The French Air Force In 1940

[Pips]

Below is a link to an Air University review article on the subject on the performance of the Armee de l'Air in 1940. It explores the possible reasons for it less than stellar performance in France's greatest hour of need.

A fascinating read.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airc ... kland.html

[Graeme Sydney]

As you say Pips, a fascinating read. Thanks.

I've realised for some time that the responsibility for defeat in France in '40 lay as much with the institutions and the political and military leadership of ‘20’s and ‘30’s as it did with the ineptitude/incompetence of the leadership of the battle. This article outlines the issues very concisely. I thought the cause was more 'fortress/isolationist mentality/ideology’ but it would seem that there were more crass human factors at work.

The conclusion “Mastery of the air was there for the seizing,…” begs the question ‘could France have held out if she did gain mastery of the air?’. Or alternatively ‘could France have held out if there had been an agreed air-land doctrine and an effective air-land command structure put in place and practiced in the ‘30’s ?’

I would say a lot of French politicians and military professionals had a lot to answer for. I bet they weren’t brought to account. I wonder if the fundamental relationships have changed to this day.

Cheers, Graeme.

[Daniel Laurent]

Hello,
Yes, interesting, thanks.
I guess the same sort of conclusion could be drawn concerning the French armoured vehicles. On the paper, very similar to the Panzers strength, but poorly organised and misused on the front line as being dispersed in the Infantry units.

You may know it already, sorry, but after the German breakthrough at Sedan on May 10, 1940, the 4th French Armored Division, the 4eme DCR, by the way the sole French armored division in 1940, created from an assembly of armored regiments and units, was created and went to combat with few days of training.
Except its commander, none of the officers had a clear idea about an armored division tactical management.
On May 17, 1940 they attacked the German 10th Panzer Division (Guderian Panzer army group) at Montcornet. They first overcame German anti-tank positions. But with only 200 French tanks and no air support, the offensive had little impact on stopping the German advance and the 4eme DCR had to retreat under severe air attacks from Ju-87 bombers.
There was more success on May 28, when they forced the German Panzers to retreat at Caumont. Their commander became the first and only French commanding officer to force the German Panzers to retreat during the invasion of France. Prime Minister Paul Reynaud promoted him provisional brigadier general and on June 6 appointed him as War Secretary of State.

Too little, too late.
This officer was General Charles de Gaulle.

I wish that David Lehmann will appear in this thread, he knows much mure more than me about the 1939-40 French Army.

I would say a lot of French politicians and military professionals had a lot to answer for. I bet they weren’t brought to account.

Some of them were brought to trial in Riom (Centre France) by the Petain regime, but it was a mockery if trial and was quickly stopped. When de Gaulle took power in 1944, many of the high ranked officers were simply sent to early retirement.

I wonder if the fundamental relationships have changed to this day.

Can you please clarify your question ? I wish to reply but need to be sure of the exact meaning
(Me Frog me anglish no goud )
Regards
Daniel

[David Lehmann]

Hello,

Concerning this article I would like to add a comment from the France 1940 discussion group:

This article is well written, and the case against inter-service rivalry is well stated. Several points are nonetheless completely wrong. The article states that the French did have enough aircraft in 1940 but that they lacked trained aircrew which according to the programmed training schedule was not going to come to fruition until early 1941.
In fact, they lacked both. The French did not have enough aircrafts. The thousands of aircraft counted in those "reserves" were either obsolete, non operational, or lacking key components (like armament). The French were in the process of having enough modern aircrafts (barely) in June-July when this was disrupted by the German invasion.
Simply put, regarding aircraft counts the article is comparing apples and oranges like counting all the obsolete planes which the French kept to police colonies or as trainers but only counting modern British or German planes (though for the latter they only had more modern planes as their air rearmament took place later).
Saying that the French air force refrained from adding radios / propellers / armament to planes coming out of the factory so as to keep the production figures down is simply false. The technical services did their best, they labored under severe shortages. One can certainly make a case that the whole production system wasn't as effective as it should have been, but not the case being argued in that article. However, most of the article is to the point, which is that the whole thing was a mess and inter-service rivalry really didn't help.

Here are also several of my notes dealing with the Air Force:

The French Air Force was largely inferior to the German one, in numbers and quality, especially the bomber fleet which was really small in comparison.

Operational frontline planes on May 10, 1940 on the western front:
• France: 879
• Great Britain: 384 deployed in France (total of 416 : 100 fighters (Hurricane + Gladiator) and 316 attack planes and bombers (Fairey Battle + Blenheim)
• Belgium: 118
• Netherlands: 72
• Germany: 2,589 (versus 1,453 allied ones)

The French Air Force had some 1,900 planes, of which only about 1,400 frontline planes available (650 fighters, 240 bombers and 490 reconnaissance and observation planes). It was conceived as a DEFENSIVE ARM, in cooperation with / attached to the ground troops. It was therefore much dispersed and it explains the importance of the reconnaissance fleet working for the ground troops. At the time of the German attack the French Air Force was just modernizing and reorganizing. The French Air Force at the moment of the Phoney War and of Fall Gelb was under strengthened and under complete mutation. The Air Force HQ would only have been really ready for war end 1940 or in 1941.
The French fighters were Morane-Saulnier MS.406, Curtiss H-75, Bloch MB.151, Bloch MB.152, Dewoitine D.520 single-engine fighters and Potez 631 twin-engine fighters. Only 400 fighters were operational on 10 May 1940. All the MS.406 fighters were already planned to be replaced by Bloch MB.152, Dewoitine D.520 or Arsenal VG.33 fighters but in May 1940 they constituted still the backbone of the French fighters' fleet. There were only 36 operational Dewoitine D.520 fighters on 10 May 1940 and no Arsenal VG.33 fighter had been produced.
The Bf-109E reached 556 km/h and the Spitfire MkI 580 km/h (it depends also which conditions are considered). Anyway, the Morane-Saulnier MS.406, Bloch MB.151/152 and Curtiss H75 were all 50 to 90 km/h slower than the Bf-109E. All of them had worse climbing speed and top altitude compared to the Bf-109E. The D.520 had 240 hp less than the Bf-109E (1,150 hp vs 910 hp) and the German fighter was still 30-40 km/h faster in level flight but that was not the case at all altitudes. The difference was obvious at lower altitudes but roughly inexistent at 5,000-6,000m. The D.520 climbed not as good as the German fighter from 0-4000m but as good as the Bf-109E between 4000 and 6000m. In manoeuvrability and agility the D.520 was often clearly better and the diving speed was better and reached more than 665 km/h (more than 700 km/h according to pilots). An isolated Bf-109E pursued by a D.520 and which tried to escape by diving was generally lost. Nonetheless, the low number of D.520s in service in 1940 and the advancing German troops on the ground (you have to control airfields to operate your fighters) made that this good fighter could not change the overall balance of forces.

