Life in Occupied Russia

[Obserwator]

That proves that the aim of the German occupation authorities was not the decimation of the local population for its own sake.

http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaste ... rticle.HTM

The period of work on the GPO coincided with the greatest intensification of Nazi crimes in the east. This applies, above all, to the mass "liquidation" of millions of Soviet prisoners-of-war and Jews. The data contained in the version of the GPO available to Wetzel had become obsolete. According to these data, 45 million persons were living in the territories assigned for colonization, including 5-6 million Jews. A large percentage of this population perished; the losses in Poland reached six million and in the territory of the USSR over 20 million, including about seven million civilians. Moreover, at least one and a half million Polish civilians and prisoners-of-war ware taken to the Reich for forced labor. And the Nazis intended to act even more ruthlessly after achieving victory. In November 1941, that is at the time when Hitler and his close associates considered that the result of the war was already decided, Göring gave some indications of this in a conversation with Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister. During this conversation the question of the famine threatened Greece war raised. Göring advised Ciano not to worry about this too much, just as he was not worrying about the fact that the Soviet prisoners-of-war were dying of hunger. "This year, 20 to 30 million people will die of hunger in Russia. Perhaps it is a good thing that this is happening, because certain peoples must be decimated

http://www.dac.neu.edu/holocaust/Hitlers_Plans.htm

Wetzel stated that a situation should be aimed at in which a Russian from the Gorki Generalkommissariat would feel that he was different from a Russian in the Tula Generalkommissariat.3 The first task, then, was to break down the unity of the nations of the Soviet Union, and then to split the Russian nation from the inside. To make certain of this objective Wetzel considered imperative "a racial sifting of the Russians." by this phrase he meant the removal of the most valuable element "from a racial point of view" and their Germanization. This led him to imagine, in accordance with the theory of racism, that the Nordic elements in each nation determine its value and ability, and that the elimination of a few million "Nordic types" from among the Russian people would reduce it, from loss of "Nordic blood," to a lower racial category within a couple of generations. He thought that as a result of this process the Russians would become stupid and apathetic, lose all their initiative and readily accept the guiding role of the Germans.

Apart from these two methods of protecting the Nazi Reich against the Russian danger, Generalplan Ost also suggested the necessity of using another preventive measure - destruction or at least considerable reduction of the biological vitality of the Russian nation. This was a proposal that, in fact, concerned all the Slav peoples.

The object of this biological campaign was to curb the natural increase. Under the Nazi plan, a deliberate and calculated policy was to be conducted in the eastern part of Europe to cut down the natural increase by the double device of trying to reduce the birth rate and taking no steps to combat mortality.

[David Thompson]

Michael -- You wrote:

The claim that the German occupation authorities planned a famine in the occupied Soviet territories for the purpose of reducing the native population is an exaggeration based on a misinterpretation of the documentary evidence.

Is it? There's a lengthy memorandum on the subject at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 55#p552155 , dated 23 May 1941. It sets forth the German economic plan for the occupied USSR, once Operation Barbarossa got started on 22 June 1941. There's no misinterpreting this:

b. Since Germany and Europe, respectively, require surplus under all circumstances, the consumption must be decreased correspondingly. The examples given above show the extent to which the amount of surplus can be increased by a limitation of consumption.

c. Such a decrease of consumption, contrary to the territories so far occupied, is feasible here because the principal food surplus area is clearly separated from the principal deficit area. http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 155#552155

As we shall see, the German plan to "decrease consumption" was to seize the food, which would cause a famine. The dead don't eat.

You then wrote:

What the German authorities planned was to take as much food out of the occupied territories as was needed to feed the German army of occupation and to supplement the rations of the German population.

You're being too modest. The 23 May 1941 memorandum ( http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 155#552155 ) shows that the Germans also planned to "supplement the rations" of western Europe with the food they intended to seize in the USSR:

Since Germany and Europe, respectively, require surplus under all circumstances, the consumption must be decreased correspondingly.

In future, Southern Russia must turn its face towards Europe. Its food surpluses, however, will only be paid for if it purchases its industrial consumer goods from Germany, of Europe. Russian competition from the forest zone must therefore be abolished. It follows from all that has been said that the German administration in these territories may well attempt to mitigate the consequences of the famine which undoubtedly will take place, and to accelerate the return to primitive agricultural conditions. An attempt might be made to intensify cultivation in these areas by expanding the acreage under potatoes or other important food crops giving a high yield. However, these measures will not avert famine. Many tens of millions of people in this area will become redundant and will either die or have to emigrate to Siberia. Any attempt to save the population there from death by starvation by importing surpluses from the black soil zone would be at the expense of supplies to Europe. It would reduce Germany's staying power in the war, an would undermine Germany's and Europe's power to resist the blockade. This must be clearly and absolutely understood. The manufacturing industries in Belgium and France are much more important for Germany and the German war effort than those in Russia. It is therefore much more essential to safeguard food supplies to those countries through surpluses from the East than to make an ambitious attempt to preserve Russian industry in the food-consuming zone. One must always bear in mind that the Great Russian people, whether under Tsarism or Bolshevism, is always an irreconcilable enemy not only of Germany, but also of Europe.

You went on to say:

Whether or not a famine ensued would depend on how much food was left over after the German authorities had extracted the amounts they planned to take.

