Why did the German let the Dutch starve in 1945?

[maxxx]

quote="michael mills"]
And it is obvious that the German authorities undertook measures to bring relief to the suffering population, including the very radical step of allowing enemy aircraft to fly over their territory, an act of great trust.[/quote]

if we are talking about MAY 1945: What could the crumbling rest of the Luftwaffe do but allow the allied (that had air superiority) to fly over allied (if still occupied) territory? To call this an act of trust seems a little ,mmmm, euphemic....????

The germans "allowed" at this time the allies to break the last resistance and win the war. Another act of great trust?

[Peter H]

Seyss-Inquart's Nuremberg testimony on the Dutch famine can be found here:

http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tg ... 2-02.shtml

http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tg ... 2-03.shtml

The testimony of Heinz Max Hirschfeld,General Secretary of the Economic and Agricultural Ministry:

http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tg ... 5-02.shtml

The Dutch resorting to eating tulips is mentioned here as well--is this true?

http://www.everything2.com/index.pl?nod ... 0of%201944

[Harro]

The Dutch resorting to eating tulips is mentioned here as well--is this true?

Tulip bulbs. Yes, definitely. There was not much else left in the western part of the country.

[Pieter Kuiper]

From the charges against Seyss-Inquart at Nuremberg (February 1946):

MOUNIER: When a railway strike broke out in the north in September 1944, soon after the liberation of southern Holland, Seyss-Inquart, in order to break the strike, gave orders that no food stocks were to be moved from the northeast to the West. As a result of this, it was impossible to establish food stocks in the West.

Consequently, Seyss-Inquart must also be held responsible for the famine which ensued during the winter of 1944-45, causing the death of some 25,000 Dutchmen.

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/02-07-46.htm

GERTHOFFER: The excessive rationing, over many years, of food, clothing, and fuel, ordered by the occupiers to increase the amount of spoliation, has brought about an enfeeblement of the population. The average calory consumption by the inhabitant, which varied between 2,800 and 3,000, dropped in large proportions to about 1,800 calories, finally to fall even to 400 calories in April 1945.

Starting from the summer of 1944, the food situation became more and more serious. The Reich Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart, forbade the transport of food stuffs between the western and northern zones of the country. This measure, which was not justified by any military operations, seems only to have been dictated by hatred for the population, only to persecute and intimidate them, to weaken and terrorize them.

Not until about December 1944 was this inhuman measure lifted; but it was too late. Famine had already become general. The death rate in the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Leyden, Delft and Gouda increased considerably, rising from 198 to 260 percent. Diseases which had almost been eliminated from these regions reappeared. Such a situation will have irreparable consequences for the future of the population. These facts are given in two reports which I submit as Documents Numbers RP-139 and 140.

By ordering such severe rationing measures in order to get for themselves products which were indispensable to the existence of the Netherlands, which is contrary to all principles of international law, I may say that the German leaders committed one of their gravest crimes.

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/01-21-46.htm

It may be interesting to see what Seyss-Inquart had to say for himself. Here he is questioned by his own counsel:

DR. STEINBAUER: The Report of the Netherlands Government, which the Prosecution also mentioned, states in great detail that the defendant, as Reich Commissioner, is responsible for the famine which began in September of 1944 and lasted until the spring of 1945 and for the great mortality, especially of children-whole tables of statistics have been submitted-because, on the occasion of the shipping and railroad strike, he prohibited the importing of food. That is one of the most important and serious charges made against him. I have asked for witnesses on this subject, and perhaps I might cut it short now so that the witnesses may speak about it.

SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to be allowed to comment on this matter. This is the charge which seems the most serious to me, too.

DR. STEINBAUER: In the Government Report it is asserted that at the time 50,000 Dutch people died of starvation; and, therefore, I should like to ask you what reason you had for establishing this traffic embargo at that time?

SEYSS-INQUART: I believe I have already explained that in the main. The traffic situation was such that the Wehrmacht had to make sure of its shipping space. As long as it did that there was no ship traffic as such possible. I wanted to limit this to as short a period of time as possible so that afterwards ship traffic could again be assured and Holland regularly supplied with food. Ship traffic was not interrupted primarily by my embargo, but rather - the witnesses will confirm this - by the fact that all ships that could be found were confiscated.