Roughly only 120 of the bomber/assault planes were modern ones (10 Amiot 354, 55 Lioré et Olivier 451, 45 Bréguet 691 or 693, 10 Potez 633) with 85 being operational. The others were older ones: 75 Bloch MB.200 or MB.210, 10 Farman 222 or 223 and 35 Amiot 143 with about 100 considered operational.
From the 490 reconnaissance planes only 370 are really operational and rather modern ones: Bloch 174, Potez 637 and Potez 63/11. Older Mureaux 115 and 117 were also still in use.
Great Britain sent 416 planes in France and kept about 800 planes in Great Britain but all the allied planes available (1,340 French + 416 British + about 190 for Belgium and the Netherlands = 1,946) was still inferior to the about 3,500 German planes effectively used during the 1940 western campaign. Nevertheless, the RAF was also active from Great Britain, especially during the battle of Dunkirk. At the beginning of the German offensive, a very large part of the Dutch and Belgian Air Forces had been destroyed on the ground as well as 232 French planes.

The German Air Force was conceived as an OFFENSIVE ARM with very numerous fighters and a powerful bombardment/attack fleet to support the ground troops like "aerial artillery". The Germans had 1,264 fighters (roughly 1,016 Me-109 single-engine fighters and 248 twin-engine Me-110) and 1,120 bombers (He-111, Do-17, Ju-88). The VIII.Fliegerkorps concentrated 300 Ju-87 "Stuka" dive bombers and 42 Hs-123 "assault" biplanes for close air support. There were also about 700 observation/reconnaissance planes (Fi-156, Hs-126, Do-17, He-111 and Ju-88) and about 450 transport planes for a total of 3,900 planes. The Germans had a powerful fighters' fleet, which combined with a very powerful mobile AA artillery covering the advancing troops was decisive to gain the air superiority. From the 892 destroyed French airplanes more were shot down by the AA guns than by the German fighters. On 13 May 1940, the Luftwaffe was able for the first time of history to concentrate about 1,500-1,700 planes over the front of the Meuse River for a decisive breakthrough. In the area of Sedan only weak French divisions were defending an overstretched front. Nevertheless, from 10th to 18th of May 1940, 179 German planes had been shot down over the Meuse River area. The Panzewaffe was actually trained to cooperate closely with the Luftwaffe, especially the VIII.Fliegerkorps, which concentrates all the dive bombers and assault planes, specialized in close air support, and providing a new kind of mobile artillery to support the advance of the mechanized troops. The Germans were able to concentrate all their tanks in the Panzerdivisionen but also all their dive bombers in one air corps. The Germans had also the advantage of having omnipresent observation planes to support them.

According to Karl Heinz Frieser, the Luftwaffe lost 1,236 planes (about 525 bombers, 125 dive bombers, 275 transports, 235 Me-109 fighters and 75 Me-110 fighters) + 323 heavily damaged planes during the western campaign. Jean-Gisclon studied the French fighter units. He indicates that the Germans lost between May 10 and June 25, a total of 1,471 destroyed and 675 damaged planes, these numbers are higher than the German ones. The usual numbers given by the historians of the Luftwaffe are between 1,389 and 1,470 lost planes. We will retain the number of about 1,300-1,400 German planes lost in May-June 1940. The German human losses in the Luftwaffe are 1,355 KIAs, 1,226 WIAs and 715 POWs.

Often it is said that the French fighters destroyed 800-1,000 German planes but modern studies indicate that this number is rather 300-500. All propaganda left, the French fighter groups claim in fact a maximum of 996 victories, and of those 733 are "confirmed" in air combat and 263 only "probable". Among these 733 victories, many French pilots (even sometimes French + British pilots) share the same victory and are each credited with one victory. The bomber/reconnaissance planes' defensive fire and the AA fire from the ground are on their side estimated to be responsible for the loss of 100-200 more planes. That would make 400-700 German planes really destroyed by the French Air Force and AA defenses.

The claimed victories for May-June 1940 are:
• Great Britain: 821 (for the fighters : 201 for the Air Component, 131 for the Advanced Air Striking Force and 489 for the Fighter Command)
• France: 853 (733 for the fighters + 120 for the AA defenses) (Buffotot and Ogier, 1975)
• Netherlands: 525 (fighters + AA defenses)
• Belgium: about 100
--> Total : 2,299

These numbers are of course impossible because the Germans lost about 1,300-1,400 planes. If we take into consideration the latest serious studies the Dutch would have destroyed 225 planes, including about 170-200 transports lost in the Netherlands during the airborne operations and often destroyed on the ground by the artillery. The Belgian Air Force seems to have destroyed only 6 German planes. If we take into consideration the German losses due to accidents (250-300) there are about 800-850 planes that were destroyed by the British and French. To these losses for May-June 1940 you can also add the losses on the western front during the Phoney war. These German losses were later missing above London.

Another wrong idea is that during May-June 1940 there were mostly fighter versus fighter combats and that during the battle of Britain the allied fighters attacked preferentially the German bombers. In fact the real statistics show that the percentage of German bombers lost is higher over France than over Great Britain.

Except the Dewoitine D.520 fighters, the other planes were inferior to the last version of the Me-109 but the French fighters scored nevertheless rather well. The Curtiss H-75 equipped 4-5 fighter groups (from a total of 24 single-engine fighter groups) in May 1940 and got the most air victories with 237 claimed victories (and the loss of 71 Curtiss H-75 fighters). The French Air Force lost 892 planes and the human losses are: 541 KIAs, 364 WIAs and 105 MIAs (40% of the officers and 20% of the NCOs and men). For the fighter units alone Jean Gisclon gives the numbers of 204 KIAs, 188 WIAs and 31 POWs.
"At the end of 1939, the Royal Aircraft Establishment arranged for a loan of a Curtiss Hawk from France (the 88th production Hawk 75A-2) for comparative trials against a Spitfire I (K9944). In many respects, the Hawk turned out to be superior to the Spitfire. The RAE found that the Hawk did indeed have exceptional handling characteristics and beautifully harmonized controls. In a diving attack at 400 mph, the Hawk was far superior to the Spitfire I owing to its lighter ailerons. In a dogfight at 250 mph, the Hawk was again superior, because its elevator control was not over-sensitive and all-round view was better. However, the Spitfire could break off combat at will because of its much higher speed. When the Spitfire dived on the Hawk, the Curtiss could avoid its opponent by banking and turning rapidly. The Spitfire could not follow the Hawk around and would overshoot the target. The Hawk 75A displayed appreciably superior take-off and climb characteristics. The swing on takeoff was smaller and more easily corrected than on the Spitfire, and during the climb the Hawk's controls were more effective. However, the Hawk tended to be rather slow in picking up speed in a dive."

