Early Japanese Campaign(s) in the 2ndSino-Japanese War

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Jerry Asher
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Postby Jerry Asher » 11 Aug 2006 06:01

Within the fight for Tianjin and Bejing was a minor fray at Daku, in late July spilling over into August 1937. Can anyone identify the IJN ships guarding that area? My reading of Hsu indicates that a small SNLF force was put ashore at Daku to desecure the wharfs, warehouses and berths for Japanese shpping. That one of these ships or one of three others that arrived July 28, 29, or 30 crossed the Daku bar and entered the Peiho River to bombard a Chinese army unit. Can anyone identify the individual ships or their unit designation. Advanced elements of the IJA 5th Division, began arriving either with the three ship unit or on freighter. How were the 5th Division forces transported? By which ships?

Please excuse me if I am not using this forum right; I'm new to this, but will learn. I asked the same question in the Japan at war category last week.

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Re Daku question.

Postby asiaticus » 11 Aug 2006 10:55

Actually its right on topic as part of the Peiking Tientsin battle.

As to your question, I hope to find an answer too.

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Postby asiaticus » 15 Aug 2006 20:41

Ok. Seems from what I have been reading that was what was happening. Thanks for the reply.

I intend to go thru these conflicts like the other thread, orbats and maps discussion.

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Peiking Tientsin Operation

Postby asiaticus » 15 Aug 2006 21:06

Here is what I have on the Peiking Tientsin Operation (July-August 1937)

Japan:
Garrison Forces Peiking Railway
China Garrison Army ( became 1st. Army 26 August 1937)
– Lt. General Kanichiro Tashiro (1 May 1936 - 12 Jul 1937)
– Lt. General Kiyoshi Katsuki (12 Jul 1937 - 26 Aug 1937) *


- China Stationed Army - Lt. Gen. Tashiro [PWf]
-- Kawabe Brigade (China Stationed Infantry Brigade) - Major Gen. Kawabe)
---- 1st China Stationed Infantry Regiment
---- 2nd China Stationed Infantry Regiment
-- China Stationed Cavalry Unit
-- China Stationed Artillery Regiment
-- China Stationed Engineer Unit
-- China Stationed Tank Unit (17 tanks?)
-- China Stationed Signal Unit
-- Army Hospital

- Main Force of East Hopei Army (Chinese Puppet forces) **[2]
-- 1st Corps “Tungchow’” 4,000 men
-- 2nd Corps ‘Tsunhua” 4,000 men
-- 3rd Corps “Tungchow’” 4,000 men
-- 4th Corps ‘Tsunhua” 4,000 men
-- Training Corps “Tungchow’” 2,000 men

- 5th Division (Motorized Square Division) - Gen. Seishiro Itagaki
--9th Infantry Brigade
---11th Infantry Regiment
---41st Infantry Regiment
--21st Infantry Brigade
---21st Infantry Regiment
---42nd Infantry Regiment
-- 5th Mountain Artillery Regiment
-- 5th Cavalry Regiment
-- 5th Engineer Regiment
-- 5th Transport Regiment

- 20th Division (Square Division) - Lieutenant-General Bunsaburo Kawakishi
--39th Infantry Brigade
---77th Infantry Regiment
---78th Infantry Regiment
--40th Infantry Brigade
---79th Infantry Regiment
---80th Infantry Regiment
--26th Field Artillery Regiment
--28th Cavalry Regiment
--20th Engineer Regiment
--20th Transport Regiment

- Sakai Brigade (1st Independent Mixed Brigade)- Lt. Gen Sakai Koji +,***
-- 4th Tank Battalion (12 Type 89 Medium Tanks, 13 Type 95 Light Tanks, 12 Type 94 Tankettes, 4 Armored Engineer Vehicles)
-- 1st Independent Infantry Regiment
-- 1st Independent Artillery Battalion
-- 1st Independent Engineer Company

- Suzuki Brigade (11th Independent Mixed Brigade)- Gen. Suzuki +
-- 11th Independent Mixed Brigade
-- 12th Independent Infantry Regiment
-- 11th Independent Cavalry Company
-- 11th Independent Field Artillery Regiment
-- 12th Independent Mountain Gun Regiment
-- 11th Independent Engineer Company
-- 11th Independent Transport Company



