the Polandized

Germans presupposes their complete separation from Polish surroundings. For that reason the persons entered in Division 4 of the German Ethnical List are to be dealt with in the following manner:

A. They are to be resettled in Old Reich territory.

1. The Superior SS and Police Leaders are charged with evacuating and resettling them according to instructions which will follow later.

2. Asocial persons and others who are of inferior hereditary quality will not be included in the resettlement. Their names will be turned over at once by the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer (Inspectors of Security Police and Security Service) to the competent State Police (Superior) Office. The latter will arrange for their transfer into a Concentration Camp.

3. Persons with a particularly bad political record will not be included in the resettlement action. Their names will also be given by the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer (Inspectors of Security Police and Security Service) to the competent State Police (Superior) Office for transfer into a Concentration Camp. The wives and children of such persons are to be resettled in old Reich territory and to be included in the Germanization measures. Where the wife also has a particularly bad political record and cannot be included in the resettlement action, her name too, is to be turned over to the competent State Police (Superior)

Office with a view of imprisoning her in a Concentration Camp. In such cases the children are to be separated from their parents and to be dealt with according to III, Par. 2, of this Decree. Persons are to be considered as having a particularly bad political record who have offended the German nation to a very great degree (e.g. who participated in persecutions of Germans, or boycotts of Germans, etc.)

B. How these persons are to be dealt with prior to resettling them.

1. Persons who hitherto had professions involving leadership of men (educators, clergymen, works' managers, Master artisans etc.) will be reeducated for other professions that do not involve the leadership of men. The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer will order and control the reeducation.

2. On application these persons will be received into the German Labor Front. They are not to be received into the Party, any of its organizations, or an affiliated organization.

3. The children will be admitted to the local German Elementary Schools and have to join the Hitler Youth. They are not to be admitted to a local Secondary School. Should such children enter a Secondary School, they would have to enter a boarding school in the old Reich territory, provided that the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer who has jurisdiction over the parents' domicile gives his consent. They are forbidden to enter a University, with the exception of children who have attended a German Boarding School for at least three years and have. been designated by the school as suitable for University attendance.

4. The property of these persons remains seized. In order to enable them to support themselves and to pay their necessary expenses they will receive instalments, the amount of which will be fixed by the competent SS and Police Fuehrer according to instructions of the Authority competent by virtue of section 12 of the Law of 17.9.1940 (German Law Gazette I p. 1270), which will be issued later.

5. They will be on an equal footing with other Germans as regards distribution of rations, textiles, etc, admission to German inns and meetings, and the receipt of pensions etc. Their dwelling houses are not to be seized, unless they are of a disproportionate size, so that the housing shortage calls for dividing up the house and seizing one part of it.

C. How they are to be dealt with following resettlement in Germany proper.

1. Their property remains seized and will be liquidated according to instructions now in force by the Authorities competent by virtue of section 12. of the Law of 17.9.40 (German L.G.I. p. 1270). The proceeds will be paid into a Special Account. After final liquidation of the property, the administration of the Special Account will be handled by the locally, competent Higher SS and Police Fuehrer. After the transfer to the locally competent SS and Police Fuehrer the persons concerned may draw from the account up to RM 2000.per year. Above this amount they may draw only with the consent of the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer. The release of the special Account is up to the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood State Headquarters. Application for it has to be made by the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer as soon as the Person concerned is considered to have been re-Germanized.

2. The locally competent State Police (Directing) Office will impose on them the following duties:

a. to join without delay an organization associated with the NSDAP and to make their children join the Hitler Youth.

b. not to change their domicile in the first 5 years following the resettlement, unless the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer agrees,

c. not to marry without permission by the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer,

d. to refrain from accepting a guardianship, not to start studies at a University, unless the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer agrees,

f. not to assume a new German name for a non-German one.

3. On their application they will be received into an organization affiliated with the NSDAP, unless there are special objections in a particular case. They will not be received into the Party or any of its formations, apart from the children being received into the Hitler Youth.

4. The competent Higher SS and Police Fuehrer will appoint for each resettled family, resp. for each independent single person, a "Counsellor". This counsellor has to assist the person who is to be re-Germanized, in reverting to his original nationhood, to report every 6 months to the competent SS and Police Fuehrer and the competent State Police (Superior) Office on the progress of the Germanization and to give his opinion on measures intended by the State Police, if any. The Party has promised to recognize service as a "Counsellor" as service for the Party.

5. Apart from the exceptions stated in Nrs. 1-4 the persons concerned are on equal footing with other German nationals.

III. The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer will further the Re-Germanization actions with every means at their disposal and continuously take stock of their success. In case they find that obstacles are put in the way of a re-Germanization action, they will report on their findings to the competent State Police (Superior) Office for appropriate measures. Where it proves to be impossible to attain re-Germanization even by forcible measures taken by the State Police, they will apply for a revocation of the naturalization through the Reich Fuehrer SS, Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood and give notice to the competent State Police (Superior) Office.

The Superior SS and Police Fuehrer will take particular care that the re-Germanization of children will not be hindered by adverse influence of their parents. In case such adverse influence has been found to exist, and that it cannot be removed by forcible measures taken by the State Police, the children have to be placed with families against whose ideological and political opinion there are ;no objections, provided they are prepared to receive them as foster children without reservation, moved by love for the good blood flowing in the children's veins, and to treat them as their own children. The same applies to children who have been separated from their parents by virtue of Nr. II A 3 of this decree.

IV. In the course of fulfilling their duties imposed on them by this Decree the competent State Police (Superior) Offices will take in particular the following measures:

1. They will take into protective custody the persons named to them under Nr. II A 2 and 3 of this Decree and will order their imprisonment in a concentration camp.

2. They will start a dossier on every person entered in Division 4 of the German Ethnical List. One dossier will be enough for a whole family. The dossier will contain a photo of the persons in question and every communication received, which may be of value for judging the persons in question.

3. They will impose the obligations as provided in Nr. II C 2 and keep watch on their being fulfilled, and take appropriate measures for enforcing them.

4. They will assist the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer in their tasks of re-Germanization, particularly in removing obstacles by forcible measures whenever there is opposition to re-Germanisation. Before ordering forcible measures by the State Police they will give the Counsellor of the person in question an opportunity to state his opinion.

5. They will take into protective custody all persons, with regard to whom the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer has applied for revocation of their naturalization and will order their imprisonment in a Concentration Camp.

signed H. HIMMLER

(STAMP) F.f.c.
Kippsch, Office Employee.

**********************************************
[DOCUMENT C.]

The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police,
Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood
Berlin, 7/1/1942.
II B 1 e -IV-

a. The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer, 3 copies
b. The Inspectors of Security Police and Security Service, 3 copies
c. The State Police (Superior) Offices in the incorporated Eastern areas, 5 copies
d. The Security Service (Superior) Office in the incorporated Eastern areas, 5 copies
e. The Criminal Police (Superior) Office in the incorporated Eastern areas, 3 copies
f. Dept. I of the Reich Ministry of the Interior, 5 copies
g. The Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood-Staff Headquarters, 3 copies
h. The Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood - Communication Centre to Racial Germans, 3 copies
i. Main Office for Questions of Race and Settlement, 5 copies
j. Reich Main Security Officefor distribution sub. B.

Subject: Resettlement of members of Division 4 of the "Deutsche Volksliste".

According to the Decree of the Reich Leader SS, Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood, dated 16.2.42, Ref.Nr. II A 2 Nr. 420 VII/41-176 concerning "Treatment of persons entered in Division 4 of the German Ethnical List" these persons are to be resettled in Old German territory. Evacuation and resettlement have to be effected by the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer on instructions to be issued later.

Since conditions at the moment are difficult in every part of the war economy, and especially since there is a considerable shortage of housing in the whole of the Reich, the former intention of resettling at once the members of group 4 of the German Ethnical List in Germany proper, cannot generally be accomplished.

This is why for the time being only individual persons or individual families can be resettled; in the first place they are persons whose resettlement for political and for reasons laid down by the Security Police seems to be particularly urgent.

Whereas there should be no difficulty in dealing with the asocial and biological inferior persons mentioned in II A 2 of the Decree of 16.2.42, the State Police (Superior) Offices ought to pay particular attention to the persons mentioned under II A 5 as having a particularly bad record. Even if the greater part of these persons are already imprisoned in a Concentration Camp, some of them still reside in the Incorporated Eastern Areas. With regard to.the persons entered in Div. 4 of the German Ethnical List I hereby order the following:

I

1. The State Police (Superior) Office will demand from the local branches of the German Ethnical List, the Security Service (Superior) Offices and the Criminal Police (Superior) Offices their dossiers dealing with members of Division 4.

2. Decisive for the further treatment of members of Div. 4 will be the result of a racial test. As soon therefore as it will be possible to examine a larger number of members of Div. 4, the competent examiner of the Head Office for Race and Settlement has to be informed, and place and time for the racial test have to be fixed.

