Historically I have not been interested in the Italian Campaign in Africa, and I focus on the Eastern Front during 1941.
However, I was reading this great book I found on sale called the The German Campaigns of World War II by Chris Bishop and Adam Warner. It is illustrated with all the operational maps and such, and is concise and, so-far, accurate about the campaigns. I was reading about the African campaign and was suprised to learn several facts:
"Axis forces in North Africa remained under Italian command until early 1943."
"Rommal was a corps and latterly army commander, but the superior officer in Africa was Italian."
"Rommel's troops were predominantly Italian."
"Italian divisions, notably the Ariete armoured division and the Trieste motorized division fought extremely well after the fiasco in early 1941."
If this is the case, then I don't understand how at one point the Italian troops buckled so easily, and the next they are fighting well. If Italians in Africa always remained under Italian command, why is Rommel considered to be "the general" of that campaign? Also, not many people think that the Italians were fighting in that campaign after 1941, or at the most the people I've talked to are under the impression that it was an even mix of German and Italian.
Does anyone have any thoughts on this?
- MVSN
The African Campaign: Italians and Germans
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MVSNConsolegenerale
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gabriel pagliarani
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I simply don't understand what is your question. The chain of Command? Simple: Lybia was considered "italian metropolitan ouseas provence" therefore the chief had to be (nominally) italian. But it was only a gentle arrangement: the fact was that Rommel got his own orders directly from Hitler. Courage? About the performances of Ariete, Centauro and other mechanized units, pls read the comments that Churchill reported in his memories. Did you think that the bloody hoax Cancellor Schmidt said in 1972 was really true and not only offensive? (...italian tanks had 1 gear to attack and 6 gears backward to escape..) The bones of those who never escaped still cover the sands of North Africa.
The Germans were sent to supprot the Italians. North Africa was an italian theatre.
Desert warfare required a higher degree of mechanisation than the bulk of the Italian units in North Africa possessed. Given the better equipment of the Germans, especially in terms of the level of mechanistion, these units played a more significant role than the usually poorly mechanised Italian units. As MVSNConsolegenerale says the Ariete and Trieste divisions i.e. the mechanised Italian units, performed well.
Even in the attacks by the British against the Italians in late 1940/early 1941 (Operation Compass) the bravery of the Italian artillery was much praised
The "buckling" of Italian forces was at least in some cases the result of the lack of transport. Once an Italian unit was cut off from supplies by a mechanised unit it was faced with the option of dying from thirst or surrender as it lacked a viable means of escape- escape on foot in the desert was not a realistic option.
The portrayal of Rommel as "the general" of the campaign results from two basic factors. Firstly he was in command of the more mechanised elements of the Axis forces in North Africa. If any successful advances were to be made they would be made by these mechanised units. Hence
reference would be made to "Rommel's troops" implying they were German, even when these included Italian forces.
Secondly the British propaganda had the Italians as inept inefficient and cowardly troops, they therefore could not defeat any British forces. The Germans had won in Norway and France so were obviously good troops. Rommel did defeat British troops and by having him as a bold leader these defeats were a little more "acceptable". The British admire such skilled generals even if they are the enemy. To be defeated by a genius is understandable... hence the moves by Montgomery and others to play down the "Rommel legend" to make him a more ordinary and therefore defeatable, general.
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Desert warfare required a higher degree of mechanisation than the bulk of the Italian units in North Africa possessed. Given the better equipment of the Germans, especially in terms of the level of mechanistion, these units played a more significant role than the usually poorly mechanised Italian units. As MVSNConsolegenerale says the Ariete and Trieste divisions i.e. the mechanised Italian units, performed well.
Even in the attacks by the British against the Italians in late 1940/early 1941 (Operation Compass) the bravery of the Italian artillery was much praised
The "buckling" of Italian forces was at least in some cases the result of the lack of transport. Once an Italian unit was cut off from supplies by a mechanised unit it was faced with the option of dying from thirst or surrender as it lacked a viable means of escape- escape on foot in the desert was not a realistic option.
