Stange

[Peter H]

Dos anyone know this officer's full name or about his career?

Armenian Massacres: New Records Undercut Old Blame
Reexamining History
by Edward J. Erickson
Middle East Quarterly
Summer 2006

The debate about the World War I deportation and massacre of Armenians in eastern Anatolia has become more contentious with time. Opponents of Turkey's European Union accession treat the Armenian question as original sin. Yet much of the historical debate upon which politicians pass judgment is tinged more by polemic than by fact. Nine decades after hundreds of thousands of Armenians—and millions of others—died during World War I, it is important to dig down into the archives to show what the historical record really says.

There is little argument that many Armenians perished during World War I, but there remains significant historical dispute about whether Armenian civilians died in the fog of war or were murdered on the orders of the Ottoman government. More specifically, the debate about whether or not there was a genocide of Armenians rests upon three pillars: the record of the Turkish courts-martial of 1919-20 during which the new Turkish government, formed following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, tried and hanged some Ottoman officials for war crimes; documents produced in the Memoirs of Naim Bey, an account allegedly written by an Ottoman official claiming to have participated in the deportation of Armenians;[1] and the role of the "Special Organization" (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa), somewhat equivalent to the Ottoman special forces.

Recently, two researchers have debated the nature of the World War I Armenian massacres and, more specifically, the role in the massacres by the Special Organization and the group's relationship to a Prussian artillery officer known in the records only by his last name, Stange.[2] The first, Vahakn Dadrian, director of Genocide Research at the Zoryan Institute for Contemporary Armenian Research and Documentation, wrote that Stange was the "highest-ranking German guerilla commander operating in the Turko-Russian border," one of several "arch-accomplices in the implementation of the massacres," and a Special Organization commander.[3] Dadrian argued that the Ottoman government diverted the Special Organization units to deportation duty in rear areas where they became the principal agent in the Armenian massacres. He bases his claims against Stange on secondhand German reports of massacres in Stange's area of operations and uses controversial testimony from the 1919 Istanbul courts-martial proceedings to support his claim about Special Organization redeployments. Since that time, many parties have taken Dadrian's assertions at face value. [4]

Last year, however, Guenter Lewy, a professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts, challenged Dadrian's findings on the grounds that Stange was neither a Special Organization guerilla leader nor did his unit operate in the area of the massacres.[5]

In history, details matter. Given the importance that contemporary officials place on the events of nine decades past, clarifying Stange's operations is critical to the current debate. In this regard, the official 27-volume Turkish military history of the World War I campaigns, while seldom utilized in Western scholarship, is a valuable tool.[6] The volumes are not readily accessible to university researchers; they are only available at a single military bookstore on a restricted Turkish army compound in Ankara. Far from the politicized debate surrounding the massacres, these histories shed light on nitty-gritty details such as which officers and units were deployed where and when. Within the set, the Third Army histories help flesh out Stange's wartime record. [7] They were published simultaneously to Dadrian's 1993 article and so should not be dismissed as a Turkish response to Dadrian's work. They also provide an important source of information which Dadrian, genocide scholars, and other historians of the period have not yet taken into account.

Ottoman Irregular Forces in Eastern Anatolia
Analyzing the events of 1915 requires an understanding of the Ottoman military for, too often, treatments of the period confuse units and muddle Ottoman military terms.[8] Between 1914-18, there were five groups of Ottoman military and paramilitary forces engaged on the Caucasian front. The Ottoman regular army was a uniformed conscript force led by professional officers who were trained in conventional military tactics and who responded to military discipline and orders. It fought on all Ottoman fronts during the war.

Assisting them were the jandarma, a paramilitary gendarmerie or rural police force trained to military standards and led by professional officers. Every province had at least one mobile jandarma regiment and also numbers of static jandarma battalions.[9] The Ministry of the Interior controlled the jandarma in peacetime but, with the Ottoman mobilization on August 3, 1914, command passed to the Ministry of Defense.

