For once, Mr Mills I actually agree with you.michael mills wrote:
Thus it may be seen that the actions of Jäger at Kaunas and Jeckeln at Riga in November 1941 anticipated eventual German Government decisions. Nevertheless, at the time they were performed they were contrary to policy, and hence subject to reprimand.
There is no proof of a real reprimand.michael mills wrote:Jäger at Kaunas and Jeckeln at Riga in November 1941 anticipated eventual German Government decisions. Nevertheless, at the time they were performed they were contrary to policy, and hence subject to reprimand.
http://www.nizkor.org/ftp.cgi/people/w/ ... .411025.deNach Sachlage bestehen keine Bedenken, wenn diejenigen Juden, die nicht arbeitsfähig sind, mit den Brackschen Hilfsmitteln beseitigt werden.
Comments: (a) There is clearly a discrepancy between Jeckeln's estimate of the number of persons killed at Salaspils camp and the statement "It is assumed that ca. 7.000 men and women died in KZ-Salaspils" in Luca's post. One or possibly both of these sources are mistaken.He gives a figure of 55,000 to 87,000 Jews exterminated in the Salaspils Camp. In fact, the best estimates of historians are that only about 7,000 persons died in that camp, and the great majority of those persons were not Jews.
Comments: (a)Jeckeln also states that the first convoys of Jews arrived at the Salaspils Camp in November 1941, a minimum of three according to him. False; only one convoy of Jews arrived at Riga in November 191, on Sunday 30, and it did not go to the Sapaspils Camp.
You have misread the passage. Jeckeln's statement is:a minimum of three according to him
Jeckeln is speaking of a maximum ("no more than three") of three convoys, not a minimum.I believe that in November 1941, no more than three convoys arrived in all, but during the next seven months, from December 1941 to June 1942, eight to twelve convoys arrived each month.
only one convoy of Jews arrived at Riga in November 191, on Sunday 30
The train arrived at the Riga railway station. Salaspils camp was only 18 ( http://tesla.sal.lv/~vsk2/ )-22 ( http://www.inyourpocket.com/latvia/salaspils/en/ ) kilometers away. I don't consider this confusion or mistake, if that's what it is, telling or even noteworthy.it did not go to the Sapaspils Camp
Comments: (a)He also states that from December 1941 onward, eight to twelve convoys of Jews arrived at the Salaspils Camp for a period of seven months until June 1942. False; convoys of Jews from Germany continued to arrive at Riga until the end of February 1942, but they were taken into either the Riga Ghetto or the Jungfernhof Concentration Camp, not to Salaspils.
He also states that from December 1941 onward, eight to twelve convoys of Jews arrived at the Salaspils Camp for a period of seven months until June 1942.
False; convoys of Jews from Germany continued to arrive at Riga until the end of February 1942, but they were taken into either the Riga Ghetto or the Jungfernhof Concentration Camp, not to Salaspils.
Is it? Here's what Raul Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, Harper Colophon, New York:1979, pp. 232-233, has to say:False
(ii)The Reich Jews began to arrive in November. Some were sent to the Salaspils camp to be worked to death in icy temperatures; the others were sent to the Riga ghetto, which had been divided in half to separate German from Latvian Jews.
Jeckeln does not restrict his answer to "convoys of Jews from Germany"; he was talking about convoys of Jews from "France, Belgium, Holland, Czechoslovakia, and other occupied countries" as well.convoys of Jews from Germany continued to arrive at Riga until the end of February 1942, but they were taken into either the Riga Ghetto or the Jungfernhof Concentration Camp, not to Salaspils
Comments: (a) As noted above, Jeckeln is making his statement from memory 3 1/2 to 4 years later, based on reports he received from others.He also states that a minimum of 55 and a maximum of 87 convoys of Jews arrived at the Salaspils Camp. False; approximately 20 convoys of Jews arrived at Riga, and thye did not go to the Sapaspils Camp.
Source, please, which I have already requested from you once before.False; approximately 20 convoys of Jews arrived at Riga, and thye did not go to the Sapaspils Camp.
Comments: (a)So why did Jeckeln give all that false information to his Soviet interrogators? The only rational conclusion is that the Soviet interrogators had made up their minds that the Salaspils Camp was an extermination centre for tens of thousands of Jews brought from Germany, France, Belgium, Holland, Czechoslovakia and other occupied countries, and therefore "coached" Jeckeln to give answers to corroborate what they wanted to believe.
