French interwar and WW2 artillery - books and web sites

[Dadis]

Hello,

could someone recommend exhaustive book or internet resource about french interwar and WW2 artillery?
I have found neither any book in http://www.amazon.co.uk nor comprehensive web site regarding this theme.
TIA.

[Michael Emrys]

While I would not call them exhaustive, the World War II Fact Files by Chamberlain et al do provide some useful information. They can be found on this and following pages:
http://www.amazon.co.uk/s/ref=nb_ss_b/0 ... .y=0&Go=Go

Michael

[Andreas]

Try this site: http://www.atf40.fr/

You need to speak French though.

All the best

Andreas

[David Lehmann]

Hello,

It depends what you are looking for: data about guns and ammunition, wartime manuals with data about organization and doctrine, artillery units histories, battle reports more oriented towards artillery point of view etc.
Can you read French? There would be many magazine articles or books more or less related to what you are looking for.

Several battles are especilly interesting to study from an artillery point of view:
- Gembloux (how the French infantry/artillery couple faces the German tank/aircraft couple) in May 1940
- the battle south of Amiens in June 1940 with the artillery fighting the Panzers.
- the artillery units involved in the battle of Stonne
etc.
It depends also what kind of artillery you are interested in (AT guns depending from the artillery (47mm and 75mm), light/heavy field artillery, mountain artillery, fortress artillery, self-propelled artillery, etc.)

Several sources you might consider:
• "France 1940 – l'armement terrestre" (Stéphane Ferrard)
• "Les canons de la Victoire 1914-1918 – tome 1 : l'artillerie de campagne" (François Vauvillier & Pierre Touzin)
• "Les matériels de l'armée de terre française 1940" (2 volumes, Stéphane Ferrard)
• "The French army 1939-1940 – organisation, order of battle, operational history" (4 volumes, Lee Sharp)
• Various 1936-1940 French military manuals including :
--o "Cours d'artillerie – 2e volume" (Ecole Spéciale Militaire – Saint-Cyr - 1939-1940)
--o "Cours d'artillerie – Tome 1" (Ecole Militaire de l'infanterie - 1936)
--o "Description et entretien du matériel et des munitions de 155 C. Mle1917" (Ministère de la Guerre, 1932)
--o "Instruction générale sur le tir de l'artillerie" (Ministère de la Guerre, 1940)
etc.
• "15e batterie" (Paul Adrien)
• Bulletin de liaison de l'association des amis du musée du canon et des artilleurs :
--o N°15 : L'artillerie dans la bataille des Alpes en 1940 (partie 1)
--o N°17 : L'artillerie dans la bataille des Alpes en 1940 (partie 2)
--o N°18 : L'artillerie en mai 1940 dans la bataille de Gembloux et le repli vers Dunkerque
--o N°20 : L'artillerie en mai et juin 1940 dans la Ligne Maginot
--o N°23 : L'artillerie de la 3e DIM du 14 mai au 7 juin 1940 - sud de Sedan - bataille de Stonne
--o N°25 : L'artillerie lourde hippomobile dans la Blitzkrieg de 1940
• "Ceux de l'artillerie 1939-1940" (Etienne Dubuisson)
• "Corps à corps avec les blindés" (Henri Lespès)
• "Gembloux 1940 … Echec à la 4e Panzer" (Marcel Pieret)
• "Gembloux" (Henri Aymes)
• "Histoire de la 5e Division Légère de Cavalerie et du 78e Régiment d'Artillerie" (1956)
• "Historique des 2e et 202e régiments d'artillerie – campagne de 1939-1940"
• "Historique du 306e RACP – 1939-1940" (Colonel Brock)
• "Historique du 364e RALP – 1939-1940" (Lieutenant-Colonel Versevy)
• "La 1e division marocaine dans la bataille de Gembloux" (Commandant d'Ornano)
• "La 3e division d'infanterie motorisée 1939-1940" (General Bertin-Boussu)
• "La bataille au sud d'Amiens, 20 mai – 8 juin 1940" (Pierre Vasselle)
• "Mémorial de France – faits d'armes de la Guerre 1939-1940" (André Paul Antoine)
• "Souvenirs d'une bataille perdue – 1939/1940" (Jacques Riboud)
• "The battle of Gembloux, 14-15 May 1940 : the 'Blitzkrieg' checked" (Jeffery A. Gunsburg, the journal of military history 64 (January 2000), 97-140)
• "Un peu de gloire … un peu d'humour … beaucoup de sang …" (Marc Lami)
• "Amiens 1940 : der deutsche Durchbruch südlich von Amiens 5. bis 8. Juni 1940" (Volkmar Regling)