In addition, there was the tribal cavalry (aşiret, formerly the hamidiye). In 1910, the Ministry of Defense integrated the twenty-nine tribal cavalry regiments into the regular army. Used as both conventional cavalry and for internal security duties, members were mostly Kurdish and Circassian, poorly disciplined, and led by tribal chieftains.[10] However, in the army reorganization of 1913, these regiments were reclassified as reserve cavalry (ihtiyat süvari) regiments of the regular Ottoman army.

The gönüllü, paramilitary volunteer forces, allowed Turks and Islamic ethnic groups living outside the Ottoman Empire to join the war effort and fight together.[11] These were often poorly led and armed but organized into units so that they could assist the regular army in both combat and non-combat operations. During World War I, most volunteers serving in the Caucasus were "Greek Turks," "Caucasian Turks," Laz, or Muslim refugees from the European provinces such as Macedonia or Epirus lost in 1913.[12] By definition, the volunteers were not released Ottoman convicts.

The Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa or Special Organization, a multi-purpose special volunteer force led by professional officers, was equivalent to a modern special operations force. It sought to foment insurrection in enemy territory, fight guerillas and insurgents in friendly territory, conduct espionage and counterespionage, and perform other tasks unsuited to conventional military forces. While many histories suggest the Special Organization received orders from the Committee of Union and Progress or the Ministry of the Interior, the archival record suggests that the Ministry of Defense commanded the Special Organization during World War I.[13]

Finally, there were numbers of non-military groups operating in Anatolia during the war. These non-military çeteler (which may be translated as bandit, brigand, insurgent, or guerilla groups depending on context) were local groups not subject to centralized command and control. Çeteler was a catchall term that was used by both the Ottomans to describe insurgents and authentic criminal bands and also by foreign observers to describe groups of killers, whose origins were often unknown.

The Stange Detachment
Where then did Major Stange fit in? Shortly before the outbreak of World War I, the German Kaiser charged General Otto Liman von Sanders to lead a military mission to the Ottoman Empire to assist in rebuilding the Ottoman army after its defeat in the Balkan wars. Liman von Sanders assigned Captain Stange, a Prussian artillery specialist, to command the Erzurum fortress artillery.[14] Stange was a conventional military officer with no special knowledge of guerilla operations. His assignment to the Ottoman Third Army in Erzurum reflected his mainstream skills. He occupied his time working on the defenses until the outbreak of war offered him the chance to lead troops against the Russians.

According to the original Ottoman war plan, the Third Army was ordered to stand on the defensive in the Caucasus while the bulk of the Ottoman army concentrated in Thrace.[15] However, in early September 1914, a revised campaign plan directed the Third Army to conduct offensive operations in the event of war. When war broke out between Russia and the Ottoman Empire on November 2, the Ottomans were actively planning a winter offensive in the Caucasus. The plan called for the three army corps of the Third Army to encircle the Russian army at Sarakamiş with a supporting operation on the Black Sea flank between Batum and Ardahan, in modern day Georgia.[16] There were no regular Ottoman army combat units on the Turco-Russian frontier from the Black Sea south for about 100 kilometers for this supporting attack. Nevertheless, Ottoman border forces pushed across the frontier and, on November 22, closed in on the Russian town of Artvin.[17] Flushed with success, on December 6, the general staff ordered the Third Army to push onward toward Ardahan.[18] It was in this capacity that Stange entered the scene. Ottoman strategists committed every available Third Army division to the Sarakamiş offensive. The Third Army headquarters ordered Stange to take command of the Eighth Infantry Regiment, two artillery batteries, and the Çoruh Border Security Battalion.[19] This newly organized force was designated the Stange Detachment (Ştanke Bey Müfrezesi) and ordered to take Artvin while the rest of the army moved toward their main objective. None of the troops were trained in guerilla or unconventional warfare. Against light opposition, Stange pushed forward and took the town on December 21.