- Temporary Aviation Army Corps (Rinji Hikodan -Temporary Hikodan). [CDF] [PWf] [4]
-- 1st Army Air Force Battalion (reconnaissance aircraft) Ki-4, Ki-5
-- 2nd Army Air Force Battalion (fighter aircraft) Ki-10
-- 3rd Army Air Force Battalion (long range reconnaissance aircraft)
-- 5th Army Air Force Battalion (light bomber) Ki-2
-- 6th Army Air Force Battalion (large bomber) Ki-2
-- 8th Army Air Force Battalion (fighter aircraft) Ki-10
-- 9th Army Air Force Battalion (light bomber) Ki-1
-- 3rd independent squadron (large bomber)
-- 4th independent squadron (reconnaissance aircraft)
-- 6th independent squadron (reconnaissance aircraft)
-- 9th independent squadron (fighter aircraft) Ki-10
-- 1st, 2nd Airfield companies
-- 8th, 9th Signal platoons
-- 1st Truck Transport Co.
-- 3rd Field aircraft depot

Navy:
IJN Second Fleet [involved in landings of 5th Division at Ta Ku Kou ]
– 2nd Fleet - Admiral Zengo Yoshida [M144]
-- composition?

(IJN Mutsu)
8.11.1937: depart from Sasebo, sail to western Korean coast as escort force of a transport flotilla to Northern China
8.15.1937: returen to Sasebo

Third Fleet was assigned for over-all operations in China. Second Fleet was assigned to escort army transports. With the dispatch of troops to the Tsingtao area, the Second Fleet assumed responsibility for operations in North China waters, while the Third Fleet operated in Central and South China waters. These areas of operation were divided by the Lung-Hai railroad, starting from Hai-chou, and included the area of North China Operations.

Notes:
* replaced Gen. Koichiro after his death.

+ Sakai and Suzuki Brigades, from Kwangtung Army were temporarily attached. [PWf]
11th IMB Suzuki Bde later became 26th Div. [PWf]

** E. Hopei Army consisted of these units in May 1937: [2 ]

*** Sakai Brigade armour 12 Type 89 Medium Tanks, 13 Type 95 Light Tanks
12 Type 94 Tankettes, 4 Armored Engineer Vehicles. This was the strength of the 4th Tank Battalion. The 3rd Tank Battalion equipped with Type 94 Tankettes and Type 95 Light Tanks that was to have been assigned to Sakai Brigade remained behind in Manchukuo. [T]


China:

29th Route Army - Commander: Sung Che-yuan, [1,5]
Deputy: Tung Lin-keh
-37th Division * (15750 men)
-- Special Operations Regiment
--109th Brigade
--110th Brigade
--111th Brigade
--Indpendent 35th Brigade

-38th Division * (15400 men)
--Special Operations Regiment,
--112th Brigade
--113rd Brigade
--114th Brigade
--Independent 26th Brigade

-132nd Division *(15000 men)
--Special Operations Regiment,
--1st Brigade
--2nd Brigade
--Independent 27th Brigade
--Independent 28th Brigade

-143rd Division ( Chahar province) (15100 men)*
-- Special Operations Regiment
--1st Brigade
--2nd Brigade
--Independent 29th Brigade
--Independent 31st Brigade
--Security Brigade

-9th Calvary Division (3000 men)
-- 1st Brigade
--2nd Brigade
- Independent 13th calvary brigade (1500 men)
- Hopei Peace Preservation force (Pei-wan, 2500 men)
-Independent 39th B (3500 men)
-Independent 40th B (3400 men)

-1 Brigade of 53rd Corps?

Air Forces - ? [4]


Notes:- Each Chinese Division in 29th Corps had 3 Infantry Brigades and had an attached indipendant brigade.
- 1 Brigade of 53rd Corps took part in the attack on Feng-tai.


Sources:
[1] Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, History of The Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) 2nd Ed. ,1971. Translated by Wen Ha-hsiung , Chung Wu Publishing; 33, 140th Lane, Tung-hwa Street, Taipei, Taiwan Republic of China.
Pg. ?-?
Map 2


[2] Jowett, Phillip S. , Rays of The Rising Sun, Armed Forces of Japan’s Asian Allies 1931-45, Volume I: China & Manchuria, 2004. Helion & Co. Ltd., 26 Willow Rd., Solihul, West Midlands, England.