You have yet to establish that the information is false. All you have shown is that it is at variance with Luca's source or sources, and since we don't know who it is or they are, we can't check their assumption ("It is assumed that ca. 7.000 men and women died in KZ-Salaspils").So why did Jeckeln give all that false information to his Soviet interrogators?
That's one conclusion, but it's hardly the only rational one. Assuming that Jeckeln is wrong, a more likely explanation is that he misremembered or was mistaken. The reaction of the interrogator to Jeckeln's explanation, and Jeckeln's reply, are consistent with this more reasonable interpretation:The only rational conclusion is that the Soviet interrogators had made up their minds that the Salaspils Camp was an extermination centre for tens of thousands of Jews brought from Germany, France, Belgium, Holland, Czechoslovakia and other occupied countries, and therefore "coached" Jeckeln to give answers to corroborate what they wanted to believe.
In other words, Jeckeln was guessing, or making an estimation. Had Jeckeln been coached by the Soviets as you claim, surely he would not have hedged his answer, and would have given a more definite figure than the broad range he actually provided.Q : This figure sounds low. Are you telling the truth?
A : I have no other, more exact figures.
Are you sure that it is not you who misunderstood the letter? Here what Prof. Gerald Fleming said about it in Hitler and the Final Solution, University of California Press, Berkeley: 1982, pp. 70-73:Pieter Kuiper has misunderstood the nature of the draft letter to Lohse dated 25 October 1941.
and at pp. 110-11:On 25 October 1941, Amtsgerichtsrat (lower court judge) Dr. Wetzel, since July 1941 the Adviser on Jewish Affairs with the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories and prior to that Head of the Race Politics Office of the Nazi party, drafted for his minister Alfred Rosenberg an important letter to Hinrich Lohse, the Reichskommissar Ostland stationed in Riga. This top secret draft dealt with the "solution of the Jewish question" and was directly related to Lohse's report delivered to Wetzel on 4 October 1941 in the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, likewise "re: the solution of the Jewish question." Wetzel wrote Lohse as follows:
__________________________________________________________________________With regard to my letter of 18 October 1941, please be informed that Oberdienstleiter [Chief Executive Officer] Brack from the Führer's Chancellery has stated his readiness to assist in the construction of the necessary accommodation(s) and gassing apparatuses. At the present time we do not have on hand a sufficient quantity of the apparatuses, so they first must be constructed.10 Brack's
____________________________________________________________
10. Minutes of transcripts from the interrogation of Friedrich Jeckeln, 21 December 1945:70Q: Were gassing vans used in the Ostland?
A: Yes, they were used for the extermination of Jews.
Q: Where and when were these gassing vans used in the Ostland?
A: Through the above-named commanders of the SD and Gestapo in the Ostland I learned that between three to five gassing vans were used in the liquidation of Jews in Salaspils and Riga in the second half of 1942. In the course of a conversation at the end of 1942 and beginning of 1943, the commander of the SD and Gestapo in Latvia, Dr. Lange, told me about the use of such trucks and described the setup to me. He requested that I come over to have a look, but I declined. He also told me how the people inside the vehicles began to scream loudly and bang on the walls with their fists after they had been inside for five minutes, then lost consciousness, and finally also their lives. (Historical State Archives, Latvian S.S.R., Riga.)
