Italian battlefield successes, were there any?

[davethelight]

Virtually every time when I read of accounts relating to Italian forces in WWII the Italians are described as poor combatants, indeed it seems to have become a running joke among WWII enthusiast of just how bad the Italians performed in WWII, weather it be at a tactical or strategic level.

Just look at their poor showing in campaigns such as when they invaded France in 1940 after the Germans invaded a few weeks before, their botched invasian of Albania and Greece in 1941, their string of defeats and capitulations through north Africa, and the piss poor performance of their navy against the Royal Navy, despite the fact that they had a large and modern Medeteranian fleet operating close to home.

So despite all of the negative press, are there any well documented cases of Italian forces achieving a victory in battle, or at least giving a good account of themselves in defence, even on a very small scale?

[Lupo Solitario]

the first impulse in reading these sort of questions is to give a look at here and there, etc.etc. but I think it's better try to place some consideration.

First one, Italy surrended in september 1943, i.e. after over three years of war, this means the country had some fighting capabilties notwithstanding defeats.

Italy lost the capabilty to lead an his own strategical campaign after may 1941. By that moment, all front commands had been in german hands so we don't record italian commanders more...but italian forces were still on line. So we have to tell:
-a substantial failure of italian strategical campaigns before may 1941 and no more italian leadership after
-a series of struggles involving italian forces where their performance had high and low moments.

If we go now to see the tactical level we have many positive occasions for italians. I want to name:
-the hard defence of Keren (east africa) in march 1941
-the two battles of Bir el Gobi (north africa) during operation Crusader 1941
-the conquest of Stalino (Ukraine) october 1941
-the Christmas battle in Ukraine 1941
-the role of italian motorized forces at Gazala june 1942
-Serafimovich and Isbuscenky (ukraine) july-august 1942
-the standing against all odds of Folgore at Alamein november 1942
-idem for Julia at Nowo Kalitwa december 1942
-Mareth line and Takrouna (Tunisia) april 1943

etc. etc. For what concerns italian navy, it always kept open italian-african supply lines which was its essential work (and not idiot suicide missions as Matapan one) still when they had the pleasant nickname of "death routes"

[SM79Sparviero]

december, 18, 1941, Alessandria.
Six Incursori ( raiders-frogmen) of Decima Flottiglia Mas sunk battleships Valiant and Queen Elizabeth , severely damaged destroyer Jervis and a tanker.
Six men severely damaged four ships.

Tobruk,September , 13-14, 1942.
operation Agreement.
a "pretty putrid sort of garrison"( !) ( Lloyd Owen D., page 230) , that's San Marco Marines defeated:force A ( 420 Royal marines ) and force C ( 160 Argyll and Sutherland and Royal Northumberland).
Flotilla-Leader Sikh , class Tribal, was immediately sunk.
Seven torpedo boats were sunk by the attack of the Macchi C-200 with 50 kg bombs and of the "Motozattere"= "muli del mare"=sea mules= motorcrafts

Cruiser Coventry was sunk by German Junkers-88.
Italians lost 15 (!) men. 43 men were blessed.

[Peter H]

The RSI efforts,Operation Winter Storm 1944.

http://www.geocities.com/kumbayaaa/itre ... m1944.html

[davethelight]

Wow, these particular incidents you guys have mentioned really are a revelation to me, I've never heard of such prowess on the part of Italian combat units. I wonder why these events are not better known and discussed among WWII historians and enthusiasts. I suppose it might be because of the sheer scale of the many other events which occured during the war. Small events tend to be overlooked. Thanks.

[Napoli]

I guess some people make the mistake of thinking that most Axis troops in Nth Africa were German when in fact it was more likely 70% Italian.
With better comand under the Geramns as well as the support of their tanks they did well in fact.
I'd say most blame goes to Mussolini and advisers as to the capabiltities and disisions given to invade and open on all fronts they did all at the same time almost.
They never had the chance to equipe and train troops in the way Germany and England did in their own time frame over a period of 4 years and if I'm not wrong, Italy only had about half the population of Germany for starters.

[Folgore]

I would say that the strategic, and partially tactical, efforts of the Italian Armed Forces were a great delusion during this conflict. While Individually our valor is proved by 2000 years of history, and renovated during that war.
World War II drammatically showed the two most peculiar italian characteristics: An individual capacity above the ordinary joined to disastrous coordination qualities...
Folgore!

[Wargames]

Davethelight wrote:{/b]

Wow, these particular incidents you guys have mentioned really are a revelation to me, I've never heard of such prowess on the part of Italian combat units. I wonder why these events are not better known and discussed among WWII historians and enthusiasts. I suppose it might be because of the sheer scale of the many other events which occured during the war. Small events tend to be overlooked. Thanks.

Italian submarines also had their share of victories as did the Ariete division.