[M144] Monograph 144 Chapter II http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/144/14 ... 20Incident

[T] Taki’s IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY PAGE http://www3.plala.or.jp/takihome/

[PWf] Forum: Pacific War 1941-1945, discussion about Peiking Tientsin Operation http://www.f16.parsimony.net/forum27947 ... s/6086.htm


[CDF] China Defense Forum: IJA in China orbat, 1937 to 1945
http://www.china-defense.com/forum/inde ... topic=2726
http://www.china-defense.com/forum/show ... php?t=1168

[3] Madej, W. Victor
Japanese Armed Forces Order of Battle, 1937-1945 [2 vols]
Allentown, PA: 1981


[4] Sino-Japanese Air War 1937-45 http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/sino-japanese.htm


[5] Organization of the 29th Route Army
http://www.china-defense.com/forum/inde ... topic=8763

Organization of the 29th Army:
37th D - spec op regiment, 109th B, 110th B, 111th B, Indpendent 35th B (15750 men)
38th D - spec op regiment, 112th B, 113th B, 114th B, Independent 26th B (15400 men)
132th D - spec op regiment, 1st B, 2nd B, Independent 27th B, Independent 28th B (15000 men)
143th D - spec op regiment, 1st B, 2nd B, Independent 29th B, Independent 31st B, Security B (15100 men)
9th Calvary D- 1st B, 2nd B (3000 men)
Independent 39th B (3500 men)
Independent 40th B (3400 men)
Independent 13th calvary bragade (1500 men)
Hopei Peace Preservation force (2500 men)

The Chinese name of the spec op regiment is 特務團. The "spec op" regiments are often used by the army HQ as final reserve. It happens many times during the war of resistance that whenever these units are used, it is the begining of a heroic last stand.

You have to understand that the 29th Army is a very special unit in China. Sung was allowed to maintain 1 army in the whole area he controled. So what he did is to make this army very huge. Note that each division has 3 brigades, and there are many independent units. This is Sung's way to both increase and conceal his strength.

Sung owns a quasi-independent part of China (part of Hopei and Chahar), controls the tax, the government, the military. The same way Shantung was ruled by Han and Shansi, Shuiyan was ruled by Yan. This is also why the Japanese had advocated the "North China 5 provinces Special Zone"
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Map Peiking Tientsin Operation

Postby asiaticus » 15 Aug 2006 21:42

Map 2 Peiking Tientsin Operation from

Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, History of The Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) 2nd Ed. ,1971. Translated by Wen Ha-hsiung , Chung Wu Publishing; 33, 140th Lane, Tung-hwa Street, Taipei, Taiwan Republic of China.
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Peiking Tientsin Operation (July 8 - August 4th 1937)

Postby asiaticus » 22 Sep 2006 09:13

Peiking Tientsin Operation (July-August 1937)[1]

Following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 8th, the Japanese China Stationed Army sent reinforcements from Tientsin, while General Sung Che-yuan, ordered his forces to hold their positions, and attempted to avert war through negotiations. After repeated negotiations both sides agreed to cease fire and return to their stations. On July 9th Chiang Kai-shek ordered 26th Route Army (later 1st Army) under Gen. Sun Lien-chung to take 2 Divisons to Baoding and Shihchiachuang to be under the command of Gen. Sung.

However on the afternoon of July 10th, after receiving reinforcements the Japanese renewed the attack. Again they were repelled. After the Japanese attack failed Lt. General Kanichiro Tashiro commander of China Stationed Army fell ill and died on the 12th of July, being repaced by Lt. General Kiyoshi Katsuki. On that same the Japanese ordered a Division, two brigades and an air regiment as reinforcements for the China Stationed Army. Later in July three more Divisons were sent to the Peiking Tientsin area.
Since these reinforcements had not yet arrived, the Japanese claimed that they would not aggrivate the situation and agreed on an investigation by both sides hoping to resolve it as a local incident.

By July 25th the Japanese reinforcements arrived and attacks began first at Lanfang on the 38th Division.

On July 26th, Japanese planes bombed Lanfang. Japanese units attempted to enter Kuang An Gate in Peiking but were stopped. The Japanese then issued an ultimatum to Gen. Sung demanding the withdrawal of Chinese forces on the outskirts of Peiking to the west of the Yungting River. Gen. Sung flatly refused, and ordered his units to prepare for action and requested large reinforcements from the Central Government.

On July 27th, the Japanese laid seige to Chinese forces in Tungchow, one battalion broke out and fell back to Nanyuan. Japanese planes also bombed Chinese forces outside Peiking and reconnoitered Kaifeng, Chengchow and Loyang.