3. The leaders of the State Police (Superior) Offices and the leaders of the Security Service (Superior) Offices (or their Deputies) will take personal part in the examinations, in order to inspect personally the persons to be tested. The result of the test is to be added to the dossier.

The persons not passing the racial test (hereditarily inferior persons etc.) will be excluded from the German Ethnical List on application to the competent branch. Their certificate of having been entered into the list will be taken away by the State Police (Superior) Office. After having been excluded from the list they are to be treated as non-German subjects. In case they have been found asocial, they have to be imprisoned in a Concentration Camp.

4. The racial tests having been completed, the leaders of the State Police (Superior) Offices and the leaders of the Security Service (Superior) Offices, resp. their permanent deputies (in the Security Service the IIIB officials) will together examine the material available and will apply in case of necessity to the Reich Main Security for an Order for Custody and Concentration Camp Imprisonment. In cases presenting particular difficulties the dossiers are first to be submitted to the Reich Security Office, Dep. III B. The decision of the latter office then will be forwarded to the competent State Police (Superior) Office for further action.

5. Those persons, with regard to whom Imprisonment in a Concentration Camp has been decided upon will be transported at once by the competent State Police (Superior) Office to a Concentration Camp, on the specified order of Dept. IV of the Reich Main Security Office. The competent State Police (Superior) Office then will send their dossiers to the competent Camp Administrative, enclosing an appropriate communication and quoting the decision reached.

II

1. Persons with regard to whom it was decided to resettle them will be reported by the Sate Police (Superior) Office to the competent Superior SS and Police Leader in the Incorporated Eastern areas to whom the dossiers will be handed over.

2. The Superior SS and Police Leaders in the Incorporated Eastern Areas will request the Superior SS and Police Leaders in these parts of Germany proper which have been designated for such settlements, to assign the settlers a place of work and appropriate housing; the dossiers will accompany the request.

The Staff Headquarters will designate to the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer in the Incorporated Eastern areas certain larger areas suitable for resettlement.

3. The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer in Germany proper acting on their own responsibility, will decide on the settlement on the basis of the dossier sent to them and taking into consideration the conditions as a whole.

In other respects the settlement follows the rules of the procedure used in the resettlement of persons suitable for re-Germanization.

4. The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer in the Incorporated Eastern Areas report to the following Authorities whenever a transport leaves, enclosing a list of names and places of departure:

a. Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood,Communication Centre for Racial Germans

b. Reich Commission for the Consolidation of German Nationhood,Staff Headquarters

c. Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood, Reich Main Security Office III B,

d. The Superior SS and Police Leader in Germany proper.

e. The State Police (Superior) Offices competent in Germany proper,

f. The Security Service (Superior) Offices, competent in Germany proper,

g. The State Police (Superior) Office, competent in the Incorporated Eastern Areas.

5. For further dealings with the resettled persons the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidated German Nationhood - Communication Centre for Racial Germans assumes jurisdiction; he will act through the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer.

6. In fulfillment of their duty to examine continually the success of the re-Germanization action (cp.III of the- Decree of 16.2.42) the Security Service (Superior) Offices in Germany proper have to intervene in the same way as they do in continuously reporting on the Poles suitable for Germanization to the Reich Main Security Office and the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer. They have to assist the appointed "Counsellors" as to questions of race (In Charge: Dep.III B) whenever possible.

(signed) Streckenbach
SS Group Leader

A true copy (g)
Klimsch Employee


*********************************************
[DOCUMENT D.]

Ref. 1-3/4-1 (21.6.41 Foe/La Berlin, 7/28/1942

Subject: Evacuation and Resettlement of the members of Division 4 of the German Ethnical List.

Your Ref: Decrees of Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police, Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German -Nationhood of 16.2.1942, Ref. Nr. II A 2 420 VII/41 176, and of 1.7.42, Ref. Nr. III B 1 e IV.

To the:Higher SS and Police Fuehrer for the districts: Alpine Country, Danube, Elbe, Fulda-Werra, Contre, North East, North Sea, Baltic Sea, Rhine, Spree, South, South East, South West, Wartha, Danzig-West Prussia, West, Western Area, Katowice.

Copies to:

1. The Reich Minister of the Interior Dept. I 72 Unter den Linden Berlin NW 7

2. The Reichsfuehrer SS, Chief of the German Police 8 Prince Albrecht Street Berlin SW 11

3. The Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood, Communication Centre for Racial Germans, 29 Keith Street Berlin SW 68

4. The Chief of the Main Office SS. for Race and Settlement 8 Prince-Albrecht Street Berlin SW 68

5. The Reich Main Security Office 102 Wilhelm-Street Berlin SW 68

Supplementing the Decree of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, dated 1.7.42 -- quoted above -- I hereby order the following:

For the reasons mentioned in the Decree quoted above resettlement will for the moment be effected only for individual persons or families in cases where their resettlement seems to be urgent for reasons of policy or security Police.

Where this action assumes larger proportions, I request immediate report.

I. Regional Distribution.

a. The members of Div. 4 of the German Ethnical List who are to be evacuated from the area within the competence of the Representative for Danzig-West Prussia of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood at Danzig will be resettled in the area under the jurisdiction of

1. The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer Centre at Braunschweig (the transit camp being at the Castle, Ilsenburg.)

2. The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer Fulda-Werra at Kassel (the transit camp being at Hann. Muenden.)

b. The members of Div. 4 of the German Ethnical List to be evacuated from the area under the competence of the Representative for the Wartha District of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood at Poznan will be resettled in the area under the competence of

1. The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer for Alpine Country at Salzburg (the transit camp being at Parsch/Salzburg)

2. The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer for South West at Stuttgart (the transit camp being at Schelklingen)

3. The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer for the Rhine at Wiesbaden, (the transit camp being in "Highway-House", Wiesbaden)

c. The members of Div. 4. of the German Ethnical List who are to be evacuated from the area under the jurisdiction of the Representative for Katowice of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood at Katowice will be resettled in the area under the jurisdiction of

1. The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer Baltic Sea at Stettin (the transit camp "Major Schill" being at Belgard/Pomerania.)

2. The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer West of Duesseldorf, (the transit camp being at Bochum/Westphalia, 30, Kloster-street.)

3. The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer Western Area at Metz, (the transit camp "Brown House" being at Kaiserslauter.)

d. The members of Div. 4. of the German Ethnical List who are to be evacuated from the area under the jurisdiction of the Representative for North East of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood Koenigsberg will be resettled in the area under the jurisdiction of

1. The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer for the Reich Capital of Berlin at Berlin.

2. The Higher SS and Police Fuehrer for North Sea at Hamburg. The transit camp will be designated later.

I reserve the right to enlarge the areas of resettlement in case of necessity.

II. Assignment of labour.

The members of Div. 4. of the German Ethnical List will be distributed in Germany proper, since they are persons suitable for re-Germanization. They are not allowed to return to the Eastern Areas. Their settlement is effected under the exclusive responsibility of the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer, who are bound by the rules concerning persons suitable for re-Germanization.

III. Certificates.

The members of Div. 4 of the German Ethnical List acquire German nationality with a proviso for revocation. They will be given Re Certificates of the "Deutsche Volksliste". For the time being they have not to apply for Identity Cards.

IV. Treatment after resettlement in Germany proper.

In this respect I refer to the Decree of the Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police, Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood of 16.2.1942, Ref. Nr. II A 2 420 VII/41 176 and of 1.7.42, Ref. Nr. III B le IV, from which I quote the following: (follow excerpts from these Decrees, already translated)

The remaining contents of the decrees quoted have to be kept in mind with diligence.

V. Statistically the persons entered in Div. 4. of the German Ethnical List will be treated in accordance with my Order of 7.8.1941, I-3/4-14 (13.3.41). These persons will be taken separately from members of Div. 3 of the "Deutsche Volksliste."

The Chief of Staff Headquarters.
[signed] Greifelt
SS Group Leader

David Thompson
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#40

Post by David Thompson » 13 Oct 2004, 01:49

19420220 Document: *3040-PS; Description: Secret order of Reichsfuehrer SS, 2/20/1942, concerning commitment of manpower from the East. (USA 207)

"Document 3040-PS, [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume V: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1946. pp. 744-754.
General Decree Collection [Allgemeine Erlassammlung-AES] 2nd Part

SECRET

Published by RSHA I Org. Section 2 A III f, pages 15-24.

Commitment of manpower from the East. Circular decree of the Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior dated 2/20/1942S IV No. 208/42 (foreign workers)

Enclosed I am sending you general regulations about recruiting and committing manpower from the East for your information and careful attention. I have the following additional directives of the security service (SD):

A. Manpower from the original Soviet-Russian territory.

I. General security measures.

(1) The commitment of manpower in the Reich from the original Soviet-Russian territory results in greater dangers than any other employment of foreigners in spite of the special standards of their way of ring, since a complete separation from the German and other foreign laborers and a strict supervision will frequently, in practice and especially at the place of work, scarcely be effected. The security police is charged with the responsibility for preventing the danger and it must do everything to accomplish its tasks; that is, to diminish the possibilities of danger to a minimum. Since enforcements cannot be counted on, it is the special task of the inspectors and state police administrative offices to urge the other administrative offices, charged with the commitment of the manpower, to take over the affairs of the security police within the sphere of their jurisdiction.

