Importance of Moscow as a rail hub

[KDF33]

I've often read that Moscow was critical to the Soviet war effort because it served as the USSR's primary rail hub. The typical argument goes something like this: the loss of Moscow would have prevented effective North-South movement of men and materiel as well as prevented effective coordination between the different Soviet Fronts.

Here is a map showing the Soviet railway system in 1941. As you can see, Moscow was indeed the major railway hub of the USSR, but there still stood a very dense network behind the capital. Take, for instance, the red-colored section of the Western Trans-Siberian which could effectively connect the Ural industrial area with the southern Soviet Fronts. Note the dense net of parallel tracks in the general area of Tambov and, in particular, directly to it's north.

Of significant interest is the generally poor rail support in the extended area where the battle of Stalingrad took place. This didn't prevent the Soviets from massing and supplying over 1.1 million men for the Uranus counter-offensive. The situation was even worse in the Caucasus, where the Soviets were down to 1 single-track railroad bordering the Caspian Sea plus the port of Baku to bring supplies to the 800,000 men of the Transcaucasus Front. Yet the Soviets succeeded in supplying them, albeit they were generally under-supplied compared to those of comparably large Fronts.

Admittedly the biggest impact of the loss of Moscow would have been felt in the North, where both the Moscow-Leningrad and the Moscow-Vologda double-track railways would have been cut. Yet, even here the Soviets could still have been supplied from Kirov as well as from Lend Lease arriving at the Northern ports. Lastly, the minor tracks to the East of Moscow could have been connected to restore the main Vologda line, although this would presumably have taken some time.

Overall, the loss of Moscow would have been problematic (loss of a couple more millions of citizens, some armaments factories, supply problems for the northern Fronts) but wouldn't have been a death blow to the Soviet war effort, a claim which is too often made without a shred of evidence. This should also put to rest the idea that the German officers pushing for an early Moscow drive knew any better than Hitler how to defeat the USSR.

Edit: I forgot to mention that river barge traffic on the Upper Volga would contribute to maintain the connection between the military industry based in Gorky and the Vologda double-track rail line. Indeed, river traffic is too often discounted when it did in fact significantly contribute to the movement of Soviet supplies.

[stg 44]

What about the role of trucks in supply?

[KDF33]

Trucks were used to bring supplies from the railheads to the front, i.e. for "operational" rather than "strategic" supply.

[stg 44]

Trucks were used to bring supplies from the railheads to the front., i.e. for "operational" rather than "strategic" supply.

AFAIK trucks were pretty important for assembling for the Stalingrad encirclement; especially when shipping down the Volga was pretty much directly from the heart of Soviet production centers in the Urals and needed to be brought into position from the river.

Not sure what your definition of strategic is in this sense. Yes, there is no need to use trucks to bring in raw materials over long distances (though was pretty important for getting things from rail stations to factories). But for military operations in which rail is not an option it is important. In the strategic operation of Kursk, trucks were very important since there was only a single rail line leading into the bulge.

But as to rail itself, just because there are double tracks doesn't mean that we know how many trains they can take per line. I learned in WW1 studies of British logistics in Flanders that even 'major' double track lines had a limit to how many trains they could take per day with surprising variability depending on pre war volume needs. So though there is the Moscow bypass in the south with a double tracked line, it may not have the capacity of the double track lines running through Moscow. Not sure how long a 'heavy' usage double track line would take to build in wartime conditions if Moscow was cut off.

[Max Payload]

Lastly, the minor tracks to the East of Moscow could have been connected to restore the main Vologda line, although this would presumably have taken some time.

Meanwhile everything on the north-south axis would have to pass through Arzamas and/or Kotelnich (or pass even further east). These are hardly strategic hubs and in the case of Kotelnich as a route around Moscow, it would be the equivalent of by-passing Paris via Berlin.
The problem with the rail/barge connection is the time delay and resource requirement in the transfer of goods and supplies from one mode of transport to the other.
The loss of Moscow may not have finished the Soviet Union, but, irrespective of the political consequences and the effect on morale, the transportation and supply problems resulting the loss of the capital would have been enormous.