On July 28th, the Japanese 20th Divison and three brigades launched an offensive against Chinese forces in Peiking. The main attack was against Nanyuan and a secondary attack against Peiyuan. Scores of planes made bombing runs in rotation. Bitter fighting ensued with Gen. Tung Ling-ko Deputy Commander of 29th Corps and Gen. Chao Teng-yu commanding 132nd Divison being killed. The Peace Preservation units were also mauled. However the a brigade of 38th Division under Gen. Liu Chen-san beat back the Japanese in the Langfeng area and a brigade of the 53rd Corps and another unit recovered the rail station at Fengtai.

132nd Division Chief Zhao Dengyu as well as Deputy Corps Chief Tong Linge

That night realizing that fighting the Japanese in this situation was futile, Gen. Sung lead the main force of 29th Corps to withdraw south of the Yungting River. Mayor Chang Tze-chung of Tientsin was left in Peiking to take charge of political affairs in Hopei Chahar in an acting capacity. Gen. Liu Ju-chen's New Separate 29th Brigade was left in Peiking.

On July 29th, the puppet Eastern Hopei Army troops mutinied against the Japanese in Tungchow killing most of their Japanese advisors and other civilians. Meanwhile on the coast at dawn the 5th Division and naval forces separately attacked the Tientsin and the port at Taku-kou. Units of 38th Divison under their acting commander Liu Wen-tien and its local Peace Preservation forces defended Tientsin. Gen. Huang Wei-kang's brigade defended Taku fighting gallantly and killing many Japanese troops. It also attacked the nearby Japanese airfeild at Tungchutzu, destroying many aircraft. At night Gen. Chang Tze-chung was ordered to withdraw toward Machang and Yangliuching south of Tientsin.

On July 30th, the Japanese captured Tientsin and Taku, looting and burning caused heavy distruction.

On August 1st, Gen. Chiang Kai-shek appointed Gov. Fu Tso-yi of Sui-yuan as commander in Chief of the 7th Army Group, with (1 division, 3 Brigades and units of 19th, 35th and 61st Corps) and Gen. Tang En-po as frontline overall commander ( also commanding 13th and 17th Corps) coming from Shanxi and Suiyuan to reinforce Chahar.
Governor of Cahar Liu Ju-ming as Deputy CinC commanded 143rd Division and 2 Peace Preservation Brigades garrisoning the province.

The Japanese entered Peiking and soon on August 4th, Gen. Chang Tzu-chung finding it impossible to carry out his duties left Peiking, and Liu Ju-chens forces withdrew into Chahar.


Sources:
[1] Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, History of The Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) 2nd Ed. ,1971. Translated by Wen Ha-hsiung , Chung Wu Publishing; 33, 140th Lane, Tung-hwa Street, Taipei, Taiwan Republic of China.
Pg.177-180
Map 2

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Postby Jerry Asher » 25 Sep 2006 06:16

Japanese naval units at Daku, late July 1937, Aug 1 Still speculating, but beleive now that Japanese light cruisers Tatsuta and Tenryu were the first units if IJN to Daku as guards.
They would have had the manpower to put shore party ashore to protect Japanese wharfs and warehouses at Daku-which we know was done. Des Div 10 as part of DesRon1 was at Lushan from 23 July on. Orders of 28 July to DesRon 2 do not allow time for DesRon2 Div's to arrive. DesDiv 10 is detached and stays with DesRon2 until Sept 5th when the initial movement of the three divisions is complete. I have DesDiv 10 as comprising three units, Akatsuki, Sagari and Sazanami---Still feel that a solid history of the 5th Division would yield the names of the transports and guarding naval units.

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Operation Chahar / Peiking –Suiyuan Railway Operation

Postby asiaticus » 23 Nov 2006 20:26

Known by the Japanese as チャハル作戦, Operation Quhar and variously by the Chinese as the 长城抗战 (Battle of the Great Wall), or Peiking – Suiyuan Railway Operation. This campaign occurred in August 1937 following the Battle of Beiping-Tianjin at the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War. This was the second attack by Kwangtung Army and the Mongol forces of Prince Teh Wang on Inner Mongolia after the failure of the Suiyuan Campaign (1936). The Chahar Expeditionary Force was under the direct command of General Hideki Tojo, the chief of staff of Kuangtung Army. A second force from the Peiping Railway Garrison Force, later the 1st Army under General Kiyoshi Katsuki was also involved in the attack from the south at Nankou.