The portrayal of Rommel as "the general" of the campaign results from two basic factors. Firstly he was in command of the more mechanised elements of the Axis forces in North Africa. If any successful advances were to be made they would be made by these mechanised units. Hence
reference would be made to "Rommel's troops" implying they were German, even when these included Italian forces.
Secondly the British propaganda had the Italians as inept inefficient and cowardly troops, they therefore could not defeat any British forces. The Germans had won in Norway and France so were obviously good troops. Rommel did defeat British troops and by having him as a bold leader these defeats were a little more "acceptable". The British admire such skilled generals even if they are the enemy. To be defeated by a genius is understandable... hence the moves by Montgomery and others to play down the "Rommel legend" to make him a more ordinary and therefore defeatable, general.
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gabriel pagliarani
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Sorry Daveh, but I agree only partially. The legend of italian cowardice was not originated by Allied propaganda, but had surely the strongest support in the same Wehrmacht. Both Stalingrad and El Alamein defeats were counted as Italian, not German defeats! And Britishes were not facing CSI on Don river's shores. Simply the invincible Nazi Army had the necessity to cover its own faults with the evident lacks of the less equipped, less effective, less trained and probably less militarized among Axis allieds.The fact that a Cancellor of the Bundesrepublik as Schmidt said the legend of the italian tank having 6 gears back to the President of France during a gala in Paris (...and Schmidt beloved Italy...) holds up how much this insult (calumnia is the right term) is still living among Germans. True or not, this insult is still running.
Italians in North Africa
Although technically Rommel was under Italian command, realistically the Italians were under German command in the campaign. Yes, the Germans had the better equipment and better overall units in that theater of operations, but the Germans also employed the Italians better in combat after they took over control than Mussolini did in 1940. Mussolini and Graziani’s handling of the Italian units was very poor in 1940. Overall, Rommel knew how to employ the Italian units in combat due to their inferior weapons and with Luftwaffe support they started to function better from 1941-43. The few German units down in North Africa gave the Axis stable and fast moving formations that allowed the other Italian division the ability to fight better and they did.
James
James
Hi gabriel pagliarani
Sorry I was taking a very British centred view when I wrote my previous posting. The Italian or indeed other Axis allies/ co -belligerent nations actions on the Easterm Front is poorly known in Britain. Where it is known it is as a result of the Germans "using" their Allies as an excuse for such failures as at Stalingrad.
Italian succeses and bravery eg at Keren, X MAS, torpedo bombers, Folgore Parachute Division get little mention.
As a follow on to this how were the Italians viewed and portrayed in WW! when they fought with Britain and France?
Sorry I was taking a very British centred view when I wrote my previous posting. The Italian or indeed other Axis allies/ co -belligerent nations actions on the Easterm Front is poorly known in Britain. Where it is known it is as a result of the Germans "using" their Allies as an excuse for such failures as at Stalingrad.
Italian succeses and bravery eg at Keren, X MAS, torpedo bombers, Folgore Parachute Division get little mention.
As a follow on to this how were the Italians viewed and portrayed in WW! when they fought with Britain and France?
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gabriel pagliarani
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If I well remember 1 of the only 5 Victoria Crosses postumosly released to British Pilots was given to a British crew lost on Italian front during WW1..therefore Italian front was surely considered one of the most dangerous and lethal sites in the world. During 1917-18 the expected time of life for italian soldiers in italian trenches was 3 days only, as per Austro-hungarics and Germans.
If you happen to read, for instance, H.U. Rudel book (I have always thought that memoire-like books have always had a very strong "grip" in readers minds) you will find that Mr. Rudel himself blaims very heavily the Italians that he saw running westward under his plane.corleone wrote:This is the first I have heard of the Germans blaming Italians for the loss of Stalingrad. How did they try and justify that?
The reader is left with the following impression: those bunch of cowards caused the loss of Stalingrad front, because through the gap left by the Italians, the Russian managed to encircle the city.