At the same time, other Ottoman forces were operating in the area. Bahattin Şakir, a high-ranking member of the governing Committee of Union and Progress, commanded the Special Organization force, which had infiltrated its forward units near Batum to foment an uprising among Laz and Turkic peoples inside the Russian Empire. In addition to this mission, Şakir ordered Ziya Bey, an artillery major commanding the Special Organization men on the ground in Russia, to encircle and destroy çeteler that included a number of Armenians.[20] The Special Organization also attacked regular Russian army units, capturing four officers and sixty-three Russian soldiers in late November.[21] One Turkish source also mentions a large force of volunteers operating in the Çoruh River valley under Yakup Cemil Bey.[22] Another Turkish source asserts that Yakup Cemil's detachment was a Special Organization force composed of çeteler.[23] In this bitter internecine fighting, many civilian Turks, Armenians, and other local ethnic groups were massacred indiscriminately.[24]

With so many different units and organizations operating in the area, there was bureaucratic wrangling over how to unify the command as the Sarakamiş campaign approached. In the end, Stange took command of the entire force—regulars, border security battalions, volunteers, and the Special Organization. However, the Special Organization and volunteers continued to receive their orders from Şakir, who wanted to retain control of the operation while Stange answered to the X Corps commander, in whose sector he operated.[25]

On December 22, the X Corps and Third Army ordered Stange, the Special Organization, and the volunteers to converge separately on Ardahan. The Special Organization, now locally commanded by Captain Halit Bey, cooperated and joined the advance.[26] Despite bad winter weather, these forces began to encircle the city on December 29. Because Stange controlled neither the Special Organization nor the volunteers, he sent coordination copies of his own detachment orders to Halit, who passed these on to the adjacent volunteers.[27] This was a clumsy arrangement, and there is no indication that the Special Organization and volunteers reciprocated. The result was an uncoordinated attack on Ardahan. Stange's detachment suffered heavy casualties[28] while Special Organization and volunteer losses were light.[29] The Ottomans failed to hold the city for long. In early January 1915, the Russians retook the city with bayonet assaults. Over the next month, the Ottomans conducted a fighting retreat back toward Artvin.

At the end of January 1915, Şakir consolidated some of the Special Organization units into a Special Organization Regiment (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Alay) commanded by Halit.[30] This regiment was assigned nine officers and 671 men.[31] Halit also gained control over a group of volunteers known as the Baha Bey Şakir Force. Subsequently and because of the deteriorating tactical situation, Şakir ordered the Special Organization Regiment to cooperate with Stange in defensive operations along the border. Additionally, a smaller Special Organization detachment commanded by Riza Bey conducted operations around Murgal, northwest of Artvin. Istanbul also sent Stange about 1,600 replacements. Fighting was hard, and the Ottomans were pushed back. On February 16, three Russian infantry and two cavalry regiments, Cossacks, and an Armenian battalion attacked a rear guard of Halit Bey's Special Organization soldiers.[32] The Special Organization fought well and covered Stange's regulars as they retreated.

On March 1, 1915, the Russian army launched a major attack to restore the frontier, pushing back Stange, the Special Organization, and the volunteers. In reaction to what appeared to be a disastrous retreat, on March 20, the X Corps reorganized the Ottoman forces on the northeast frontier, forming the Lazistan Area Command (Lazistan ve Havalisi Komutanlıgı) [See Table 1].[33] By this time, Şakir had left Erzurum, and Stange finally received unitary command over the regular army unit as well as the Special Organization and volunteers. Stange immediately set about coordinating a defense with a combined force of 4,286 men, six machine guns, and four cannon.[34]



Table 1
Lazistan Area Command - March 28, 1915

Lazistan Detachment No. of Men
1st Btln, 8th Infantry Regt 306
3rd Btln, 8th Infantry Regt 581
Mountain Btry, 8th Field Artillery 192
Machinegun Company 97
Engineer Company 140
Cavalry Platoon 30

Trabzon Jandarma Regt No. of Men
Trabzon Jandarma Btln 400
Rize Jandarma Btln 450
Giresun Jandarma Btln 330
Hopa Hudut (Border) Btln 330

Special Organization Regiment (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Alay)
Zia Bey Btln
Adil Bey Btln
Muhsin Btln
Salih Aga Btln
Ibrahim Bey Btln
Veysel Efendi Detachment 1,430 men (in total)

Source: TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu Harekatı, Kuruluş 12 (Organizational Chart 12)

The Third Army sent Staff Lieutenant Colonel Vasıf to be Stange's chief-of-staff in the expanded command[35] while Stange collected supplies, engineers, and cavalry from the Third Army Lines of Communications Command. In addition, the military mobilized all men in the Trabzon vilayet (province) between the ages of 17-18 and 45-50 while a Special Organization unit from Istanbul joined the Lazistan area command's Special Organization regiment.