The 5th of June 1940 was a very good day for the French fighters with 55 German planes reported as destroyed for the cost of 10 KIAs, 9 WIAs and 5 MIAs on the French side. As a comparison, on September 15, during the battle of Britain, the RAF claimed 56 German planes and lost 25 fighters. In fact in both cases these numbers are too high and for example on June 5 the Luftwaffe lost actually only 35 planes.

The French ace Edmond Marin-la-Meslée collected 20 victories (16 confirmed + 4 probable) in May/June 1940 with a Curtiss H75A. He was pilot in the GC I/5 which obtained 111 air victories (84 confirmed and 27 probable). The German ace Werner Mölders had been shot down over France and made prisoner like 714 other aircraft crew members during the battle (on June 17, France had still about 400-500 German airmen kept prisoner).

On June 15, second-lieutenant Pierre Le Gloan (GC III/6) shot down 5 Italian planes (4 Fiat CR.42 and 1 BR.20) in 40 minutes with his Dewoitine D-520 over Saint-Raphaël. Le Gloan was in formation with captain Assolant when they saw 12 Fiat CR.42. Le Gloan destroyed 2 CR.42 and Assoulant returned to base with his guns jammed. Alone, Le Gloan continued his patrol. Over Hyères Le Gloan attacked 3 CR.42 and destroyed one plane, he broke the combat when 8 other Italian planes arrived. The airbase at Luc called him back because it was attacked by Italian planes. Le Gloan destroyed his fourth CR.42 and one BR.20 from the 172nd strategic reconnaissance Squadriglia. It was one of the first pilots of WW2 to destroy 5 planes in one sortie.

The French Farman 222.2, 223.3 and 223.4 heavy bombers (a total of about 42 only available in May/June 1940) were really long range bombers and carried 4200 kg bombs (2x 500 kg and 16x 200 kg). Ugly and slow, this was typical of France’s pre-modernization Air Force of the mid 30's. This "advanced" version of the Farman 221/222 (222.2) had retractable gear, but showed little improvement over its predecessor. It did have long range and carried a large bomb load though. First they dropped leaflets over Germany and Czechoslovakia but they were also the first allied planes to bomb Berlin (Siemens factory) and other cities (Rostock - Heinkel factories -, Hamburg, Münich and Köln). They also bombed rail-roads and crossroads in Aix-La-Chappelle, Maastricht, Flessingue and Middelburg in order to delay the German troops. After Italy declared war to France, these bombers dropped leaflets over Roma and bombed fuel refineries in Porto Maghera and Livourne. Only one was lost during the Battle of France - and that was a flying accident. Vichy and the Luftwaffe used them as transports through 1944.

The Lioré & Olivier 451 was by most accounts, an excellent aircraft, though perhaps a bit short on defensive armament despite a rear 20mm gun. Used often badly for ground attack because only in small numbers and often without escort. This plane bombed Germany and Italy but France had so few bombers and very few attack planes that it didn't change the strategic outcome. Later used by Vichy in North Africa and Syria. Also used by the Germans but also by again by the French against the Axis forces in 1943.

A total of about 155 Amiot 351 and Amiot 354 have been available during May/June 1940, they carried about 2,200 kg bombs (2x 500 kg and 6x 200 kg). It was a very modern medium bomber (477 km/h) but the last version, the Amiot 354, arrived too late. Four of them were later used as transports by the Luftwaffe, including two with 1./KG200 (the special service Geschwader). The engines were taken by Germany and used on the Me-323. Other Amiot 351/354s were used after WW2 by the French air mail service.

The Amiot 143M carried 1,200 kg bombs, this aircraft was called to desperate daylight raids over Sedan !

The Bloch MB.200 and MB.210 carried 1,600 kg bombs (2x 500kg or 8x 200kg or 32x 50kg). There were also 24 in the Rumanian Air Force and 124 in the Czech Air Force.

The Potez 630 series in the French Air Force in 1939/1940:
Potez 631 = heavy fighter and attack - roughly equivalent to the Me-110
Potez 633 = light bomber, this model has a bomb bay

Potez 631 armament:
2x 20mm HS404
4x 7.5mm MAC34
(4x 50 kg bombs for attack missions)
1-2x 7.5mm MAC34 for rear defense

Potez 633 armament:
1x 7.5mm MAC34
2x 100 kg bombs
4x 100 kg bombs or 8x 50 kg bombs (in the bomb bay)
1-2x 7.5mm MAC34 for rear defense

The Potez 630 series is modern in 1938. The Czech AVIA company bought the licence to build a fighter version (Potez 636) but the German invasion ended the project. China bought 4 PO.631 and 5 PO.633 but they were seized by the French Army in Indochina (French colony composed of Annam, Cochinchina, Tonkin, Cambodia, Laos and a part of the Chinese territory that is called Kouang-Tcheou-Wan) before delivery. 3 of them have been used against the Japanese (in Lang Son) and Thai armies attacking Vichy forces in 1940 and 1941. Yugoslavia received 2 PO.630, no further deliveries because of the war and all the production was directed to the French Army. Switzerland used 1 PO.630 and 1 PO.632 (= PO.633 with Hispano engines), no further deliveries because of the war and all the production was directed to the French Army. Used until 1944 and equipped with a 2x 20mm Oerlikon FF/K guns extra pod. Greece ordered 24 PO.633 but only 10 could be delivered and saw action against Italian and Albanian forces. Rumania received 21 PO.633B2 used in the 74th and 75th bombing squadrons. They were used for bombing and long range recon missions. Used during Barbarossa, Odessa and Stalingrad for example and at least until 1943. The Luftwaffe used French booty PO.630s for training and reconnaissance missions.

