A 1933 proposal to resolve the Polish Corridor dispute

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Re: A 1933 proposal to resolve the Polish Corridor dispute

#91

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 07 Feb 2016, 18:32

wm wrote:
4thskorpion wrote:As for Jews in today's Poland...when the PiS minister of defence thinks the Protocols of the Elders of Zion are probably genuine, one wonders!
And now please see here what the "chief Jew" of Poland produces and sells, and marvel at the extent of freedom of expression available in this country. But be warned, what you'll see there can't be unseen...

=======
Edit:

The "chief Jew" of Poland isn't Jerzy Urban but Poland's Chief Rabbi, Michael Schudrich - it's a well-known fact:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Schudrich

Please get the facts straight next time, your statements like the one above can be offensive to many people.

/Peter K
I wouldn't call Urban the "chief Jew" of Poland - that would be a slander to all other Jews in Poland.

Poland's current First Lady Agata Duda-Kornhauser is a better role model with partly Jewish ancestry:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agata_Kor ... and_family

As for Jerzy Urban - he is a hard-line Communist, a Polish equivalent of Germany's Gregor Gysi, I think:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gregor_Gysi

"Native Germans have low fertility because the Nazis are not good at making children" - said Gysi:

There are words which carry the presage of defeat. Defence is such a word. What is the result of an even victorious defence? The next attempt of imposing it to that weaker, defender. The attacker, despite temporary setback, feels the master of situation.

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Re: A 1933 proposal to resolve the Polish Corridor dispute

#92

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 07 Feb 2016, 19:11

Pretty much all posts from pages 5, 6 and 7 have been off topic in this thread.

Let's stick to the topic - "A 1933 proposal to resolve the Polish Corridor dispute".

Feel free to start a new thread to dicuss things not related to the Polish Corridor.
There are words which carry the presage of defeat. Defence is such a word. What is the result of an even victorious defence? The next attempt of imposing it to that weaker, defender. The attacker, despite temporary setback, feels the master of situation.


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Re: A 1933 proposal to resolve the Polish Corridor dispute

#93

Post by wm » 09 Feb 2016, 01:09

It can't be denied - lots of off-topic but still, we have a few misconceptions here that really need correcting.
Mr Urban isn't a communist, he (as his father) has been a socialist from the very day he was born. He is as Jewish as Moses himself but his family Polish credentials are beyond reproach.
His father fought for Poland politically under the Czarist regime, then fought for Poland as a volunteer soldier for three years. In the pre-war Poland he owned and ran a popular and influential daily, today an invaluable source of information about those times.
Mr Urban himself, in the fifties was a journalist in a popular weekly which contributed a lot to dismantling of the Stalinist regime in Poland. It was eventually shut down by the communists and he was banned from writing for many years.
Then, in the nineties he owned and ran a popular, although disliked by many weekly which poured a lot of cold water on the naivety about politics and everything else so prevalent after the fall of communism. It did the Poles good.
He is very well known and he is instantaneously recognizable by anybody. He and his father are part of Polish history. Those people mentioned above are not. You can't be the chief if nobody knows you.



And now as a repentance I would like to present this document. It shows that there was no need for any additional corridors, only an ounce of common sense was required.
It shows that Hitler initially didn't care much about the extraterritoriality of his pet project. And it shows that the Polish terms of agreement weren't that bad. He could have had his highway if he really wanted it.
28 November. Letter of the Head of the Western Section to the Ambassador in Berlin on the motorway through Polish Pomerania (with an appendix)
Warsaw, 28 November 1938
Top secret.
To Ambassador Lipski
in Berlin
[...]Among the more important questions that we intend to submit to the Minister is that of whether to plan the road through the territory of the Free City of Danzig, or immediately to the south of this territory. The second option seems far more convenient. As to the national status of the future road and certain other questions, I am sending a note solely for your guidance, about the direction in which we are moving.
I would like to mention that—in December 1937, when Puricelli last raised, through the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Rome, the suggestion of building a motorway through Polish Pomerania - it only concerned a concession for a set period of time granted to the Association about to be established, and not extraterritoriality. [...] Puricelli was supposed to have discussed the project with Chancellor Hitler, who adopted a very favourable attitude to it.
Piero Puricelli was a famous Italian road-builder, in Europe seen as the father of the motorway.