Stange reorganized his augmented command into field forces and static forces. The field forces, which held the defensive lines against the Russians, were composed of the 8th Infantry Regiment, the Trabzon Jandarma Regiment, and the Special Organization Regiment.[36] The static forces, which were responsible for rear area security, were composed of the Riza, the Trabzon, and the Samsun Jandarma regiments. On April 14, 1915, Stange had over 6,000 men assigned to his command.[37] Table 2 shows Stange's revised command arrangements.



Table 2
Lazistan Area Command - 15 April 1915

FIELD FORCE

Lazistan Detachment 1st Btln, 8th Infantry Regt
3rd Btln, 8th Infantry Regt
Machinegun Company
Trabzon Jandarma Regt Giresun Jandarma Btln Amasya Jandarma Btln
Hopa Border Btln
Machinegun Company
Special Organization Regt Ziya Bey Btln Adil Bey Btln
Mehmet Ali Btln
Ibrahim Bey Btln
Veysel Bey Btln
Machinegun Company
Field Force Troops Two artillery batteries (8th Artillery), Engineer Company, Cavalry Platoon

STATIC FORCE

Rize Jandarma Regt 2 jandarma btlns
Trabzon Jandarma Regt 3 jandarma btlns
(probably reconstituted from recalled men)
Samsun Jandarma Reg 4 jandarma btlns

Source: TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu Harekatı, Kuruluş 13 (Organizational Chart 13)

These arrangements solidified the Ottoman defense, which by mid-April was successfully holding a line about ten kilometers west of the prewar Ottoman-Russian frontier. They also show a return to a conventional military organizational architecture, mirroring the organization of regular Ottoman infantry divisions in 1915, which contained three regiments each with a machine gun company. A general support element of artillery, engineers, and cavalry augmented the regiments.[38] The field force was, practically speaking, staffed and organized as a regular infantry division. This reflects Stange's conventional background and the tactical necessity to put an effective and standard defense on the empire's northeast frontier. The tempo of fighting dropped, and the front remained stationary until early 1916. Throughout this period the Special Organization Regiment remained on the line and engaged in conventional defensive operations.[39] In late January 1916, the recently promoted Major Halit relieved Stange; he returned to Erzurum.

Early 1916 was a period of disaster for the Ottoman strategic position in northeastern Anatolia and the Caucasus. The Russians seized Erzurum, Rize, and Trabzon. Regular army infantry divisions reinforced the Lazistan Area Command. Several Special Organization battalions in the sector were transferred to the adjacent Çoruh Detachment in May 1916 where they continued to participate in frontline duties.[40] The remaining Special Organization troops were distributed into two elements, which were designated as the First and Second Special Organization regiments and assigned to a newly-formed coastal detachment.[41]

Other Special Organization units were redeployed to the IX Corps sector on the Erzincan front near the village of Tuzla.[42] These units served directly under a provisional corps commanded by Staff Lieutenant Colonel Şevket and conducted offensive operations in conjunction with the Ottoman Thirteenth Infantry Division.[43] On June 6, 1916, three Special Organization companies were assigned to the newly formed Haçköy Detachment on the line south of Tuzla. The detachment also had an infantry battalion, two cavalry squadrons, and artillery.[44] The Special Organization continued to participate in conventional operations on the Caucasian front for the remainder of the summer. On July 29, 1916, the First and Second Special Organization regiments were inactivated and a single regiment reestablished.[45] Major combat operations in the Ottoman Third Army area began to diminish in the late summer and, by mid-fall 1916, had almost completely stopped. This was a result of both combat exhaustion and severe weather.

The published paper trail of the Special Organization formations on the Caucasian front ends in 1917, and the Special Organization does not appear in the 1918 Ottoman Caucasian orders of battle. It is unclear what happened to the Special Organization officers and men assigned to the units at that time. However, the deportation of Armenians was completed in 1916, and it appears certain that the Special Organization formations in this study remained on the front during that period.