The Bréguet Br.691/693 assault planes were very good (top speed of 480-495 km/h) and sturdy, with excellent maintenance features (engine change in 80 minutes). The armament consists in:
• 1x 20mm HS404
• 5x 7.5mm MAC (2 in the nose and 3 fixed and pointing aft and downwards used for strafing only)
• 1x 7.5mm MAC for rear defense
• 8x 50 kg bombs
The starboard side cannon and machineguns in the nose have a 0 to -15° elevation towards the ground for better aiming and strafing of ground targets even if the aircraft is in level flight. Fighter cover was often provided but e.g. the Morane-Saulnier MS.406 could generally not follow these fast assault planes.
The Bréguet Br.691/693 assault planes were first used in very low altitude / grazing attacks but this tactic proved to be deadly against German columns very well protected by AA MGs and guns. The tactic was then changed for level attacks at 900m high but there was no appropriate sight for the bombs and the planes went back to very low level attacks with the same deadly results. Several missions were then flown at medium altitude level bombing (2,000-3,000m) to finally adopt half dive bombings on 10 June with a 45° dive from 2,500-3,000m.
The assault aviation saw action during May and June 1940. The first mission was performed on May 12 by 18 Bréguet 693 planes from GBA I/54 and II/54. They attacked German armored columns west of Maastricht and only 8 planes came back.

Regards,

David

[David Lehmann]

Hello,

Since the 4e DCr of de Gaulle has been mentioned I would like to share several notes about this unit and this man.

The 4e DCr was an emergency formation initially used to block the German advance towards Paris. The division is engaged in battles like Montcornet and Crécy-sur-Serre near Laon (May 17-20) and later to eliminate the German bridgehead at Abbeville on the Somme River.
Formed on May 15, 1940, with only a few units ready when ordered to the front, it was nearly two weeks before it reached its peak strength beginning June. The units were not trained to act together and at the beginning even the engineers were used as supporting infantry. The 4e DCr seems strong on the paper but the units were at first engaged one by one as they arrived and had often not their theoretical strength.

Therefore when people say that the 4e DCr was the strongest French armored unit it's not right. It is also often said, because of Guderian's mistake, that the French tanks from the 4e DCr came very close (a few miles) to Guderian's HQ. This is wrong, the tanks were Renault B1bis tanks from the 2e DCr.

De Gaulle was not a genious. He had nonetheless a very modern vision of the armored units and is the spiritual son of General Estienne, the father of the French tanks in WW1.
He could nonetheless not achieve what he wanted and display all his capacities as a commander in May / June 1940 because the division he had to command was not at all organized along his vision.
One has also to note that the 4e DCr rarely had to face German tanks, they attacked on the flanks of the Panzerdivisionen and against an infantry pocket (a few tanks of course but mainly flanking units with AT guns, engineers, mines, heavy AA guns, armored cars, artillery ... and of course the Luftwaffe).

At the very beginning and for the battle of Montcornet, the infantry of the 4e DCr is totally insufficient and is often not trained for combat (rear units, services or engineers hurried as companion infantry to support the tanks). Most of this infantry was carried by buses, they lacked all-terrain vehicles. The infantry component improves later for the battle of Abbeville.
Ammunition was also lacking in this infantry and for the tanks and armored cars there are cases of lacking sights, firing pin etc. The 4e DCr was an emergency unit but pushed by his commander they had the will to fight and engage the enemy.

In many sources it is shown as the rare French offensive actions ... this is completely wrong, there are many French attacks. It is probably a result of the post-WW2 years under de Gaulle ?

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About Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970):

He started WW1 as captain in the 33e RI. He was WIA in 1914 in Dinant and in 1915 in the Somme. In 1916 in Verdun he was WIA for the third time and captured. He tried 5 times to escape but was liberated after the armistice in 1918. He spent 22 months in Poland during 1919-1921 among 600 other French officers sent to Poland to help Marshal Josef Pilsudski against the Bolsheviks. In Poland he was infantry instructor. He fought against the Soviets and after a combat near the Zbrucz River was awarded the Virtuti Militari, the highest Polish military decoration. In Poland he was influenced by the use of tanks, fast manoeuvres and the combat in open terrain.

At the beginning of WW2, Lieutenant-Colonel De Gaulle is in the 3rd tank brigade led by General Delestraint. This brigade consists in the 507e RCC in Montigny-les-Metz, the 511e RCC in Verdun and the 512e RCC in Châlons-sur-Marne. On December 24, 1937 he is promoted Colonel and becomes commander of the 507e RCC.

Charles de Gaulle published several books and articles before WW2, including:
• "La discorde chez l'ennemi" (1924)
• "Le fil de l'épée" (1932)
• "Vers l'armée de métier" (1934) - published in English under the title "The army of the future" whereas the
French title means “towards a professional army”.
• "La France et son Armée" (1938)

In his books he repeated many points from General Estienne. He supported the new ideas of mechanized troops and the creation of specialized armored divisions. These fast moving forces would be able to break through the enemy defenses, to advance deep in the rears, to destroy key positions and to disorganize the whole enemy deployment. He is also advocating a different command style, from the first lines, in contact with the continuous changes on the battlefield. He is also convinced of the important role of the aviation to support the tanks. Such views will be confirmed in 1940, but by the Germans.

De Gaulle is of course in contradiction with the official and politically correct defensive doctrine. He is also advocating an army of professional volunteers instead of conscripts. He therefore encountered hostility from the political and civilian leaders through the 1920's and the 1930's, except President Paul Reynaud, who will play a significant role in his career.

In May 1940, de Gaulle is promoted General and commander of the new born 4e DCr. Unfortunately, this new division is an emergency formation initially used to block the German advance towards Paris. It is engaged in battles near Laon (Montcornet, Crécy-sur-Serre) and later to eliminate the German bridgehead at Abbeville on the Somme River. Formed on May 15, 1940, with only a few units ready when ordered to the front, it was nearly two weeks before it reached its peak strength beginning June. The units were not trained to act together and at the beginning even the engineers were used as supporting infantry. The 4e DCr seems strong but the units were at first engaged one by one as they arrived and had often not their theoretical strength. Too weak, too late, not developed according the de Gaulle's views, the 4e DCr tried to launch several counter-attacks or strong reconnaissance (Montcornet, Crécy-sur-Serre, Abbeville) but the overall impact was very limited.

There are good books dealing with the 4e DCr but I have not yet taken the time to write a summary in English:
• "Le colonel De Gaulle et ses blindés – Laon 15-20 mai 1940" (Paul Huard)
• "De Gaulle sous le casque – Abbeville 1940" (Henri de Wailly)
• "Abbeville 1940 - avec la division cuirassée de Gaulle" (Jean Marot)

One has nonetheless to note that unlike the other DCrs the 4e DCr had never to face numerous German tanks. Many of the B1bis tank losses can be credited to 8.8cm FlaK and 10.5cm leFH (especially in Abbeville).