From a material point of view, the main pieces to study for the 1940 engagements might be:
- Canon de 75mm (L/34.5) Mle1897
- Mortier de 75mm T Mle1915
- Canon de 105mm C (L/17) Mle1935 Bourges
- Canon de 105mm C (L/20) Mle1934 Schneider
- Canon de 105mm L (L/27) Mle1913 Schneider
- Canon de 105mm L (L/41.5) Mle1936 Schneider
- Mortier de 150mm T Mle1917 Fabry
- Canon de 155mm C (L/15) Mle1917 Schneider
- Canon de 155 mm C (L/17.8) Mle1915 Saint-Chamond
- Canon de 145/155mm (L/48.5) Mle1916 Saint-Chamond
- Canon de 155mm L (L/29.8) Mle1917 Schneider
- Canon de 155mm L (L/26) Mle1918 Schneider
- Canon de 155 mm GPF (L/38.2) (Grande Puissance FILLOUX)
- Canon de 155 mm GPFT (L/38.2) (Grande Puissance FILLOUX – Touzard carriage)
- Canon de 155mm L (L/55) Mle1932 Schneider
- Canon de 194 mm GPF (L/33.5) (Grande Puissance FILLOUX) (tracked SPA)
- Mortier de 220mm C (L/10.3) Mle1916
- Canon de 220mm L (L/35) Mle1917 Schneider
- Canon de 240mm (L/22.3) Mle1884/1917 Saint-Chamond
- Mortier de 240mm LT Mle1916
- Mortier de 280mm C (L/12) Mle1914 Schneider PF (on plateform)
- Mortier de 280mm C (L/12) Mle1914 Schneider Ch (tracked SPA)
- Mortier de 370mm (L/8) FILLOUX

Regards,

David

[David Lehmann]

I started once to translate a summary based on a French artillery manual.

Notes about the French artillery in 1939-1940


1. MISSIONS

- Support the infantry and the tanks
- Create depth on the battlefield

1.1 Divisional artillery

In the OFFENSIVE:
• Preparation fire:
--o Destruction of obstacles hampering the movement of the infantry or of the tanks
--o Destruction or neutralization of the enemy infantry's organization
• Immediate support of the infantry regiments (0 – 600 meters range beyond the first friendly positions)
• Protection fire (600 – 1500/2000 meters range)

In the DEFENSIVE:
• Counter-preparation fire
• Stopping fire on pre-planned targets in order to defend the network of outposts and the main line of resistance

OFFENSIVE and DEFENSIVE:
• Destruction of enemy AFVs

1.2 Army Corps artillery
• Counter-battery fire
• Long range fire (interdiction, harassement) beyond the action area of the divisional artillery
• Destruction or neutralization of the enemy observation posts located far away
• Reinforcing the action of the divisional artillery


1.3 Army artillery
• Long range fire against:
--o Communication networks
--o Ammunition dumps
--o Airfields
• Counter-battery fire
• Reinforcing the action of the Army Corps artillery


2. OBSERVATION

The artillery observation has 2 main roles:
• A tactical intelligence role (research and analysis of objectives for itself but also giving the HQ intelligence about the enemy deployment)
• A technical role (preparation and control of the fire missions) according to the mapping, weather, gun type and ballistics conditions

The observation means of the artillery are:
• Ground observation posts
• Setting/adjustment platoons using observation of high air bursts
• Spotting batteries
• Air observation / reconnaissance (balloon, autogyro or plane)


2.1 Ground observation posts

The observation posts are organized at the different command levels by specialized troops of the artillery. There are generally:
• Battery level = 1 observation post
• Group level (3 batteries) = 2 additional observation posts
• Regiment level = 1 additional observation post
• Divisional artillery level (2 regiments) = 1 additional observation post

The ground observation posts have the advantage of enabling a continuous observation if the field of view is not blocked by smoke, dusts or bad weather. The fixed emplacements of these posts enable to deploy quick and sure communication lines and to use fine observation and measuring instruments. The drawback is that the field of view is limited by the configuration of the ground and that the enemy can spot the posts and can blind them or can destroy them.