This only because Mr. Rudel book is only intended as the story of his personal, and very remarcable I should say, experience in war wich included the flight over retreating Italian troops.
If the reader doesn't go anyway deeper (not very much, just "the basics") he will be left with this impression.
But if the reader is couroius enough as to find the aswer to some questions such as: how many Italians were on the front? How many Kms was the front long? Who decided their displacement there? Did they possess any credible anti tank capability? How many Russians attacked them, when and where? Was this the first strike against the Axis line or, maybe, there was another successful strike before nearby? Were there any motorized/armoured reserves available in the second lines?
The answers to these question should modify the impressions left by Mr. Rudel (or other German and/or Allied) books.
Regards
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gabriel pagliarani
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I was just thinking at that book (Iron pilot: the italian title) The soldiers he saw were Rumanians: the gap was opened between Hungarian and Rumanian displacements but Rudel immediately thought to Italians. :roll: Too easy: it is alike to shoot to the pianist.FB wrote:If you happen to read, for instance, H.U. Rudel book (I have always thought that memoire-like books have always had a very strong "grip" in readers minds) you will find that Mr. Rudel himself blaims very heavily the Italians that he saw running westward under his plane.corleone wrote:This is the first I have heard of the Germans blaming Italians for the loss of Stalingrad. How did they try and justify that?
The reader is left with the following impression: those bunch of cowards caused the loss of Stalingrad front, because through the gap left by the Italians, the Russian managed to encircle the city.
This only because Mr. Rudel book is only intended as the story of his personal, and very remarcable I should say, experience in war wich included the flight over retreating Italian troops.
If the reader doesn't go anyway deeper (not very much, just "the basics") he will be left with this impression.
But if the reader is couroius enough as to find the aswer to some questions such as: how many Italians were on the front? How many Kms was the front long? Who decided their displacement there? Did they possess any credible anti tank capability? How many Russians attacked them, when and where? Was this the first strike against the Axis line or, maybe, there was another successful strike before nearby? Were there any motorized/armoured reserves available in the second lines?
The answers to these question should modify the impressions left by Mr. Rudel (or other German and/or Allied) books.
Regards
I could be wrong, of course, but if memory serves me correctly, the first gap through the Don Axis lines was opened in correspondance of the junction between a German Division and teh Romanian army Corps, southwards of ARMIR. Some days later, with Russian forces already behind the lines, the front of Cosseria and Ravenna Divs front was attacked (they resisted more or less one week) with strong pressure placed on the other Infantry Divisions (Sforzesca, Torino, Celere) all of them, I mean, what was left of them, received the order of retreat. The Alpini Corps, wich was placed in the northernmost part of the Italian Don front sector - bording north with the Hungarian Armee, with the "help" of the weak Vicenza Division was ordered to maintain the line "at all cost". Vicenza Div., which was an Inf. Div., had come to Russia as a garrisoning unit with only second and third line duty and for this reason the Division was lacking its Arty Regiment. It was nonetheless sent to the front line in substitution of Julia Div which had been sent in a hurry to the south (Ravenna and Cosseria sector) in order to try to stabilize the southern part of the front. They did it. After almost one month of resistance the Alpini Corps received the order to retreat. At this point they were completely surrounded, because also the Hungarian couldn't resist the sheer force of the Russian offensive and had to retreat.
But Mr. Rudel blaims it all on the Italians. Gabriel is correct: it's like shooting the pianist.
Nobody in particular has to be blamed for the disaster, IMHO. Except for the German high command that decided to leave hunderds of Kms of front too weakly defended (too few men x Kms of front) with no tanks behind as a reserve.
best regards
But Mr. Rudel blaims it all on the Italians. Gabriel is correct: it's like shooting the pianist.