[appendix]
director J. Potocki
Top secret.
The question of the motorway through Polish Pomerania In connection with suggestions about building a motorway through Polish Pomerania to be used by Germany, the following issues arise:

1. Extraterritoriality. The strip of territory that would be designated for the motorway would cease to be subject to Polish jurisdiction and would pass under Germany's jurisdiction if Poland recognised it as extraterritorial. In effect, in this strip German law would be applicable, German courts would be competent (which is not insignificant with regard to automobile accidents), order would be kept by German police, the German customs system would be in force, etc. A criminal who ran away from Poland onto the motorway would have to be turned over to Polish authorities on the basis of the extradition agreement, whereas political and other criminals could be pursued by German police over the entire motorway. In treasury terms, indirect taxes (petrol), régies, etc., would be subject to German regulations. One of the important consequences of extraterritoriality would be Germany's right to transport troops and military supplies, both in time of peace and war, irrespective of Poland's neutrality.

2. Form of operation. Should the formula of extraterritoriality be rejected, the question arises of who would, on Germany's behalf, build and operate the motorway. It seems that this should be a joint-stock company, in which both the Reich and Poland would have an equal share. This company would be granted a concession from the Polish government for a specified number of years to build and operate the motorway. This could be solely a Polish-German company, or one with the participation of international capital. In the latter case, the question arises about what capital this should be so as to preclude the company from being used by a third State as an instrument in Polish-German relations (Swedish perhaps?).[...]
The company would probably have to draw profits from the operation by charging a toll for travelling on the motorway. [...]

3. The course of the motorway. The question of the motorway's course is not only an important question for the army, but also a political problem. If the motorway were to run in the northern section of Polish Pomerania, its further course would cross the territory of Danzig. In such a case, the Danzig section would have to be built and operated on the same conditions as the Polish section on account of Danzig being distinct from the Reich [...]

4. The Paris Convention. [...]
This is connected with the issue of using the motorway in time of war in which Germany would be a belligerent party, and Poland would be neutral. [...] It is in our interest to limit military transit on both the motorway and on other highways (subject to the Paris Convention) until peace is achieved, with the exclusion of a war in which either Germany or Poland is a belligerent party. The question of transport of troops or ammunition via the motorway in time of peace should be regulated in advance in order to avoid a sudden threat to State security in Polish Pomerania.

5. Links with Polish territory. The motorway could be built in such a way as to cross Polish territory without any links thereto, or with three or four exit ramps onto Polish territory along its course. [...]
source: Polish Institute of International Affairs, Polish Documents on Foreign Policy. 24 October 1938 – 30 September 1939
Last edited by wm on 09 Feb 2016, 03:29, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: A 1933 proposal to resolve the Polish Corridor dispute

#94

Post by michael mills » 09 Feb 2016, 02:48

I t5hink the Danzig question was more important to Hitler than the extraterritorial link to East Prussia.

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Re: A 1933 proposal to resolve the Polish Corridor dispute

#95

Post by Futurist » 09 Feb 2016, 03:20

michael mills wrote:I t5hink the Danzig question was more important to Hitler than the extraterritorial link to East Prussia.
You mean due to Danzig's ethnic German majority and due to the fact that a Germany with good relations with Poland would have been able to use Polish roads in order to access East Prussia?

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Re: A 1933 proposal to resolve the Polish Corridor dispute

#96

Post by michael mills » 09 Feb 2016, 04:05

Something like that. When the request for an extraterritorial link to East Prussia was presented in October 1938, it was part of a package of proposals that included Poland's becoming Germany's ally. If Poland and Germany had become full allies, then there would have been no need for the extraterritorial link.

For example, in 1940, German forces were able to move through Hungary to reach Romania and Bulgaria. That was because Germany and Hungary were allies; the German troops had free access, and there was no need for a special road belonging to Germany.

Furthermore, if Poland had agreed to the reunification of Danzig with Germany, the proposed access road could have followed the shortest route, from the easternmost part of German Pomerania to the westernmost part of Danzig. Such a short access road could have been built on pylons, with the land under it remaining Polish territory and providing unimpeded access to the Polish territory lying to the north of the access road, in particular the Polish port of Gdynia.