view is that, since construction of the apparatuses within the Reich would present far greater difficulties than on-site production, the most expedient course of action is to send his people directly to Riga, in particular his chemist Dr. Kallmeyer, who will take the necessary steps from there. Oberdienstleiter Brack further points out that the procedure in question is not without its hazards, and that therefore special safety precautions are needed. Under these circumstances, I ask you to contact Oberdienstleiter Brack in the Führer's Chancellery through your Higher SS and Police Leader. Please request from him the dispatching of the chemist Dr. Kallmeyer and any further assistants that are needed. I might further point out that Sturmbannführer Eichmann, the Adviser on Jewish Affairs in the Reich Main Security Office, is in complete accord with this procedure. According to information received here from Sturmbannführer Eichmann, camps for Jews will be set up in Riga and in Minsk, where Jews from the Altreich [Germany proper] might also be sent. Jews are currently being evacuated from the Altreich to Litzmannstadt [Lodz] and other camps, from which points those fit for work will be transferred to work forces in the East. Given the present situation, Jews who are not fit for work can be eliminated without qualms through use of the Brack device. Incidents such as those that took place during the shootings of Jews in Vilna, according to a report I have on my desk,11 can hardly be sanctioned, keeping in mind that the executions were undertaken openly, and the new procedures assure that such incidents will no longer be possible. Jews fit for work, on the other hand, will be transported to work forces in the East. That the men and women in this latter group must be kept apart from each other goes without saying. Please keep me informed as to any further measures you take.12
11. Per Gerald Reitlinger, "On July 17, 1941, seven hundred Jewish hostages from Vilna were shot at the train station in Ponary (Punar)" (The Final Solution 3d ed. [London, 1971], 228). Cf. Marc Dvorjetski, Ghetto a l'est (Paris, 1949), 25, 38. "The city of Vilna was almost entirely 'Jew-free' by 7 September 1941, after further mass shootings had taken place at the beginning of the month."
12. NO-365, U.S. National Archives.
71
As we can see in this document, Jews unfit for work, who in the course of the "resettlements" had been or were to be transported to Lodz, Kovno, Minsk, and Riga, were destined to be gassed—already at this time, that is, three months prior to the so-called Wannsee Conference, during which the "Final Solution procedures" were formalized and finalized among high-ranking functionaries. In other words, the planning of the Final Solution and its procedures, visible—for all the camouflaging and code language—in the minutes of the Wannsee proceedings of 20 January 1942, were already well under way three months earlier.
It is further apparent in Wetzel's letter to Lohse that Sturmbannführer Eichmann, Heydrich's Adviser on Jewish Affairs in the RSHA, had informed Wetzel, the Adviser on Jewish Affairs in the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, about the first experiences with Zyklon B in Auschwitz in autumn 1941. After Zyklon B had been tested on Russian prisoners of war and had demonstrated its effectiveness in "bringing about instantaneous death," Höss passed this piece of information on to Eichmann, "and we decided," Höss writes, "to employ this gas in future mass exterminations."13
From Wetzel's letter we also learn of the plans of the central office of T4, directed by the Führer's Chancellery." In this extermination agency SS-Oberführer Viktor Brack, of the Führer's Chancellery—an immediate subordinate to the head of the Führer's Chancellery, Reichsleiter Bouhler -- played an essential role. On Bouhler's instructions, T4 sought to send the gassing specialists of the recently phased-out euthanasia program in the Reich to the extermination camps under construction in the East—which was in
__________________________________________________
13. M. Broszat, ed., Kommandant in Auschwitz: Autobiographische Aufzeichnungen von Rudolf Höss, Quellen and Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, vol. 5 (Munich, 1958), 155.
14. Cf. pp. 20-23.
72
fact done—in order that their valuable experience in killing with carbon monoxide, an expertise acquired at the permanent gas chambers in the euthanasia liquidation institutes,15 might now be "put to good use" in the planned mass annihilation of European Jews.
* * * *
________________________________
15. Cf. pp. 23-24, nn. 14-17.
Adolf Hitler's involvement in the Final Solution did not end with his request for continual updating on the progress of the Einsatzgruppen.9 He also issued orders covering all aspects of the gassings. This, at least, is the picture that emerges when we fill in the background to the so-called Gas Chamber Letter of 25 October 1941, which was sent to the Reichskommissar for the Ostland, Hinrich Lohse.10 Its author, the Adviser on Jewish Affairs in the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Lower Court Judge Dr. Wetzel, sketched in the details surrounding this top secret draft document in his interrogation on 20 and 21 September 1961:
________________________________________________________On 24 October 1941, I went to Brack's office in the Fuehrer's Chancellery on Vossstrasse. Brack said . . . that he had an assignment for me. I was to convey the following message to Minister Rosenberg: Minister Rosenberg should inform Reichskommissar Lohse that he, Brack, had a gassing apparatus ready for shipment to Riga. Brack told me that the gassing apparatus was to be used on the Jews, and that Eichmann had agreed that this gassing van should be sent to Riga. Jewish convoys would also be sent to Riga and Minsk. . . . In the course of this briefing, Brack told me that this was a matter of a Führer-order or Führer-commission.11
8. RSHA IV A I b, Nr. 576 B/41 g, FT (enciphered), signed "Mueller, SS Brif" (Fa 213/3, Institut für Zeitgeschichte).
9. Cf. "Reports to the Führer, re: campaign against gangs," report number 51, for 1 September to 1 December 1942: prisoners executed, 8,565; gang accomplices and suspects executed, 14,257; Jews executed, 363,211.