However, for the most part, the reason you don't hear about Italian victories is because they didn't have much of an opportunity to obtain them. The terrain was always against them. If they attacked west they ran into the mountains of France. If they attacked east they ran into the mountains of Greece. If they attacked south, they ran into a desert. Mountain warfare has historically always been difficult, the only chance of the Italians having for advancing being with divebombers - Which they didn't have. Desert (lowlands) warfare has historically been been decided by mobility and supply - And the Italians had neither.

I suppose the best opportunity Italy had for an offensive victory was in September, 1940 against Egypt. The British did not have Matilda tanks in Egypt at the time and Italy had a huge invading Army versus a rather small British Army. Even that would not have been an easy battle because the British were quite mobile while the Italians walked. Still, the British will not retreat beyond Alexandria, meaning that, if the Italians could advance far enough, and fast enough, they could have surrounded the British and laid siege with artillery - And they had enough in Lybia to do the job.

But Italy passed up this opportunity and paid dearly for it.

[Jon G.]

...However, for the most part, the reason you don't hear about Italian victories is because they didn't have much of an opportunity to obtain them. The terrain was always against them. If they attacked west they ran into the mountains of France. If they attacked east they ran into the mountains of Greece. If they attacked south, they ran into a desert. Mountain warfare has historically always been difficult, the only chance of the Italians having for advancing being with divebombers - Which they didn't have. Desert (lowlands) warfare has historically been been decided by mobility and supply - And the Italians had neither.

Terrain, even difficult terrain, has always formed part of various countries' military planning. That doesn't put Italy in a particularly disadvantegous position relative to other prospective combatants - and indeed Italian pre-war planning centered mostly on a possible conflict with France and/or Yugoslavia, which both shared mountaineous borders with Italy.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 41&start=0

But what Italian officers were planning for didn't always coincide with what Mussolini intended. As far as I know, nobody in Italian high command had anticipated (and much less wanted) a military conflict with Britain, at least prior to Abyssinia.

Part reason why the puny little Italian tankettes were so useless in the desert was that they were designed with the Alpine front in mind.

I suppose the best opportunity Italy had for an offensive victory was in September, 1940 against Egypt. The British did not have Matilda tanks in Egypt at the time and Italy had a huge invading Army versus a rather small British Army...

Well, the Italian attack on Egypt was intended to coincide with Operation Sealion, the German attack on Britain. As such, Graziani's attack on Egypt was intended as a political move which would entitle Italy to parts of the spoils after the collapse of the British empire. I'm unsure if Mussolini really thought that the 10th Army really could push all the way to the Nile in 1940. Graziani certainly didn't think so.

You're right that there were no Matildas with the British at the time of Graziani's attack in September 1940 but they were just around the corner as it were. According to the information I've been able to find the 7th RTR landed at Port Said September 24th with 48 Matildas. The convoy with the Matildas must have been well underway by the time the Italians attacked; Egypt was pretty dominant in British pre-war planning.

[pitman]

Don't forget the valor and actions of the Italian partisans from 1943-1945, who fought quite bravely against the Germans and in April 1945 liberated most major north Italian cities before the Allies could get to them. The considerable losses they suffered is testament to their bravery.

[Galahad]

--You don't find much about glory in World War II. But the Savoia Cavalry Regiment of the Italian Army gained some glory on 24 August 1942, when it conducted one of the last--if not the last--mounted cavalry charges in history.
--Against Soviet infantry in position. Successfully.
--That, to me, says quite a bit about what Italians were capable of when properly led and motivated.
--For those who haven't heard about the charge, here's a link to an article about it from the 21 October 1998 issue of The Spectator. I think you'll find it most interesting.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/ ... i_n8817479

[acecool]

I report to you some victory of Regia Marina during II WW , These comments became from http://www.regiamarina.it .
First battle of Sirte ( December 1941 ).