The German documents show that the planners in the Reich Ministry of Food Supply believed that there would not be enough food left over for the local civilian population and that a famine would inevitably result.

Since you acknowledge this, why talk about "Whether or not a famine ensued would depend on how much food was left over"? There is no "whether" option in the German plan. The documents clearly show that the Germans planned to take so much food that that a famine would result, and they intended and acknowledged that. Let's look at how the matter is expressed in the documents themselves:

There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people will be starved to death if we take out of the country the things necessary for us.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 129#552129

The consequences will be cessation of supplies to the entire forest zone, including the essential industrial centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg. http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 155#552155

The population of these areas, in particular the urban population, will have to face most serious distress from famine. http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 155#552155

It follows from all that has been said that the German administration in these territories may well attempt to mitigate the consequences of the famine which undoubtedly will take place, and to accelerate the return to primitive agricultural conditions. An attempt might be made to intensify cultivation in these areas by expanding the acreage under potatoes or other important food crops giving a high yield. However, these measures will not avert famine. Many tens of millions of people in this area will become redundant and will either die or have to emigrate to Siberia. http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 155#552155

Our task is to re-integrate Russia with the European division of labor, and it involves, of necessity, the destruction of the existing economic equilibrium within the Soviet Union. Thus, it is not important, under any circumstances, to preserve what has existed, but what matters is a deliberate turning away from the existing situation and introducing Russian food resources into the European framework. This will inevitably result in an extinction of industry as well as of a large part of the people in what so far have been the food-deficit areas.

It is impossible to state an alternate in sufficiently hard and severe terms. http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 155#552155

Then you said:

They foresaw two possible outcomes of that famine, or a combination of the two;

- either large numbers of the civilian population wold have to migrate to the East out of the area of German occupation

- or else millions would die of starvation.

Well, let's look at the "migration" option. The Germans are going to seize all the food and cut off supplies to the famine region. This includes all the livestock, which might be used to pull wagons:

It will also be necessary to utilize for German purposes the livestock which has no fodder base of its own, i. e. it will be necessary to seize livestock holdings immediately, and to make them available to the troops not only for the moment, but in the long run, and also for exportation to Germany. Since fodder supplies will be cut off, pig and cattle holdings in these areas will of necessity drastically decline in the near future. If they are not seized by the Germans at an early date, they will be slaughtered by the population for its own use, without Germany getting anything out of it.

* * *
It has been demanded by the Fuehrer that the reduction in the meat ration should be made good by the fall. This can only be achieved by the most drastic seizures of Russian livestock holdings, particularly in areas which are in a favorable transport situation in relation to Germany * * *
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 155#552155

So how is this "migration" to take place? By rail? No, that's not what the Germans had in mind:

The population of these areas, in particular the urban population, will have to face most serious distress from famine. It will be necessary to divert the population into the Siberian spaces. Since rail transport is out of the question, this too, will be an extremely difficult problem. http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 155#552155

So the "migration" is to be a foot march to Siberia. The migrating "many tens of millions," including women, children and the elderly, don't have any means of transporting their possessions other than what they can personally carry. They have to start moving within a very limited period of time if they want to eat. And they don't have any food to carry with them either. How many of the "redundant" "many tens of millions" would survive this challenge? Anyone who thinks about this "migration" for more than a few seconds can see that it too is a murder plan.

You also said:

The German planners were quite ruthless in their willingness to let millions of the civilian population die, but the death of millions was not their goal. Rather it was the feeding of the German population by whatever means, even at the expense of other groups.

This explanation cannot withstand scrutiny. The German population was already well fed in 1941, at the time when the famine plan was hatched. Since there was no food emergency in Germany, the planned seizures in the USSR were unnecessary to meet the basic food needs of the German population. Consequently, we must look elsewhere for the German motive to seize the food in such amounts. That motive is easy to find in the documents themselves. They speak of eliminating the whole industrial basis of the famine region, along with its population. How is this to be achieved? By cutting off the food supply ("cessation of supplies to the entire forest zone, including the essential industrial centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg."). The motive is obvious -- to cause the death of the population in the famine zone, whose inhabitants are "redundant." The documents make this perfectly clear by describing the intended result. It would be much more accurate to say that the German planners intended to kill millions of people in the occupied USSR by deliberately starving them to death.

Then you noted:

As a matter of fact, the expected huge famine did not occur during the winter of 1941-42, and millions did not die, although there was malnutrition and an elevated death-rate.

There were two main reasons for the non-occurrence of the expected death-toll;

1. Large numbers of city and town-dwellers moved to the countryside, where alternative sources of food were found.

2. The migration of large numbers of the population to the East had already occurred, in the form of the mass evacuation carried out by the Soviet Governmetn immediately after the German invasion.

You have misread or misinterpreted the documents. The main reason for the non-occurrence of the expected death-toll is that the famine was planned for the forest belt area around Moscow and St. Petersburg, as well as the Ural industrial region. The famine didn't happen because the Germans were unable to capture the areas they planned to starve:

The surplus territories are situated in the black soil district (that is, in the south and south-east) and in the Caucasus. The deficit areas are principally located in the forest zone of the north.