The aim of these observation posts is to spot potential targets in the enemy deployment and to provide intelligence about the situation, the movements and the activity in the enemy lines. These posts have to follow the movement of the friendly line. They have to look for signals (flares etc.) from the troops to trigger a stopping fire mission etc.
The observation of the fire mission itself has to adjust the fire (generally more than one observation post involved) and to analyze the results and efficiency of the shelling.

2.2 Setting/adjustment platoons using observation of high air bursts

These platoons are part of the artillery regiment HQs (sometimes even in the group HQs of the regiments). They allow setting up fire missions on objectives of known coordinates by day and by night; even if the targets cannot be spotted by the ground observation posts. The adjustment of a fire mission requires about 20 minutes.

2.3 Spotting batteries

These batteries are specialized in the research and the characterization of objectives, especially enemy artillery batteries. Usually attached to the general reserve of the artillery, they are dispatched to the General commanding the artillery units of an Army. He distributes then the batteries, often 1 battery per Army Corps.
One spotting battery is commanded by a Capitaine and consists in:
• SROT (Section de Repérage par Observation Terrestre) = Spotting platoon by ground observation
• SRS (Section de Répérage par le Son) = Spotting platoon using sound locators
• A topographic platoon

The SROT uses spotted flames, lights, smokes or dust to locate enemy artillery positions. They also participate in fine tuning the friendly fire mission by observing the explosions.
One SROT is composed of 6 posts (one every 2-3 km) and 1 central. The posts have specialized observation and measuring instruments. They are located precisely on known coordinates. The observation results of the different posts can then be reported and cross-checked in the central to determine the coordinates of the different objectives.
The SROT needs about 6 hours to be fully operational but fewer posts can be deployed quickly and act initially as simple intelligence gathering posts.

The SRS can locate an enemy battery thanks to the sound of its fire. The SRS consists in 8 posts (one every 2-3 km, at 1-3 km of the first friendly line) and 1 central. They can watch an area of 10-15 km deep in the enemy deployment. The SRS need 12-24 hours to be fully operational.
The SRS has several advantages:
• The posts can be completely hidden to the views of the enemy (the deployment in independent of the ground)
• The location is precise (20 to 50m)
• Location of targets while other means are inefficient e.g. enemy battery in woods, fog etc.
The drawback is that the SRS is frequently hampered by the wind.
The SRS is used to locate enemy batteries firing but also sometimes to adjust the fire of friendly heavy artillery batteries.


2.4 Air observation / reconnaissance

An aviation depending directly from the artillery was under creation in 1939/1940 but at this time the balloon, autogyro or plane used for these missions are from the Air Force (except for several long range artillery regiments depending from the general artillery reserve, which had organic planes with radio sets).
Usually the air observation means are grouped at the Army Corps level (8 planes, 4 autogyros and 1 balloons battalion).

The plane can fly directly over the objectives to be targeted (roughly without blind areas) and can reach the maximum range of the artillery batteries. The crew can come back with photos enabling to analyze the target and/or to analyze to results of the fire mission(s).
The drawback is that the observation is discontinuous and depending from the weather conditions. The enemy fighters or AA guns can hamper or completely prevent the mission to be fulfilled.
One other issue is the radio sets. There is an air to ground radio link (R11 radio sets in the infantry) but the ground to air radio link is often lacking. The troops have to use visual signals to communicate with the plane. The number of planes is also limited (although the observation and reconnaissance planes are numerous in the French Air Force) and the assigned missions have to be carefully selected.

The autogyro can land and operate roughly everywhere and very close to the artillery HQ to which it is providing intelligence. The drawback is that it is unarmed and slow. It cannot be operated for day missions over enemy lines. The autogyro remains therefore over the friendly lines and spots the objectives close to the front. It uses an ER40 radio set for air to ground and ground to air radio liaison. In the future, the attachment of these aircraft directly to the artillery will improve the efficiency by deploying them directly next to artillery batteries. The progresses may enable to direct the fire from the autogyro itself.

The balloon has the advantage of having a direct telephone link to the ground and of having a large field of view, reducing the areas where enemy unit can hide. Nonetheless, it is not completely fixed does therefore not enable precise measurements. It is also very vulnerable and has to remain rather far away behind friendly lines.
The balloon is used for the research and observation of objectives and the control / adjustment and observation of fire missions. Thanks to the direct telephone link it is adapted to direct quickly fire against mobile targets

2.5 Adaptation of the observation means to the artillery missions

The different targets can be listed as:
• Near objectives, often in the field of view of observation posts and mainly treated by the divisional artillery
• Distant objectives, often hidden by the relief and treated by Army Corps and Army artillery (enemy artillery, roads, crossings, bridges, ammunition dumps etc.)