The 16 December 1941 leave Naples an Italian convoy of four large cargo ships escorted by eight destroyers. South of Messina strait it is reached by a support escort composed by the BB Duilio and by cruisers Aosta, Montecuccoli and Attendolo, and 4 destroyers. Farther a strong group is sailing: the BBs Littorio, Cesare and Doria and moreover cruisers Gorizia and Trento and ten destroyers. An enormous deployment for four cargos only, but it is to be considered that the Italian Navy command wanted to break, at all costs, the English blockade on Libya route, because too much cargo ships and escort destroyers were sank on that route. The 17 December an Italian reconnaissance aircraft finds out, north of Sidi el Barrani (Egypt) an English formation, that was a convoy going to Malta, but exchanged at that time, for a lot of signaling and recognition mistakes, for a true enemy task force, at sea to attack the Italian convoy. To excuse this mistake it is to say that was part of the English convoy (that, however, was escorted also by three cruisers) the tanker Breconshire, which was disguised in warship shape and was exchanged for a battleship. Admiral Cunningham, commander of the English fleet based in Alexandria, informed of the Italian fleet's going out, convinced himself that it was going to attack the English convoy; so he ordered to admiral Vian, (convoy escort units commander) to maneuver so to avoid battle in order to protect the precious tanker, and later to attack Italian fleet, but only after the sunset. From Italian part, admiral Iachino (fleet commander), receiving the recognition signaling the English fleet, maneuvered to intercept it, but with great caution, erroneously convinced that the English was a battle formation. The Littorio group entered in contact with the enemy at great distance (over 30000 meters) only just after sunset (it was 17.53 and the sunset was at 17.40) and, seen the known limitations of Regia Marina in night combat, without results. The English, seen their numerical inferiority, had to free themselves from the contact and, in spite of the orders to attack during the night, admiral Vian preferred to attend to the convoy security and escort, so it arrived without problems to Malta. Same thing made admiral Iachino, losing touch toward west, to go with the fleet to defend the Italian convoy, fearing a night attack that never was. The shooting last only about 15 minutes: no one of every shells shot hit. Considering that both convoys and escorts arrived to destination, either Iachino as Vian had achieved their objectives. From a merely military point of view, the first battle of Sirte was an English success, considering the difference of force ratio, but Italians had achieved the very important objective to escort a convoy to Libya without losses, earning morale and trustworthiness after the failures series in sea transport toward Libya. Moreover, after tanker escort, English warships came to know that Italian ones were in escort mission too and so they tried to intercept it; little time after midnight of 19 December, English fleet ran, at 15 miles from Tripoli, into a very large mine field, which was been prepared by Italians, with great precognition, just to avoid an English raid. English formation, called "K force" lost CA Neptune and DD Kandahar, while cruisers Aurora and Penelope were heavily damaged also if, with difficulty, they returned to Malta. Considering these elements too, it is correct to say that the Italian operation was a success. There was also a moral victory: Littorio group was all day long on offensive, against an English formation that had retreated and that, during the night, it had tried no reaction, also if it was advantaged by having radar. Above all to operation' success, least, had contributed the fact that English had not carriers among them and Italian warships, at least this time, were effectively protected by Italian-German aviation. If admiral Iachino would be informed in time and exactly on enemy warship position, and of their composition, probably English force would have been more damaged.

Attack to Alexandria port of 18 December 1941.

The evening of 17 December at 18.40, Italian submarine Scire' was at about a mile from west entrance of Alexandria port. At 20.47 three S.L.C. (slow running torpedo), the "maiali" (Italian word for "pigs") were put into the water, everyone rode by two commandos of X flotilla MAS, who went to, underwater, towards the harbor entrance. Luckily three English destroyers were returning, so the nets at the entrance were opened to let the ships pass, saving Italian commandos the long and hard work to break open them. The three pigs followed English destroyers and entered in enemy base, directing toward their assigned objectives. Their work was slow, laborious but succeeded; at 06.00 a 8000 ton. tanker exploded, followed at 06.15 by an explosion that heavily damaged battleship Valiant, and the worst had to come: a few minutes after, at 06.19 battleship Queen Elizabeth, Cunningham's flagship, leap on the water, shaking for a large explosion. The Alexandria raid was fully successful: six Navy commandos (Durand De La Penne, Emilio Bianchi, Antonio Marceglia, Spartaco Schergat, Vincenzo Martellotta and Mario Marino) succeeded to inflict on English ships a great defeat: two powerful battleships were out for a long time. The six commandos were captured and put into detention.

Blockade of Malta. First six months of 1942.

The dramatic experiences in convoy escort during the last months of 1941 and the heavy risk that Malta, with its strategic position, had roused to Libya supplies had not more to be ignored. Consequently, Italian and German Commands decided to radically face the problem. The blockade of Malta, which in the first six months of 1942 was near absolute, was achieved by the combined action of naval forces, M.a.s. (torpedo boats), mine fields in Sicily channel and near Malta, and Italian-German air forces. The battles described below are the most important in that time, that saw in Mediterranean sea a deployment of forces that lost nothing in comparison with the more famous air-naval battles of the Pacific theater.