Therefore, an isolation of the black soil areas must in any case place greater or lesser surpluses in these regions at our disposal. The consequences will be cessation of supplies to the entire forest zone, including the essential industrial centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

* * *

1. All industry in the deficit area, particularly the manufacturing industries in the Moscow and Petersburg regions as well as the Ural industrial region, will be abandoned. It may be assumed that these regions today absorb an annual 5-10 million tons from the food production zone. http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 155#552155

You added:

(That mass movement of people to areas where there was not an adequate food supply and preparations had not been made led to wide-spread malnutrition and starvation in the unoccupied part of the Soviet Union).

Fortunately, the malnutrition and starvation was nowhere near as bad as what the Germans had planned for the residents of those areas.

You continued:

In the Spring of 1942, when the German authorities found that the anticipated mass-starvation of the local population had not occurred (with the exception of the high mortality among the Soviet POWs), those authorities did not undertake any alternative measures to ensure a high death-rate among the Soviet population. If anything, they undertook measures designed to improve agriculture and the food supply (both for export to Germany and for the local people), such as a limited land reform.

Again, you have misinterpreted the documents. As I've pointed out above, the famine was to be imposed specifically on the Great Russian population in the forest belt and Ural industrial areas, not the Ukraine. The 23 May 1941 memo makes that perfectly clear:

The following consequences result from this situation, which has received the approval of the highest authorities, since it is in accord with the political tendencies (preservation of the "small" Russians, preservation of the Caucasus, of the Baltic provinces, of White Russia to the prejudice of the Great Russians):

I. For the forest belt

a. Production in the forest belt (the food-deficit area) will become "naturalized," similar to the events during the World War and the Communistic tendencies of the war, etc., viz: agriculture in that territory will begin to become a mere "home production." The result will be that the planting of products destined for the market such as, in particular, flax and hemp, will be discontinued, and the area used therefor will be taken over for products for the producer (grain, potatoes, etc.) Moreover, discontinuance of fodder for that area will lead to the collapse of the dairy production and of pig-producing in that territory.

b. Germany is not interested in the maintenance of the productive power of these territories, except for supplying the troops stationed there.

One must always bear in mind that the Great Russian people, whether under Tsarism or Bolshevism, is always an irreconcilable enemy not only of Germany, but also of Europe.

By contrast, here's what the memo says about the Ukraine:

Industry can only be preserved insofar as it is located in the surplus region. This applies, apart from the above-mentioned oilfield regions in the Caucasus, particularly to the heavy industries in the Donets district (Ukraine). Only the future will show to what extent it will prove possible to maintain in full these industries, and in particular the Ukrainian manufacturing industries, after the withdrawal of the food surpluses required by Germany. http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 155#552155

You concluded:

That proves that the aim of the German occupation authorities was not the decimation of the local population for its own sake.

This benign conclusion is disproved by the 23 May 1941 memo, which shows that the famine was not to be directed against the local population generally, but was intentionally and specifically directed at the Great Russian population living and working in the forest belt around Moscow and Leningrad, and in the Ural industrial region. The aim of the German occupation authorities, to kill "many tens of millions" (rather more intense than a mere "decimation") of the Great Russian population of the forest belt and the Ural industrial region by famine, was never realized because the Germans couldn't capture the areas where the planned famine was to take place.

[michael mills]

David Thompson wrote:

This explanation cannot withstand scrutiny. The German population was already well fed in 1941, at the time when the famine plan was hatched. Since there was no food emergency in Germany, the planned seizures in the USSR were unnecessary to meet the basic food needs of the German population. Consequently, we must look elsewhere for the German motive to seize the food in such amounts. That motive is easy to find in the documents themselves. They speak of eliminating the whole industrial basis of the famine region, along with its population. How is this to be achieved? By cutting off the food supply ("cessation of supplies to the entire forest zone, including the essential industrial centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg."). The motive is obvious -- to cause the death of the population in the famine zone, whose inhabitants are "redundant." The documents make this perfectly clear by describing the intended result. It would be much more accurate to say that the German planners intended to kill millions of people in the occupied USSR by deliberately starving them to death.

The interpretation of German documents given in the above paragraph is pure opinion, unsupported by any sources for that interpretation.

Please give a source that demonstrates that the purpose of the German plan to extract the food surplus from the occupied Soviet territories was not to supplement the rations of the population of Germany and German-occupied Europe, but specifically to kill off a part of the Soviet population by starvation.

Please give a source that demonstrates that there was no present or impending food crisis in Germany or German-occupied Europe, and that there was no need to extract food from the occupied Soviet territories.

Please give sources that analyse the food economy of wartime Germany and German-occupied Europe.

Please give sources that demonstrate that Germany and German-occupied Europe were quite capable of producing enough food for their populations, and therefore did not face a food deficit owing to the Allied blockade and did not need to import food from the occupied Soviet territories.

Please give a source that shows why the British blockade would not have created a food crisis in Germany in the Second World War, when the same blockade during the First World War produced precisely such a food crisis with widespread malnutrition in Germany and an elevated death rate.

The claim that the reason why the forecast famine did not occur (at least to the extent predicted by the German agricultural experts) was the German failure to capture the forest zones around Moscow, Leningrad and the Ural industrial zone is untenable.

The German plan was to stop the flow of food from the food-surplus areas of Ukraine and the North Caucasus to the food-deficit areas (the forest zone, which included Belorussia, an area Germany did capture and occupy), and divert it westward to Germany and German-occupied Europe.