[LWD]

... The situation was even worse in the Caucasus, where the Soviets were down to 1 single-track railroad bordering the Caspian Sea plus the port of Baku to bring supplies to the 800,000 men of the Transcaucasus Front. Yet the Soviets succeeded in supplying them, albeit they were generally under-supplied compared to those of comparably large Fronts. ...

Was any significant amount of LL supplies used to directly supply this front?

[Yuri]

For increase of speed it was used the ring scheme of movement of trains.
For example, in Stalingrad battle, a train moved on such ring.
This principle was used everywhere. Allowed to make trains in length some kilometres.
Besides, on east coast of Volga the way without an embankment has been laid (red).
Sections which have been dismantled with Baikal-Amur railways were for this purpose used.
Restoration the Baikal-Amur railways was is begun only in 1974

[KDF33]

Max,

Meanwhile everything on the north-south axis would have to pass through Arzamas and/or Kotelnich (or pass even further east). These are hardly strategic hubs and in the case of Kotelnich as a route around Moscow, it would be the equivalent of by-passing Paris via Berlin.

I don't see the problem here. The Soviets don't have to send supplies along a stricly North-South axis, but from the factories to the front. Soviet war production was concentrated in two clusters, one in the Urals (Nizhniy Tagil, Sverdlovsk, Tchelyabinsk, etc.) and another along the banks of the Volga (Gor'kiy, Kuybishev, Saratov, etc.).

Looking at the map, Gor'kiy can send supplies either up the Volga to the rail link of Yaroslavl, and then either westward or northward on rails; or it can just send supplies north-eastward to Kotelnich and then in a straight line west to Vologda. The industries of the Ural cluster can send supplies along the Sverdlovsk-Kirov-Vologda or Sverdlovsk-Kirov-Kotlas-Konosha rail lines. Lend Lease arriving at Murmansk and Archangelsk can also be sent straight to the fighting Fronts. Finally, Gor'kiy can be connected to Ivanovo via track laying, although this would take some time.

The problem with the rail/barge connection is the time delay and resource requirement in the transfer of goods and supplies from one mode of transport to the other.

Well, obviously this adds another step in the process but both the Germans and the Soviets made extensive use of barge transport during the war. I don't believe this to be a critical issue.

The loss of Moscow may not have finished the Soviet Union, but, irrespective of the political consequences and the effect on morale, the transportation and supply problems resulting the loss of the capital would have been enormous.

Not quite. As I've previously shown, the situation north of Moscow would be far from catastrophic, whereas the situation parallel to the capital or to it's general south would be barely affected.

stg 44,

Not sure what your definition of strategic is in this sense. Yes, there is no need to use trucks to bring in raw materials over long distances (though was pretty important for getting things from rail stations to factories). But for military operations in which rail is not an option it is important. In the strategic operation of Kursk, trucks were very important since there was only a single rail line leading into the bulge.

Well, "strategic" might not have been the proper term. What I meant is that supply operations linking the factories to the Fronts obviously couldn't be accomplished by truck.

LWD,

Was any significant amount of LL supplies used to directly supply this front?

I have no data on this.

[LWD]

..

The loss of Moscow may not have finished the Soviet Union, but, irrespective of the political consequences and the effect on morale, the transportation and supply problems resulting the loss of the capital would have been enormous.

Not quite. As I've previously shown, the situation north of Moscow would be far from catastrophic, whereas the situation parallel to the capital or to it's general south would be barely affected.
...

They might have been catastrophic but the question is for whom. If Stalin lost power for one reason or another due to the loss of Moscow it might have been very significant or had little impact. If the Germans put the huge effort necessary to take Moscow together would they be willing to give it up? If not a Soviet counter attack might well pocket significant numbers of German troops and such a loss in late 40 or 41 could have been catastrophic for them.

[stg 44]

I think we can at least agree that lateral communications would have been very badly damaged if Moscow was cut off or fell. Getting the material to the front from the Urals wasn't the problem so much as lateral movement of troops and supplies from north to south.