Battle of half June 1942 ( Intercepting of Alexandria convoy)

The English fleet based in Alexandria was bound for Malta, escorting a large convoy composed by nine cargo ships. The Italian fleet, commanded by admiral Iachino left the port of Taranto to intercept it; it was 13.00 of 14 June. At 18.00 an Allied reconnaissance aircraft spotted Italian fleet and alerted English Command; the convoy, which, in the meantime, had lost two cargo ship to German dive bombers attacks, was alerted of the menace: continuing on that route at 7.00 a.m. of 15 June it would have encountered the Italian fleet in a strong inferiority condition (8 light cruisers and 25 destroyers for the English against two battleships, 4 cruisers and 12 destroyers for the Italians): what there was to do? The convoy went on, with prudence, trusting in its own aircraft, until 1.00 a.m., then inverted the route. During the night, at dawn and in the first morning hours the English would have to violently attack with their aircraft but, for the very first time, Italian fleet had the radar: aboard DD Legionario was installed a German Dete (radar). Maneuvering with radar help, Italian fleet avoided English chase till the morning, when it was spotted and attacked: CA Trento was hit by a torpedo and immobilized (it was sunk some hours later by English submarine P.35, who surprised the cruiser during towing operations by part of two destroyers, which were detached from the Italian formation); Italian formation went on. In the night English convoy had its bad time too: attacked by German E-boote (torpedo motorboats) it had a destroyer sunk and a cruiser, the Newcastle, damaged. At 4.30 convoy newly inverted route, believing to have damaged so heavily the Italian fleet to force it to return base. At 8.00 a.m. English are alerted by their spotters that Italian fleet was practically intact: at this point English gave up their plans and, definitively inverted the route, were bound for Alexandria: but they had to pass in the sea between Crete and Egypt, a very dangerous zone, so much that English sailors called it "bomb valley", and indeed they were attacked by German stukas: two destroyers were sunk and cruiser Birmingham was crippled. The convoy went on, always pursued by Italian formation, and succeeded in returning Alexandria, also it lost cruiser Hermione, sunk by a German submarine. English operation is completely failed.

Battle of half June 1942. (Battle of Pantelleria).

While Taranto based Italian fleet was intercepting Alexandria's convoy, another English convoy, composed by seven cargo ships, was bound for Malta coming from west, protected by Gibraltar fleet. Off Sardinia, the convoy was attacked by aircraft and submarines: a cargo ship was sunk and cruiser Liverpool, damaged, had to retreat to Gibraltar. Before reaching Capo Bon, English fleet inverted route, while the convoy went on under escort of a cruiser, nine destroyers and 16 minesweepers and armed motorboats. To intercept English convoy, at 19.24 of 14 June, under command of admiral Da Zara, the 7th Division, composed by cruisers Eugenio di Savoia and Montecuccoli, and 7 destroyers (reduced then to 5 because two of them had engine breakdown), left Palermo port. At dawn of 15 June, it was 5.30, 25 miles southwest off Pantelleria, there was the spotting. At 5.39 the units opened fire and, while English escort was engaged in combat, cargo ships were attacked by aircraft. At 8.30 admiral Da Zara broke contact, sure of a great victory (he then entered in port whit his ships' gun at maximum elevation in sign of victory and he was welcomed by great celebrations; Mussolini himself decorated the admiral for valor). During afternoon English ships are again attacked by aircraft and, in the night, they went into a large minefield near Malta; only two cargo ships succeeded in entering the port. What happened in the shooting? Reports were contrasting and, however, admiral Da Zara was sure of the sinking of a "Kenya" class cruiser and two destroyers, besides the heavily damaging of other three destroyers. Later on the official Italian's reconstruction, and the crossed control with English ones, demonstrated that in the shooting between the two formations Italians heavily damaged English destroyer Bedouin, damaged DD Partridge and hit with a single shell cruiser Cairo, slightly damaging it. From their part Italians had few damages: DD Vivaldi, hit and aflame, was forced to return to base and the two cruiser were hit both by a single shell, with very little effect. Also if the battle of Pantelleria was an Italian victory it was not seen through to the end, and English operation had the partial success to reach Malta with two cargo ships with their supply, which, for the besieged island, was a true breather.

Battle of half August 1942.