To accomplish that end, all Germany had to do was to capture the food-surplus area, and to stop the flow of food northward to the forest zone. It did not need to capture all or indeed any of the forest zone. And the fact is that Germany did capture the whole of Ukraine and (briefly) most of the north Caucasus.

Finally, the very passage that David Thompson quotes to prove a German intention to partially exterminate the Soviet population by starvation, or more particularly the population of the food-deficit area (mainly Great Russian), in fact disproves such an intention, as opposed to an intention to seize food supplies no matter what the cost.

Here is that passage again, with the relevant parts highlighted.

In future, Southern Russia must turn its face towards Europe. Its food surpluses, however, will only be paid for if it purchases its industrial consumer goods from Germany, of Europe. Russian competition from the forest zone must therefore be abolished. It follows from all that has been said that the German administration in these territories may well attempt to mitigate the consequences of the famine which undoubtedly will take place, and to accelerate the return to primitive agricultural conditions. An attempt might be made to intensify cultivation in these areas by expanding the acreage under potatoes or other important food crops giving a high yield. However, these measures will not avert famine. Many tens of millions of people in this area will become redundant and will either die or have to emigrate to Siberia. Any attempt to save the population there from death by starvation by importing surpluses from the black soil zone would be at the expense of supplies to Europe.

If the German intention had been to kill off part of the Russian population by starvation, then obviously the German occupiers would not attempt to "mitigate" the famine by returning to "primitive agricultural conditions" or by increasing the acreage under potatoes, since that would frustrate the exterminatory intention. But the German agricultural experts who wrote this paper foresaw exactly such an attempt to mitigate the consequences of the diversion of food from the food-surpus areas to Germany. To be sure, they considered that such attempts would not be sufficient to avert famine, but they did not say that those attempts should not be made.

It is important to realise that the German experts did not say that no attempt at all should be made to save the population in the food-deficit area. Rather they said that such an attempt should be not be at the expense of supplies to Europe.

[David Thompson]

Michael -- Your original post which started this discussion is at: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 416#604416
You don't cite to a single source or give supporting authorities for your claims anywhere in the entire essay.

My reply to your post had 24 quotations from contemporaneous German documents, each of which was sourced with a hyperlink, showing that your apologia for German policy in the occupied USSR had a large number of errors in it. I pointed each of these errors out in turn, showing how your generalizations were inaccurate and provided the readers with the means to check each contention.

Your response was this:

The interpretation of German documents given in the above paragraph is pure opinion, unsupported by any sources for that interpretation.

I think it should be apparent at this point that your contentions are becoming increasingly unreal. I showed you that your claims were belied by the documents I cited. Rather than accept that you had misread or misinterpreted the documents, you persist in your now-discredited claims.

Again without offering any proof of your own, you asked me to:

(1)

Please give a source that demonstrates that the purpose of the German plan to extract the food surplus from the occupied Soviet territories was not to supplement the rations of the population of Germany and German-occupied Europe, but specifically to kill off a part of the Soviet population by starvation.

The source is the memorandum of 23 May 1941. I have already given 20 quotations or more from it in my posts above. The intent to kill off a part of the Soviet population by starvation is clearly and repeatedly stated in the document, as I have shown through quoting it. The document is posted for all to see at: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 55#p552155

(2)

Please give a source that demonstrates that there was no present or impending food crisis in Germany or German-occupied Europe, and that there was no need to extract food from the occupied Soviet territories.

This request assumes that your unsourced contention (now expanded to include western Europe) -- that there was such a need -- is correct, and asks me to disprove it. Since you provided no proof for a "food crisis" in the first place, I don't feel strongly pressed by your demand that I prove a negative proposition. The claim that there was a "present or impending food crisis in Germany or German-occupied Europe" needs to be established as a fact before there is any need for me to answer it. This requires proof, which you have not provided.

The lack of proof for, and the failure of contemporaneous documents to mention, any "food crisis" in Germany in 1941 is a strong argument that your claim has no basis in fact. For example, the 23 May 1941 memorandum exhaustively states the justifications for the seizures of food from the occupied USSR in the most realistic terms, and a "food crisis" in Germany isn't mentioned anywhere. In fact, the document talks about providing the seized foodstuffs to western Europe as well as Germany, which shows that German needs cannot account for the amount of the seizures. If you contend that there was such a crisis in Germany in 1941, please show, with sourced material, that it is not just a figment of your imagination before asking me to rebut the claim.

(3)

Please give sources that analyse the food economy of wartime Germany and German-occupied Europe.

This is hardly a requirement for understanding the 23 May 1941 memo regarding the seizures of food and the planned famine in the USSR. The memo itself provides its own analysis, if you take the trouble to read it. You're "grasping at straws." If you want to show that some collateral evidence somewhere requires a different interpretation from that obviously imparted by the language of the 23 May 1941 memo, produce it.

(4)

Please give sources that demonstrate that Germany and German-occupied Europe were quite capable of producing enough food for their populations, and therefore did not face a food deficit owing to the Allied blockade and did not need to import food from the occupied Soviet territories.