(2) The tasks resulting from the commitment of Russians are to be summarized by the state police administrative offices in a periodic report and to be recorded therein by a responsible executive official of the criminal police under constant personal supervision of thechiefs of the state police office.

(3) Whenever possible, an official is to be appointed for a certain number of plants, employing manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory, who in connection with the counterespionage officials directs the supervision of this manpower at the place of work and in the quarters.

(4) As far as these plants with manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory do not yet have commissioners for political counter-intelligence, such men are to be appointed.

(5) Lacking further possibilities of supervision, it is absolutely necessary to establish an especially intensively active intelligence service among the laborers, whereby special attention is to be given to the dissemination of communist ideology and the danger of sabotage acts.

II. Placement and Supervision.

(1) The provision of separate and supervised placement of manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory, as provided for under number AV of enclosure 1, must not be disregarded with the singular exception of the individually employed female laborers on the farms.

(2) 1. Special attention must be given to the prompt procurement of guards for the plants mentioned under number (AV 1b) and (c) of the enclosure. Even though the plants and the Reich employment administration are obliged to assist intensively in accomplishing this task, the responsibility is nevertheless that of the administrative offices of the security police.

2. Therefore, the following procedure is intended:

(a) The state employment offices have orders to plan continuously for several weeks in advance, to which plants of their district and in what numerical strength the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory, due to arrive with the next transport, will be distributed. They shall immediately, after drawing up respectively completing the plan, inform the inspectors of the security police and of the SD about that; and they, in turn, have to take care that they are constantly kept informed and in communication with the district leader of the guild of protective trade [Fachgruppe Bewachungsgewerbe].

(b) The inspector of the security police and of the SD of the district in which the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory is newly committed, receives information promptly, before the arrival of each transport, from section IV E 1b of the Reich security office RSHA].


The state employment office -- section manpower commitment -- which, if necessary, has to inform about changes of the arrangements; the inspector of manpower in such plants which need officers from the regular police for the guards; the district leader of the guild of protective trade with the task of furnishing the guards for and to establish communication, himself or through the agency with the state police administration office, locally competent for the individual plant; the locally competent state police administration office.

(c) The state police office then must examine or must have examined the quarters arranged by the plants. It shall be ascertained whether plant protection exists in the plant, and whether it is sufficient numerically for the guarding of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory. If this is not the case, the state police office has to provide for the increase of the plant protection by the protective trade. In the plants where no plant protection exists, it has to supervise the guards made available by the protective agency and to examine whether they fulfill the requirements as to number and qualification.

(3) The commitment of the protective trade in protected plants has been discussed with the high command of the armed forces. The administrative group "work commitment" in the Four Year Plan will inform the central offices who have state plants with own guard service subordinated to them, that they can receive manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory only if they guarantee the supervision of manpower by the guard service provided for these plants. Since a poor supervision of the manpower in these plants endangers the general security, the state police administration offices will also have to keep an eye on the guarding of these plants and to report difficulties to the RSHA.

(4) In spite of all precautions, numerous difficulties will arise especially in making available the required guard personnel. These are to be overcome locally as well as possible and, in case of failure, to be reported by teletype.

When supervising the guarding of this manpower, the state police administration offices will, above all, have the following duties:

(a) Confirmation of the leader of the guard as well as his duty. In plants with plant protection the leader of the guard is usually the leader of the plant protection. In the plants in which are or will be exclusively men of the protective trade, the official furnished by the regular uniformed police -- in the county usually the rural police official -- is to be appointed leader of the guard. Leaders and deputies should be auxiliary police officials if regular police officials are not available. In larger camps additional capable men may possibly have to be appointed as auxiliary police officials since an auxiliary police official must be at hand at all times. However, attention has to be paid to the fact that guard officials will be appointed as auxiliary police officials only to the absolute necessary extent.

(b) Instructions for the plant protection and the guard personnel. The guards must keep strictly away from the Soviet Russian manpower and must not speak with them except in line of duty. They have to treat the camp inhabitants strictly but must not commit any injustices against them.

(c) The conduct of the guards is to be checked constantly. Violations against discipline by the men of the plant protection and the protective trade are to be punished by the state police.

(d) Selection of those German men of the administration personnel who are to be given additional duties of special plant protection against the Russians.

Since but a few men of the guards can be used at the working place the necessary number of German foremen and masters is to be entrusted with these plant protection functions. The men selected for this purpose must be politically dependable, their character unobjectionable, and capable of acting energetically. In plants with a main office plant protection, the subordinate office plant protection men are to be subordinated to the plant protection leader. In plants without a main office plant protection, a subordinate office plant protection leader is to be appointed from among them; he is charged with the supervision of the subordinate office plant protection men. The plant protection men are responsible, in the sense of the aforesaid, for the constant orientation of the guards. The state police offices have to convince themselves about the thorough spot checks and, if necessary, have to order additional training under consideration of the given situations.

(e) General instructions to the guards according to the attached sample. (See enclosure No. 2)

(f) Special instructions to the guards in individual cases or in special local questions.

The task of the guards is solely the guarding and maintaining of discipline of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory. Special problems of administration are not to be given to them. The administration of the camps is, rather, a special affair of the plant; that includes also the keeping of a camp diary resp. of camp index. Of course, this does not include the fact that the leader of the guard can make complaints when maladministration endangers the execution of tasks of the security police.

III. Combating violations against discipline.

(1) According to the equal status of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory with prisoners of war, a strict discipline must be exercised in the quarters and at the working place. Violations against discipline, incl. work refusal and loafing at work, will be fought exclusively by the secret state police. The smaller cases will be settled by the leader of the guard according to instruction of the state police administration offices with measures as provided for in the enclosure. To break acute resistance, the guards shall be permitted to use also physical power against the manpower. But this may be done only for a cogent cause. The manpower should always be informed about the fact that they will be treated decently when conducting themselves with discipline and accomplishing good work.

(2) In severe cases, that is in such cases where the measures at the disposal of the leader of the guard do not suffice, the state police office has to act with its means. Accordingly, they will be treated, as a rule, only with strict measures, that is with transfer to a concentration camp or with special treatment.

(3) The transfer to a concentration camp is done in the usual manner.

(4) In especially severe cases special treatment is to be requested at the Reich security main office, stating personnel data and the exact history of the act.

(5) Special treatment is hanging. It should not take place in the immediate vicinity of the camp. A certain number of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory should attend the special treatment; at that time they are warned about the circumstances which led to this special treatment.

(6) Should special treatment be required within the camp for exceptional reasons of camp discipline, this is also to be requested.

IV Anti-Reich activities.

Anti-Reich activities, especially dissemination of communist ideology, propaganda of disunity, sabotage acts, are to be fought against with the strictest measures. The care in obtaining information shall not suffer through quick arrests, in order to catch the whole group of perpetrators. Anti-Reich conduct is, as a rule, to be punished by special treatment, in slighter cases a transfer to a concentration camp may be considered.

V. Criminal violations.

(1) Criminal violations will fundamentally -- regardless whether committed inside or outside of the camp -- be punished by state police measures. The inquiries, as far as necessary, are to be made by criminal police offices. The county police offices are instructed to submit results of inquiries to the competent state police administration office before sending them to the public prosecutor.

(2) Criminal delicts are generally to be punished as violations against discipline, that is, against smaller violations the state police measures, against crimes like murder, deadly assault, robbery special treatment will be used.

(3) When committing capital crimes against German persons, a legal judgment may, however, in an individual case, appear suitable. If the state police office considers this necessary, it can transfer the case to the prosecuting attorney under the provision that, according to the criminal laws, one can safely count on the death penalty for the perpetrator.

VI. Sexual intercourse.

Sexual intercourse is forbidden to the manpower of the original Soviet Russian territory. By means of their closely confined quarters they have no opportunity for it. Should sexual intercourse be exercised nevertheless especially among the individually employed manpower on the farms -- the following is directed:

1. For every case of sexual intercourse with German countrymen or women, special treatment is to be requested for male manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory, transfer to a concentration camp for female manpower.

2. When exercising sexual intercourse with other foreign workers, the conduct of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory is to be punished as severe violation of discipline with transfer to a concentration camp.

VII. Measures against fraternization with manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory.

(1) Special attention is to be paid to the fundamental segregation of manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory from the German population. It is important to prevent a penetration of communistic ideology into the German population by cutting off every contact not directly pertaining to the work and, if possible, to avoid every solidarity between German people and the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory. Against Germans who act to the contrary, steps are to be taken by the state police according to the situation of the individual case.