Nobody in particular has to be blamed for the disaster, IMHO. Except for the German high command that decided to leave hunderds of Kms of front too weakly defended (too few men x Kms of front) with no tanks behind as a reserve.
best regards
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gabriel pagliarani
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Did you forget Black Shirts. They well performed both battles, but their units just destroied by enemy action were postumosly and silently cancelled from both OOBs. A Kingdom's political make-up necessary after Sept 8 1943 and the best youth of Italy MIA, then lost and forgotten for ever.FB wrote:I could be wrong, of course, but if memory serves me correctly, the first gap through the Don Axis lines was opened in correspondance of the junction between a German Division and teh Romanian army Corps, southwards of ARMIR. Some days later, with Russian forces already behind the lines, the front of Cosseria and Ravenna Divs front was attacked (they resisted more or less one week) with strong pressure placed on the other Infantry Divisions (Sforzesca, Torino, Celere) all of them, I mean, what was left of them, received the order of retreat. The Alpini Corps, wich was placed in the northernmost part of the Italian Don front sector - bording north with the Hungarian Armee, with the "help" of the weak Vicenza Division was ordered to maintain the line "at all cost". Vicenza Div., which was an Inf. Div., had come to Russia as a garrisoning unit with only second and third line duty and for this reason the Division was lacking its Arty Regiment. It was nonetheless sent to the front line in substitution of Julia Div which had been sent in a hurry to the south (Ravenna and Cosseria sector) in order to try to stabilize the southern part of the front. They did it. After almost one month of resistance the Alpini Corps received the order to retreat. At this point they were completely surrounded, because also the Hungarian couldn't resist the sheer force of the Russian offensive and had to retreat.
But Mr. Rudel blaims it all on the Italians. Gabriel is correct: it's like shooting the pianist.
Nobody in particular has to be blamed for the disaster, IMHO. Except for the German high command that decided to leave hunderds of Kms of front too weakly defended (too few men x Kms of front) with no tanks behind as a reserve.
best regards
About the loss of Stalingrad in particular, the Barbarossa plan in general must be said the following:
-A lot of people agreed that Barbarossa was destined to failure from the beginning.
-The German Allies (the Romanian Army included) weren't equiped and trained like the German Army. You musn't forget also the motivation of the soldiers.
The romanians didn't want to engage the USSR, more than needed. Their war with USSR stopped after eliberating a small teritory taken by USSR from Romania. Still, the German allies requested that the "war effort" to continue. With no modern equipment, courage can't win a battle.
About the African war:
As it was said, practically, Rommel got his orders from Berlin, only officially he answered to the Italian High Command. All the time, any major decision taken by him was reported to Berlin.
The "Deutche Afrika Korps" (in short DAK), was created and sent to Africa, with the sole purpose to stopp the british from driving the italians out of Northern Africa. It was a political move, so Hitler trying to maintain Italy in the war on his side. About the troops present on the Axis side in N. Africa, one could say that the italians were predominant. Practically, the success of DAK was due to it's brilliant leadership and equipment. Rommel said that, when well motivated and with modern weapons, the italians fought very well indeed. The lack of success of the italians in ww2 was (obviously) due to the "poor management" of the troops and no equipment.
-A lot of people agreed that Barbarossa was destined to failure from the beginning.
-The German Allies (the Romanian Army included) weren't equiped and trained like the German Army. You musn't forget also the motivation of the soldiers.
The romanians didn't want to engage the USSR, more than needed. Their war with USSR stopped after eliberating a small teritory taken by USSR from Romania. Still, the German allies requested that the "war effort" to continue. With no modern equipment, courage can't win a battle.
About the African war:
As it was said, practically, Rommel got his orders from Berlin, only officially he answered to the Italian High Command. All the time, any major decision taken by him was reported to Berlin.
The "Deutche Afrika Korps" (in short DAK), was created and sent to Africa, with the sole purpose to stopp the british from driving the italians out of Northern Africa. It was a political move, so Hitler trying to maintain Italy in the war on his side. About the troops present on the Axis side in N. Africa, one could say that the italians were predominant. Practically, the success of DAK was due to it's brilliant leadership and equipment. Rommel said that, when well motivated and with modern weapons, the italians fought very well indeed. The lack of success of the italians in ww2 was (obviously) due to the "poor management" of the troops and no equipment.