(a) What "Allied blockade"? At the time the memo was written (23 May 1941) the only enemy still active in the field was Great Britain and its commonwealth, reeling from its most recent defeats in the Mediterranean. Germany was still able to purchase food from the USSR, was not at war with either the USSR or the US, nor was it effectively "blockaded." Germany could import food from the rest of the world via Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Iran and Sweden. In addition, Germany was seizing all surpluses in its occupied territories, from cash to crops. See, for starters, the "occupation costs" assessed by Germany on the countries it had conquered, at:

German costs assessed on occupied countries 1940-44
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=62936

and

The Nazi exploitation of occupied Belgium
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=28324

(b) In May 1941, when the memo was written, Germany could buy food from the USSR. The question, therefore, is why the Germans needed to seize the food from the USSR rather than pay for it, and seize the food in such quantities that it would cause a famine which would kill "many tens of millions" in the USSR. Certainly "many tens of millions" weren't dying from starvation in Germany or Nazi Europe during the same period. The purpose of the proposed seizures is clearly stated in the memo -- It was to punish the Great Russians, cause massive economic dislocation in the former USSR, and allow the Germans to redistribute the stolen food as patronage to those it favored.

(c) Since you have not mentioned the "emigration" option to the famine, I take it that you concede my point that a foot march to Siberia was just an alternative murder plan for the inhabitants of the planned famine zone. This is additional evidence of the real purpose for the proposed German seizure of food in such huge quantities -- to deal a crippling blow to the Great Russian population which would last for many years.

(d) It is clear from the memo that Germany intended to throw the burden of feeding its armed forces onto the occupied territories generally, and onto the occupied eastern territories in particular. Germany wanted to shirk the burden of having to feed its own troops, although that was its obligation under the laws and customs of land warfare. That is why you see statements like this:

II. Food and supplies in the territories to be occupied in the "Barbarossa" area: The special conditions in the "Barbarossa" area necessitate an extensive exploitation of the country under a rigid leadership, especially in the field of food supplies, in order to supply the troops.

The troops must be aware of the fact that every saving in supplies, especially food supplies, will increase the range of the operations.

On the other hand, however, it is necessary to preserve and protect the production of the country, especially in the agricultural sector, so that it may be utilized at the earliest possible date to ensure contribution to the German food supplies. http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 151#552151

(emphases in original) I. Supplies for the Army

Germany's food situation in the third year of war demands it imperatively that the Wehrmacht, in all its provisioning, must not live off Greater German territory or that of incorporated or friendly areas from which this territory receives imports. This minimum aim, the provisioning of the Wehrmacht from enemy territory in the third year, and if necessary in later years, must be attained at any price. This means that one-third of the Wehrmacht must be fully provisioned by French deliveries to the army of occupation. The remaining two-thirds (and even slightly more in view of the present size of the Wehrmacht) must without exception be provisioned from the Eastern space. This leads to the following particulars:

1. Bread Cereals. The requirements of the Wehrmacht as to bread cereals amount annually to about 1 and a half million tons. France supplies 470000 tons yearly in accordance with the Hague Convention for Land Warfare and the Armistice Treaty. France will have to continue to make such shipments also in the third year. The East will, in future, have to make available under all circumstances about 1 million tons. In furnishing bread cereals to the Wehrmacht, consideration must also be given to the problem of supply of foodstuffs and beer.

2. Oats. The requirements of the army amount to about 1.8 million tons. France and other occupied territories in the West ship approximately 600000 tons. Accordingly, 1.2 to 1.5 million tons would be the quota for the East.

3. Meats. The requirements of the Wehrmacht amount to about 600000 tons annually. France, with Holland and Denmark delivered up to now 200000 tons and will, in the third year of the war, ship 125000 tons at the most. Accordingly, there remain about 475000 tons of meats which the Eastern territories will have to supply, or figured in the exchange of value of grain, 2.4 million tons of grain.

4. Fats. The requirements of the army amount annually to about 100000 tons. France has been up to now unable to supply fats and will in the future also be unable to do so. The entire 100000 tons will have to be shipped by the Eastern territories.

5. Besides, the Eastern territories will have to supply the proportionate requirements of the Wehrmacht as to hay and straw respectively; furthermore, they will have to furnish the requirements as to fruit, vegetables, canned fish, sugar, prepared foodstuffs and legumes.

From this it follows that about 1 million tons of bread cereals, 1.2 million tons of fodder cereals, 2.4 million tons of grain for meat production, or a total of from 4 and a half million to 5 million tons of grain will have to be supplied from the Eastern territories for the requirements of the army, in addition to the shipments of hay, straw, fats, eggs, etc. It is to be noted that hereby the transport situation for exports to Germany from the East and for supplies from Germany will be considerably relieved.

These quantities have by all means to be furnished for the army in the Eastern territories. They will be increased by these amounts by which the French quotas might possibly be reduced.

It cannot be anticipated today what troop transfers will take place during the third.year of war (possibly also demobilization of a considerable number of soldiers). Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that a part of the army, such as for instance, the "Flak" (anti-aircraft batteries), the personnel in training, especially the youngest training age class, etc., will also in the future be permanently stationed in Germany. For all these reasons, the estimated size of the Wehrmacht in the East may be considerably reduced during the third year of war, which would lead to an increase in the number of consumers in Germany herself. Also, in this case, the quantities made available for the estimated 2/3 of the entire Wehrmacht will have to be supplied under any circumstances from the Eastern territories. Obviously the transport situation will hereby be considerably burdened.