2) If German countrymen or women should exercise sexual intercourse or commit indecent acts with manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory, transfer to a concentration camp is to be requested.

(3) The intercourse between other foreign workers employed in the Reich and the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory also brings great dangers to be dealt with by the security police; therefore, it should also be fought with measures against the foreign workers. As a rule, the transfer into a correction camp (deportation for Italians) will be considered; this is also valid for cases of sexual intercourse.

VIII. Search.

(1) Fugitive workers from the original Soviet Russian territory are to be announced principally in the German search book. Furthermore, search measures are to be decreed locally.

(2) When caught, the fugitive must receive special treatment.

IX. Handling in the Reich security main office.

(1) Requests, reports, inquiries resulting from the treatment of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory according to the existing directives, are to be transferred to section IV A 1 of the Reich security main office, competent for the handling of Soviet Russian affairs.

(2) Only inquiries and reports, especially pertaining to the guarding of this manpower, are to be addressed to section IV E lb of the Reich security main office.

B. Manpower from the Baltic states and foreign manpower, not of Polish origin, from the Government General and from the annexed Eastern territories.

I. General

(1) This manpower is to be treated uniformly in the Reich by the state police. On the basis of the political view of these nations resp. tribes (Volksstaemme) toward the Reich on the one hand and their position in the East on the other hand, they are to be governed by the general regulations valid for foreign manpower, but are subject to special limitations in their way of living.

(2) These limitations consist essentially in a conspicuous separation of this manpower from the German people. Since the employment and housing of this manpower is not closely confined and guarded, it is the task of the secret police to be especially watchful about the obedience to the mentioned principle. The secret police has to inform the offices charged with the employment of foreigners through constant communication, that this principle will be considered in all measures of work employment. Settlement of these persons in the Reich, individual billeting in spite of existing collective quarters, a position superior to that of a German worker, etc., must not be tolerated. As far as these people themselves violate the established principle, and act unlawfully against Germans by insubordination and acts of violence, such a conduct will be met with state police measures.

(3) This manpower must, under no circumstance, be put on the same level as the Poles or the manpower of the original Soviet Russian territory, on account of their nations' fundamental antagonism toward the Polish people and bolshevism. Nevertheless, special attention should be paid to them -- especially by the establishment of an active intelligence service among this manpower since their good conduct toward the German nation might change into the opposite, but at least could stiffen, because too high political expectations are not fulfilled.

II. Anti-German activities.

AntiGerman activities like sabotage acts, communist-marxist agitation, antiGerman statements, strike instigation are, under consideration of the aforesaid to be met with all strictness, applying the usual state police measures.

III. Fighting against the breach of work contract.

(1) The fighting against the breach of work contract of this manpower is principally the duty of the secret state police.

(2) This does not mean, of course, an interference with the activity of the Reich arbitrator of work with the means at his disposal in the regulation and settlement of industrial difficulties as long as no active intervention is necessary. If more stringent measures are necessary, the arbitrator will transfer the proceedings to the secret state police.

(3) In every case, however, it is the task of the state police administration office to check whether the violation of the work duty by this manpower is not caused by the plant by breach of contract as well as general bad treatment. If the conduct of the concerned manpower appears justified through the fault on the part of this plant, the state police is not to interfere, since this is free manpower.

(4) In any other case, however, immediate action is necessary and, in case of a breach of contract on part of this manpower, the transfer to a correction camp is to be ordered, as a rule. In cases of severe repetition the transfer to a concentration camp can also be requested. In the cases of breach of contracts handled by the state police, the arbitrator has to be informed each time about the decision.

IV. Criminal violations.

(1) The inquiry proceedings of all criminal violations committed by the named manpower are to be submitted by the local police offices, rural police offices resp. criminal police offices, after conclusion of the inquiries, to the state police administration offices.

(2) The county police offices have received instructions accordingly. The intervention of the state police administration offices serves the purpose to give them a clear view of the crimes of the Eastern workers in their districts and, besides, to punish especially objectionable criminal acts by state police measures.

(3) The criminal violations are to be punished as follows:

Crimes against decency, acts of violence, and acts of sabotage are to be punished fundamentally by state police measures (special treatment); however, I have no objection against a transfer of the inquiry proceedings to the competent public prosecutor if, according to the penal laws, one can safely count on the death sentence against the perpetrator. In these cases the result of the trial is to be ascertained; should a death sentence not be passed, against expectations, a report has to be made to me attaching a copy of the sentence.

Inquiry proceedings resulting from other acts are, as a rule, to be transferred to the competent public prosecutor. If a strong increase of crimes is noted in certain spheres, then there are no objections at all to punish purely criminal acts, as a deterrent example, by state police measures.

V. Searching for fugitive workers.

As far as the proceedings for searching for fugitive persons are concerned, the directives valid for Polish civil workers are to be applied in the same sense.

VI. Sexual intercourse with Germans.

(1) The sexual intercourse of the manpower from the Baltic states as well as of the foreign manpower of non-Polish origin from the Government General and from the annexed Eastern territories with Germans is punishable by severest penalties (Changed by circular decree dated 10/23/1943). The workers will be instructed thoroughly by using the attached orientation sheet (enclo. 3) and foreign languages text when reporting at the local police offices. An instruction of the German population will be effected through the party administration offices.

(2) The county police offices have received instructions to arrest without delay workers who violate this regulation and to report them to the competent state police administration office.

(3) For male manpower who had sexual intercourse with German, special treatment is to be requested, for female manpower, transfer into a concentration camp. The directives issued for the special treatment of Polish civil workers are valid correspondingly; this is also applicable for the treatment of the involved German persons.

VII. Handling by the Reich main office.

Requests, reports and inquiries resulting from the treatment, according to the existing directives, of the manpower from the Baltic states as well as of the foreign manpower of non-Polish origin from the Government General and the annexed Eastern territories. (changed by circular decree dating 12/7/1942, section VII) of the Reich security main office, competent for the handling of these persons.

C. Manpower of Polish nationality from the Government General and the annexed Eastern territories.

The valid regulation for manpower of Polish nationality are listed in enclosure 1 under C. When Polish civil workers commit punishable acts, and if the state police office is to act after submittal of the inquiry proceedings, the directives issued under B IV of this decree are to be applied.

Now as before, the section IV D 2 in the Reich security main office is competent for the treatment of civil workers of Polish nationality. To the inspectors of the security police, the districts of the security police in Prague, all state police administration offices, criminal police administration offices, security service (main) offices.

For information:

To the higher SS and police officers, districts of security police, commandant of the security police in the Government General.

Not published

David Thompson
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#41

Post by David Thompson » 13 Oct 2004, 02:22

19420420 Document: *016-PS; Description: Sauckel's Labor Mobilization Program, 4/20/1942. (USA 168)

"Document 016-PS, [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume III: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 46-61.
The Deputy for the 4 Year Plan
The General Plenipotentiary for Labor Mobilization
GBA Berlin W 8,
4/24/1942

Mohrenstrasse 65 (Thuringia/House)
Phone: 126571

Bureau of Ministry [Ministerburo]
received 4/27/1942,
No. 0887 Min. 28/v
Dr. K.P. has been informed

Very esteemed and dear Party-member Rosenberg!

Inclosed please find my program for the mobilization of labor. Please excuse the fact that this copy still contains a few corrections.

Heil Hitler!
Yours
[signed]: Fritz Sauckel

copies for Mr. Wittenbacher [signed]: WACHS 70x

[Stamp] Chancellory 5/1/1942 (Kanzlei) Mischke
read: ILFL/KS 45.42
filed: 1-5, 5/5 42 Pg

To The "Reichsminister" for the Occupied Territories of the East, Party-Member Rosenberg Berlin

***************************************
The Deputy for the Four Year Plan The Plenipotentiary for Labor-Mobilization
The Labor-Mobilization Program
20 April 1942
Sckl./We.

The Labor Mobilization Program

On the occasion of the Hero/Memorial Day, in 1942, the hardest and most gigantic commitment of German soldiery in all history was announced to the German people by the Fuehrer. Besides the heroic and victorious conduct against an enemy of an unheard of superiority in number and material, and fighting with the courage of utter despair and beastly brutality, stands the endurance of hardships unparalleled in history of severest winter of cold, ice, snow and story since 140 years. The conquest of the unbelievable difficulties arising from such a climate and terrible weather conditions elevates our soldiers of the East Front, by comparison with the human and soldierly efforts of all times up to now, without exaggeration, to supermen.

It is now the duty of the Home Front towards those soldiers to summon all its strength for an equally gigantic effort to enable them to win complete, final and most rapid victory.

All the burdens and further necessary restrictions, even in the field of nutrition, must be endured with proud determination in consideration of the shining example of the soldiers.