The 10 August 1942, south off Balearic islands, was gathering a 60 ships complex: it was operation "Pedestal", the greatest ever made by English to supply Malta. There were 16 cargo ships, two battleships (Nelson and Rodney), four carriers besides a lot of cruisers and destroyers. Having had early the information from Gibraltar' spies, Axis Command prepared countermeasures alerting submarines and deploying over 700 aircraft in Sardinia bases. The morning of 11 August Italian and German submarines attacked: the English carrier Eagle was sunk by German submarine U 73. Italian submarine Dagabur was rammed and sunk by an English destroyer. The morning of 12 August, south of Sardinia, intervened Italian aviation, which sunk a cargo ship. At 18.30 another resolute Italian-German aircraft attack: a destroyer sunk and some bombs on the bridge of carrier Indomitable which, aflame, returned to Gibraltar. Off Biserta, the main of English formation inverted route and the convoy went on escorted by 5 cruisers and 12 destroyers. In the evening of 12 August, English convoy met Italian submarines, that, at least, were deployed with the "pack of wolves" tactic in passage points; successes did not lack: Italian submarines sunk cruiser Cairo and two cargo ships and damaged cruisers Nigeria, Kenya and other two cargo ships (in particular submarine Axum with a single four torpedo salvo contemporaneously hit the Cairo, removing its stern and forcing it to auto-sinking, the Nigeria and the only tanker of the convoy, the Ohio). During night, Italian M.A.S. (torpedo motorboats) intervened, and sunk cruiser Liverpool and four cargo ships. The 13 August, before survivor ships could arrive in Malta (it would arrive two undamaged cargo ships and three damaged ones), aircraft sunk another cargo ship. If the morning of 13 August, in Pantelleria' sea there would have been also a little part of Italian surface fleet, no English ship would have escaped to destruction; instead Italian ships were ordered to return to base, for the lack of air cover, by Navy High Command, authorized by Mussolini. Italian crews did not like this decision, also if understandable, because it tasted of surrender; moreover, on returning route, cruisers Bolzano and Attendolo were damaged by English submarine Unbroken, proving, in Italian sailors' eyes, that if people do not risk, people loose. The battle of half August cost English high losses, but, thanks to American help, they could afford them; moreover they succeeded in supply, also if only partially, Malta. For the Italian surface fleet this was a battle to forget, while assault crafts, submarines and M.A.S. had achieved a great success.

[acecool]

for terrain battlefield i search for , when i've good material in english i post, see you

[acecool]

Bir el Gobi
July 1941 the Btg Group. GG.FF disembarks to Tripoli (Libia) with tasks of garrison to Homs and Misurata. Subsequently it endures transformations in organic and armaments and comes incorporated in the RECAM (Exploring Grouping of the Army corps with Mantova) and sended to garrison the zone of Bir el Gobi. At the moment to communicate their employment to the Commander of the Group, General Gambara says : “… ll task is arduous; the volunteers are to the first combat, are young…”. The battle of Bir el Gobi begins 3 hard December and until to the 7. The combats are hard, come inflicted serious losses to 11a Indian Brigade and part of 22a Brigade Guards, went in its aid. In spite of the remarkable disparity of forces, the Btg Group. GG.FF make to fail the English plan (that the alignment previewed to divide in two Italian-German), preventing therefore to the ally forces to catch up El Adem.
(from http://www.collezioni-f.it/museo/collez ... cioci.html)

[acecool]