II. Supplies for the German civilian population.

1. Only after meeting these requirements of the army which, under any circumstances, will have to be made available from the Eastern territories, can shipments to Germany to cover civilian needs begin. In this matter, any dissipation of energy on side issues must, under any circumstances, be abstained from. First and foremost is the transport to Germany of oil seeds -- particularly of sunflower seeds, but also of flax seed, cotton seed, soya beans -- in order to increase the stocks of fats. For, from the fat stocks in the third year of war there will be a lack of about 150000 tons of oil which Japan and Manchukuo up to now shipped through Russia. Furthermore, the remaining oil seed reserves that are still on hand will be used up in the third year of the war economy. For these reasons, it will be necessary to procure from the East from 400000-500000 tons of oil which must be considered equivalent to about 1.5 million tons of oil seeds. This transport problem must under all circumstances be solved, and in doing so the fact that in the Eastern territories the oil seeds are being pressed to oil will not lead to an alleviation of the situation for the reason that greater Germany can likewise not do without the resulting oil cake. It will be a question of expediency as to whether oil seeds or oil and oil cake should be shipped. The final result must be the delivery of about 400000 tons of oil and 1 million tons of oil cake.

2. Only after the transport of these oil seeds is accomplished, may an export of grain be effected, which of course, is extremely desirable, because greater Germany must at an increasing rate supply the occupied territories and must also herself replenish her reserves after the bad harvest in 1940 and after this year's harvest which, at best, must be expected to be an average one. In any case, the grain surpluses of the newly-annexed border territories and also of regions situated favorably in respect of transportation, must be exported to Germany in order to obtain soon the quantities which the Russians anyway would have supplied voluntarily. In any case, however, if transportation is not possible, all grain surpluses that exist in the Eastern territories above the quota for army requirements, must be secured so that these stocks can be transferred to Germany during the coming year.

3. As the shortening of rations in Germany has already now shown, the weakest point in the German food situation is the meat supply. The relief resulting from the fact that 2/3 of the army is procuring its meat from the Eastern territories, is not sufficient to make good in the fall the cut that was made in meat rations, because Germany's fodder supply situation makes it absolutely necessary to reduce further the stocks of pigs. Therefore, it will be necessary to place quantities of meat, also, from the Eastern territories at the disposal of the Reich.

While, however, the supply to the army must come from all territories in the East (according to the troop contingents stationed in the individual territories), and while the export of oil seeds and grain will for the most part originate in the black soil zone, the procurement of meat for German purposes, even for the purposes of the current requirements of the Wehrmacht, must take place from the forest belt and, in that zone, especially from the White Russian region and the central industrial areas in the vicinity of Moscow.

One has to be entirely clear regarding the following situation: The stocks of cattle in the whole of Russia amount to about 63 million compared with 22 million in greater Germany, the stocks of pigs amount to 30 million compared with 24 million in Germany at the present time. The cattle stocks are more concentrated in the natural pasture-lands; these are the regions north of Moscow, excluding the Baltic provinces, up to Siberia and the Steppe regions in the south-east. The pork larders are situated in the north-west wooded regions as far as Moscow. These territories in the future will, in any case, have to reduce their stocks of cattle very considerably, especially their pig inventories, on account of the interruption in grain deliveries from the black soil zone. In such a situation, the danger exists that if our authorities do not seize the stocks of cattle immediately, in order to supply the army on the one hand and the homeland on the other, the livestock might be slaughtered within a very short time for the purposes of the local population and would therefore no longer be available for German purposes.

What matters, therefore, is not only to prepare making available stocks of cattle for 1 year for 2/3 of the Wehrmacht and to ship to the Baltic Sea ports livestock, especially from the north-west and the central regions, in order to utilize it for German civilian requirements by way of the border slaughter house in the North of Germany, but the decisive point is to assure, as far as possible, meat stocks for the future as well. The problem of preserving meat therefore will be of utmost importance, especially in the northern regions. Everything in tin-plate that is obtainable or can be made in Russia must, therefore, be withdrawn from all other canning purposes and serve in the manufacture of canned meat, which can be stored over a longer period of time only in tin-plate cans. Possible exceptions to this rule, perhaps in the case of canned fish, will only be ordered later as far as it should be necessary. Another important point is to use as well all other methods of preserving food (pickling, freezing and smoking of food). It is necessary for this important purpose to make use of all meat packing houses that are located in these regions. The importance and urgency of this task will have to be pointed out again and again. The interruption in the fodder supply will make it impossible to get hold of the cattle later on.

* * *

IV. Collection: The solution of these problems requires, apart from the maintenance of production in the surplus area, a smooth functioning of collection. For this reason alone the collective farming structure must not be touched, since collection is the easier the bigger each individual farming unit. In conducting collection in the reconstruction areas, i.e. in the surplus-producing districts, the food supplies of the producing peasants and farm laborers will have to be considered, in order to insure maintenance and increase of production in future years. Such considerations will not always be possible, or necessary, in the food consuming areas of the forest zone, except for the special treatment to be accorded the Baltic and, if possible, the White Russian territories. Apart from collecting provisions and supplies for the Wehrmacht, the important thing in the food-consuming areas will be to seize the largest possible portion of the oil seed harvest and to collect the largest possible quantities of grain in order to insure export to Germany. The seizure of livestock which will be needed has already been discussed. In order to obtain barter goods for the peasants in the surplus producing zone, sugar crops will be seized without exception. The same goes for tobacco, alcohol, hides, leather, and fiber crops for the manufacture of textiles, as well as for industrial consumer goods, such as coal, kerosene, etc. http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 155#552155

and

The job of feeding the German people stands, this year, without a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany's claims on the East; and here the southern territories and the northern Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people. We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to feed also the Russian people with the products of that surplus-territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings. very extensive evacuation will be necessary, without any doubt, and it is sure that the future will hold very hard years in store for the Russians. A later decision will have to determine to which extent industries can still be maintained there (wagon factories etc.)- The consideration and execution of this policy in the Russian area proper is for the German Reich and its future a tremendous and by no means negative task, as might appear, if one takes only the harsh necessity of the evacuation in consideration. The conversion of Russian dynamics towards the East is a task which requires the strongest characters. http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 157#552157