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EXAMPLE OF BATTLE: MONTCORNET

The first action of the 4e DCr takes place on May 17. It is an offensive reconnaissance towards Montcornet, on the flank of the 10.PzD and 1.PzD.

The first combats are led by Renault R35 tanks from 24e BCC on May 16 and May 17, before the attack itself. On May 16, the battalion is integrated to the 4e DCr but unlike several other units of the 4e DCr it was not constituted in the emergency with everything that was available. This BCC had been created in August 1939 and participated already to the attack on the Sarre area in September 1939. The platoon (3 tanks) of Sous-Lieutenant Jeanney (from 3/24e BCC) is ordered to defend the bridge of Chivres. At 19h30 a German column with 3 armored cars and motorcycles is destroyed. During the night 2 additional side-cars are destroyed. On May 17 around 5h00, an other German column (Artillerie Abteilung 615) is attacked and destroyed: 31 KIAs, about 30 POWs, 18 trucks destroyed, 5 motorcycles and side-cars destroyed or captured and numerous radio sets captured. The 24e BCC takes part to the attack on Montcornet (except this platoon). The town of Lislet and Montcornet are reached as well as the bridges on the Serre River, but the French tanks in Montcornet lack infantry support. Several tanks are destroyed by AT mines but they resist to the 3.7cm PaK except to the close range shots. Finally the 24e BCC looses 7 tanks.

For the probe on Montcornet (May 17) around 5h00, the 4e DCr engages only 80 tanks:
• 1/46e and 2/46e BCC (with 22 Renault B1bis tanks but only 17 engaged, 5 remained blocked in marshes at the beginning of the attack) [+3/46e BCC during the afternoon only]
• Elements of the 2e BCC and of the 24e BCC (49 Renault R35 tanks)
• 14 Renault D2 tanks from the 345e CACC
• Infantry from the 4e BCP (650 men)

They face German troops from various units including:
• AA 90 (10.PzD) – armored cars and motorcycles
• 6 tanks from the 10.PzD coming just out of the repair unit (including 1 Panzer IV)
• 666.Pionier battalion
• 56. Flak battalion + additional 8.8cm AA guns reinforcement during the day
• Luftwaffe (Stuka dive bombers attacks)

The French units advance on 25 km. They destroy German vehicles and guns, attack several towns like Lislet and Montcornet at the spear of the French attack and finally go back. From the 80-90 French tanks engaged during the day, 18 are lost due to enemy action (4 B1bis tanks, 2 D2 tanks and 12 R35 tanks). At least 2 Renault B1bis and 2 Renault D2 have been destroyed by 8.8cm AA guns. 2 Renault B1bis are indirectly lost because of air attacks, immobilized in big bomb holes. Many of the Renault R35 tanks are destroyed by AT mines and at short range by 3.7cm AT guns in the towns of Montcornet and Lislet, which were attacked without infantry support.
After the day 5 additional Renault B1bis are unavailable: 1 due to mechanical breakdowns, 3 blocked by elements of the terrain and 1 which will be scuttled, leading finally to 5 B1bis tanks destroyed.
The French human losses are nonetheless weak: 14 KIAs, 6 WIAs and 9 MIAs. On the German side the detail of the losses in not known but concerning the human losses there are about 100 KIAs and the French troops came back with about 120-130 POWs.

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EXAMPLE OF BATTLE: ABBEVILLE

The battle of Abbeville, in fact three separate battles, was one of the most violent of the 1940 western campaign and it lasted 10 days. On May 20, the 2.PzD and especially the Luftwaffe completely destroyed the city of Abbeville which had been declared “open city” and which included no military target except perhaps a few retreating troops on the move. The city had been destroyed like Arras in France or Rotterdam in the Netherlands and there were thousands of civilians killed.

On May 21, the Somme River is crossed in Abbeville and a German bridgehead is established. The bridgehead has a radius of about 30 km and is leant against the Somme River and the city of Abbeville. The German fortified this area very well with trenches, barbed wire networks and numerous minefields. A hill, Mont de Caubert, is controlling the access to the city with large open ground in front of it. Around the city there are many swamps, the area is thus not very well fitted for a tank attack.

The main German troops consist in: 57.ID (IR.179, IR.217, IR.199 = 9 battalions) + AR.157 + AA.157 + Pioneer Bat. 157. The division is reinforced by Flak group 64 + eventually support elements (artillery) from the 2.ID (mot.) stationed on the opposite bank of the river.

Note about IR.199:
The 16th Bavarian infantry regiment “List” was formed in 1914 and was named according to the commander, Oberst List. This was the regiment which Adolph Hitler served in as a Gefreiter during World War 1. In 1936, IR.19 inherited the traditions and honors from the WW1 IR.16.
On September 21, 1939, the newly formed IR.199 took over the traditions from IR.19 and carried the name “List”. Later, in November 1943, Grenadier Regiment 199 was awarded a cuff-title.

The main front line around Abbeville is at first is hold by IR.217 whose armament and supports include:
• 139x LMGs
• 70x HMGs
• 45x 5.0cm mortars
• 30x 8.1cm mortars
• 48x 3.7cm PaK
• 16x 2cm Flak30/38
+ 20x 10.5cm leFH18 (also used in direct AT role)
+ at first 8x and later 16x 8.8cm FlaK. The heavy AA guns have large open views on the French approaching troops from the Mont de Caubert.


1) First attack: May 27 (1st AD)
The 1st British Armoured Division (General Evans) failed in less than 2 hours and the British troops lost 120 tanks from the 165 tanks engaged.
All the British light tanks could be easily penetrated even by the German 2.0cm guns which were not efficient against the French tanks. Some of these British tanks were fast but they did not use this potential advantage to hit and run. As described by testimonies in Abbeville for example: while fired on, the British tanks generally just stopped to fire or to regroup, allowing the German AT gunners to concentrate easily on sitting ducks. The French tanks at least, even the "lighter" ones like the Renault R35, had the luck to have a 40mm thick armor.


2) Second attack: May 28-31 (4e DCr)
The 4e DCr is led by General de Gaulle. The French troops despite loosing many tanks inflicted heavy losses to the Germans. The bridgehead is drastically reduced but the bridges in Abbeville and the hill of Mont de Caubert are still in German hands.