The observation means have therefore to be adapted to the different objectives and missions.
The divisional artillery uses mostly the ground observation means of the groupings, groups and batteries.
The Army Corps artillery fights mainly the enemy artillery and uses:
• Planes, autogyros and balloons (the artillery HQ at the level of the Army Corps contains as organic means 2 officers-observers of the artillery, who are detached to the Air Force unit providing the aircraft. The HQ of the divisional artillery can also have 2 such officers).
• Spotting batteries (SROT and SRS)
• But it uses also largely ground observation posts.
The Army artillery has to fire at targets which are even more distant and cannot operate without air observation. It employs also spotting batteries but very rarely ground observation posts.
All these 3 kinds of artillery make use of setting/adjustment platoons using observation of high air bursts.


3. THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARTILLERY

The SRA (Service de Renseignements de l'Artillerie) appeared during WW1. Its main role is to:
• Provide precise information to the friendly artillery units about the location, organization and means of the enemy artillery
• Provide information to the HQ about the importance of the enemy deployment, the activity and possibilities of the enemy artillery. It enables the HQ to evaluate the tactical/operational situation (the enemy is strengthening its front etc.)

… TO BE CONTINUED …

SOURCES:
"Cours d'artillerie / 2e volume / 1939-1940" (Ecole Spéciale Militaire – Saint Cyr)

Regards,

David

[David Lehmann]

According to many French and German testimonies and battle reports (Gembloux, Abbeville and others), the French artillery was very efficient in 1940 and it seems to have been often superior to the German artillery: fast responding, high rate of fire and very accurate. The French gunners and forward observers new their job and defeated many German attacks.

This is e.g. well illustrated by Gunsburg's article about the battle of Gembloux, testimonies of German soldiers/officers often comparing the 1940 shellings to the worst ones of WW1 etc.
One could also quote Martin S. Alexander in his article "After Dunkirk: The French Army’s Performance against ‘Case Red’, 25 May to 25 June 1940" (War In History 2007; 14; 219):

The French artillery in particular, as the Wehrmacht acknowledged, proved technically superior to its counterpart. This ‘redoubtable weapon’, as Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac has termed it, was put to telling use by gunnery officers whose ‘rapid adaptability’ to new tactics, such as deploying 75mm field guns in an anti-tank role, was ‘remarkable’.

On the German side, the logistics and sometimes the mobility were probably better organized but they often went in combat with insufficient ammunition supplies. The German artillery has also the advantage of the air superiority, enabling the use of Fi-156 and Hs-126 spotter planes. Nevertheless, the French troops were skilled in camouflage tactics and the Germans were often overconfident and caught on their positions by French counter-battery fire. Of course the quick advance of the German troops explains sometimes the lack of the German artillery if the attack was not well prepared. In the French infantry division there are more field guns / howitzers than in a German infantry divisions but the Germans have far more infantry guns and mortars.

In Gembloux, the French artillery proved to be very efficient and very precise, stopping many German assaults, firing on each German concentration, destroying many tanks (about 50 in indirect fire) and silencing the German artillery by counter-battery fires. Perfectly camouflaged, the batteries remained often undiscovered despite the German spotting planes. The German artillery and the Luftwaffe were unable to neutralize the French artillery.
The power of the French infantry / artillery couple as opposed to the German tanks / aviation couple is well illustrated by the Gembloux battle were many assaults were defeated thanks to artillery concentrations. German divisions' HQs were also quickly detected by French listening posts and they were immediately under French artillery fire. The German reports about the battle of Abbeville also indicate that the French artillery was very powerful, accurate, fast responding and had a high rate of fire.