Since there has been no evidence of any food crises, actual or impending, in Germany when these plans were drafted, declarations to the effect that the food was needed for "the job of feeding the German people" should be considered as the official "cover story" for the actual plan of killing "many tens of millions" by deliberately imposing an artificial famine.

(5)

Please give a source that shows why the British blockade would not have created a food crisis in Germany in the Second World War, when the same blockade during the First World War produced precisely such a food crisis with widespread malnutrition in Germany and an elevated death rate.

Please read my answers to your requests (2) and (4).

You concluded with this statement:

Finally, the very passage that David Thompson quotes to prove a German intention to partially exterminate the Soviet population by starvation, or more particularly the population of the food-deficit area (mainly Great Russian), in fact disproves such an intention, as opposed to an intention to seize food supplies no matter what the cost.

Here is that passage again, with the relevant parts highlighted.

In future, Southern Russia must turn its face towards Europe. Its food surpluses, however, will only be paid for if it purchases its industrial consumer goods from Germany, of Europe. Russian competition from the forest zone must therefore be abolished. It follows from all that has been said that the German administration in these territories may well attempt to mitigate the consequences of the famine which undoubtedly will take place, and to accelerate the return to primitive agricultural conditions. An attempt might be made to intensify cultivation in these areas by expanding the acreage under potatoes or other important food crops giving a high yield. However, these measures will not avert famine. Many tens of millions of people in this area will become redundant and will either die or have to emigrate to Siberia. Any attempt to save the population there from death by starvation by importing surpluses from the black soil zone would be at the expense of supplies to Europe.

That's interesting. Here are the highlights in the original German document, which you can read at: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 55#p552155

In future, Southern Russia must turn its face towards Europe. Its food surpluses, however, will only be paid for if it purchases its industrial consumer goods from Germany, of Europe. Russian competition from the forest zone must therefore be abolished. It follows from all that has been said that the German administration in these territories may well attempt to mitigate the consequences of the famine which undoubtedly will take place, and to accelerate the return to primitive agricultural conditions. An attempt might be made to intensify cultivation in these areas by expanding the acreage under potatoes or other important food crops giving a high yield. However, these measures will not avert famine. Many tens of millions of people in this area will become redundant and will either die or have to emigrate to Siberia. Any attempt to save the population there from death by starvation by importing surpluses from the black soil zone would be at the expense of supplies to Europe. It would reduce Germany's staying power in the war, an would undermine Germany's and Europe's power to resist the blockade. This must be clearly and absolutely understood. The manufacturing industries in Belgium and France are much more important for Germany and the German war effort than those in Russia. It is therefore much more essential to safeguard food supplies to those countries through surpluses from the East than to make an ambitious attempt to preserve Russian industry in the food-consuming zone. One must always bear in mind that the Great Russian people, whether under Tsarism or Bolshevism, is always an irreconcilable enemy not only of Germany, but also of Europe. From this it also follows that there can be no question of introducing marketing regulations or food rationing in these territories. Rationing would establish a claim against the German administration on the part of the population, and such a claim must be rejected beforehand.

I think at this point the documents speak for themselves, and unless you have something more to add, I will leave the question of whether your contentions are credible or credulous to the readers.

[Zebedee]

Dave - apologies for bringing up an old thread, I came across it whilst looking for the excellent resources you provided on German policy in the East.

I generally agree with every single interpretation of the evidence you give but I was wondering whether you had managed to get hold of a copy of Adam Tooze's The Wages of Destruction yet?

Tooze builds up a case that there was a fact a huge problem with German food production and thus explains the policy of intended starvation in this light.

Have you modified your views on a 'food crisis' in light of this research?

As ever, this site is a veritable goldmine of information,

Thanks and apologies for the thread necromancy,

Zeb

[Okrojsha]

Dave T., thank you for the well-supported answers to many a revisionist "fact" provided by the "better Europeans" vs. truth about the "untermenschen" (i.e. Russians and other Slavic peoples). Keep up the great work, regards from Serbia.

[Voice of Truth]

For the Germans the Russians were obviously untermenschen (I hope I spelled it right) and the former had no plans to improve life for the latter. And why should they if for centuries Russians' own master from Peter the Great to Joseph Stalin (with few exceptions in between) treated the general population as cattle. Somewhere in "the Comedians" (which is set in Haiti) Graham Greene writes that the local police would never torture a white man simply because he's is white. Well, the rest of Europe always saw the Russians as a breed apart, definitely not as "white people" as themselves. One of the reasons for that being the fact that ...(see above about Peter the Great and Stalin). Half of the France was occupied, but the Germans never had plans to exterminate the French (even though, apparently, Hitler placed them somewhere between the Jews and the Blacks). Germans expected 30 million Rusians to die from starvation, by that time Stalin successfully starved millions. The occupying power rarely improves life on the occupied territory even though in the case of Russia it would have been easy.