A narrow elevated road under German control could not have served as a base for an attack on Poland, if that is what the Polish Government truly feared, since the pylons supporting it could easily be demolished.

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Re: A 1933 proposal to resolve the Polish Corridor dispute

#97

Post by wm » 09 Feb 2016, 04:16

michael mills wrote:I t5hink the Danzig question was more important to Hitler than the extraterritorial link to East Prussia.
Certainly, but this wasn't an insurmountable problem either. At the beginning Hitler was sufficiently generous he offered Carpathian Ruthenia for Danzig. The problem was that territory, although a large one, was poor and useless. And Poland didn't want to acquire land through naked aggression.
But, some other territory, useless to Germany but with access to sea could have been much more attractive to Poland.
In the spirit of compromise a reasonable offer would be for example the land between Rummelsburg, Rügenwalde, Dembeck.

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Re: A 1933 proposal to resolve the Polish Corridor dispute

#98

Post by michael mills » 09 Feb 2016, 05:23

Carpathian Ruthenia was not useless to Poland, since possession of it would provide a land link to Hungary, one of the crucial aims of Polish foreign policy in the inter-war period, since Hungary was Poland's only friend in Eastern Europe.

The main reason why Poland supported Germany in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, apart from its desire to annex the western part of the former Teschen Duchy, was that it thought that once Slovakia became separated from Czechia, it could be partitioned between Poland and Hungary, thereby creating the desired Polish-Hungarian border. That is why the Polish Government became so angry when in March 1939 Germany made Slovakia into a separate state under its protection.

However, Hitler allowed Hungary to annex Carpathian Ruthenia, which did create a Polish-Hungarian border, albeit a rather short one. It is probable that Hitler allowed that annexation as a favour to Poland, rather than making Carpathian Ruthenia into a state under German protection from which Ukrainian nationalist activists could subvert either Soviet Ukraine, or the Ukrainian provinces of Poland, or perhaps both. The suppression of an independent Carpathian Ruthenia (which existed for just one day in March 1939) shows that Hitler was still interested in making a deal with Poland.

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Re: A 1933 proposal to resolve the Polish Corridor dispute

#99

Post by Futurist » 09 Feb 2016, 11:44

michael mills wrote:Carpathian Ruthenia was not useless to Poland, since possession of it would provide a land link to Hungary, one of the crucial aims of Polish foreign policy in the inter-war period, since Hungary was Poland's only friend in Eastern Europe.

The main reason why Poland supported Germany in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, apart from its desire to annex the western part of the former Teschen Duchy, was that it thought that once Slovakia became separated from Czechia, it could be partitioned between Poland and Hungary, thereby creating the desired Polish-Hungarian border. That is why the Polish Government became so angry when in March 1939 Germany made Slovakia into a separate state under its protection.

However, Hitler allowed Hungary to annex Carpathian Ruthenia, which did create a Polish-Hungarian border, albeit a rather short one. It is probable that Hitler allowed that annexation as a favour to Poland, rather than making Carpathian Ruthenia into a state under German protection from which Ukrainian nationalist activists could subvert either Soviet Ukraine, or the Ukrainian provinces of Poland, or perhaps both. The suppression of an independent Carpathian Ruthenia (which existed for just one day in March 1939) shows that Hitler was still interested in making a deal with Poland.
Thank you very much for sharing all of this information, Michael! :)

Also, out of curiosity--wasn't Galicia (as opposed to Subcarpatian Ruthenia) the center of Ukrainian nationalism back in the late 1930s (as well as right now, for that matter)? After all, the (relatively) Ukrainian nationalistic candidate Viktor Yushchenko won Galicia by a much larger margin in 2004 in comparison to the margin that he won Subcarpathian Ruthenia by:

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Re: A 1933 proposal to resolve the Polish Corridor dispute

#100

Post by wm » 09 Feb 2016, 12:25

michael mills wrote:The main reason why Poland supported Germany in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, apart from its desire to annex the western part of the former Teschen Duchy, was that it thought that once Slovakia became separated from Czechia, it could be partitioned between Poland and Hungary, thereby creating the desired Polish-Hungarian border.
There is not even a shred of evidence that Poland wanted to partition Slovakia, and lots of secret or top secret Polish diplomatic documents have survived from that period.

michael mills wrote:Carpathian Ruthenia was not useless to Poland, since possession of it would provide a land link to Hungary, one of the crucial aims of Polish foreign policy in the interwar period, since Hungary was Poland's only friend in Eastern Europe.
Poland didn't have any defensive agreements with Hungary, only with Romania and France.
In the interbellum period Romania was the only ally of Poland in Eastern Europe. Because of that an alliance with Hungary was impossible for obvious reasons.

