German Logistics Statistics

[Iron_Bismarck]

German GrossTransportum (GTR) Supply Capacity (tons / day):

June 1941 — 54,000
June 1942 — 47,000
Aug. 1942 — 57,000
Jan. 1943 — 80,000
1943 — 70,000
1944 — 60,000
1945 — 45,000

German Divisional Maintenance Requirements (tons / day):

Infantry (inactive) — 80
Infantry (allocated) — 270
Infantry (heavy fighting) — 1,100

Armored (inactive) — 30
Armored (allocated) — 300
Armored (heavy fighting) — 700

Size of German Military on Eastern Front (# divisions):

June 1941:
Infantry — 129
Armored — 19

German Logistics Burden for Eastern Front (tons / day):

June 1941:
Inactive — 10,890
Allocated — 40,530
Heavy Fighting — 155,200

Sources:

viewtopic.php?t=120947&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=15

Frank, Reinhard. Trucks of the Wehrmacht. Quoted from:
viewtopic.php?p=1065096#1065096

TM-E 30-451 Handbook on German Military Forces. Quoted from:
http://www.lonesentry.com/manuals/tme30/ch6sec4.html

[Iron_Bismarck]

Over the period 22 June - 6 December, 1941, the Wehrmacht consumed an estimated 16,648,000 tons of supplies. This averages out to 99,095 tons / day, over this 168 day period.

Satisfyingly, this figure of ~100 kilotons (kt) per day falls neatly between the ~40 kt and ~150 kt estimated total requirements listed above for "allocated" and "heavy fighting". This makes sense because, whilst many eastern front units saw heavy fighting, others were kept in reserve. It is certainly "in the ballpark".

Indeed, peak consumption happened during the first month of Operation Barbarossa, when estimated total requirements were over ~120 kt per day.

During this period, total German GTR available was only 54 kt per day — roughly half of that required.

It appears that the Germans either had some other form of logistical support, or they pressed their logistics harshly, or both.


Source:

The Eastern Front at the Turning Point. Quoted from:
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for- ... p_0006.htm

[Andreas]

GTR was not the exclusive means by which logistics were supported. Especially at the beginning of an operation you can supplement it by:

a) using organic transport assets to connect you to your railhead
b) issuing as much as possible to be carried along by the units themselves

Later on, the key is to move your railheads along behind the advancing frontline. GTR will then serve to bridge the gap between railhead and Army/Corps dumps, whence supplies will be moved on by organic assets. So an ideal operation would look as follows (made-up example):

1) Frontline east of Yelnya
2) Divisional dump at Yelnya
3) Army Supply Dump at Smolensk
4) Railhead at Minsk

To 4) supplies are brought up by rail.
From 4) to 3), supplies are transported by GTR
At 3) supplies are collected by divisional transport columns for transport to 2)
At 2) supplies are collected by regimental columns to move forward.

At least that is how I understand the process.

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

Over the period 22 June - 6 December, 1941, the Wehrmacht consumed an estimated 16,648,000 tons of supplies. This averages out to 99,095 tons / day, over this 168 day period.

Satisfyingly, this figure of ~100 kilotons (kt) per day falls neatly between the ~40 kt and ~150 kt estimated total requirements listed above for "allocated" and "heavy fighting". This makes sense because, whilst many eastern front units saw heavy fighting, others were kept in reserve. It is certainly "in the ballpark".

Indeed, peak consumption happened during the first month of Operation Barbarossa, when estimated total requirements were over ~120 kt per day.

During this period, total German GTR available was only 54 kt per day — roughly half of that required.

It appears that the Germans either had some other form of logistical support, or they pressed their logistics harshly, or both.


Source:

The Eastern Front at the Turning Point. Quoted from:
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for- ... p_0006.htm

Where in the paper did you get the 16,648,000t number from? Is it the table on A20? In which case I have to ask you if you have actually read the paper? Because if you had read it, you would have noted that this figure has nothing/zilch/nada whatsoever to do with reality. The paper itself in the introduction says that the aggregate results were 400-500% too high.

When we ask you to read, we mean read. Not skim for interesting numbers, because that leads to stupid mistakes, and total waste of time for everyone involved.

All the best

Andreas