The Chinese forces opposing this invasion of Suiyuan were the Suiyuan Pacification Headquarters under the command of General Yen Hsi–shan. Fu Zuoyi governor of Suiyuan was made commander of the 7th Army Group and Liu Ju-ming, governor of Chahar was made its deputy commander, defending Chahar with 143rd Division and two Brigades. General Tang Enbo was sent by Chiang Kai-shek with 13th and 17th Corps from the Central Army and made Frontline Commander in Chief. 1st Cavalry Corps was in Chahar under the command of Chiao Cheng-shou facing the Mongolian forces of Teh Wang.

Battle of Nankou

On August 8th the Japanese 11th Independent Mixed Brigade, commanded by Gen. Shigiyasu Suzuki began their attack on the left flank of the 13th Corps position at Nankou but were thwarted after three days by the difficult terrain and stubborn resistance of the Chinese. A new attack on August 11th supported by tanks and aircraft took Nankou Station after which Gen. Suzuki's brigade advanced on Juyong Pass.
That same day, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the activation of the 14th Army Group (10th, 83rd and 85th Divisions) under Gen. Wei Li-huang. Coming by rail from Yingchia-chuang to Yi Hsien, elements of it were sent on a ten day march through the plains west of Peiking in a turning movement in support of Tang Enbo's forces. 1st Army made attacks on the Japanese forces in Lianghsiang and Chaili to distract them and sent a detachment to Heilung Pass to cover 14th Army Groups advance.

On Aug 12th, Tang Enbo's army counterattacked surrounding the Japanese cutting them off from their supplies and communications. On Aug 14th, Itagaki Seishiro's 5th Division was sent to the relief of the 11th IMB at Juyongguan.

On August 16th, Itagaki arrived at Nankou and began an enveloping attack on the right flank of 13th Corps making a five pronged attack at Huanglaoyuan. 7th Brigade of 4th Division under Shih Chueh was moved to block this move and reinforcements of Li Hsien-chou's 21st Division and Chu Huai-ping's 94th Division were brought up, engaging in days of heavy fighting. On August 17th General Yen His-shan, Director of the Taiyuan Pacification Headquarters, directed 7th Army under Fu Zuoyi to move its 72nd Division and three brigades by rail from Tatung to Huailai to reinforce Gen. Tang Enbo's forces.

Battle the Great Wall

Meanwhile in northern Chahar the Chinese 1st Cavalry Corps captured Shangtu, Nanhaochan, Shangyi and Huateh from the puppet Mongolian Army of Prince Teh Wang. Elements of 143rd Division took Chungli, while its main force reached Changpei. During this Chinese advance the Japanese Chahar Expeditionary Force under Lt. General Hideki Tojo composed of the mechanized 1st Independent Mixed Brigade and the 2nd and 15th Mixed Brigade gathered for a counteroffensive from Changpei to Kalgan.

From August 18th to 19th the Chahar Expeditionary Force counterattacked from Changpei, and took Shenweitaiko on the Great Wall and Hanno Dam. The scattered and poorly equipped Chinese forces were unable to stop them and they now threatened the Peiking – Suiyuan Railway at Kalgan. On the 20th Gen. Fu Zuoyi's 7th Army diverted its 200th and 211th Brigades moving south by rail to join Gen. Tang Enbo's forces back to defend Kalgan, while its remaining 72nd Division arrived to reinforce Chenpien and and 7th Separate Brigade to defend the rail head at Huailai.

On August 21st, the Japanese forces broke through at the cities of Hengling and Chenpien. Gen. Tang En-po's forces awaiting reinforcement, but having suffered over 50% casualties, still defended Huailai, Chuyung Pass and Yenching. Liu Ju-ming's 143rd Divison fell back to defend Kalgan from the advancing Japanese.

On August 23rd, as Itagaki Seishiro's 5th Division pushed toward Huailai from Chenpien against Ma Yen-shou's 7th Separate Brigade, advance elements of the 14th Army Group arrived on the Japanese flank at Chingpaikou, driving off the Japanese outpost there and contacted the Japanese forces advancing to Chenpien and the front beyond. However they were delayed in crossing the Yungting River and their attack was delayed until it was too late to stop the Japanese advance, and due to poor communications they failed to link up with Gen. Tang En-po's forces. After 8 days and 8 nights fighting, Itagaki on Aug 24th, linked up with Kwantung army's 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade at Xiahuayuan.

On August 26th, Gen. Tang En-po's forces were ordered to break out toward the Sangchien River while Liu Ju-ming's forces were ordered to withdraw to the far side of the Hsiang-yang River.