Interestingly, the Russian population today is falling like a stone. From 148.5 million in 1991, it has now fallen to - I believe - 144 million, and is falling fast. This is despite millions of ethnic Russians having moved back to Russia from the former Soviet republics since 1991, so the 'real' fall in population could be many millions more. This is quite an incredible population decrease for a country that is not at war!

Maybe in 50 years there will no more Russians in Russia!

[Voice of Truth]

295th -- You said:

On the starvation issue, whatever Hitler planned the situation from the beginning was awful for the civilian population because Stalin had ordered a "scorched earth" retreat and the food supply destroyed. Where there is no food, you'll have famine, Hitler plans or not, and any army in that situation would channel the limited supply to its own at the peril of the local enemy population. There are debates over whether the plan to leave the local people with an average ration of 2,000 kcal per day amounted to planned starvation or not--postwar rations in the US Zone were 1500 kcal in 1946, and no one is accusing the Americans of deliberate starvation.

Are you trying to suggest that the Nazis didn't plan a famine in the area of the Soviet Union they occupied?

Let's remember that when the allies invaded Germany in 1945, the population's calorific intake, especially in Russian occupied areas, went down to starvation levels. Infact, there is good evidence to suggest that the allies were not too bothered by this in the first year of occupation. I won't call this 'deliberate starvation', but it certainly wasn't an ethical approach to treating a defeated enemy, to put it politely.

[David Thompson]

Voice of Truth -- You wrote:

Let's remember that when the allies invaded Germany in 1945, the population's calorific intake, especially in Russian occupied areas, went down to starvation levels. Infact, there is good evidence to suggest that the allies were not too bothered by this in the first year of occupation. I won't call this 'deliberate starvation', but it certainly wasn't an ethical approach to treating a defeated enemy, to put it politely.

What does your unsourced allegation have to do with Germany's plan to deliberately starve tens of millions of Russian men, women and children to death by plundering their crops and livestock?

[Tom Houlihan]

To answer the original question, Aberjona Press has recently released Victims, Victors, written by Roman Kravchenko. Roman was sixteen when Barbarossa started. His father was a czarist officer. Their town in the Ukraine was Russian, then Polish, then Russian, then occupied, then Russian again. He served in the Red Army towards the end of the war. It's an interesting read, but don't pick it up expecting a lot of combat.

[KatG]

Just wanted to post a comment in response to the original question of what was life like in occupied Russia. I have family who lived through Germ. occup. (in outskirts of Leningrad) so have first-hand accounts. No food, no heat. After a couple of years, the Germans started giving them potato peelings b/c they needed them to work. Work was hard, e.g. cleaning or shoveling (if you can call cleaning snow with your bare hands ---- shoveling). In 43, my family was given 2 choices: you can send both of your daughters to clean the minefields, OR you can send one to work as an Ost in nazi Germany. Lousy choice. They chose the latter. The Ost experience is a separate story but no better. Overall, the Germans didn't consider them to be people and treated them accordingly.

Also of note. As a Russian, you could have had a better life under the Germans if you said that you were volksdeutsch (with German blood). I do know people who had no German blood, and who chose that path. That was a completely different ballgame. You got more food, better housing, better treatment.

[Benoit Douville]

Kat,

That's an interesting story. I do not considered Russian people who choose to go working for the Germans traitors because of Stalin who had no respect for human life. When you think about it, Hitler really missed a great opportunity there because the Germans were really welcome has liberators in Soviet Union in 1941.

Regards

[michael mills]

Sounds like a tough time. No food, no heat, only potato peelings to eat. Hard physical labour. Forced labour for the war effort of the people under whose rule one lived, being sent to some distant place far away from home. The only way of getting better conditions being to join the party of the rulers.

Was that much different from the conditions of life in the parts of the Soviet Union not under German occupation?

Indeed, was it all that much different from the conditions of life for the non-privileged majority in the Soviet Union before the German invasion?

[yaroslav]

Hi, I'm Yaroslav.
I'm very interested in the history of WW2 and military crimes from the side of Nazi Germany and Red Army.

But this topic is very important and discussions on it could be endless. I would like to add my 5 cents to it.

First of all, WW2 impacted on the life and history of my family. This theme was a very painful for all people which survived. I asked my grandfathers to tell me something about period of 1941 - 1943, occupation of Ukraine.

I would like to notify, that official western concepts regarding WW2 in Russia is different from ours.
First is that Soviet Union limited access to real history resources and replaced them with pro-soviet and faked.
Second is that Soviet Union provided own view on the WW2 that did not reflect all complete truth, so the writings and some resources from post soviet countries do not have authority in the west.
Also, western people is creating their own opinion on a base of writing and investigations of Antony Beevor, Viktor Suvorov ... etc, which, for my own opinion, are trying to create one-sided history view ...

But reality is bit different.

[yaroslav]

Kyiv, Ukraine October of 1941.

Photo was made by Johannes Hahle, 6th Wehrmacht Army.

People could be killed even if they have looked on the German solder without proper respect.

Also on these photos you can see people which are on the way to Babiy Yar, well known place of mass killing.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Babi_Yar