Naturally, I asked myself whether the Dutch food supply would be endangered; and I said to myself that the Dutch people themselves were responsible for this state of emergency, and that the military interests of the Reich were, anyhow, equally important. I thought that if in the second half of October I could establish an orderly ship traffic, then, according to my experience, I would have 2 months' time in which to take care of the food supply for the Dutch people. Then I could bring in between 200,000 and 250,000 tons of food. And that would be sufficient to maintain rations of 1400 to 1800 calories. I believe I can recollect that between 15 and 20 October I gave the order to establish ship traffic again.

DR. STEINBAUER: And what did you do?

SEYSS-INQUART: Ship traffic was not established because the Dutch traffic authorities, for the most part, had disappeared, perhaps because they were afraid that they would be made responsible for the general railroad strike. For weeks on end our efforts were fruitless; and finally I talked with Secretary General Hirschfeld and gave him complete authority ... in the field of transportation. He then, although very hesitantly, re-established traffic. He will confirm that I supported him in every possible way. Food supplies were brought into Holland. But many weeks had passed in vain. Within my sector, I then provided additional aid, about which witness Van der Vense and, I believe, witness Schwebel can give you information in their interrogatories.

May I also call your attention to the fact that the Dutch Government changed the figure of 50,000 deaths to the correct one of 25,000.

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/06-11-46.htm

A few days later Steinbauer questioned Hirschfeld: 

DR. STEINBAUER: The question of the embargo in 1944 was discussed in detail here. I have one question to put to you:
When did you speak to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart for the first time about lifting the embargo?

HIRSCHFELD: In answering this question, I must go back a little. When the railroad strike was proclaimed, M. Louwes and I on 22 September 1944 were visited by Van der Vense who on behalf of the Reich Commissioner told us that he expected that M. Louwes and I would issue an appeal to the railroad men in order to put an end to the railroad strike in the interests of the food supply for the country. If we did not do so, countermeasures would immediately be taken to threaten the Netherlands population in the west of the country with famine.

We refused to issue such a statement, and we told Van der Vense that he should report to the Reich Commissioner that reprisals against the population in connection with the railroad strike would place responsibility for the famine on the Reich Commissioner. That was the decisive discussion. Nevertheless, the embargo came into being. Thereupon protests were issued on this subject to the various agencies of the Reich Commissioner, and on 16 October 1944 the first discussion took place in which it was announced that the intention was to lift this embargo.

DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that unfortunately in this particular year the frost came earlier than in other years?

HIRSCHFELD: Perhaps it came a little earlier than in other years; but in Holland the question of frost is always uncertain. From the Dutch side it was pointed out - I did this myself in a press report - that we always have to expect an early frost.

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/06-14-46.htm

Part of Seyss-Inquart's line of defense was that he was not responsible for the lack of transportation - the Wehrmacht had confiscated rolling railway stock, ships, etc:

DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for the Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Mr. President, under Number 115 I am submitting the sworn questions and answers which were admitted by the Tribunal, as well as the cross-examination of Dr. Arved Bolle, the harbor construction engineer of Hamburg. I am submitting this in German and in a certified English translation, and with respect to the accusation that Seyss-Inquart was responsible for the catastrophic famine in September 1944, I quote merely one sentence on Page 3 of the translation:

Practically speaking, therefore, as soon as the strike commenced, all inland shipping in Holland was taken over by the military and was thereby withdrawn from the influence of the civil administration and the Ministry of Transportation.

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/08-31-46.htm

[michael mills]

So it would appear that one of the major factors contributing to the food shortage in the western Netherlands in the autumn and winter of 1944 was the requisition of all transport by the Wehrmacht for military purposes.

Given that transport within the Netherlands had been disrupted by the railway strike instigated by the Netherlands Government-in-Exile, the action by the Wehrmacht to secure the means of transport for continuing its war effort would seem to be justified by military necessity.

The action of the Wehrmacht might be compared with the action of the British Indian Government of requisitioning all small boats in the Ganges Delta region in 1943 for military purposes. That was, along with other factors, one of the causes of the Bengal Famine of 1943 which cost over one million lives.

The figure of some tens of thousands of deaths from malnutrition in the Netherlands in 1943-44 pales into insignificance in comparison with the Bengal death-toll. One that basis, I suggest a cessation of the plaintive cries about what those nasty Germans did to the helpless Dutch.