El Alamein battlefield memories of Division "Folgore" paratroops (from http://bunker.altervista.org/battaglia.html)
The battle of “El Alamein” … The greatest battle of Africa the name of one taken locality center of one small railway station mail to approximately 100 km to the west of Alexandria of Egypt: “El Alamein”. From said locality diparte a wide throttling little more than 60 km, that it goes from the sea to the depression of El Qattara. To South of this last locality the depression prolongeds until to the Oasis of Siwa, the land is impassable for the vehicles dealing itself of the bottom of an ancient inner sea, composed from sands you furnish and salate swampy zones. The course of the throttling is tilted with the top situated towards the culminating inside and to Naqb Rala (q. 216) from which the dipartono ciglioni of the depression, than in some points it is deep until to some tens of meters under the sea level. The points of greater relief are: Abu Dweig (q. 229); Qaret Abun Saq (q. 198); Gebel Sanhur (q. 208); Munqar Labbaq (q. 183); Gebel Kalak (q. 173). Between these greater quotas, some throttlings are known like passable steps and mainly those of the “Step of the Camel” and “Step of the Wagon”, through which the “red Track” passes that with South-West course goes from El Alamein to the depression of El Qattara. The other known tracks are the “Rommel tracks”, the “Whisky tracks”, the “Chianti tracks”; the names of these last localities go back to used conventional names for the acquaintance of the same tracks during the last world-wide conflict; other important track but with cross-sectional course is the “Tonnen tracks” that leaving from Deir el Munassib it crosses respective: the “Rommel tracks”, the “red Track”, the “Ram tracks” continuing towards the West through the “Step of the Wagon” (Cars Pass). Other point of remarkable importance used for the survey was the “Palificata”, that it drew origin from a telegraphic line that gives Sidi Abd el Rahaman was connected with the “red Track” to South of Himeimat. It followed large way the rears of the armored Army ltalo-German (ACIT). On the more southern part of the described zone turned out ,in defensive position on a forehead of approximately 15 km the Division parachutists “Folgore” to the headquater of Major general Enrico Frattini. The main and immediate defense of the zone, was constituted from a wide one wraps of mined fields on two open orders, at a distance variable from the 2 to the 4 km connects to you in cross-sectional sense from other mined fields. The mined breakup to scompartimenti or bags carried alphabetical conventional names. Other obstructions completed and integrated the defensive positions also to back of the alignment or on lateral positions, in order to avoid or to neutralize eventual encirclings to the shoulders. In the inside of the mined bags weapons constituted from project them or from airplane bombs they could be made to explode by means of contacts electrical workers at a distance. Such particular sagacities came call “Teufel-Garden to you” (Garden of the Devil). At home and abroad there were of the corridors obligates to you, dispositions of reticulates to you, surveillances, and at last the emplacements and the shelters for crews of every type and the troop. The battle of El Alamein was carried out, for the Italian-Germans, in clearly disadvantageous conditions. In fact English, abundant supplies and modern armament, set up their great battle on the prevalence of means. They, since the days that will precede the attack employed, uninterruptedly, by day and of night, large formations of flying fortresses fighter bomber, in order to hit and to destroy ours I placed to you, to interrupt the traffic and the refueling, to damnage the alignment of our artilleries and the defense works. English aviation, for all the duration of the battle, dominated without any contrast the sky bringing remarkable damnages to our device of defense. here was reached therefore the evening of 23 October when the action of preparation the opposing artillery began unexpected, that it preannounced the imminence of the attack. English had 2.000 new tanks of the more modern types, (beyond 1.300 employ in the battle) in prevalence Americans to you, of one strongest aviation that dominated without any contrast the sky, of approximately 3.000 guns of every bore and of elevated power, with an ammunition supply that allowed they to turn upside down on our lines migliaia of tons of projects them for consecutive weeks. From the margins of the depression of El Qattara until the sea ignited, unexpected, a gigantic one spots that warmlight was melted in only a vulcanic one, accompanied from thousands of explosions that submergeeed our alignment completely, from the line of the bench marks to the emplacements of artillery and beyond, in order to upset and to destroy all that that could upgrade our resistance. The smoke-producing curtain use paralyzed the observation, hindered the shooting of the guns and prevented to notice the movements of the enemy who got ready to itself to lock under ours defense in order to attack them. The “Folgore” attended the imminent collision with the firm will of contrast them to the adversary with the maximum engagement and to make to pay, to English, beloved price, their ambitious plan. Our boys seemed electrify to you from that atmosphere of battle and the exceptional show that carried out around they, and attended without fears the development of the events in order to meet with the Tommy and debit they the “welcome”. To 23 hours 20,40 of October the adversary began a fire of violence artillery and inusitate proportions who maked its action uninterruptedly for all the night on the 24 and invested in full load the entire forehead garrisoned from the Division “Folgore”. From the survey of the blazes he could himself be calculated that against the single forehead of 187° the regiment they acted not less than 150 pieces (confirmed then in 200). In spite of massive the shooting of artillery, the metallic rumor of cospicue masses of tanks could be heard from time to time locking under the positions of the parachutists. When, between the explosions and the blazes that they illuminated to day the emplacements the order of the commanders “to the combat posts” was heard a single outcry answered, highest and unanimous “Folgore!”