Plans for the war with Russia in 1945:
The British press revealed in early October, the contours of a plan conceived by Winston Churchill, to launch an Anglo-American war against the Soviet Union, after the war in Europe had been effectively ended. Churchill's Chiefs of Staff committee turned down the plan, on military grounds. Excerpts of the plan were published by the Daily Telegraph on Oct. 1, 1998.
According to the Daily Telegraph report by Ben Fenton, Churchill feared that after V.E. Day on May 8, 1945, the Russians could move westwards and threaten Britain. Churchill's view was that an assault against the Soviet Union would be the only solution, and that it would have to be mounted before the Americans withdrew the best of their forces for combat in the Pacific. Churchill ordered his staff to ``think the unthinkable,'' and draft a plan. The report which resulted, named ``Operation Unthinkable,'' was delivered to Churchill on May 22, by his Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay. This was five days after German Admiral Doenitz had formally surrendered. The scenario for this ``Third World War,'' which was to have started on July 1, went as follows:
"Operation Unthinkable"
``The overall political or political object is to impose upon Russia the will of the United States and British Empire....
``Even though `the will' of these two countries may be defined as no more than a square deal for Poland, that does not necessarily limit the military commitment.
``A quick success might induce the Russians to submit to our will at least for the time being; but it might not.
``That is for the Russians to decide. If they want total war, they are in a position to have it....
``To achieve the decisive defeat of Russia in a total war would require, in particular, the mobilisation of manpower to counteract their present enormous manpower resources.
``This is a very long-term project and would involve: a) the deployment in Europe of a large proportion of the vast resources of the United States. b) the re-equipment and re-organisation of German manpower and of all the Western European Allies.''
Opting for a limited war, given that total war would be unwinnable, Churchill's team, according to Fenton's account, planned ``an attack by 47 British and American divisions, 14 of which would be armored, on a two-pronged offensive, one part along the Baltic coast of Germany towards Stettin [Szczecin], the second further south towards Poznan, both cities being well inside Poland.'' Ten Polish divisions were supposed to join in, as well as 10 German divisions, rearmed ``under a reformed German High Command.''
According to an appendix to the report, entitled ``German reactions to conflict between Western Allies and Russia,'' the team considered the possibility of having up to 100,000 Germans engaged:
``War-weariness will be the predominant feature of the attitude of the German civil population. However, ingrained fear of the Bolshevik menace and of reprisals by the Russians should make the German civil population prefer Anglo-American to Russian occupation and therefore incline it to side with the Western Allies.''
The plan which emerged, according to Fenton's summary, was that, ``as infantry attacked westwards, the Royal Navy would sail along the Baltic coast, supporting the attack's left flank and harrying the Russian right almost unopposed. The RAF and USF would operate from bases in Denmark and northern Germany, outnumbered by the Russians, but with superior machinery,'' Fenton wrote.
Operation Unthinkable assessed the situation as follows: ``Superior handling and air superiority might enable us to win the battle, but there is no inherent strength in our strategic position and we should, in fact, be staking everything upon the tactical outcome of one great engagement.'' Churchill's team considered that Russian retaliation could include attempts to take over Norway, Turkey, Greece, and the oil fields in Persia and Iraq. Thus, they argued: ``If we are to embark on war with Russia, we must be prepared to be committed to a total war, which would be both long and costly.'' They added: ``Our numerical inferiority on land renders it extremely doubtful whether we could achieve a limited and quick success, even if the political appreciation considered that this would suffice to gain our political object.''
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"A Protracted War Against Heavy Odds"
The report on Operation Unthinkable, was then handed over to the Chiefs of Staff committee, which included Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir David Cunningham, the First Sea Lord, and the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal. On June 8, the senior officers replied that, considering the numerical superiority of Russian divisions (264 to 103), a different approach should be taken.
``It is clear from the relative strength of the respective land forces that we are not in a position to take the offensive with a view to achieving a rapid success.
``Since, however, Russian and allied land forces are in contact from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, we are bound to become involved in land operations. In support of our land forces we should have technically superior, but numerically inferior, tactical air forces.
``As regards Strategic Air Forces, our superiority in numbers and technique would be to some extent discounted by the absence of strategical targets compared to those which existed in Germany, and the necessity for using these strategic air forces to supplement our tactical air forces in support of land operations.
``Our views, therefore, that once hostilities began, it would be beyond our power to win a quick but limited success and we should be committed to a protracted war against heavy odds.
``These odds, moreover, would become fanciful if the Americans grew weary and indifferent and began to be drawn away by the magnet of the Pacific War.''
Churchill, having received the response of his military officers, wrote to Ismay on June 8, saying, considering American redeployments and possible Russian advances westwards, ``Pray have a study made of how then we could defend our island, assuming France and the Low Countries were powerless to resist the Russian advance to the sea.'' Churchill ended his letter, ``By retaining the codeword `Unthinkable,' the Staffs will realise this remains a precautionary study of what, I hope, is still a purely hypothetical contingency.'' The study Churchill commissioned was presented on July 22.