Conclusions
Many historians find military chronicles dry and difficult to comprehend. Nevertheless, when it comes to the controversy over the fate of Armenians in 1915, they are crucial. Many contemporary historians accuse the Special Organization and Major Stange of complicity in genocide. The records, though, do not lend such accusations credence.

The official military histories of the modern Turkish Republic portray the operations of organized Ottoman Special Organization units on the Caucasian front from December 1914 through the end of 1916 as largely conventional. There is little evidence of a cover-up, especially as these histories are technical, not intended for the public, and predate the scholarly controversy over allegations of Special Organization complicity in Armenian genocide. Importantly, the official histories fully cite archival sources and often reproduce reports and orders.

Early Special Organization operations near Batum were unconventional and involved guerilla warfare operations. However, the Sarikamiş offensive provided the engine that drove the Special Organization into the arms of regular army commanders like Stange. Subsequent and perennial manpower shortages kept the Special Organization engaged in conventional military operations. From the record of unit assignments and locations on the front, it appears that the Special Organization units associated with Stange were not redeployed from the Caucasian front to deport and massacre Armenians.

Nor does it seem possible that Stange was involved in the deaths of Armenians. The modern Turkish histories show that he commanded regular army forces engaged in conventional offensive and defensive operations until late March 1915. Although he technically commanded all Ottoman forces near Ardahan in 1914, he exercised no real control over the Special Organization or volunteers.

[Glenn2438]

Hi Peter,

I have been struggling with this for the last few days

There were in fact two Stanges on the December 1913 Liman Mission to Turkey; a Major August Stange formerly of Infanterie-Regiment 21 and a Hauptmann Stange (first name at this time unknown to me), formerly the 3rd Artillery Staff officer in Metz. This latter foot artillery offcer (Fußartillerie-Regts 8 & 15) who was promoted char. Major in November 1914 is probably the gentleman in question. He returned to Prussian service and is reported in the Ehrenrangliste as being the foot artillery commander of the 4th Army. Unfortunately this Stange never commanded a regular foot artillery regiment, remained in the Reichsheer nor had his first name published in any of the award rolls in my possession. His first name and fate then are at the moment problematical. He did survive the war with the final rank of Oberstleutnant (unlike August Stange who died in 1918) and was still alive in 1926.

Perhaps Andy maybe able to furnish further details on his return from holiday. In the meantime I shall continue to dig!

Regards
Glenn

[Peter H]

Hi Glenn.

Thanks for your efforts on this.Much appreciated!

Regards
Peter

[abaus]

Peter,

Unfortunately, I am not able to provide Stange's first name. His career (1891-1913), as Glenn mentioned, was spent in just two foot artillery regiments, Nr. 8 and 15. His progression was completely normal, which means for us that he is next to impossible to fully identify. Should I come across it, I'll certainly pass it along.

Andy

[Peter H]

Thanks Andy.

Regards
Peter

[Tosun Saral]

Stange:
According to Prof. Dr.Tank Staff Col.Ismet Görgülü " On Yıllık Harbin Kadrosu 1912-1922" (Personal of Ten Years Long War)

p.105 : Lt. Col. Stange Commander of Artillary Fortress Erzurum in 1914 [Görgülü got this information from German Lt. Col. Gurze's article translated into Turkish in Askeri Mecmua no 79, s.18 (Military Magazine Nr. 79, p.18)on 1931 "Büyük Harbte Kafkas Cephesindeki Muharebeler (Battles in Caucasus Front During Great War),

p.109: Units of North and South Wings
-Stange Detachment (Stange Müfrezesi) commanded by Lt. Col. Stange (This Müfreze was also known as 8th Inf. Reg.) Stange was nicknamede by Turks as İbrahim Bey [Görgülü got this information from "Gen. Fahri Belen "Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi 1914 Yılı Hareketleri s.142 "Turkish War During WW1 Operation in 1914 p.142)
-Yakup Cemil Detachment (Yakup Cemil Müfrezesi) commanded by Capt. Yakup Cemil
-Bahattin Şakir Detachment (Bahattin Şakir Müfrezesi) : commander (?)
-Deli Halit Müfrezesi commanded by Maj. Halit Bey (Maj. Gen. Karsıalan, nickmaned as Deli/crazy)(He got the family name Karsıalan after the new civil refoms of Turkish Republic, which means The one who to Kars back)
-Fethi Bey Müfrezesi commanded by Maj. Fethi (This Müfreze was also known as 93th Inf. Reg.)
Görgülü's note: the last 4 Müfreze was bandes established by Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (The Special Forces)

[NikosV]

Akcam, Taner; trans. Paul Bessemer. A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility" Henry Holt and Company (New York, 2006).

mentions Colonel Stange several times and indexes his name for easy reference.