Studying the battle south of Amiens on June 5 during Fall Rot is also very interesting.
• A good German study giving e.g. the number of the operational German tanks and losses can be found in Volkmar Regling's study (in German language) from MGFA Freiburg: "Amiens 1940 : der deutsche Durchbruch südlich von Amiens 5. bis 8. Juni 1940".
• The best French study of this battle is probably from Pierre Vasselle in "La bataille au sud d'Amiens, 20 mai – 8 juin 1940".
Other sources can be used
• "Souvenirs d'une bataille perdue – 1939/1940" (Jacques Riboud) and articles from the same Lieutenant published in the Field Artillery Journal after he escaped France.
• The testimony of a German tanker also published in the Field Artillery Journal (translation from a German source). His whole platoon was destroyed in a few minutes by the French AT guns before they could realize what was happening.
• "Le 19e Groupe de Reconnaissance Divisionnaire (1939-1940)". The reconnaissance group of the 16e DI who launched a counter-attack on Oresmaux on June 6.
• "Corps à corps avec les blindés" (Henri Lespès). This book illustrates the history of the 5th battery of the 37e RAD. It is a 75mm Mle1897 field battery of a reserve regiment, which fought against the German tanks in direct fire. One of the gun had an Arbel plateform for a 360° traverse. They did not meet German tanks before but fought very valiantly and knocked out many German tanks before being neutralized.
• "Historique du 306e RACP – 1939-1940" (Colonel Brock). Datat about a artillery regiment involved in the battle.
etc.

On June 5, the German XIV.Panzerkorps (9.PzD, 10.PzD, 13.ID (mot), 9.ID and "Grossdeutschland" regiment) assaults the French positions south of Amiens on the Somme River. The 14-20 km front is hold by the 16e DI supported by 2 companies of the 12e BCC (26 Renault R35 tanks) [whereas a complete infantry division is supposed to defend a front of 5-7 km]. This assault is part of the general offensive launched by the Germans for the second stage of the campaign of France and known as Fall Rot. If the German divisions are at full tank strength they could launch 418 tanks against the French positions.
Nonetheless, the 9.PzD and 10.PzD are already reduced to 50% of operational tanks on June 5 and have only about 225 tanks. The 10.PzD is already reduced to 180 tanks before the battle and therefore the 9.PzD can probably rely only on 45 operational tanks.
There are also the 6 Sturmgeschütze III (assault guns) from Sturmgeschütz-Batterie 640, which are attached to the "Grossdeutschland" infantry regiment. There are also theoretically about 140 armored cars in the Aufklärungs-Abteilungen (reconnaissance "battalions") of the different divisions involved.
Therefore the German launch probably about 300 AFVs (not counting here all the armoured personal carriers) and roughly about 60,000 men against about 15,000 French troops supported by only 26 tanks.

With General Weygand having replaced General Gamelin as the head of the French troops, the obsession of always trying to reconstitute a continuous front has been abandoned. According to their new tactics, the French troops are organized in strong points in the towns and woods and in a depth of about 10 km. These hedgehogs include infantry, AT mines, Hotchkiss Mle1914 MGs, 25mm and 47mm AT guns but also 75mm field guns used in an AT role. They are organized for a 360° defense. The advancing German tanks are rapidly cut from their supporting infantry and confronted on the rear by the French artillery batteries (75mm Mle1897 field guns, 105mm Mle1913 field guns, 155mm C Mle1917 and 155mm GPF field guns) engaging them in direct (75mm field guns but also the 105mm field guns) and indirect fire. On June 8 and 9, the 16e DI rears are reinforced by the 24e DI. After 5 days, the German operation failed in that area and the Germans sustained heavy losses. The XIV.Panzerkorps is then moved from this area and engaged behind the XVI.Panzerkorps near Péronne, where the German assault is more successful. The German troops lost about 135 tanks in that battle (destroyed or transiently damaged), including many definitively destroyed ones especially against French artillery batteries firing directly on the enemy tanks. The 2 French divisions have nonetheless lost 60-70% of their strength and manpower but they have blocked the advance of a Panzerkorps which was finally directed against a neighbouring part of the front. The isolated hedgehogs fought generally until the end or until the exhaustion of all ammunition. These units were not even peace time units but only reserve units. Unlike in Gembloux (May 14-15, 1940) the French troops had no strong artillery support, first because artillery batteries were engaged in direct fire missions against the German tanks, and second because once the German tanks had bypassed the strong points they were pouring like swarms on the French rears, engaging the HQs, heavy artillery batteries and supply columns. The artillery batteries could then not provide indirect fire support anymore and had to fight in self-defense against the enemy tanks. The strong points were therefore often left with there own mortars to provide support to the infantry. As usual, the German tanks almost always avoided contact with well set up defenses (or in other case French heavy tanks) and went elsewhere to break through the lines, letting the infantry, artillery and aircraft deal with the strong points cut from their rears. After this battle the number of operational tanks of the XIV.Panzerkorps dropped dramatically (at least transiently) : on June 8, the 10.PzD was left with 60 tanks only and the 9.PzD with 30 tanks only. The remnants of the 16e DI and 24e DI will continue to fight like on the "Chauvineau Line" near Paris.