(See plates.) Submitted to Hitler, 31 December 1942 (NS 19/291, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz).
10. Cf. p. 71 n. 12.
11. Hearing of Dr. Erhard Wetzel, 20-21 September 1961, 2JS 499/61, Staatsanwaltschaft Hannover.
110
Asked how he, Wetzel, as a judge, could account for his having been a party to unlawful murder, the defendant replied:
____________________________________________________I have already explained: Brack explicitly told me that this matter resulted by order of the Führer, and that in conformity with this assignment I had to report to the Reich Minister Rosenberg, who in turn would notify the Reichskommissar Ostland. I was only acting as deputy, and I do not feel in any way answerable for these things. To refuse the assignment and simply walk out of the Reich Ministry was out of the question. I was informed that the position in the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories would constitute military service. Had I refused the assignment, especially being a member of the party, I would have faced internment in a concentration camp.12
12. Ibid., p. 31
That is patently false, as revealed by the extraordinary efforts to prevent the liquidation of one particular trainload of Jews from Berlin.The actual events show that authorisation to kill the deported German Jews, whether only those unfit to work or all of them, was given later, in stages
Richard Evans, "Lying About Hitler," pp.79-80 (emphasis in original)Yet, from the entry in Himmler's phone log it was perfectly clear to me, as it would be to anybody, that the subject of the conversation on 30 November 1941 between Himmler and Heydrich concerned one transport of Jews from Berlin. ... From these sources I discovered that a trainload of Jews had been transported from Berlin on 27 November 1941 and arrived in Riga on the night of 29-30 November just before the massacre of the local Jews by the SS police chief in the region, Friedrich Jeckeln, who took the Berlin Jews off the train on 30 November and had them machine gunned into the pits with the rest.
......This manipulation of the phone log had already been pointed out by Broszat and Trevor-Roper in their reviews of the 1977 edition of Irving's book ["Hitler's War"]. As Trevor-Roper, Broszat and Hitler specialist Eberhard Jaeckel also pointed out, if Hitler had intervened personally to to stop the killing of a single trainload of Berlin Jews on their arrival in Riga, then this strongly suggested that he was making an exception here, and that he therefore knew that there was a general policy of killing them on arrival.
and he did admit mistranslating of "poor Xerox print from his National Archives microfilm of Himmler’s handwritten notes" he used in early 1970's (Irving's description)......This manipulation of the phone log had already been pointed out by Broszat and Trevor-Roper in their reviews of the 1977 edition of Irving's book ["Hitler's War"].
and he did admit mistranslating of "poor Xerox print from his National Archives microfilm of Himmler’s handwritten notes" he used in early 1970's (Irving's description)
emphasis added<11> MR RAMPTON: I will start again. Last two lines bottom of page
<12> 13: "Many people, particularly in Germany and Austria had
<13> an interest in propagating the accepted version that the
<14> order of one mad man originated the entire massacre." That
<15> is to say the massacre of the Jews, those are my words, my
<16> Lord. "Precisely when the order was given in what form
<17> has admittedly never been established. In 1939? But the
<18> secret extermination did not begin operating until
<19> December 1941. At the January 1942 Bunzig conference?
<20> But the incontrovertible evidence is", note those words,
<21> Mr Irving, in the light of your recent answers, "the
<22> incontrovertible evidence is that Hitler ordered on
<23> November 30th 1941 that there was to be 'no liquidation'
<24> of the Jews (without much difficulty I found in Himmler's
<25> private files his own handwritten note on this)." In the
<26> light of that, Mr Irving, would you care to revise the
< 1> answers you gave a moment ago?
< 2> A[Irving]. No.
< 3> Q. Well, what do those words mean? Do they speak for
< 4> themselves or do they not, that I have just read?