The French troops consist roughly in:

1) Tanks and armored cars:
• 46e BCC (13 Renault B1bis tanks)
• 47e BCC (19 Renault B1bis tanks)
• 44e BCC (45 brand new Renault R35 tanks)
• 2/24e BCC (20 Renault Renault R35 tanks)
• 10e Cuirassiers (11 Panhard P178 armored cars)
• 3e Cuirassiers (40 Hotchkiss H39 and 39 Somua S35)
TOTAL : 176 tanks and 11 armored cars

LOSSES (due to enemy fire, mechanical malfunctions or accidents): 111 tanks are not operationnal after the battle. This number includes destroyed tanks and recovered tanks under repair. 2 armored cars have also been destroyed.
22 from the 32 Renault B1bis tanks have been knocked out. Mostly all the destroyed B1bis have been knocked out by 8.8cm guns, 10.5cm guns or mines. Roughly no B1bis was lost due to 3.7cm AT guns and several of the German AT and light AA guns were simply overrun and dig into the ground by the French heavy tanks.

2) Infantry: 6 battalions
• 4e BCP (622 men -- losses = 54 men)
• 7e RDP (1/7e and 2/7e RDP = 1,400 men -- losses = 159 men)
• 22e RIC (1/22e, 2/22e and 3/22e RIC = 2,500 men -- losses = 600 men)
TOTAL: 4,522 men
LOSSES: 813 men (including 80 POWs)

3) Artillery:
• 322e RATTT (24x 75mm Mle1897)
• 305e RATTT (12x 105mm field guns)
• I/315e RAP (12x 75mm Mle1897 field guns)
• 73e RA from the 2e DLC (12x 75mm Mle1897 and 12x 105mm field guns)
TOTAL: 72 field guns and howitzers but not all available at the beginning of the attack

+ Various AT batteries:
661st independent AT battery, motorized: 5x 47mm SA37 AT guns
665th independent AT battery, motorized: 5x 47mm SA37 AT guns
51/11 self-propelled AT battery: 5x Laffly W15 TCC tank destroyers (47mm SA37 AT guns)
52/11 self-propelled AT battery: 5x Laffly W15 TCC tank destroyers (47mm SA37 AT guns)
And the BDAC (AT batteries) of the 322nd and 305th artillery regiment (16 47mm SA37 AT gun)
But they will have no Panzers to fight.

+ AA units (like the 1020th battery of the 404e RADCA) with about 15x 25mm Hotchkiss AA guns

De Gaulle first wanted to cross the Somme and to attack Abbeville from the North. Several reconnaissance patrols revealed that all the bridges were either destroyed or controlled by the Germans. They wanted to cross the river in other areas but there were no bridging elements in the division and engineer elements that could have been used were too far away.
The French attack was launched as soon as possible, no time for reconnaissance of the area before, the units were engaged as soon as they arrived. The vehicles had already traveled a long way just before the attack, they arrived and deployed at night and the men did not sleep for a long time.

At first the objective was to cross the Somme River and to join the encircled armies of the North. Due to the degradation of the general situation the actual objective was to reduce the German pocket and to destroy the bridge in Abbeville. The French army in fact launched about 13 more or less important attacks along the Somme River during this period, in Amiens, in Abbeville etc.

The 4e DCr during the first push of its attack took the village of Huppy where the German III/IR.217 was completely destroyed. The IR.217 and IR.179 fled in panic and a breakthrough of about 14 km has been achieved. After the French attack, the German pocket was reduced to an area of 600m large and 2km long.

The attack did nonetheless not allow taking Abbeville because of several important points:
• No previous reconnaissance of the attack axis
• Several fresh troops lacked experience and/or training and part of the infantry battalions were composed of 30-35 years old reservists (like in the 22e RIC which fought nevertheless very bravely). Concerning the 3e Cuirassiers, the crews have had their tanks for only one week and never trained at the platoon, company or higher level. Some tank crews had only fired few real shells before the engagement and were just able to drive the tank on a road but they had very little experience in all terrain and especially not at all by night. The movements for the preparation of the attack were made by night in a difficult area (forests, ravines etc.). It explains why several units where late in their deployment and why the whole attack was not perfectly synchronized. On the other side the Renault B1bis tank crews for example were well trained and were already experienced due to previous battles.
• The tank / infantry cooperation was not always very good. The cooperation was often hampered by dense enemy fire and several of the infantry elements were not trained to operate with tanks.
• Lack of communication and radios which didn’t allow exploiting the first German panic. The road to Abbeville was wide open for the tanks, the German were fleeing on the other side of the river. The reconnaissance elements (several Panhard P178 armored cars) saw the situation but were not able to inform General de Gaulle which therefore could not take the appropriate decision.
• The artillery was effective, fast and really accurate but it shelled more often selected areas than precise enemy elements spotted by the front line units like several camouflaged 8.8cm Flak guns which ambushed the French tanks.
• The 8.8cm Flak and 10.5cm leFH used in AT role really blocked the French tank attacks. Without these heavy AA guns, the German positions would have been overrun.
• Lack of efficient coordination between the commanders of the different units
• Lack of air support. No French aircrafts supported efficiently the attack in cooperation with the ground troops. The single French planes actually attached to this area were several Potez 63/11 (GAO 551) reconnaissance planes. French bombers attacked nonetheless the German troops at Abbeville on May 30 (including 12 Glenn Martin 167F and 5 LeO 451 bombers).
• The Luftwaffe on its side was not very active over the theater of operation, it was mobilized over Dunkirk. Nevertheless Ju-87 'Stuka' dive bombers attacked the French rears just before the French attack and several planes attacked the recovery units of the 4e DCr while they were towing and repairing damaged tanks during the battle. The Luftwaffe finally attacked seriously directly in front of Abbeville on May 31 and later on June 4.
• In Abbeville from end May to the beginning of June, instead of attacking once with all means about 500 tanks were engaged successively in 3 attacks because of the emergency of the situation and/or the lack of organization.

The French units were engaged without preparation and without knowledge of the area. The soldiers behaved very bravely but were not optimally used and sometimes penalized by the too late and inadequate choices of their commanders. Bravery pays but is not sufficient to win a battle; one must add skills, experience, cohesion and intelligence.

Nevertheless the battle of Abbeville, like many others during 1940, depicts units that are sometimes inexperienced but always very brave, far away from the usual stories of surrendering and fleeing French troops. Abbeville will finally be liberated in 1944 by the 1st Polish armoured division.

In Abbeville the Germans sustained heavy losses including 4-6 8.8cm heavy AA guns. Several of these heavy AA guns were destroyed by Renault B1bis tanks. There is an example of a B1bis destroying such an AA gun at 1,500 meters with its 75mm SA35 hull gun. German troops fled in panic in front of the French tanks, many surrendered and a lot of equipment was abandoned and captured.