Lieutenant Jacques Riboud was a forward artillery observer in one of the main strong point and enabled us to read what happened in a particular area of the front from his point of view.
Jacques Riboud's "Souvenirs d'une bataille perdue" has already been published in 1994 but I discovered this book in its 2006 edition. Jacques Riboud was a Lieutenant and forward observer in a reserve horse-drawn heavy artillery regiment equipped with 155mm C Mle1917 Schneider howitzers (237e RALHD from the 16e DI). In civilian life he has been on the "Ecole des Mines" and was an engineer later specialized in petrol chemistry. After the campaign of France, Jacque Riboud left France and went to the USA in March 1941 since he was married to Nancy Riboud (originally Nancy Bowe). He was interrogated a long time by the US intelligence services about the battles and especially about the combat between the French artillery and the German tanks. He wrote several articles for the US "Field Artillery Journal" on the request of Colonel John Coleman. He used the name of Jean Dupont to write his articles when France was occupied and later there is an article from him in the magazine in 1946 with his real name. He told his story to his sister-in-law (Mary Bowe) who wrote it in English. Apparently William Bowe (son of Mary Bowe) wrote a book based on these notes but it seems not to have been published. The title would have been "The horse war - A story of the Fall of France". There is a series of articles from him published in 1941 in the "Field Artillery Journal".

The 237e RALHD is a heavy artillery regiment usually meant to be deployed on the rear lines. It has been mobilized on the 9th of September 1939. There are no AT guns in this unit. The unit is equipped with horses and most of the men are simply gunners or drivers and as such they have only 1 carbine for 5 men. The officers are armed with a pistol or a revolver and there are also 2 MGs for AA self-defense. Beside his pure artillery role, this unit is therefore not adapted for a direct fight. Later the group of Jacques Riboud will receive a FM Mle1924/1929 LMG for self defense.

The regiment is organized in 2 groups of 3 batteries for a total of 24 howitzers plus the headquarters and the supply column. Such a regiment has a theoretical strength of :
• 47 officers, 146 NCOs, 1,527 men = 1,720 soldiers
• 1,320 horses and 197 wagons
• 14 liaison vehicles, 27 light trucks, 2 heavy trucks
• 3 motorcycles, 47 bicycles

The 237e RALHD is part of the 16e DI, a typical "North East" reserve infantry division mobilized on the 7th of September 1939 and organized as follows :
• A divisional HQ (General Mordant is the commander of the division)
• 3 infantry regiments (29e RI, 56e RI and 89e RI - each with a command company, a weapons company and 3 infantry battalions)
• A (13th) divisional pioneer company (attached to 56e RI)
• A (14th) divisional AT company (attached to 29e RI) (CDAC) with 12x 25mm SA34 AT guns
• A divisional training centre (CID)
• A divisional reconnaissance "battalion", the 19e GRDI of normal type (horse mounted cavalry, motorcycles/side-cars and light motor vehicles but no armored cars).
• A light artillery regiment, the 37e RAD
--o 3 artillery groups (36x 75mm Mle1897 field guns)
--o A 10th divisional AT battery (BDAC) (8x 47mm SA37 AT guns – mixed motorized/horse-drawn)
--o A divisional AA battery (BDAA) (703/409e battery, 6x 25mm AA guns)
• A heavy artillery regiment, the 237e RALHD (24x 155mm C Mle1917 howitzers)
• 16th divisional artillery park (PAD = parc d'artillerie divisionnaire)
• 16th engineer battalion (bataillon de sapeurs-mineurs)
• 16th telegraph company (16/81)
• 16th radio company (16/82)
• A horse-drawn HQ transport company (16/8)
• A motor HQ transport company (116/8)
• 16th divisional quartermaster service
• 16th divisional medical group


The theoretical number of AT guns available in a typical division like the 16e DI is about 52x 25mm AT guns and 8x 47mm AT guns for a total of 60 AT guns:
• 12x 25mm SA34 AT guns in each of the 3 infantry regiments:
--o 2 in each of the 3 infantry battalions
--o 6 in the regimental heavy company
• 12x 25mm SA34 AT guns in the divisional AT company (CDAC)
• 4x 25mm SA34 AT guns in the GRDI
• 8x 47mm SA37 AT guns in the BDAC

It is reported that the division was lacking 20x 25mm AT guns. It had therefore only around 30x 25mm AT guns.