< 5> A. I have done exactly what any normal editor would do, you
< 6> present the evidence and then you draw conclusions.
< 7> I present the evidence in the body of the book. I even in
< 8> this one case print a facsimile of the document which is
< 9> pivotal to this particular argument and then in the
<10> introduction (as a good author should) I put my principal
<11> conclusions. Here I am putting my principal conclusion as
<12> the author, David Irving, that I draw the conclusion from
<13> this episode that Hitler had intervened to stop -- and
<14> here is the error, the liquidation of the Jews. What
<15> I should have written is "the liquidation of a transport
<16> of Jews". That was the state of my knowledge at the time
<17> I wrote this version of this book. Subsequently of course
<18> I amended it.
<24> A[Irving]. Evidence for what?
<25> Q[Rampton]. For an order from Hitler that Jews -- that the train load
<26> of Jews, let us stick with that for the moment?
< 1> A. This is --
< 2> Q. Should be not liquidated?
< 3> A. -- I do not mean this offensively, but this is the common
< 4> sense interpretation of the evidence lying before us,
< 5> rather the perverse interpretation. We will always has
< 6> versions or two interpretations, one is the obvious one,
< 7> which is -- and the other is the perverse one. The
< 8> obvious one is if Himmler goes to Hitler's headquarters
< 9> and is handed a phone at some time on his way out and he
<10> then has to make phone call to Heydrich saying, "stop
<11> killing the Berlin Jews", then there is some close
<12> connection between that and the fact he has seen Hitler
<13> that day.
<14> Q. That is a possible interpretation, we in this court, and
<15> I do not know about the court of history, we in this court
<16> when we say "evidence" we mean "evidence" not "inference".
<17> A. The issues that are being pleaded are mistranslation, or
<18> distortion, deliberately mistranslation, distortion,
<19> manipulation and I do not think that the particular avenue
<20> we are going down leads in the --
<21> Q. I will put it bluntly to you and then I will leave it, you
<22> can deny it, because you will deny it, I am sure; (a) you
<23> deliberately mistranslated it, you inflated from one train
<24> load into Jews generally, that is number one; and (b) you
<25> inserted an order from Hitler for which there was no
<26> evidence?
< 1> A. -- I will take those two allegations seriatim; that
< 2> I inflated it deliberately, there is not a shred of
< 3> evidence for that. The evidence is quite clear, that as
< 4> soon as Dr General Flemming brought to me the evidence
< 5> there was one train load of Jews which was in trouble that
< 6> day, I immediately and in subsequent editions of the book
< 7> revised it to the narrow interpretation of the word
< 8> "transport" rather than the wider interpretation.
all above quotes from day 3, 13 Jan 2000, of the libel case Irving vs Penguin Books UK and Deborah Lipstadt< 7> Q. Would have been to put both possible "theories", as you
< 8> call them, in this website into your book?
< 9> A. Well, here you have another time discrepancy, Mr Rampton,
<10> because the book was delivered to the publishers in 1995,
<11> and this Moscow diary came to my hands in 1998, three
<12> years, so it would have been quite a feat of imagination
<13> to imagine what was in the archives and I had not at that
<14> time seen.
<15> Q. No, but you had assumed without more, had you not?
<16> A. This is not the point you were just trying to make, you
<17> were trying to imply I concealed what I knew, which would
<18> fall within the grounds of manipulation and
<19> mistranslation.
<20> Q. What I put to you is this, that you inserted an order from
<21> Hitler without evidence?
<22> A. I inferred an order from Hitler with very strong evidence.
<23> Q. You state it as a categorical fact?
<24> A. In my introduction to the book, yes, I draw conclusions.
<25> Q. And also in the text, if I may say so.
<26> A. No, in the text I state exactly what the documents say.
< 1> Q. And you mistranscribe the word Judentransport so as to
< 2> make Hitler appear the more merciful because that is what
< 3> it is about?
< 4> A. No, I applied the wider interpretation of the "transport"
< 5> rather than the narrow interpretation, which one could
< 6> subsequently apply once one knew more about the history of
< 7> that particular train load.
However, Browning goes on to state
In the fall of 1941......A plan or program for the immediate mass murder of all European Jews did not yet exist. Over the coming months many important decisions were yet to be taken concerning how, when, where, at what rate and with what exceptions the task of murdering the European Jews was to be accomplished.