Our Armed Forces of Greater Germany surpassed themselves in heroism, resistance and endurance at the Front of the East, in Africa, in the air and on the sea. To insure their victory in any case, it is necessary now to produce more and better weapons, materiel and ammunition through another increased effort and endeavor of the entire German people, that is, all the producing workers, intellectual and manual, the omen and the entire German Youth.

In this manner will the German Home Front contribute decisively to the frustration of the hopes of our enemies to again escape their complete and final defeat.

The aim of this new, gigantic labor mobilization is to use all the rich and tremendous sources, conquered and secured for us by our fighting Armed Forces under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, for the armament of the Armed Forces and also for the nutrition of the Homeland The raw-materials as well as the fertility of the conquered territories and their human labor power are to be used completely and conscientiously to the profit of Germany and their allies.

In spite of the fact that most of the German people capable of doing so have already made a most commendable effort for the war economy, more considerable reserve must be found and made available under any circumstances.

The decisive measure to realize this is in the uniformly regulated and directed Labor-mobilization of the nation in the war.

To reach this goal, the following principles must be worked out and executed:

A. All important Production Programs, actually in progress, must under no circumstances be disturbed by the new measures. On the contrary, they should ever be increased.

B. All orders of the Fuehrer, Reichs-Fieldmarshal of the Greater German Reich and the "Minister" for ammunition and armament are to be carried out as quickly as possible. Labor supply necessary for that purpose must be freed and made available either in Germany or in the occupied territories.

C. The task concerning the seed and harvest of German peasantry and all the territories under German control with the view to secure the largest production is just as urgent. The lacking laborers must be made available as quickly as possible.

D. A supply system for the vitally necessary materials for the German people will be assured.

The realization of these principles for labor-mobilization requires:

1. The cooperation of all the forces of the party, economy and the state under coordinated leadership.

2 The best will of all the German people.

3. The most far-reaching measures to imbue all the employed German workmen and women with the highest confidence in the justice of the consideration of their own personal welfare and their salaries as well as the best possible care for their health and shelter under the actual war circumstances.

4. The quickest and best solution of the question of the use of women and youth labor.

To reach the goal determined by the Fuehrer the simultaneous and quickest use of numerous different measures of unified purpose are absolutely necessary. As any one of those must not interfere with the others, but rather complement them, it is also absolutely necessary that all the offices [Dienststellen] in the Reich, its territories and communities, in party, state and economy, participating in this decisive task act according to coordinated, synchronized directives.

Thus, the labor-mobilization of the nation contributes extraordinarily to the quickest and victorious termination of the war. It requires every effort of the German people on the Home front. It is for that German people, for their preservation, their freedom, happiness and amelioration of their nutrition and standards of living that this war is being fought.

Basic Principles

I. In the districts [Gau], it is the task of the district-chief [Gauleiter] to take in his hands the propaganda and orientation of the German people concerning the necessity of labor-mobilization and to carry out important measures for the care of the employed youth and women as well as to supervise the condition of camps and shelters.

They also assure themselves of the closest and friendliest cooperation of all the participating institutions.

II. It is not only the most distinguished duty of the General Plenipotentiary but a condition sine qua non for the success of his task, to assure himself of the utmost cooperation and understanding of all the highest Reichs-Bureaus [Reichsstellen], especially those offices [Dienststellen] of the Armed Forces whose departments are concerned with his task.

III. Equally necessary is the mutual understanding of all the Reichs-leaders [Reichsleiter] of the party, especially the cooperation of the German Labor Front [Deutsche Arbeitsfront] and the institutions of economy.

IV. The General Plenipotentiary for labor mobilization will therefore use with the help of the smallest, personal staff of assistants the existing party, state and economic institutions and assure the quickest success of his measure with the good will and the cooperation of all concerned.

V. The General Plenipotentiary for labor mobilization has therefore, with the consent of the Fuehrer and the knowledge of the Reichsmarshal of Greater Germany and the director [Leiter] of the Party Chancellory [Reichskanzlei] appointed all the district chiefs [Gauleiters] as his plenipotentiaries in the German Districts of the National Socialist Party.

VI. The plenipotentiaries for labor mobilization are using all the offices of the Party in their district. The chiefs of the highest offices of the State and economy of their districts will assist and advise the District chiefs in all matters concerning the labor mobilization.

The most important for that purpose would be the following:

The President of the Land Labor Office [Praesident des Landesarbeitsamtes ]

The Trustee for Labor, [Treuhaender der Arbeit],

The leader of the Peasants [Landesbauernfuehrer],

The economic adviser of the district [Gauwirtschaftsberator]

The District Superintendent of the German Labor Front [Gauobmann der Deutschen Arbeitsfront],

The leader of the womanhood of the district [Gaufrauenschaftsleiterin],

The leader of the Hitler Youth of the region [Gebietsfuehrer der Hitler-Jugend],

The highest representative of the interior and general administration, and of the office for Agriculture [der hoechste Vertreter der Inneren und Allgemeinen Verwaltung bzw. des Landeswirtschaftsamtes].

Should the confines [Bezirk] of a Land-Labor Office comprise several Districts, it seems advisable that the President of the Land-Labor Office in question should make available to the District Chief, in hose district capital there is no Land-Labor Office, his closest and most capable assistants in such a way that also in those offices the continuous information and instruction of the district-chiefs about ail the measures concerning the labor-mobilization remains assured.

VII. The most distinguished and important task of the district-chiefs of the National Socialist Party in their capacity as plenipotentiaries in their districts consists in assuring the best understanding and cooperation of all the offices of their districts participating in the labor-mobilization.

Nevertheless, it must be strictly observed that the dignitaries of the party and the offices of the National Socialist Party, its organizations, sub-divisions and attached institutions do not assume functions coming under the jurisdiction of the State, the Armed Forces or economic institutions and for which only those authorities are responsible; they are not to interfere with official business not coming under their jurisdiction, according to the wish of the Fuehrer.

Should we succeed with the help of the Party in convincing all the German intellectual and manual workers of the great importance of the labor-mobilization for the outcome of the war, and succeed in taking good care and keeping up the morale of all the men, women, and the German youths who work within the labor mobilization program under extraordinarily strenuous circumstances, as far as their physical and mental capabilities of endurance are concerned, and should we furthermore be able, also with the help of the party, to use prisoners of war as well as civilian workmen and women of foreign blood not only without harm to our own people but to the greatest advantage to our war and nutrition industries, then we will have accomplished the most difficult part of the labor mobilization program.

The Task and its Solution

(No figures are mentioned because of security reasons. I can assure you, nevertheless, that we are concerned with the greatest labor-problem of all times, especially with regard to figures.)

A. The Task:

1. The conscription of new soldiers to a gigantic extent for ail branches and services of the Armed Forces has been rendered necessary by the present war-situation.


a. The removal of workers from all professional enterprises, especially of a great number of trained personnel from armament producing war industries.

b. Also the removal of especially non-essential personnel from the war nutrition industry.

2. The war situation also necessitates the continuation of the tremendously increased and improved armament programs as ordered by the Fuehrer.

3. The most essential commodities for the German people must continue to be produced for minimum requirements.

4. The German housewife's health, particularly the health of those on the farms, must not be endangered in their quality as mothers by the war. On the contrary, they must be relieved in every possible way.

B. The Solution:

1. All skilled workers removed from defense plants through induction into the Armed Forces must absolutely and immediately be replaced in such a way that no bottleneck or decrease in the production of the war product results. It is the responsibility of all the authorities for the labor mobilization to make sure that this directive is considered in each case.

The most capable workers must. therefore, be removed from the reserves of discontinued, lesser defense installations, and the discontinued construction industry and be made available to the enterprises from which specialists are being called into the Armed Forces, 8 weeks before their actual induction. in order to enable them to instruct and familiarize their replacement with their work.

2. Workmen or women available because of destruction or damage of their installations must just as quickly be made available and incorporated again in the war industry.

3. The Armament and Nutrition tasks make it vitally necessary, not only to include the entire German labor lower but also to call on foreign labor.

Consequently I immediately tripled the transport program which I found when I took charge of my mission.

The main effort of that transport has been advanced into the months of May-June in order to assure in time and under any circumstances the availability of foreign labor power from the occupied territories for an increased production, in view of coming operations of the army, as well as agricultural labor in the sector of the German Nutrition Industry.

All prisoners of war, from the territories of the West as well of the East, actually in Germany, must be completely incorporated into the German armament and nutrition industries. Their production must be brought to the highest possible level.

It must be emphasized, however, that an additional tremendous quantity of foreign labor has to be found for the Reich. The greatest pool for that purpose are the occupied territories of the East.

Consequently, it is an immediate necessity to use the human reserves of the conquered Soviet territory to the fullest extent. Should we not succeed in obtaining the necessary amount of labor on a voluntary basis, we must immediately institute conscription or forced labor.

Apart from the prisoners of war still in the occupied territories, we must, therefore, requisition skilled or unskilled male and female labor from the Soviet territory from the age of 15 up for the labor-mobilization.