On August 29th the Japanese Oui Column moved south from Tushihkou, and on the 30th attacked Yenching via Chihcheng, After repulsing the attack 17th Corps withdrew to join the rest of Tang En-po on the far side of the the Sangchien River.

Kalgan/Zhangjiakou, fell Sept. 3, and after Gen. Fu Zuoyi's 200th and 211th Brigades failed in a counterattack to recapture it and fell back to the west to defend the railway to Suiyuan at Chaikoupao. This brought and end to Operation Chahar.

September 4th, the South Charhar Government was set up at Kalgan. After the fall of Kalgan, Chahar's "complete independence" from China was declared by "100 influential persons," headed by the 36-year-old Prince Teh, a pro-Japanese Mongolian, of the "Inner Mongolia for Inner Mongolians" movement whose Mongolian troops helped the Japanese to take Kalgan.


Sources:
[1] Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, History of The Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) 2nd Ed. ,1971. Translated by Wen Ha-hsiung , Chung Wu Publishing; 33, 140th Lane, Tung-hwa Street, Taipei, Taiwan Republic of China.
Pg. 180- 184
Map 3

[2] Jowett, Phillip S. , Rays of The Rising Sun, Armed Forces of Japan’s Asian Allies 1931-45, Volume I: China & Manchuria, 2004. Helion & Co. Ltd., 26 Willow Rd., Solihul, West Midlands, England.

[3] RESISTANCE WARS
http://www.uglychinese.org/war.htm#Ichigo
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Orbats for Operation Chahar / Peiking – Suiyuan Railway Oper

Postby asiaticus » 23 Nov 2006 20:29


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more on Operation Chahar:

Postby asiaticus » 05 Dec 2006 02:30

more on Operation Chahar:
the Oui Column, Manchukuoan forces involved, and a Japanese map of the operation.

Oui Column in Aug. 1937 Operation Chahar?

viewtopic.php?t=111890

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Re: Early Japanese Campaign(s) in the 2ndSino-Japanese War

Postby tigre » 29 Jul 2016 15:19

Hello to all :D; a little more on the first stage of this war..................................

The "China Incident" (Lukouchiao), a point of view.

Japan's major interest on the continent was to husband Manchuria. It could not and would not relinquish Manchuria, from which it had expelled Chinese and Russian powers at the cost of two wars. In the 1930s the major threat to Manchuria was posed by the Soviet forces. North China was the rear of Japan's defense against this threat. As the Kuomintang's national unification proceeded, the Kuantung Army became preoccupied with the question of how to neutralize China in the event of a conflict with Russia.

In 1932 Japan risked an initial collision in Shanghai; it was a dress rehearsal for later and more serious attempts, though the Chinese defense of the city area was not without credit. In 1933, it strengthened its position in Manchukuo by adding Jehol. The Soviets were not idle; at the expense of China, they occupied Outer Mongolia; its capital, Ulan Bator, became headquarters of the XXXIII Russian Corps, as a token of sovereignty.

Soviet influence supported Red Chinese armies in South China and Kansu; Chiang Kai-shek waged several campaigns against them, on his own account. Japan regarded the spread of communist influence with a jaundiced eye; along the Amur and on the line Chabarowsk—Vladivostok, both opponents developed fortified positions; an eventual showdown was practicable only via Ulan—Bator against the Siberian railway. As a preliminary strategic condition for this plan, the Peking—Tientsin area was needed for military concentrations, and the five Chinese provinces, Shantung, Hopei, Chahar, Shensi and Suiyuan, had to be brought under Japanese influence.

On one hand, Japan maintained a garrison in north China to guard its embassy and protect the rights of its nationals.This force, known as the China Garrison Army, was composed of one infantry brigade, one field artillery regiment and one tank unit. Its main strength was stationed in Tienching with small units in the vicinity of Peiping and along the Peiping-Linghai Railway.

On the other hand, the Chinese had the 29th Army in north China, commanded by Sung Che-yuan, a war lord from Hopeh and Chahar Provinces, and was composed of four divisions, two independent brigades, two cavalry divisions and one cavalry brigade.

This was the situation when a detachment of the 37th Chinese Division opened fire on a Japanese company engaged in night maneuvers on 7 July in the vicinity of the Marco Polo bridge. Thus the outbreak of the war cannot be explained solely in terms of Japanese actions. Who fired the mysterious shots at Lukouchiao will perhaps never be known.