[KDF33]

Well, again lateral communications wouldn't have been affected from the new frontline east of Moscow down to the Caucasus. Now, I agree that it would have been affected north of the capital, but I don't see why this would gravely matter. Why, after all, would the Soviets be interested in moving major units deployed among the northern Fronts to the deep south of the country?

[stg 44]

Well, again lateral communications wouldn't have been affected from the new frontline east of Moscow down to the Caucasus. Now, I agree that it would have been affected north of the capital, but I don't see why this would gravely matter. Why, after all, would the Soviets be interested in moving major units deployed among the northern Fronts to the deep south of the country?

How do you figure? If Moscow is gone there isn't a north-south railway that is double tracked. The rivers aren't exactly militarily well placed either. Moving units from the South to the North, a more likely scenario, is heavily impeded.

[Max Payload]

Moving units from the South to the North, a more likely scenario, is heavily impeded.

One consequence of which may have been the inability of reserve armies from the Moscow area to be moved to the Lake Ladoga area in time to prevent a link-up between the the Germans and the Finns (after which Leningrad would inevitably have fallen). Additionally the Soviets would have lost any operational flexibility in the vicinity of the capital making, for example, a coordinated December counter-offensive against AGC north and south of Moscow much more difficult. The transfer of First Shock Army to the Lovat may not have been possible, in which case the Demyansk pocket is unlikely to have been formed. As it was, even with the Moscow rail hub available, the Moscow and Ostashkov counter-offensives did not live up to Stalin's expectations. An even less successful outcome, perhaps with Moscow remaining in Geman hands, may have had significant ramifications.
These are just some of the possible short-term consequences of the loss of the Moscow hub. The possible longer term consequences are inevitably more speculative.

[DarthMaur]

I've often read that Moscow was critical to the Soviet war effort because it served as the USSR's primary rail hub. The typical argument goes something like this: the loss of Moscow would have prevented effective North-South movement of men and materiel as well as prevented effective coordination between the different Soviet Fronts.

Here is a map showing the Soviet railway system in 1941. As you can see, Moscow was indeed the major railway hub of the USSR, but there still stood a very dense network behind the capital. Take, for instance, the red-colored section of the Western Trans-Siberian which could effectively connect the Ural industrial area with the southern Soviet Fronts. Note the dense net of parallel tracks in the general area of Tambov and, in particular, directly to it's north.

Of significant interest is the generally poor rail support in the extended area where the battle of Stalingrad took place. This didn't prevent the Soviets from massing and supplying over 1.1 million men for the Uranus counter-offensive. The situation was even worse in the Caucasus, where the Soviets were down to 1 single-track railroad bordering the Caspian Sea plus the port of Baku to bring supplies to the 800,000 men of the Transcaucasus Front. Yet the Soviets succeeded in supplying them, albeit they were generally under-supplied compared to those of comparably large Fronts.

Admittedly the biggest impact of the loss of Moscow would have been felt in the North, where both the Moscow-Leningrad and the Moscow-Vologda double-track railways would have been cut. Yet, even here the Soviets could still have been supplied from Kirov as well as from Lend Lease arriving at the Northern ports. Lastly, the minor tracks to the East of Moscow could have been connected to restore the main Vologda line, although this would presumably have taken some time.

Overall, the loss of Moscow would have been problematic (loss of a couple more millions of citizens, some armaments factories, supply problems for the northern Fronts) but wouldn't have been a death blow to the Soviet war effort, a claim which is too often made without a shred of evidence. This should also put to rest the idea that the German officers pushing for an early Moscow drive knew any better than Hitler how to defeat the USSR.

Edit: I forgot to mention that river barge traffic on the Upper Volga would contribute to maintain the connection between the military industry based in Gorky and the Vologda double-track rail line. Indeed, river traffic is too often discounted when it did in fact significantly contribute to the movement of Soviet supplies.

Huh. Any chance you've read the thread on Paradox forums?

http://forum.paradoxplaza.com/forum/sho ... ease/page3

You made almost the same post as i did! And we did it independently (yours is apparently day earlier, and i read it only today), so we made the same conclusion from that map. Interesting.

[Paul_Atreides]

Same source, same conclusion (not mine), but an year ago

http://www.vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archiv ... 323666.htm