[Pieter Kuiper]

The action of the Wehrmacht might be compared with the action of the British Indian Government of requisitioning all small boats in the Ganges Delta region in 1943 for military purposes. That was, along with other factors, one of the causes of the Bengal Famine of 1943 which cost over one million lives.

And how many lives if any did that particular measure cost?

The withdrawel of the boats from coastal districts is mentioned on http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/F_0016.htm, but you need to look hard to find it.

[simsalabim]

So it would appear that one of the major factors contributing to the food shortage in the western Netherlands in the autumn and winter of 1944 was the requisition of all transport by the Wehrmacht for military purposes.

Did I or any other poster deny this? It was one of the factors. You still seem to ignore the fact that a certain Seyss Inqarth blocked food transport to the west of the country for six weeks.

Given that transport within the Netherlands had been disrupted by the railway strike instigated by the Netherlands Government-in-Exile, the action by the Wehrmacht to secure the means of transport for continuing its war effort would seem to be justified by military necessity.

As David Thompson already posted the links and references to the systematic plunder of the Netherlands (according to L. de Jong, one of the worst in Western Europe), I will leave it to our readers to validate your remark.

The action of the Wehrmacht might be compared with the action of the British Indian Government of requisitioning all small boats in the Ganges Delta region in 1943 for military purposes. That was, along with other factors, one of the causes of the Bengal Famine of 1943 which cost over one million lives.

Our readers should also know that Bengal rice farming was struck by an agressive fungus and the area was waisted by a typhoon. Food import from Birma was impossible because of the war there. (my information comes from a thesis of the Flemish University of Leuven, http://www.agr.kuleuven.ac.be/aee/clo/w ... s2002e.pdf)

Nice aversion and straw man mr Mills.

The figure of some tens of thousands of deaths from malnutrition in the Netherlands in 1943-44 pales into insignificance in comparison with the Bengal death-toll. One that basis, I suggest a cessation of the plaintive cries about what those nasty Germans did to the helpless Dutch.

Another straw man build by mr Mills and a non-sequitur as well. Repeatedly the causes of the famine have been presented to you. One of the causes was the role of the Nazi occupiers, I have never downplayed the other ones. The occupiers looked at the situation, worsened it, and next did nothing to help it, unless you count the Dutch/Swedish initiative as help.

[Harro]

In addition, why would the death toll in Asia make the Germans less guilty of starving the Dutch, or make their crime "insignificant"?

[michael mills]

For details on the Bengal Famine of 1943, see this thread:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... ght=bengal

Factors such as a reduced rice harvest due to a cyclone and plant disease were not the cause of the famine, only of a temporary reduction in the local food supply.

The reason why a temporary local food shortage turned into a famine that claimed millions of lives was a series of administrative decisions made by the British administration. Among these were:

1. A policy of "denial" in areas close to the front with Japan, of which Bengal was one, involving measures such as destruction of supplies and the removal of river transport.

2. The closure of the borders between the Indian provinces, which prevented the flow of food to Bengal from other provinces where there was a surplus.

3. The refusal of the British Government to divert shipping from the transatlantic convoys so as to make shipping available for increased food imports into India from areas of food surplus overseas, such as Australia and Argentina.

4. The continuation of rice exports from Bengal to other places of more importance to the British war effort, such as Ceylon.

All the above factors resemble the conditions in the Netherlands which led the German authorities to hold up movement of food for a period and to divert means of transport to other purposes.

Thus, the actions of the German authorities in the Netherlands and of the British in Bengal are comparable. In neither case was it the intention of the rulers to inflict starvation on the civilian population under their control; rather they gave a higher priority to their respective war efforts.

And as I have pointed out, the actions of the British Government in Bengal resulted in a much greater toll of human life than the actions of the German Government in the Netherlands at around the same time.

[iwh]

So we have the usual.."Germans bad, but the Allies worse", arguement. Surely this thread has nothing to do with the situation in Holland. An attempt at misdirection by Mr Mills.

[michael mills]

The example of the Bengal famine of 1943 has everything to do with the this thread about the starvation that struck the civilian population of the Netherlands in the winter of 1944-45, in that it provides a test case for how such famines occur.

Both cases of famine had much the same cause, namely that the power ruling the territory gave first priority to its war effort and therefore neglected the provision of food supplies to parts of the civilian population under its control.