Hitler probably came around to the decision for the total destruction of European Jewry around September, however there would be the need for a good deal of planning before it got off the ground in Spring 1942.
By the last week of October 1941 the close circle around Hitler, and gradually others as well, knew what Hitler expected of them and in what general direction they planned to proceed. They were now aware that , whatever the methods and timetable, no European jews....were to escape the measures for a basic solution to the jewish question to be enacted after the war. And the goal of these measures was physical destruction.The vision was there, the decision had been taken, planning was underway, and implementation was scheduled for a time period characterized as both "the next spring" and " after the war".
Well, there is for example the note that Rademacher made of a telephone conversation with Eichmann on September 12, 1941, where he wrote: "Eichmann schlägt erschießen vor", "Eichman proposes to shoot them". This was about Serbian Jews.Hans Kloss wrote:and I'm sure Browning can provide us with all documents supporting his claims.
232
* * *
On October 11, 1941, the Generalkommissar of Latvia, Dr. Drechsler. was sitting in his private apartment in Riga when a visitor arrived: Brigadefuehrer Dr. Stahlecker, chief of Einsatzgruppe A. Stahlecker informed his surprised host that, in accordance with a "wish" of the Führer, a "big concentration camp" was to be established near Riga for Reich and Protektorat Jews. Could Drechsler help out with necessary materials?27
Drechsler was now in a position similar to Regierungsprasident Uebelhoer, who had been fighting about the Lodz ghetto against the all-powerful Himmler. Like Uebelhoer, Drechsler was to be the recipient of tens of thousands of Jews who were sent from the Reich-Protektorat area to some form of destruction in the East. The late fall months of 1941 were a transition period during which deportations were already under way, but killing centers had not yet been established. The Ostland was looked over for possible sites while transports were shoved east. In fact, on October 21, 1941, Sturmbannführer Lange of the Einsatzgruppe telephoned Dr. Drechsler to report that the killing unit was planning to set up a camp for 25,000 Reich Jews about fourteen miles from Riga.28
By October 24, Reichskommissar Lohse was drawn into the picture. With Drechsler, Lohse complained to Lange that the Einsatzgruppe had contacted Drechsler not to discuss the matter but to inform him of developments. Lange repeated that higher orders were involved and that the first transport was due on November 10. Lohse replied that he was going to discuss the whole question in Berlin on October 25.29
By November 8, 1941, Lange sent a letter to Lohse, reporting that 50,000 Jews were on the move. Twenty-five thousand were due in Riga, 25,000 in Minsk. A camp was being built at Salaspils, near Riga.30 Since the Reichskommissar was in Berlin, his political expert, Regierungsrat Trampedach, wrote to the capital to urge that the transports be stopped.31 The chief, of the ministry's Political Division, Dr. Leibbrandt, replied that there was no cause for worry since the Jews would be sent "farther east" anyway (that is, they would be killed).32
The Reich Jews began to arrive in November. Some were sent to the Salaspils camp to be worked to death in icy temperatures; the others were sent
_______________________________________________________
* * *.
27. Drechsler to Lohse, October 20, 1941, Occ E 3-29.
28. Unsigned notation, October 21, 1941, Occ E 3-29.
29. Memorandum, office of the Reichskommissar, October 27, 1941, Occ E 3-30.
30. Stubaf. Lange to Reichskommissar Ostland, November 8, 1941, Occ E 3-31.
31. Trampedach to ministry, copy for Lohse at Hotel Adlon in Berlin, November 9, 1941, Occ E 3-32.
32. Leibbrandt to Reichskommissar Ostland, November 13, 1941, Occ E 3-32.
233
to the Riga ghetto, which had been divided in half to separate German from Latvian Jews. The new arrivals had a foreboding of what was going to happen to them when they entered the ghetto. The apartments were in a shambles, and some of the furnishings bore the traces of blood. The previous occupants were already dead.33
[Moderator's note -- At this point Hilberg goes into a discussion of the Minsk transports, and the correspondence of the Generalkommissar of White Russia, Gauleiter Wilhelm Kube, on that subject.]
_______________________________________________
33. Affidavit by Alfred Winter, October 15, 1947, NO-5448. Winter, a Jewish survivor, was a deportee.