On page 151 German Colonel Stange is mentioned as complaining about the undisciplined armed gangs of the Special Organization creating friction with the military. The footnote 12 for this reference is Bihl, Kaukasus-Politik. Tiel I, p.74.

On page 154-155 Colonel Stange is also mentioned citing: PA-AA(German Foreign Office, Political Archive [also appears as DE/PA-AA])/Bo. Kons./B. 170, Report by Stange, dated 23 August 1915. This time he makes mention that they(CUP) exaggerate about the Armenian alleged rebellions, that Ottoman authorities seized their property, that they(CUP) planned their anti-Armenian acts.

There are more references to Stange in this book but that is enough for now.

Peter H., why do so you have so much apparent esteem for the works of Edward J. Erickson? Vahakn Dadrian wrote an article that exposes how he is another foreign seller of Turkish official history(resmi tarih): http://groong.usc.edu/tcc/tcc-20040922.html

[Bill Woerlee]

NikosV

G'day mate

While I will not be speaking on Peter's behalf, I can supply an answer to your question with regards to my personal interest.

In dealing with your question there are two aspects of esteem: personal and professional. I will briefly deal with the first and then tackle the second.

As a human being, Ed is incredibly talented with a gift for understanding tact and diplomacy. My contacts with him have always been of a very positive nature and personally, I like the man. In any situation which requires a person of skills to assist in difficult situations, Ed is only too happy to help without seeking reward. In other words, in Aussie terms, he is a fair dinkum bloke, and a fellow cannot get a higher accolade.

As a scholar, Ed has undertaken some ground breaking research. Pioneers always come up short to those with 20/20 hindsight vision. The sad thing with all the critics is that they were absent when the page was empty. Not a one stepped up to the plate while Ed was writing his work - they only came out of the woodwork afterwards. So with the article you have referenced, it speaks more of the author rather than the content. Just because Ed did not pander to this fellow's personal hobby horse - the Armenian genocide - does not take away from the ground breaking work in his book. Everyone who has an axe to grind and a pet hobby horse to toss around will suggest that Ed came up short. For them his work has come up short but the fair question for all the hobby horse writers who make this complaint: where are your books that examine the period in a credible manner? I don't mean the reams of polemic that attempts to pass itself off as research but I mean dispassionate examinations of the material. There is none. That is why Ed stands head and shoulders above the polemicists with his work. That is why the hobby horse writers cannot reach a broader audience with any credibility.

Mate, it is as simple as that.

That doesn't mean that I have not found inadequacies in Ed's work - he has too - it means that we can now use the foundation work of Ed to increase the sum total knowledge of this era so we can honour all peoples.

Cheers

Bill

[NikosV]

Did you ever actually read that Dadrian essay where he demolishes Erickson that I linked to? Here it is again: http://groong.usc.edu/tcc/tcc-20040922.html

An excerpt:

"At issue here are such critical matters as the language in which the source material appears,
the conditions of access to the archives containing that material, and the degree or level of independence through which he could select, amass and utilize that material. These problems find an expression in
Erickson's own account addressing them. Nowhere in the book does he explicitly indicate, for example, that he knew either Ottoman or modern Turkish to a degree necessary to read and understand fully the
contents of the myriad documents referenced in the book. Rather, the reader is informed that author Erickson had to rely on a Turkish "translator and researcher." Furthermore, he states that he benefited from the consultations and help offered to him by the director of the Turkish General Staff's Archives and several high-ranking Turkish officers in Ankara. The problem that poses itself here is this: how badly an author must be eager to write a book on a subject matter the quintessential material of which is in a language one does not dominate?"