A few days before the battle the BDAC commanded by Capitaine Dumougin was reinforced by the 651st independent AT battery (fully motorized unit equipped with 8x 47mm SA37 AT guns). One of these additional guns had been destroyed by the Luftwaffe. The 16e DI started therefore the battle with a strength of about 30x 25mm AT guns and 15x 47mm AT guns. Nonetheless, the division had to defend a front of 14-20 km whereas a typical infantry division is theoretically in charge of defending a front of 5-7 km.

The division could also use AT mines. There would be theoretically about 1,500 AT mines for the infantry regiments. The GRDI has theoretically 580 AT mines. There might be several ones in the engineer battalion. We don't know if they were issued with the theoretical numbers or if perhaps they got extra AT mines. The most probable hypothesis is a high shortage in AT mines. We can give an estimation number of theoretically about 2,000 AT mines available in the whole division. Even that high estimation shows that minefields could only be laid as defensive measure in front of several emplacements.

Such a deployment with strong points to cut the infantry from the tanks and disorganize the German inter-arms cooperation can only be efficient if the intervals between the hedgehogs can be strongly shelled by the French artillery. The whole artillery available on the front held by the 16e DI consists in:
• 37e RAD (36x 75mm Mle1897 field guns)
• 237e RALHD (24x 155mm C Mle1917 howitzers)
Reinforced by guns from additional artillery regiments and by the army corps level:
• 315e RAP (12x 75mm Mle1897 field guns – motorized)
• 306e RAP (24x 75mm Mle1897 field guns – motorized)
• 351e RALP (12x 105mm L Mle1913 field guns – motorized)
• 183e RALT (24x 155mm GPF field guns – motorized)

That makes a total of 132 field guns and howitzers. Nonetheless 14 of the 75mm field guns are especially detached as AT guns in the strong points. We have therefore a density of 59 AT guns on a 14-20km front. Statistically that leads to 1 gun every 240-340 meters. This number is rather low to stop an assault led by about 300 AFVs and concentrated in swarms of 30-50 vehicles. Nonetheless, the Germans lost about 135 tanks in this battle.

Because of the overstretched front and the different strong points, almost all the troops have been deployed. The single reserves are provided by the 19e GRDI, a platoon of the CID and 2 Renault R35 tank companies from the 12e BCC. These elements will launch counter-attacks on June 5 and June 6. The divisional pioneer company is also kept on the rear.

Regards,

David

[Dadis]

Hi guys,

many thanks to all of you.
It's a pity, that I don't speak French, but I suppose to manage to translate most interesting parts of sources you provided.

[Bob_Mackenzie]

David

Did you ever translate the rest of the manual?

I'm also curious about the whether the French had an Autogyro in service in 1940?

Cheers

Bob

[David Lehmann]

Hello,

No I could not really go on due to lack of time but yes the French used Liore et Olivier LeO C.30 and LeO C.301 AFAIK.

Regards,

David

[Ardee]

I know there's an extensive web page about the Mle 1897 out there on the Internet...tried to find it again quickly and didn't (IIRC, it's in French). But have you tried going to Wikipedia and looking at the External Links? For example, when I looked at that section under "French 75" ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canon_de_7 ... %A8le_1897 ),they gave the following:

External links

* Manual For The Battery Commander. 75-mm Gun. FROM "L'ECOLE DU COMMANDANT DU BATTERIE, I PARTIE, CANON 75", Of THE FRENCH ARTILLERY SCHOOL, OF DECEMBER, 1916, CORRECTED TO MARCH, 1917. Translated to English and republished by US Army War College 1917
* Notes on the French 75-mm Gun. US Army War College. October 1917
* 75 Millimeter Gun Material Model of 1897 M1 (French). Pages 80-93 in "Handbook of artillery : including mobile, anti-aircraft and trench matériel (1920)" United States. Army. Ordnance Dept, May 1920

[Marek.Tempe]

Additional Question.
Mayby you know the Total number (guns not only on service but also on stocks) of
155 mm howitzer
105 mm gun
75 mm gun
French owns in late 1938/ early 1939.
Thank you in advance.
Best