Sources: FMFRP-Maneuvers in War. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
China Area Operations Record. 1937-1941.
Resistance and Revolution in China. The Communists and the Second United Front. Tetsuya Kataoka

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Early Japanese Campaign(s) in the 2ndSino-Japanese War

Postby tigre » 06 Aug 2016 18:43

Hello to all :D; a little more..................................

Concentration and strategic deployment.

The sequence of operations follows an almost orthodox professional pattern, i.e., the step-by-step progress of modern war, from the seizure of suitable concentration areas, under the protection of covering forces (which may have to engage in serious preliminary fighting) to the strategic advance and development, in accord with a prearranged plan of campaign.

Seizure of a concentration area: Armies are not assembled in haphazard fashion; serious administrative and logistic problems will have to be met, adequate road and railroad nets, shelter for the concentration and space for the eventual strategic deployment are required; the Peking—Tientsin area satisfied all requirements, as a line of departure of sufficient width, with rail lines to the zone of the interior (i.e., Manchukuo) and the Tientsin—Taku port, as an oversea's advance base for shipments from Japan. In sharp, localized fighting, Japanese covering forces seized Peking and Tientsin, 26 and 29 July.

On 25 July, the 38th Division of the Chinese 29th Army* launched a surprise attack against a Japanese signal unit engaged in repairing the telephone lines in the vicinity of Langfang station on the Pei-ping-Linghai railway. An infantry company of the China Garrison Army stationed nearby to protect the railway successfully defended the station throughout the night but suffered heavy casualties.

The following day the China Garrison Army lodged a strong protest and demanded that the Chinese forces be withdrawn from the Lukouchiao area within 24 hours. This demand was disregarded and, about sunset that day, an infantry battalion of the China Garrison Army returning to Peiping to protect the Japanese nationals within the walled city, was attacked by Chinese troops as it was passing through the Kuangan Gate. The Japanese troops suffered heavy casualties.

Operations of the covering force. In the last weeks of July, Japanese covering forces drove their opponents south of the Yung-ting River; this secured a line of departure for the advance to the south, but the west flank of their concentration, in direction of Nankow, Suiyuan and the Soviets, remained open.

On 28 July, therefore, the China Garrison Army, supported by one emergency mobilized division, two mixed brigades (one of which was mechanized) and one air group, opened its attack and, by the 30th, had forced the Chinese in the vicinity of Peiping and Tien-ching to retreat to the south of the Yungting Ho.

* The 29th Chinese Army (30, 31, 33, 37, 38 Div.)

Sources: FMFRP-Maneuvers in War. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
China Area Operations Record. 1937-1941.
Resistance and Revolution in China. The Communists and the Second United Front. Tetsuya Kataoka

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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tigre
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Re: Early Japanese Campaign(s) in the 2ndSino-Japanese War

Postby tigre » 13 Aug 2016 15:25

Hello to all :D; a little more..................................

Concentration and strategic deployment.

Being aware of the limited strength of the China Garrison Army and fearing that it might not be possible to localize the incident, on July 19, Central Authorities mobilized the 5th, 6th and 10th Divisions and the Provisional Air Group in Japan and dispatched them as reinforcements to north China to meet the threat of the armies under the direct command of Chiang Kai-shek, which had advanced into southern Hopeh Province.

On 28 July, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Song Zheyuan to retreat to Paoting in southern Hebei province. Over the next two days, intense fighting took place in Tianjin, where the Chinese forces put up a stiff resistance, but subsequently the Chinese retreated south along the lines of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and the Peiping-Hankow Railway.

On 4 August, General Liu Ruzhen's remaining forces withdrew into Chahar. Isolated, Beiping was captured by the Japanese without further resistance on 8 August 1937. General Masakazu Kawabe entered the city on 18 August in a military parade.

On 6 August, the Nanching Government, determined to enter the war, transferred reinforcements to the Peiping-Tienching area from Chahar Province and the Peiping-Hankou railway area.

Sources: FMFRP-Maneuvers in War. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
China Area Operations Record. 1937-1941.
Resistance and Revolution in China. The Communists and the Second United Front. Tetsuya Kataoka
LIFE 23 Ago 1937

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Early Japanese Campaign(s) in the 2ndSino-Japanese War

Postby tigre » 20 Aug 2016 14:22

Hello to all :D; a little more..................................

Operations of the covering force.

The Chinese moved elements of one division via Calgan and quickly occupied Nankow Pass. The Japanese sent a motorized column, 4000 men and 6oo vehicles, initially as a covering force, and then threw mass against the position in a combination of frontal attack envelopment and took Nankow Pass. The Japanese pressed south, in pursuit, while their Mongol ally, Prince Teh, took Calgan in rear of the Chinese defenders.