I introduced the example of the Bengal Famine because certain members of this Forum were whining about how naughty those Germans were to let poor innocent Netherlanders starve. That example shows how the disregard of the German administration for the needs of the civilian population in favour of concentrating on military priorities was no different from the similar disregard of the British administration in Bengal for the needs of the civilian population there in the face of the pressing need to prosecute the war against Japan.

The hugely greater loss of life in the Bengal Famine demonstrates how relatively minor the loss of life from the food shortage in the Netherlands was, despite the plaintive cries of certain members of this Forum.

I do not consider either the German administration in the Netherlands or the British administration in Bengal "bad", to use that childish term. I consider that both of them were driven by miltary necessity, which in both cases militated against their diverting transport to bringing in additional food supplies.

[simsalabim]

The example of the Bengal famine of 1943 has everything to do with the this thread about the starvation that struck the civilian population of the Netherlands in the winter of 1944-45, in that it provides a test case for how such famines occur.

Both cases of famine had much the same cause, namely that the power ruling the territory gave first priority to its war effort and therefore neglected the provision of food supplies to parts of the civilian population under its control.

Actually it doesn't. As you keep on neglecting the posts made by me and others and will repeat it again:

The Hungerwinter had several causes:
- the railway strike as ordered by the Dutch Government in exile. This means that transport in general, if available, was difficult to say the least.
- the Nazi occupiers plundered the country systematically of productions means, including means of transport
- there was no more coal supply from the south, as the provinces the mines were in, were either liberated or in a warzone.
- the direct order to block food transports
- the severe winter.

Therefore the statement:

I introduced the example of the Bengal Famine because certain members of this Forum were whining about how naughty those Germans were to let poor innocent Netherlanders starve. That example shows how the disregard of the German administration for the needs of the civilian population in favour of concentrating on military priorities was no different from the similar disregard of the British administration in Bengal for the needs of the civilian population there in the face of the pressing need to prosecute the war against Japan.

is not only wrong, it compares apples with pears and mr Mills is building a straw man. If you have an axe to grind with the Brits over their policy in bengal, don't do it over the backs of the dead in the Netherlands.

The hugely greater loss of life in the Bengal Famine demonstrates how relatively minor the loss of life from the food shortage in the Netherlands was, despite the plaintive cries of certain members of this Forum.

Again, you are comparing apples with pears. Your provocative remarks were fun to read but lack any serious ground.

[michael mills]

Simsalabim,

You are being somewhat less than honest here.

It was the clear intention of the "patriots" who started this thread to accuse the German occupation authorities of deliberately and intentionally starving the civilian population of the Netherlands to death.

My comparison of the starvation in the Netherlands in the winter of 1944-45 with the incomparably greater starvation in Bengal in 1943 was to show that those occurrences were not the result of a deliberate policy of starvation by the respective ruling powers, Britain in Bengal and Germany in the Netherlands, but rather of a hard-headed decision to give priority to military considerations over ensuring an adequate supply of food to the civilian population.

I accept your list of causes of the starvation in the Netherlands, but they do not add up to a deliberate policy of starvation, as alleged by those who started this thread.

Rather, they bear a certain similarity to measures taken by the administration in Bengal, and to the objective situation there, which likewise resulted in mass starvation. For example, the British administration seized all river transport in Bengal for military reasons, making it unavailable for transporting food, rather like the situation in the Netherlands. The British administration also banned the flow of food across Indian provincial boundaries, meaning that food could not flow to Bengal from areas with a food surplus; that is analogous to the embargo imposed by the German administration in the Netherlands.

[Pieter Kuiper]

a hard-headed decision to give priority to military considerations over ensuring an adequate supply of food to the civilian population.

The Reichskommissar imposed the embargo as a retaliation against the civilian population, to punish them for the railway strike.

This played no roll in Bengal.

I read on the Bangladeshi site (quoted before) that the price of rice has increased fourfold. This was sufficient to starve the poor there, who did not have sufficient margins and buffers. In the Netherlands, price increases were much higher.

Physicians addressed a complaint to the Reichskommissar in January 1945. For those who read Dutch:
http://www.hetillegaleparool.nl/archief ... 123-2.php3

[simsalabim]

Simsalabim,

You are being somewhat less than honest here.

It was the clear intention of the "patriots" who started this thread to accuse the German occupation authorities of deliberately and intentionally starving the civilian population of the Netherlands to death.

I beg your pardon? I didn't start this thread, I was mainly answering your questions and responding to your claims. Besides, how would one call the deliberate (and fully documented) blockade of food?