On the other hand, one quarter of the total need of foreign labor can be procured in Europe's occupied territories West of Germany, according to existing possibilities.

The procurement of labor from friendly and also neutral countries can only cover a small part of the total need. Practically only skilled workers and specialists can be considered in this case.

4. In order to relieve considerably the German housewife, especially the mother with many children and the extremely busy farm-woman and in order to avoid any further danger to their health, the Fuehrer also charged me with the procurement of 400000-500000 selected, healthy and strong girls from the territories of the East for Germany.

5. The spring cultivation of the fields [Fruehjahrsbestellung] will be assured by the use of the German youth in class-formation, together with their teachers according to an agreement with Reichs-Youth-Leader [Reichsjugendfuehrer] and the responsible, highest Reichs-Authorities.

6. The labor mobilization of the German women is of very great importance.

Examining this very difficult problem and after getting thoroughly acquainted with the fundamental opinion of the Fuehrer as well as of the Reichsmarshal of the Greater German Reich and my own most careful inquiries and their results, I must absolutely reject the possibility of having an obligatory service decreed by the State for all German women and girls for the German War and Nutrition industry.

Although at the beginning, I myself, and probably the majority of the leading personalities of the party and of the womanhood with me, believed that for certain reasons an obligatory service for women should be decreed, I am of the opinion that all responsible men and women in party, state and economy should accept with the greatest veneration and gratitude the judgment of our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler, whose greatest concern has always been the health of the German women and girls; in other words, the present and future mothers of our nation.

I cannot enumerate all the reasons which made me come to that decision. I only ask for confidence in me as an old fanatical district chief of the National Socialist party and to believe that this could be the only possible decision.

We all agree that this decision might appear unjust towards millions of women who are engaged in defense and nutrition industries under the most strenuous conditions but we also realize that an evil cannot be remedied by spreading it to the utmost.

The only possible way to eliminate the existing injustices and hardships consists in winning the war in order to enable us to remove all women and girls engaged from jobs unsuitable for women, namely endangering their health, the birth-rate of our nation, and family and national life.

We must also consider the difference, whether a woman or girl has been used to work in the field or in a factory because of her young age, and whether already she has proved to be able to stand this kind of work.

Aside from physical harm, the German women and girls under any circumstances must be protected from moral and mental harm according to the wish of the Fuehrer.

It is doubtful that these conditions could be fulfilled in the case of mass-conscription and employment. It is impossible to compare the German Woman with the German soldier in this case because of the existing fundamental natural and racial differences between man and woman.

We cannot accept the responsibility for the dangers threatening the life of the nation resulting from such a measure in the field of women labor mobilization, in view of the countless men on the fighting front -- our dead soldiers.

The many millions of women, however, faithfully and industriously engaged in the German economy, and especially now, in war time, rendering valuable services, deserve the best possible care and consideration. They, as well as the soldiers and workmen, deserve the greatest gratitude of our nation They must be treated in the best possible way by the labor offices and labor authorities and their economic and health necessities must be generously considered. The Fuehrer as well as the Reichsmarshal of the Greater German Reich attach the greatest value to those measures. For instance, it would be completely wrong to threaten pregnant women with punishment and court procedures, as has happened already, if they miss a day of work because of troubles resulting from their condition during the usual period of precaution [Schonungsperiode]. Nevertheless, it must and will be possible to maintain the necessary work discipline.

7. A last, but also important reserve consists in the possibility of the personal increased production of each German worker. It will be the most distinguished task of the party and the German labor front to achieve that increased production. There is no doubt that the German intellectual and mental worker will accomplish it, no matter where he works and in spite of the difficult conditions of our present nutrition. This will be the best way for the German worker on the home front to express his gratitude towards the soldier on the fighting front who bears the most gigantic and terrible hardships in this severe winter, thus remaining victorious over our enemies. It is also the task of the party, State and economy in cooperation to improve the sick rate by 1% through the adequate cooperation of health insurance institutions [Krankenkasse] and approved doctors [Vertrauensarzt]. This was accomplished in the district of Thuringia. Such an improvement of the sick rate throughout the Reich would mean the gain of 200000 new workers. The severest measures must be used against loafers, as we cannot allow those parasites to shunt their duties in this decisive struggle of our people at the cost of the others. 1 tried to determine the exterior solution of the task concerning the labor mobilization, as conditioned by the present war situation, under paragraph B, 1-7. It is only natural that all the possibilities contained in that paragraph will be completely exhausted. The rejection of a general conscription of all the women and girls does not mean that I condemn absolutely the use of women and girls who are in a position to make themselves available for a suitable job wherever they can be useful to the war industry without violating the principles of the Fuehrer. This will be done in closest cooperation with the competent offices of the party, state, the Armed Forces and the economy.

The labor mobilization program as laid down in paragraph 1-7 Constitutes not only the greatest labor mobilization of a people but also in history

Adolf Hitler, however, made it clear through his idea of National Socialism that figures are not the decisive factor in the life of nations Besides the tremendous figure of the employed labor forces stands their productive capacity This productive capacity depends not only on the amount of calories, which I put at their disposal in the form of nourishment, but also on their moral and mental condition.

This makes it necessary to consider besides the gigantic, organizational question, the questions of nutrition, shelter, orientation, propaganda, and spiritual guidance.

Measures to be Taken to Assure the Well-Being of German Workmen and Women

There must be no doubt for the German producing people that they out-do by far all the other workers of the world through their conscientious work and their readiness to accept the most strenuous tasks under proper political and philosophical guidance.

The district Chiefs will at this decisive stage of the war assure with the help of all the institutions and organizations of the party the best political and ideological care ever known in the history of labor and humanity in wartime, for the German producing people in their districts.

I am convinced in my capacity as general plenipotentiary for labor mobilization that everything will be done by the party to maintain within or without the plants the attitude and morale of the German workers on a high level through the use of all means of propaganda and orientation, meetings and appeals, as the only way to make the home front worthy of the fighting front, and the only means of accomplishing this gigantic task and winning the war.

I will constantly see to it, that the authorities for labor mobilization as well a the managers of the plants assist the party and Primarily the German labor front in its decisive and great task in this field.

Even workmen and women employed in war plants in their hone towns and living and eating with their families must be Properly looked after I mention only provisions of coal and potatoes, consideration of their possibility to get to their place of work The lack of spring vegetables and other troubles caused by war conditions and affecting the nerves and health of our people must be offset by the strength and satisfaction gathered by the realization of the National Socialist principles of folks community [Volksgemeinschaft] social justice and the necessity to hold out together and the belief and the confidence in our Fuehrer.

This task becomes much more complicated in the case of those millions of workmen and women who have been conscripted for labor far from their homes in jobs they are not used to. This is a necessity of war.

Such utilization of labor power can neither be restricted nor can the hardships connected with it be reduced.

The aim is to make life for our folks comrades [Volkskameraden] as agreeable as possible and to facilitate the conditions of their utilization. All these German people must be assisted by billeting them, if possible, in decently furnished rooms under as decent conditions, by encouraging companionship during their free time through the party and to assure prompt issue of ration tickets and other such things.

In this connection the Politeness-Drive [Aktion "Hoeflichkeit"] introduced by Reichs-Director party member Dr. Goebbels will be binding to the utmost for all labor offices and all offices of economy and nutrition.

All camps where German producing people, men or women, are to be quartered, must be perfect examples of German cleanliness, order and hygiene.

The German plants and the German economy must not hesitate to do everything in their power to make life far from their own homes and families tolerable for conscripted folks comrades men or women quartered in those camps. As there is a complete order guaranteed in a way for the German soldier of the Armed Forces in his company for his external requirements as well as for his character, which elevates him far above the soldiers of other nations, so should this also be made possible in adequately applied form for the producing men within the labor mobilization program.

The necessary measures for the care of the producing German people within the labor mobilization program should therefore be carried out to the fullest extent by the German labor front.

In case of more extensive commitment of women and girls away from their home towns and families, the rules for shelter and care as applied by the women's labor service [Weiblichen Arbeitsdienstes] must fundamentally be respected.

Prisoners of War and Foreign Workers.

The complete employment of all prisoners of war as well as the use of a gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men and women, has become an indisputable necessity for the solution of the mobilization of labor program in this war.

All the men must be fed, sheltered and treated in such a way as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure.

It has always been natural for us Germans to refrain from cruelty and mean chicaneries towards the beaten enemy, even if he had proven himself the most bestial and most implacable adversary, and to treat him correctly and humanly, even when we expect useful work of him.

As long as the German defense industry did not make it absolutely necessary, we refrained under any circumstances from the use of Soviet prisoners of war as well as of civilian workers, men or women, from the Soviet territories. This has now become impossible and the labor power of these people must now be exploited to the greatest extent.

Consequently, I arranged my first measures concerning the food, shelter and treatment of these foreign laborers with the highest competent Reichs-authorities and with the consent of the Fuehrer and the Reichsmarshal of the Greater German Reich in such a way that a top performance will be demanded and will be obtained.