The war of the railroads.

With the south and west boundaries of the concentration area secured, the assembly of a field army of modern composition of 200,000 to 300,000 men proceeded methodically during August; the Japanese were opposed, on a broad front of approximately 160 miles, by three times their number, but their opponents were inadequately organized, with incomplete artillery and transport.

The subsequent advance of the Japanese, i.e., the skeleton framework of their campaign, was strongly influenced by the existing rail net, in a country generally devoid of modern communications and adequate highways.

Four rail lines of the greatest strategical significance traverse North China:

The line: Peking - Suiyuan, via the Nankow Pass.
The line: Haichow - Suchow - Kaifeng - Sian, the so-called "Lunghai"
The line: Tientsin - Tsinan - Nanking, the so-called "Tsinpu."
The line: Peking - Kaifeng - Hankow, the so-called "Pinghan."

While motor transport has become an important item of modern high-speed communication, it can only supplement but never replace railroads; a standard train of 45 cars will deliver 1500 tons; it would be uneconomical, for long hauls, to attempt this volume with trucks; the enormous consumption of class I, II and III supplies for several hundred thousand men is clearly dependent on "volume delivery," i.e., railroads. The broad lines of the Japanese offensive, in this theater of war, were fixed by the available railroad net.

Sources: FMFRP-Maneuvers in War. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
China Area Operations Record. 1937-1941.
Resistance and Revolution in China. The Communists and the Second United Front. Tetsuya Kataoka
LIFE 23 Ago 1937

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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tigre
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Re: Early Japanese Campaign(s) in the 2ndSino-Japanese War

Postby tigre » 27 Aug 2016 13:56

Hello to all :D; a little more..................................

Operations on the North Front: 1937.

The advance to the south to the Hoang-Ho was conducted in three columns: on the east, General Katsuki followed the "Tsinpu" railroad; in the center, General Nishio advanced along the "Pinghan"; in the west, Itagaki, initially based on Tatung on the Suiyuan railway, moved on Taiyuan into Shansi province. Prince Teh, Japan's Mongol ally, operated along the Suiyuan railway into Outer-Mongolia. The objective of these columns was the seizure of the Lunghai corridor and the control of the northern provinces. The progress of the three main columns was comparatively swift; in less than three months, the Japanese had overrun approximately half of the northern provinces, a lineal advance of about 300 miles, along a 200-mile front. Each column encountered successive defensive positions of considerable strength: the east column at Tsang-tschau, September 24, the center column at Pauting and Schikiachwang, October 10, the west column at the Jengmen Pass; this column, incidentally, narrowly escaped destruction in a clever Chinese trap.

The initial operations of the Japanese columns advancing south of Peking and Tientsin along the "Pinghan" and "Tsinpu" railroads is characteristic of the war of the railroads and the nature of Japanese maneuver.

On August 22, the 26th Chinese Army (6 divisions) held a front from Liuliho to vicinity of Tsinghai; the flanks, i.e., rail lines, were held strongly while the center, along the Hun-ho, was covered by one and one-half divisions only. Count Terauchi, the Japanese commander in chief, decided on a breakthrough in the center, with preliminary enveloping attacks against the flanks.

Sept. 11: The Japanese left wing took Matschang, wading hip-deep in flooded terrain, and advanced slowly on Tsangtschau. Chinese reserves were attracted to this front.

Sept. I5: The right wing began the attack against the strong positions of Fangchan and Liuliho. Chinese reserves were drawn to this area.

Sept. 16: The breakthrough is launched at Kuan, with the infantry supported by tanks, heavy artillery and attack aviation; reserves moved through the gap on Tschotschau, in rear of the weakened Chinese position, and took the town on September 17; another detachment moved on Tinghsing to block the Chinese line of retreat.

The Chinese 26th Army, seriously endangered by encirclement, barely made good its escape to the southwest. The Chinese High Command attempted to reorganize along the line: Yitschau—Tsangtschau; the Japanese continued pressure to the south, and this front was kept in motion until December.

This swift advance, based on railroads, slowed down in December, primarily because events on the South Front became of paramount interest.

Sources: FMFRP-Maneuvers in War. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
China Area Operations Record. 1937-1941.
Resistance and Revolution in China. The Communists and the Second United Front. Tetsuya Kataoka

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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