. Endured after numerous enemy patrols, protect from smoke dischargers, they tried to catch up the mined fields in order to open you of crosses, but they came inexorably rejected. In the field it centers them the advanced company, the 6° commant from Marenco Captain, was made to exterminate after a violent body to body; of the 90 parachutists who composed the company, solos a score succeeded to withdraw towards our main line of defense. They had destroyed 30 tanks and killed approximately 150 English. In the afternoon of the 24, in a counterattack attempt, the commander of the grouping fell Lieutenant Colonel Marescotti Ruspoli to which she came granted the gold medal to the memory. El Alamein patrols in alarm in the desert Towards the hours a 14 of 25 October column of a group of forty of wagons (4° light Armored brigade of 7° the British Armored division) and two battalions of infantry attacked the bench mark of 12° company deil IV/187° commant from Cristofori Captain. After the most violent fight, that he lead makes yourself of body to body, the enemy came rejected with particularly bloody losses, leaving on the land 22 tanks immobilizes to you. In the night on the 26 the compiva adversary the last attempt to break off the forehead of the “Folgore”. Having stated the hardness of our line, decided to make mass against the hill of Deir el Munassib, in order to get hold of and take place therefore along a ground alignment (Deir el Munassib-Deir Alinda). After the customary preparation of artillery and smoke dischargers, to rising of the moon (hours 22) 69° the Brigade of infantry (50° British Division) and units of the Brigade “Free France” moved on three columns to the attack against the positions of the IV/187° regiment. A column, composed of two battalions of the regiment “Green Howards” and of a company armored car, resumed the failed attack of the afternoon against the bench mark of 12° the company; an other formed column of De Gaulle elements of onslaught, engaged 10° the company; a third column constituted from the battalions of the regiment “Royal West Kent” (44° British Division) and from the battalion wagons IV/8° Hussars (7° Armored division), invested from every side the bench mark garrisoned from 11° the company. At the same time they came engaged from other units the emplacements of II the battalion. To 23 hours the entire forehead of 187° a regiment therefore was pressed from every part… Shares of IX the battalion in second group, came moved in the night in order to strengthen the wings of the alignment, particularly threatened. Towards the hours the 01,00 attacks directed against the emplacements of 10° and 12° the company could be considered demolish to you. The opposing columns as a result of the serious endured losses, didn't follow from every attempt of progress and were pleased to maintain engaged the defense. Serious it was manifested instead the situation of 11° the company. Several the fire direction centers of the company attack to you on every side and pressed they give near from the tanks were defended disperatamente. The fight lasted most violent for a pair of hours; then, one to the time, pieces antitank exausted ammunitions and being able some it are not resupplied because remained it isolates to you, were forced to Hush. The automatic crews came soverchiate from the wagons. To the hours 04,00 solos a pair of fire direction centers still resisted; nearly the totality of the men of the company had fallen on the positions. In this action it fell heroically, guiding a last one deprived of hope attempt of contrassalto, the Commander of the company Captain Costantino Ruspoli to whose memory was conferred the gold medal. To the first lights of day 27 the Commander of the IV/187° (Valletti Captain) four times hurt, but remained voluntarily on the place, ordered a contrassalto that she came executed from a platoon the Commando of Lieutenant Raffaele Trotta, Commander of the company guns from 47/32 assigned in reinforces IV the battalion. To completed action, the lost positions came saldamente reconquered and estates, subsequently Trotta lieutenant came replaced from the Lieutenant Rooster, which in its turn the wounded, yielded the commando of the battalion to the Greater Vagliasindi. In the course of day 27 the enemy, effectively contrasted, tried an ulterior attack, against the positions of the 10°/IV with degaullisti elements reinforces from a battalion of the Queen's Royal Regiment (44° English Division to you). The immediate one, decided reaction of the garrison, the timely participation of the artilleries demolished the attack and the enemy came rejected with serious losses. During the contrassalto the commander of the company fell heroically to the head of its men, Lieutenant Gastone Simoni to whose memory came conferred the gold medal. Greater of artillery the Francisco Vagliasindi of 185° the regiment, whose group as a result of the endured losses had been melted, and that it had asked the honor to assume the commando of an infantry unit, fell to the head of the IV/187° regiment. Parachutists of the Folgore in combat day 28 the enemy, exausted, did not renew its attacks limiting itself to strike our violent positions with artillery shooting and mortars. In the days succeeded to you, after some crash of local character, the opposite foreheads went becoming stabilized itself. The offensive tried from the enemy against the “Folgore” bloody was failed after six days of upset combats and useless attacks. The adversary was only successful to partially occupy an advanced bench mark without but infirmare the solidity of the positions, neither fall the resistance line minimally. The enemy had left on the land some hundreds of fallen; 52 wagons were from it lost; 164 men between which 12 officials, came captured. Particularly meaningful I pay of blood offered from the commanders of battalion and group of the “Folgore”: on 16 official followed to the commando of 9 units, 15 losses were had very (10 hurt fallen and 5). General Alexander, on purpose of the combats of those days, wrote: “One found that the enemy was in forces and lain in wait for well, therefore he did not insist himself in the attack”. As far as the two groupings in which the 186° was articulated he is said that the attack was put into effect in two directions: from east towards the west, mostly on the forehead of the seventh battalion (Tantillo grouping) and essentially lead from infantries. On the forehead of the WAYS battalion the attack protrasse until 31 October, with alternate vicissitudes, for the participation of ours counterattacks lead with the support of tanks. Begun with the destruction of our centers in wrap of observation, sovrumanamente difesisi with bombs by hand and bottles Molotov cocktail; culminated 26 October with the constitution from part of the enemy of one bag to the center of the position of resistance of the battalion; and at last rejected from our 27 counterattack October, with the elimination of such bag and the capture of a greater one, 3 captains, 4 lieutenants, 207 military ones, you arm and ammunitions: in front of our positions, they are available semidestroyed, 67 average enemy battleships. 