Operation Unthinkable
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Krasnaya Zvezda
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Musashi
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Perharps the Soviets had more divisions, but the Soviet division was not equal to American division (number of soldiers). Besides American and British aviation was much more strong and modern than the Soviet. The western pilots (ok - most of them 
) were much better trained. In the addition the Soviet manpower got low in winter 1944 and spring 1945 because of appaling losses (Budapest, Koenigsberg, Berlin, etc.). The Americans and the British are not used to SUCH losses so they have not attacked Soviet Union. For me its very simple 
) were much better trained. In the addition the Soviet manpower got low in winter 1944 and spring 1945 because of appaling losses (Budapest, Koenigsberg, Berlin, etc.). The Americans and the British are not used to SUCH losses so they have not attacked Soviet Union. For me its very simple 
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Ironmachine
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Though this thread seems long forgotten, I have just found in the web the plans of Operation Unthinkable, so here there are if someone is interested:
http://www.history.neu.edu/PRO2
http://www.history.neu.edu/PRO2
Gee . . . right there on the first page:
“. . . taken the following assumptions on which to base our examination:- . . .”
“. . . (d) Russia allies herself with Japan.”
Seems to be a pretty clear-cut reason since UK and USA were at war with Japan and USSR was not. So the great exposé was that there was a plan . . . and I’d point out that contingency plans were and are a way of life in some circles . . . that addressed war with the USSR in 1945 . . . if they joined Japan in its war against the US and the UK.
Uh huh. Nothing dastardly here, so who cares. Plans are plans, they are not intent and they are not implementation.
This is just like all the hoopla that surrounded the shocking news that the US had a war plan contingency for invading Canada (Gasp!!! Oh, the horror of it all!!!). And such breathless announcements fail to note what most who actually study this sort of thing already know . . . that staffs draw up these things all the time, put them away on the shelf and there they rot. So, the US had plans for war with, pick your choice, Canada, UK, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Cuba, five or six different was to get at the USSR . . . go ahead pick one, and I’m sure that there were and are others, too. And the UK does it, and the old USSR did it, and so does everyone else. Anyone who fails to look out across the world and fails to identify potential threats, either looming or infinitesimal, and start thinking about how to deal with them is either a hopeless idealist or an absolute fool (usually one in the same). The existence of such planning is the function of planning staffs. The object being to at least have a general idea of “what would we have to do if . . .” and “what would occur that would make us have to . . .”. Even casual review of such planning is usually predicated on some overt act (such as assumption (d) in the “Unthinkable” plan) that would cause some bright-eyed, bushy-tailed Major to be sent off to the files to find and drag out Plan XYZ, bring it up to date, and present to the powers that be . . . still an only an option.
Operation Unthinkable, so what?
And had the USSR, for whatever reason, allied itself with Japan in 1945? Imagine:
"You didn't know this was going to happen?"
"You didn't have a plan for dealing with the possibility?"
"You didn't know that the Russians and the Japanese were talking?"
"Argggh! Intelligence Faliure!"
"Oh woe! Operational Planning Failure!"
followed by
"No, no, they knew . . . it was all a conspiracy!"
"You know . . . They, THEM, they all knew"
Well, THEY could have come up with a better name . . . maybe "Bear Hunt" or something a little more graphic. "Unthinkable" smacks of a foregone conclusion.
Rich
“. . . taken the following assumptions on which to base our examination:- . . .”
“. . . (d) Russia allies herself with Japan.”
Seems to be a pretty clear-cut reason since UK and USA were at war with Japan and USSR was not. So the great exposé was that there was a plan . . . and I’d point out that contingency plans were and are a way of life in some circles . . . that addressed war with the USSR in 1945 . . . if they joined Japan in its war against the US and the UK.
Uh huh. Nothing dastardly here, so who cares. Plans are plans, they are not intent and they are not implementation.
This is just like all the hoopla that surrounded the shocking news that the US had a war plan contingency for invading Canada (Gasp!!! Oh, the horror of it all!!!). And such breathless announcements fail to note what most who actually study this sort of thing already know . . . that staffs draw up these things all the time, put them away on the shelf and there they rot. So, the US had plans for war with, pick your choice, Canada, UK, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Cuba, five or six different was to get at the USSR . . . go ahead pick one, and I’m sure that there were and are others, too. And the UK does it, and the old USSR did it, and so does everyone else. Anyone who fails to look out across the world and fails to identify potential threats, either looming or infinitesimal, and start thinking about how to deal with them is either a hopeless idealist or an absolute fool (usually one in the same). The existence of such planning is the function of planning staffs. The object being to at least have a general idea of “what would we have to do if . . .” and “what would occur that would make us have to . . .”. Even casual review of such planning is usually predicated on some overt act (such as assumption (d) in the “Unthinkable” plan) that would cause some bright-eyed, bushy-tailed Major to be sent off to the files to find and drag out Plan XYZ, bring it up to date, and present to the powers that be . . . still an only an option.
Operation Unthinkable, so what?
And had the USSR, for whatever reason, allied itself with Japan in 1945? Imagine:
"You didn't know this was going to happen?"
"You didn't have a plan for dealing with the possibility?"
"You didn't know that the Russians and the Japanese were talking?"
"Argggh! Intelligence Faliure!"
"Oh woe! Operational Planning Failure!"
followed by
"No, no, they knew . . . it was all a conspiracy!"
"You know . . . They, THEM, they all knew"
Well, THEY could have come up with a better name . . . maybe "Bear Hunt" or something a little more graphic. "Unthinkable" smacks of a foregone conclusion.
Rich