It must be remembered, though, that even the effort of a machine is conditioned by the amount of fuel, skill and care given to it. How many more conditions must be considered in the case of men, even of low kind and race, than in the case of a machine!

I could not accept the responsibility towards the German people, if after having brought such a tremendous number of men to Germany these men would one day become a burden for the German people or even endanger their health, instead of doing very necessary and useful work, because of mistakes made in their nutrition shelter and treatment.

The principles of German cleanliness, order and hygiene must therefore also be carefully applied to Russian camps.

Only in such a way will it be possible to exploit that labor to the highest benefit of arms production for the fighting front and for the war nutrition program, without any trace of false sentimentalism.

The necessary instructions concerning the food, shelter and treatment of the people from the East have been communicated to the competent authorities of the police, defense and nutrition bureaus; beyond that, I turn to the district-chiefs of the National Socialist Party with the request to assist me also in this field to the best of their abilities, in order to avoid any harm that might result from the use of that kind of labor to the German people.

The subjects of blood-related, allied and friendly nations are to be treated with particular care and consideration.

All action making the stay and work in Germany more difficult and unnecessarily unbearable for the foreign workers and exceeding the restrictions and hardships imposed by the war must be avoided. We depend to a large extent on their good will and their production

It is therefore only logical to make their stay and work in Germany as bearable as possible -- without denying anything to ourselves.

This can be realized, for instance, by facilitating their national and folk [volkstuemlich] habits concerning food, shelter, and organization of their evenings after work, etc., as far as conditions and the consideration of our own people permit.

It is very possible that, if the authorities for the labor mobilization, the general and interior administration, party and labor front cooperate in close harmony in this mobilization of foreign workmen and women, the tremendous advantage resulting from this mass commitment of millions of prisoners of war and foreign, civilian working men and women for the German defense and nutrition industries may be supplemented by an equal success for the propaganda of the national socialist Great German Reich and for its prestige throughout the world.

On the other hand the greatest harm for our war industry may result if the cooperation of all forces involved is not assured and all those
problems are not solved by all competent offices.
Therefore in closing I would ask you to observe the following principles carefully:

1. All technical and administrative matters for the labor mobilization come exclusively under the authority and responsibility of the General Plenipotentiary for Labor Mobilization, the National Labor Offices [Landesarbeitsaemter] and the Labor Offices [Arbeitsaemter].

2. All questions and tasks concerning propaganda orientation.
observation of political consequences and care (of people engaged in
this labor-mobilization program) come under the jurisdiction of:

a. The party, if outside of the plant

b. The German Labor Front for manufacturing plants, the Bureau for farm politics [Amt fuer Ararpolitik] for agricultural enterprises

3. The issue of food and clothing ration cards, financial indemnities and relief come exclusively under the jurisdiction of the competent authorities or institutions of economy.

Ask the district chiefs of the National Socialist Party, as my plenipotentiaries to assure a smooth cooperation between those various bureaus as well as the best possible harmony and mutual complete exchange of information.

4. The solution of the task concerning the war mobilization of labor is of such decisive importance that even the most important local or regional interests concerning most vital peace tasks must not interfere with it. Whoever violates that rule must be made responsible if the German soldier in his decisive struggle for the fate of our nation lacks arms and ammunition, synthetic gasoline or rubber, vehicles or airplanes.

Therefore, I want to deeply impress upon all the men and women who participate decisively in this war in the labor mobilization program with insistence to comply with all those necessities, decisions and measures, according to the old National Socialist principle: Nothing for us, everything for the Fuehrer and his work, that is, for the future of our Nation!

[signed]: Fritz Sauckel

[Stamp] (The Deputy for the 4 year plan The General Plenipotentiary for
labor mobilization)

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#42

Post by David Thompson » 13 Oct 2004, 03:24

19420731 Document: *3428-PS; Description: Letter from Kube, 7/31/1942, concerning combatting of Partisans and action against Jews in White Ruthenia. (USA 827)

"Document 3428-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume VI: US Government Printing Ofice, District of Columbia: 1946. pp. 131-133.
SECRET

Department II a
No 2407/428
Eagle Swastika

Minsk, on July 31, 1942

Seal The Commissioner General for white Ruthenia Dept. Regional leader /G 507/42 g

To Reich Commissioner for the East Land Regional leader Hinrich Lohse Riga Fs 10/8/42 rec. The Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territory Journal No 1122/42 Secret

Seal of Reich Commissioner Ostland Chief dept. 8/7/1942. II pol. II adm.

Re: Combating of Partisans and action against Jews in the District General of White Ruthenia.

In all the clashes with partisans in White Ruthenia it has been proven the Jewry, in the former Polish section as well as in the former Soviet sections of the District General, together with the Polish movement of resistance in the East and the Red Guards from Moscow, is the main bearer of the partisan movement in the East. In consequence, the treatment of Jewry in White Ruthenia, in view of the endangering of the entire economics, is a matter of political prominence, which should in consequence not be solved only according to an economic, but also according to a political viewpoint. In exhaustive discussions with the SS Brigadier General Zenner and the exceedingly capable Leader of the SD, SS lieutenant Colonel Dr. jur. Strauch, we have liquidated in the last ten weeks about 55000 Jews in White Ruthenia. In the territory Minsk-Land [county] Jewry has been completely eliminated, without endangering the manpower commitment. In the predominantly Polish territory Lida 16000 Jews, in Zlonin 8000 Jews, and so forth, have been liquidated. Owing to an encroachment in the army rear zone, already reported thither, the preparations made by us for liquidation of the Jews in the area Glebokie, have been disturbed. The army rear zone, without contacting me, has liquidated 10000 Jews, whose systematical elimination had been provided for by us in any event. In Minsk-City approximately 10000 Jews were liquidated on the 28 and 29 of July, 6500 of them Russian Jews, predominantly aged persons, women and children -- the remainder consisted of Jews unfit for commitment of labor who, in their overwhelming majority were deported to Minsk in November of last year from Vienna, Bruenn, Bremen and Berlin, by order of the Fuehrer.

The area of Luzk too, has been relieved of several thousand Jews.. The same applies to Novogrodek and Wilejka. Radical measures are imminent for Baranowitschi and Hanzewitschi. In Baranowitschi alone, approximately 10000 Jews are still living in the city itself; of these, 9000 Jews will be liquidated next month.

In Minsk City 2600 Jews from Germany are left over. In addition to that all the 6000 Russian Jews and Jewesses, who remained as employees with such units, which employed them during the action, are still alive. Even in the future, Minsk will still retain its character as the strongest center of the Jewish element, necessitated for the present by the concentration of the armament industries and the tasks of the railroad. In all the other areas, the number of Jews to be drafted for labor commitment, will be limited by the SD and by me to 800 at the most, but if possible to 500, so that after completion of future actions as announced, we will retain a remainder of 8600 Jews in Minsk and of about 7000 in the other 10 areas, including the jewless areas of Minskland [county]. The danger, that the partisans can rely essentially upon Jewry in the future, will then exist no longer. Naturally, after the termination of demands of the armed forces, the SD and I would like it best, to eliminate Jewry once and for all in the District General of White Ruthenia. For the time being, the necessary demands of the armed forces, which are the main employers of Jewry, are considered. Besides the fact of this unequivocal attitude toward the Jewry, the SD in White Ruthenia has in addition the grave task to transfer continually new contingents of Jews from the Reich to their destiny. This is an excessive strain on the physical strength of the men in the SD and keeps them away from their duties, which are awaiting them in the area of White Ruthenia proper.

Therefore, I would be grateful if the Reich Commissioner could possibly stop additional deportations of Jews to Minsk at least until the peril of the Partisan movement has been subdued conclusively. I need the SD in its total force (100 commitment) against the partisans and against the Polish Resistance movement, both of which are occupying the entire strength of the not overwhelmingly strong SD units.

After completion of the action against the Jews in Minsk, SS Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Strauch reported to me tonight with just indignation, that suddenly, without directives of the Reichleader SS, and without notification to the Commissioner General, a transport of 1000 Jews from Warshow has arrived for this air-force administrative-command. I beg the Reich Commissioner (already prepared by telegram) to prevent transports of such a kind, in his capacity as supreme Plenipotentiary for the Eastern Territory. The Polish Jew is, exactly like the Russian Jew, an enemy of Germanism. He represents a politically dangerous element, the political danger of which exceeds by far his value as a skilled worker. Under no circumstances may administrative offices of the armed forces or of the air forces import Jews to an area of civil administration without the approval of the Reich Commissioner or from the Government General or any other place, as they will endanger the entire political work and the safeguarding of the District General. I fully agree with the commander of the SD in White Ruthenia, that we shall liquidate every shipment of Jews, which is not ordered or announced by our superior offices, to prevent further disturbances in White Ruthenia.