28 October, a “English parlamentario” was introduced in order to ask a truce of crews, in order to bury to the fallen of ambo the parts. The truce, granted, has the duration of three hours; to the term they come exchanges to you recovers to you piastrini of the fallen: 50 parachutists, approximately 150 English.The enemy reorders itself and he is arranged to approximately 600 meters from our lines in order perhaps resuming between 29 October and the night of 1 November its municipal efforts but, to what he seemed, with insufficient decision and only demonstrative scope: it left as a result of our reaction, in our hands an other 50 prisoners. On the forehead of V the battalion true and just the contact with the enemy happened towards hours 3 antemeridian of 24 the day October. Also it did not happen here of surprise, because since the midnight the forward post of Qaret el Himeimat had given news that was heard to parade from south-east towards the north-west one strongly means mass mechanizes to you enemy: certain prelude to an attack wrapping against the exposed wing of our general alignment. Guastatori parachutists attack to the dawn a British emplacement For said eventuality, date the nature and date also the esiguità of the forces available, the commander of the battalion, with the full consent of the commander of the regiment, had been oriented to the following concept: to reduce to the end men and means dislocates to the feet of rocks the south of the hill of Munaquir el Daba, overhanging the depression , to surveillance of the mined field here existing and with the precise task at the same time to confuse with their action the enemy giving a sure alarm to the commando; to react up with the immediate counterattack against the enemy infantries who had shown oneself from south on the plateau (lacking by now in the support of the average battleships, necessarily it lingers to you from the wild nature of the accesses) picking them therefore of surprise, when they would have believed to have caught up with extreme facility the happened one. To such scope the Commander of battalion, after to have embezzled and re-united all the men not closely necessary to the service of the crews, had approximately 3 platoons supports to you from some mortars. From part its commando of regiment dislocated like saying little hundreds of meters to north of Naqb Rala, arming with staff makeshift some pieces tank destroyer from 47/32 (joints without staff in the day of the 23) had arranged one prudenziale obstruction, forehead to south of the throat of Naqb Rala; she had a fist of men composed from the elements of the platoon connections and the commando; it had predisposed for the flux (in case the vicissitudes of the action had rendered it necessary and possible) of the men of the centers withdraw to you nearest of the battalion dislocate to YOU to you in the flat one: because, where it was joints to those ends, he judged of it must play all for all. The enemy action against the skillful flank of the battalion was resolved quickly and in the more shining way for we: the explosions of some mines and short and intense unexpected maked of the fire of the machine-guns, the launch of the bombs by hand from part of the observation elements low, perceive that the contact had happened to the feet of the Ciglione South of Munaquir el Daba and that would have been imminent showing oneself on the Plateau of Naqb Rala of the enemy infantries. The Commander of battalion articulated the rincalzo in two shares for the action on the skillful flank and in the forehead of attacking; the commander of regiment with the most modest unit of formation approached the commando of the Fifth battalion. But its participation was not necessary; V the battalion resolved with i its means the situation. Not hardly, in the uncertain early morning light it sees to spread in Hush on ground the enemy infantries, recognizable for the characteristic helmet, the Commander of the battalion makes to trigger on quickest they some blank of mortars and squalls of heavy machine-guns and to the outcry of Savoia, Alive Italy, “Folgore”, give mark them of the contrassalto: the mortars are thrown in the fray also serving of the company. The enemy arrests itself, tries to resist but he comes swept up and chased, until that the last man has not cleared the pianoro, ridiscendendo the slopes south of Munaquir el Daba. The Commander of the battalion, its Vice Commander, the Commander of the company mortars, and other officials are the wounded, sensitive are on the whole the losses that have constituted the price of the happened one. But on the forehead of V the battalion the enemy does not complete no other attack. El Alamein, mattino of 25 October 1942 a formation of English wagons Being worth some tries an attack to surprise against one Italian emplacement. The maneuver does not succeed and some wagons remain preda of the parachutists Between the WAYS and the V are schierato YOU; this does not endure some serious attempt of breach, but sopporta remarkable losses for the actions of strafing and in the actions of patrol that are developed, particularly active, towards the feature held from the WAYS, to protection of just the left flank. With the end of October (as far as 186° the regiment) all it seems to set off to one relative calm. The enemy has been rejected, but the total losses endured species in the pictures, have been most serious: the Vice Commander of the regiment (Lieutenant Ruspoli Colonel), the commander of YOU have fallen battalion (Greater Bergonzi) and some commanders of company; they are remained hurt between the others the commander of V the battalion (Greater Izzo), the battalion adjutant in 1° of the regiment (Maggiulli Captain), medical Captain Guberti. The commandos of i battalions V and are held from captains as soon as promoted, the companies in great prevalence are commant from second lieutenants of complement or non-comissioned officers; the force of the units is reduced to little men. But the regret for the loss of many and many companions of arm is turns them; lungi repressing the minds, exalt in all the proud fierezza of ovunque to have rejected the enemy fighting courageous. The general situation imposed the commando of Army to order the regression of all the forehead: the order to the 186° was carried from the Vice Commander of the General Division Bignami to hours 21,30 of 1 November: immediate execution; new line of alignment to assume itself for the dawn of 2 November: Rain Pool-Karet el Kadim; prohibition to operate destructions that however could reveal the movement to the enemy; means of transport on hand for the towing of pieces and the cargo at least part of the ammunition reservoirs; provisions and water (that they had been accumulated in sight of courageous resistance in place) nobody… All became account that began, for the regiment and the division the most painful vicissitude; but all were decided to make that this became also most glorious and remained into leggend. The withdrawn one in the desert…
(the traduction is automatic , far from perfection , I haven't time for reveased it, sorry)