Several French unit reports and personal testimonies from French B1bis crews report the fact that they have been attacked by a charging German infantry who tried to assault the tanks. This event probably involves men from the I/217.IR but it is apparently never mentioned in German archives. The testimonies speak about 300 men charging but it was in the heat of the fight and the assaulting men were probably not more than 100. They have been almost all killed by the MAC31 MGs, 47mm HE and 75mm HE shells from the B1bis tanks.


3) Third attack: June 4 (2e DCr + Commonwealth troops)
Between the 1st and the 5th of June, the 2e DCr (Colonel Perré) and Scottish troops (General Fortune) replaced the 4e DCr. On June 4, the Mont de Caubert is taken by Renault B1bis tanks, several 8.8cm AA guns are destroyed but the infantry did not follow. It is close to a victory but the Germans crushed the general front around. It was like closing a door while the walls around are collapsing. The attack is this time supported by about 200 artillery pieces for probably the biggest allied artillery concentration of 1940.

The 17e BCP (“Bataillon de Chasseurs Portés”, a mechanized infantry battalion on Lorraine 38L APCs) belongs to the 2e DCr. It is a battalion composed of active troops, well trained, well equipped and armed with two LMGs per platoon instead of only one in a typical infantry unit. In a perfect illustration of the “furia francese” this unit took the town of Mesnil-Trois-Fetus where 45 Germans from the 6th company of IR.199 are been captured and many others have been killed.

-----------------

The German troops present in the Abbeville bridgehead had a hard time but usually it is totally unknown. The allied had a lot of courage and the advantage of the material power but they lacked manoeuvre capacity and speed and finally it was a waste of equipment. There were many close combats and hand to hand fighting between the German and the French infantry. During this battle, the French tanks were used as planned by the doctrine, as shock elements to destroy enemy strong points and allow the infantry to advance.

In front of Abbeville (during 3 counter-attacks between May 27 and June 5) the Germans lost 2,000-2,500 KIAs + WIAs and 400 POWs. Many of the vehicles, AT guns, AA guns, HMGs and mortars of two regiments from 57.ID were destroyed or captured. A whole battalion (III/IR.217) has been wiped out in Huppy during the first attack of the. Several German companies ended with only 20-30 remaining men. For example the platoon led by Franz Arsan (3rd company, I/IR.179) had initially about 50 men, 4 NCOs and 3 Maxim MGs). After the battle the platoon is reduced to 19 men, 2 NCOs and 1 MG. Arsan has been awarded EK1, EK2 as well as the assault badge. The IR.179 got 20 awards and 12 of them went to Arsan’s platoon. The German human losses were significant compared to the losses of the French infantry but they still had a lot of men. The allied lost a lot of tanks during this battle. These tanks will lack during the German general offensive on the Somme and Aisne Rivers in June 1940.

Regards,

David

[Somua S35]

Hy david ,
i don't agree to few details in your text , but , to have an overall view , it's quite correct .
I take an example :
"At the beginning of WW2, Lieutenant-Colonel De Gaulle is in the 3rd tank brigade led by General Delestraint. This brigade consists in the 507e RCC in Montigny-les-Metz, the 511e RCC in Verdun and the 512e RCC in Châlons-sur-Marne. On December 24, 1937 he is promoted Colonel and becomes commander of the 507e RCC." .
It's not at the beginning of world war two . It's before . But maybe you consider the begining on spain war . I admit .
In 1939 , September, "regiments de chars de combats" disapear , and GBC appears . These old brigades was broken on 1940 , january , and be replaced by half-brigades , with no infantry ( you forgot it in your text ) .
And don't forget De Gaulle was an "army tank commander" ( for the 5th Army )between the 507th RCC and the 4th DCR . I'm not sure it was a real improvement to command the 4th DCR ....
On all informations about the unit , i agree .

I repeat , your text is quite correct . I 've made only comments about details .

Regards

[David Lehmann]

Yes it's before WW2 since I reached 1937 in the text, just replace "at the beginning" by "at the eve" for a perhaps better sentence. I know about the fate of the RCCs etc. but I wrote only a short summary.

When de Gaulle becomes commander of the 507e RCC he was in competition with another man : Jean Perré.

Jean Perré (1893-1971) played also a role in the development of the French tanks. In 1914, Lieutenant Perré was serving in the 82e RI and was WIA on September 6, 1914. He was promoted captain in 1916. He was WIA a second and a third time in 1916, in Verdun. In 1917 he was appointed to the tanks (assault artillery). From 1917 to 1918 he was fighting with his tanks and participated for example to the attack of Malmaison.

In 1919, he went in Poland to command a Renault FT17 tank company and later a tank battalion of the first Polish armored unit against the Soviets. He was also in the command staff of the 1st armored Polish brigade and later among the French advisors introduced in the Polish high command. From 1922 to 1924 he was in the "Ecole de Guerre" in Paris (War School) and after that he was appointed to the Ministry of War.

He participated also to the Rif war in Morroco (1921-1926). In 1928, he was promoted commandant, leading a tank battalion in Versailles during 2 years, before returning to the Ministry of War. He was promoted Colonel in 1938.
In 1939, he was appointed to the high command of the French army and became beside General Keller the director of the French tanks. In February 1940, he was staff officer in the 2e DCr. On May 25, 1940 he replaced General Bruché on the head of the 2e DCr, before the 3rd attack on Abbeville.

After the armistice he was in the Vichy army. In 1943 Laval offered him to lead the LVF (Légion des Volontaires Français) on the Eastern front but he refused. He took command of the "Garde" (the Republican Guard has been disbanded on November 17, 1940 and the Guard had been created, depending from the cavalry - 6 areas in France with 200 officers and 6,000 men and 3 areas in North Africa, mainly to protect against sabotages, disbanded in 1944, its members joined the Gendarmerie).
He was arrested on August 25, 1944 in Vichy and sentenced to 20 years of hard labour but liberated in September 1949. Pardoned in 1950, he recovered all his rights. He continue his military studies and published several articles. He died on March 26, 1971 at 78 years old.