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Re: A 1933 proposal to resolve the Polish Corridor dispute

#101

Post by michael mills » 09 Feb 2016, 14:14

Wm, I find it strange that you seem to want to dispute that Poland wanted to have a common border with Hungary.

Every book that I have read about inter-war Poland states that achieving a common border with Hungary was one of the main aims of Polish diplomacy in that period.

One of the reasons Poland was hostile to Czechoslovakia in the inter-war period is that the latter country separated it from Hungary. The only way Poland could have a common border with Hungary would be if Slovakia were separated from Czechia and annexed by either Hungary or Poland, or partitioned between them.

Romania was allied to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in the so-called "Little Entente", to which Poland was unfriendly.

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Re: A 1933 proposal to resolve the Polish Corridor dispute

#102

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 09 Feb 2016, 14:37

Futurist wrote:Ukrainian nationalistic candidate Viktor Yushchenko
Pro-EU candidate = nationalistic candidate? The "Orange Revolution" was about the westward shift of Ukraine - towards the EU.
There are words which carry the presage of defeat. Defence is such a word. What is the result of an even victorious defence? The next attempt of imposing it to that weaker, defender. The attacker, despite temporary setback, feels the master of situation.

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Re: A 1933 proposal to resolve the Polish Corridor dispute

#103

Post by Futurist » 09 Feb 2016, 20:09

Peter K wrote:
Futurist wrote:Ukrainian nationalistic candidate Viktor Yushchenko
Pro-EU candidate = nationalistic candidate? The "Orange Revolution" was about the westward shift of Ukraine - towards the EU.
Yes, Viktor Yushchenko was relatively nationalistic; for instance:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stepan_Ba ... nnulled.29

"On 22 January 2010, on the Day of Unity of Ukraine, the then-President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko awarded to Bandera the title of Hero of Ukraine (posthumously) for "defending national ideas and battling for an independent Ukrainian state."[100] A grandson of Bandera, also named Stepan, accepted the award that day from the Ukrainian President during the state ceremony to commemorate the Day of Unity of Ukraine at the National Opera House of Ukraine.[100][101][102][103]"

Also, supporting Ukrainian entry into the EU and/or into NATO can also be viewed as a form of Ukrainian nationalism. After all, Ukrainian EU and/or NATO membership would allow Ukraine to drift further out from Russia's orbit. :)

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Re: A 1933 proposal to resolve the Polish Corridor dispute

#104

Post by gebhk » 09 Feb 2016, 21:32

"Romania was allied to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in the so-called "Little Entente", to which Poland was unfriendly."
And nonetheless Poland was bound with Romania by military treaties.

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Re: A 1933 proposal to resolve the Polish Corridor dispute

#105

Post by wm » 09 Feb 2016, 23:33

michael mills wrote:Every book that I have read about inter-war Poland states that achieving a common border with Hungary was one of the main aims of Polish diplomacy in that period.
The common border was just a sideshow, it can't be regarded as a main aim.
Poland was dangerously vulnerable, needed allies, so her security was the main goal. The Polish-French convention was worthless, the Czechs impeccably hostile. Beck was trying to build a defensive bloc in Eastern Europe and an independent Slovakia was going to be a part of it.
That was hard enough without being a bully and annexing other countries.

The common border was nice, but without a defensive pact with Hungary it was good only as an escape route before the advancing Soviet Army.

michael mills wrote:One of the reasons Poland was hostile to Czechoslovakia in the inter-war period is that the latter country separated it from Hungary.
Poland actually offered a defense pact to Czechoslovakia a few times. The Czechs weren't interested and themselves never offered anything. Well, except that case in 1938, when Hitler parked his tanks fifty miles from the Prague city limits.

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