I could care less if some Aussies think one of the Turkish government's hired historical pens are good blokes or not. Also I gave the following reference cited by Akcam of a Stange report: PA-AA(German Foreign Office, Political Archive [also appears as DE/PA-AA])/Bo. Kons./B. 170, Report by Stange, dated 23 August 1915.

But again Dadrian covered that in the article you apparently never read:

"As in the case of any act of confrontation, the way one decides to proceed does often condition, if not precondition, the result one may be seeking. At the very start of his book he candidly, and one should add, with rare fortitude, admits that he has confronted the problem by proceeding from "the Turkish side of the hill," thereby relying, almost entirely, "on Turkish sources." In fact, the book is suffused, indeed saturated, with references drawn from "Turkish source material.""

The Documentary "Kill the Messenger" is revealing in exposing how the Turkish government does lobbying in Washington. The American Turkish Council organizes American military officers(like Erickson) at events to help them lobby for the Turkish foreign policy agendas.

Saying you contacted him or had contact with and he was nice is irrelevant. I would respect more a historian that is an asshole to me, but a good researcher. If you want a friend try 1-800-Dial-A-Friend, historians should uncover history not be the paid agent of a foreign government trying to manipulate world-wide public opinion. I wonder why so much value is placed onto Erickson and his works. If the Turks want to release kanums on history, do it openly, not in this conniving way.

[Bill Woerlee]

Nikos

G'day mate

My apologies for making the mistake in believing that your questions were an earnest search for the truth. It appears as though you have made up your mind about matters and your question was more rhetorical rather than academic, specifically asked with the intention of giving you a platform to, yet again [yawn], reiterate all your deeply held hackneyed canards, which are about as informative and relevant as to the number of coffees I drank this morning. Sorry for misunderstanding your intent. I shan't make that mistake again.

Cheers

Bill

[NikosV]

So you do not understand the principles of debate or of historicity. It is always nice to know who one is dealing with on the internet. Historians should crosscheck their facts not rely on one source. Erickson only has relied generally on the documents the Turkish government has gave him through his intermediary translator, anyone can see for themself, that the pasted article that started this thread is not crosschecked: http://www.meforum.org/article/991 But Dadrian relied on a multitude of sources: http://groong.usc.edu/tcc/tcc-20040922.html

Once again Akcam in the source I gave relied on the German Foreign Office, Political Archives. I think people serious on history, not in saying G'day mate and how nice of a bloke people are can decide. What do you think is more open the well known world-wide German archives or Erickson who in his work states he had to rely on the good offices of the Turkish military and a Turkish translator? I think the German archive policies are trusted enough worldwide that no one will doubt unless they happen to have an agenda.

Am I talking to former member Michael Mills who is now "Bill Woerlee"? Both from Canberra and a huge liking for Turkish kanum history?

[Peter H]

Nikos

I have esteem for Dr Erickson because he acts like a gentleman.

Your approach here is a contrast.

Stop insulting other members or don't bother posting here.

[NikosV]

Oh, another person substituing their personal relationship with Erickson over principals of corroboration and using non-tainted sources. I guess genocidal denial by proxy does not have much credence over knowing Mr. Erickson.

Excuse me Mr. Moderator but maybe Bill Woerlee, should have been at least warned as well since he made insulting comments before I ever got aggressive to him.

I hope everyone is not in personal contact with Erickson and can make the relevant decision of what sources are more open the German archives or the personal relationship Erickson has with the Turkish military.

[Peter H]

Now your insulting me.

I have no contact with Erickson and do not know the man.

Your pushing your luck here "'dude".Your anti-Turkish agenda is obvious to all.While we accept this we do not accept your manner in conveying it.e.g cheap insults,character slurs.

Any further such nonsense and it will be deleted without warning.

[NikosV]

So what you mean he acts like a gentlemen? That implies a personal relationship.

I do not judge Erickson based on my experience with him like Bill Woerlee. I just know I respect Dadrian from reading his work, so I believe his review of Erickson to be accurate. Especially since Akcam can bring the mentioned above references from German sources, so I do not believe his attempts to deny the Armenian genocide like in the article. Also I would never trust a historian relying on translations and a special relationship with the Turkish military.