He wrote several books and articles, including:
• "L'evolution du char de combat aux Etats-Unis." La Revue d'Infanterie 73 (1928) : pp. 555-556. Misc Files Armor.
• "Les chars de combat. Essai de classification positive." (1937)
• "Batailles et Combats des Chars français. L'Année d'Apprentissage : 1917" (1937)
• "Batailles et Combats des Chars français. La Bataille défensive, Avril-Juillet 1918" (1937)
• "La guerre et ses mutations." (1961)
• "Les mutations de la guerre moderne" (1962)
• "Intelligence et valeurs morales dans la guerre" (1965)
• "Ancien chef de la section des chars de combat au Ministère de la Guerre, ancien commandant de la 2e division cuirassée"
• "La discorde chez l'ennemi"

Regards,

David

[Daniel Laurent]

Hi, everybody,
Well, well ,well,
Now we have David and Somua discussing about the French Army in 1939-40.
You all know David, obviously, but you may not know Somua.
For the civilised members of this forum (i.e the one who can read French), you may check his references THERE
I can tell you that we will get here more than tip-top informations...
I hope they will find a point to disagree about, that would generate a splendid and constructive firework

A small question to David:
In Jean Perré bibliography, you mentionned the title "La discorde chez l'ennemi".
Are you sure?
I have a book with the same title written by "somebody else" ?
Regards
Daniel

[David Lehmann]

Hi Daniel,

I found this title once in a biography of that man ... could eventually be a mistake since I did also not find the year of publication. Who is "somebody else" ?

Regards,

David

[Somua S35]

For the civilised members of this forum (i.e the one who can read French), you may check his references THERE

Hi ,
we spoke , the co-author and me to create a bilingual web-site, but it's not the priority today . I've already made some translations for few americans , so if someone is interessted by the french army and don't understand some words/terms , send us an email ( first page of the site ) , we will answer .
However , Thanks Daniel for this little adv .
And , i'm not sure David and me will disagree on many subjects , and anyway , i think i'm not at the right level to "fight" with David , to be honnest .
Maybe in few month , i will train myself

Regards

[Pachy]

Oh no, not the Kirkland article again!

As said above what is fundamentally wrong in this article is that he takes into account every aircraft wreck in every junkyard on the French side, and compares it to a selective extract from the Luftwaffe OOB. Kirkland sounds like he was heavily influenced by the postwar writings of Pierre Cot, former Air Minister of the Front Populaire goverment, especially the finger-pointing column Cot wrote in Icare, explaining how as he remarkably managed aircraft production and doesn't bear any responsabilty for the debacle

I think a good antidote to Kirkand's article, for French readers, is Patrick Facon's book. Facon explains very well the organization of the aircraft production and why manufacturer claimed figures are so out of touch with Armée de l'air "in the field" figures. Combine this with Ehrengardt's articles on operational usage and pilot's training and you'll get a more realistic assessment of the 1940 Armée de l'air.

On a sidenote,

The D.520 had 240 hp less than the Bf-109E (1,150 hp vs 910 hp)

Sorry David this is not a very meaningful comparison, because you quote the Bf 109E's 1-minute take-off power setting with a pessimistic value for the D.520's continuous power output. At usual combat altitudes, the difference was only about 40 hp (920 hp for the 12Y45 versus 960 hp, 30-minute setting for the DB601A-1). These planes were very evenly matched... except Emils outnumbered D.520s by a 10-to-one ratio at least.

[David Lehmann]

Hello Pachy,

Thanks for the add and correction, you know that aircraft stuff is not really what I master the best

Regards,

David

[Daniel Laurent]

Hi David

Hi Daniel,
I found this title once in a biography of that man ... could eventually be a mistake since I did also not find the year of publication. Who is "somebody else" ?

The somebody else is not "anybody"

"La Discorde chez l'ennemi"
Charles de Gaulle
Editions Berger-Levrault, 1924.
Librairie Plon, 1974
Regards
Daniel

And, sorry gentlemen, I can't refrain while replying to a French citizen
LES BLEUS WILL EAT ALIVE THE ITALIANS SUNDAY EVENING

[Pips]

Thanks for the clarification on Kirklands article Patchy. knowing that out a slightly differenct complextion on things.

Sadly there's very little information available on the Armee de l'Airin English, whether it be articles like the above or books.

[cpa95]

Hi David,

"According to Karl Heinz Frieser, the Luftwaffe lost 1,236 planes (about 525 bombers, 125 dive bombers, 275 transports, 235 Me-109 fighters and 75 Me-110 fighters) + 323 heavily damaged planes during the western campaign. Jean-Gisclon studied the French fighter units. He indicates that the Germans lost between May 10 and June 25, a total of 1,471 destroyed and 675 damaged planes, these numbers are higher than the German ones."

lost german fighters in the west (1-100 percent)
9.39: 133
10.39: 85
11.39: 76
12.39: 51
1.40: 38
2.40: 46
3.40: 74
4.40: 101
5.40: 313
6.40: 165 a total of 1.082 (lost 60-100%: 310+172+23+67+1, 40% repaired: 234+15+41+1, 20% repaired: 201+3+13+1)

from the 1.082:
caused by enemy 337 (172 forward the german lines, 165 behind the german lines, 5.40: 125, 6.40: 96, losses caused by enemy fighters: 5.40: 70, 6.40: 59),
other reasons: 745 (total losses 310).
total losses 60-100% by all reasons: 573, repaired (20-60%) 509

BA-MA, RL 2 III/1025 (Frontflugzeugverluste zwischen Sept. 39 and March 45)
quoted from: Prien/Stemmer et al., Jagdfliegerverbände der Deutschen Luftwaffe 39-45, Vol. III, p. 68.



"In front of Abbeville (during 3 counter-attacks between May 27 and June 5) the Germans lost 2,000-2,500 KIAs + WIAs and 400 POWs. Many of the vehicles, AT guns, AA guns, HMGs and mortars of two regiments from 57.ID were destroyed or captured. A whole battalion (III/IR.217) has been wiped out in Huppy during the first attack of the. Several German companies ended with only 20-30 remaining men. For example the platoon led by Franz Arsan (3rd company, I/IR.179) had initially about 50 men, 4 NCOs and 3 Maxim MGs). After the battle the platoon is reduced to 19 men, 2 NCOs and 1 MG. Arsan has been awarded EK1, EK2 as well as the assault badge. The IR.179 got 20 awards and 12 of them went to Arsan’s platoon. The German human losses were significant compared to the losses of the French infantry but they still had a lot of men. The allied lost a lot of tanks during this battle. These tanks will lack during the German general offensive on the Somme and Aisne Rivers in June 1940."

@David Lehmann:
great post, i share your conclusions.
There is a good report of the battle from the german point of view: Buchner, Der Kampf um den Brückenkopf Abbeville, Wehrkunde 1957, p. 487-495. Buchner accounts some losses of 57. ID at the end of his report: 36 ATguns (3,7cm), 452/1396/282 (kia,wia,mia).


Greetings
Thomas