The Commissioner General for White Ruthenia
sig. Kube

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#43

Post by Apocalypse_Now » 13 Oct 2004, 03:27

Amazing reading David, keep it coming, thank you.

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#44

Post by David Thompson » 13 Oct 2004, 04:35

19420900 Document: *EC-347; Description: Directives for operation of the Economy in Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA 320)

"Document EC-347: Secret Directives For The Operation Of The Economy In The Newly-Occupied Eastern Territories (Green Folder) Part II (3rd Edition) Supplementary Material To Part I Berlin, September 1942 [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume VII: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1947. pp. 421-423.
Economic Staff, East
(OKW/WiAmt/Z 1/II Nr. 6250/42 geh.)
6000 copies.

SECRET

DIRECTIVES FOR THE OPERATION OF THE ECONOMY IN THE NEWLY-OCCUPIED EASTERN TERRITORIES (Green Folder)

Part II (Third Edition)
Supplementary Material to Part I
Berlin, September 1942

* * *

PART II

Directives as Well as Fundamental Decrees and Orders of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories Concerning the Eastern Territories Under Civilian Administration

A. Excerpts from the Directives of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories for the Civilian Administration (Brown Folder, Pt. I, pp. 25-30)

1. General

The principal task of the civilian administration in the occupied Eastern territories is to represent the interest of the Reich.

This basic principle is to be given precedence in all measures and considerations. Therefore, the occupied territories, in the future, may be permitted to have a life of their own in a form not as yet to be determined. However, they remain part of the greater German living space and are always to be governed according to this guiding principle.

The regulations of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, which concern the administration of a country occupied by a foreign belligerent power, are not applicable, since the USSR is to be considered dissolved, and therefore the Reich has the obligation of exercising all governmental and other sovereign functions in the interests of the country's inhabitants. Therefore, any measures are permitted which the German administration deems necessary and suitable for the execution of this comprehensive task.

* * *
High Command of the Army
Gen St d H/Gen Qu
Az. L/498 B (Qu 3/III)
Nr. 1. 36201/41 geh.

Concerning Seizure and Transport of Raw Materials from the Occupied Eastern Territories

The raw material situation makes it imperative to bring into, and utilize for, German war economy, all available quantities of non-ferrous metals -- in particular, copper, zinc and their alloys -- and also of textiles, leather, rubber, mineral oil, etc. Satisfactory results of the campaign of collecting scrap, old metals and other used materials can be expected only if forces of the army and of the RAD are made available to the organization for the seizure of scrap and old metals in the occupied territories (Major Schu), appointed by the Reich Marshall of the greater German Reich, representative of the Four-Year Plan. The actual collection must be done by prisoners of war and the civilian population. * * *

1. In the entire field of operations, collection and utilization of metals must be executed with all available forces. Factories, buildings, etc., must be ruthlessly stripped.

Factories and other enterprises are excepted which are necessary for supplying the army (munitions, armaments and leather factories) and for executing the principal economic tasks (the mineral oil economy, the food economy, as also those industries which constitute the foundation for the mineral oil and the food economy).


* * *
J. Food Supplies for the Civilian Population the Occupied Eastern Territories

(Special Decree of the Economic Staff, East. dated 4 November 1941)

The following regulations are decreed for food supplies for the civilian population in the occupied Eastern territories, with the exception of the three former Baltic states. The regulations replace special decree, No. 31 issued by Wi Stab Ost/Fue/La No. 3584/41 of 4 September 1941.

The Reich Commissars for the Ukraine and Ostland will act upon these regulations, the latter only in the old Russian and former Polish territories.

Food Supplies for the Civilian Population

Ruthless looting and destruction by the Bolsheviks have most seriously dislocated economic life and transportation in the occupied Eastern territories. Misery and distress have been the inevitable consequence for the population, especially in the large cities. Responsibility for this rests exclusively with the Soviet rulers who gave the orders for senseless destruction.

It is nevertheless the task of the economic agencies in the zone of operations to safeguard the feeding of the population, insofar as this is possible without prejudice to German interests.

No special food supply regulations are required for the rural population, since it will be in a position, in general, to supply itself. The food supply of the urban population must definitely take second place after the requirements of the Wehrmacht and German agencies, and the delivery quotas for the Reich.

The following maximum ration scales, which can only be applied under the above qualifications, will provide the basis for urban food supplies:

Weekly Maximum Ration Scales (in grams)

a. For consumers not engaged in any significant work:

Meat and meat products: none
Fat: 70
Bread: 1500
Potatoes: 2000

b. For consumers performing useful work:

Meat and meat products: 100
Fat: 100

In area of Army Groups, North and Center:

Bread: 1500
Potatoes: 4000

In area of Army Group, South:

Bread: 2000
Potatoes: 2500

c. For consumers permanently engaged on heavy manual work: (Supplements additional to b):

Meat and meat products: 100
Fat: 50
Bread: 500
Potatoes: 1000

d. For children under 14 and Jews:

(50% of the maxima as under a)

Other products than those listed above may only be allocated to the urban population after other requirements have been satisfied.

It has to be particularly taken into account that:

a. The food and transport situation does not permit a generous treatment of the civilians, and any allocations in excess of the maxima fixed above would result in unbearable disadvantages for food supplies to Germany.

b. Wehrmacht stocks or those earmarked for Wehrmacht or Reich consumption must on no account be drawn upon for feeding the civilian population.

c. The population itself in many cases still disposes of hoards, since, during the evacuation of the Russian forces, existing food stocks were distributed to, or looted by, the population. Therefore, genuine distress will in general only occur later on.

The following specific rules are laid down in agreement with the OKH (Quartermaster-General):

1. The Commandants or other agencies concerned determine as quickly as possible the number of inhabitants and report it to the local Economic Commands or Agricultural Leaders. A percentage of the population, which will depend on local conditions but is not to exceed 20%, is to be recommended for the highest ration scales as under b) above. Supplements as under c) may only be granted to the staff of enterprises which continue operations for German benefit (e.g. armaments plants).

2. Responsibility for procuring food supplies for the civilian population rests with the Economic Commands (Groups La) and their subordinate local Agricultural Leaders.

3. The Economic Commands (Groups La) determine the weekly ration scales which can be made available after provision has been made for other requirements (Wehrmacht, Reich delivery quotas, etc.), within the maximum scales fixed above. They also determine the percentage of the population which is to qualify for the increased maximum scales according to b). Finally, as soon as the necessary data can be obtained, they will limit supplementary rations as under c) exclusively to those workers of plants operating for German benefit who, according to German domestic regulations, would qualify for heaviest workers' supplements. In determining the weekly rations, the following has to be observed:

For the initial period, the rations are to be kept as low as possible, in order to force the population to use up its own hoarded food supplies and to prevent encroachments upon Wehrmacht requirements, which are difficult to meet in any case because of the transport situation.

Meat and fat are not to be issued at all for the time being. Potatoes, as far as possible, are to be replaced by beets of all kinds, bread by buckwheat and millet. Gradually the rations can then be raised up to the maximum scales fixed above.

4. The quantities of foodstuffs calculated on the basis of the population figures determined as under 3) will then be released for civilian consumption. The distribution of released food to the population will take place exclusively through the native administrative agencies and distributive services.

For a better utilization of the food allocated, essential plants, if at all possible, will institute factory canteen feeding. In other cases too, when circumstances permit, communal feeding will be given preference.

5. Transportation needed for civilian food supplies is to be taken from local resources. Motor vehicles of the Economic Commands, local Agricultural Leaders or military vehicles may not be used for this purpose.

6. The population is to be instructed by suitable propaganda media (wall posters, etc.), that the blame for the food supply difficulties is to be found entirely in the destruction and dissipation of food stocks and equipment by their own compatriots.

7. Exceptional provisions for the feeding of Russian workers and employees are contained in the decree OKH/Gen St d.H/Gen Qu Az.l/833/41 IVa (IV, 1) of 23 August 1941; and for the feeding of Soviet prisoners of war in the decree OKH/Gen St d.H/ GenQu/IVa (III, 2) Az. 960 Nr. I/23 738/41 geh. of 10/21/1941.

The additional food requirements under these regulations are to be balanced by a corresponding reduction in the general rations within the areas of the Economic Commands.

(signed) DR. MUSSET
Last edited by David Thompson on 01 Nov 2004, 09:34, edited 1 time in total.

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#45

Post by Topspeed » 13 Oct 2004, 04:48

David Thompson wrote:19410628 Document 1056-PS: The Organization of the Administration of Occupied Eastern Territories

"Document 1056-PS: The Organization of the Administration of Occupied Eastern Territories [translation]", 6/28/1941, in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume III: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 701-715.
[Found in Rosenberg's files.]

c. Caring for the population,
That was something the soviets didn't do for their citizens. That still doesn't justify the annihilation plans of Leningrad nor Moscow. Here again is a strong contradiction with actual actions taken and what was planned.

rgds,

Juke

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