After studying the article "The Riviera Landings" in After the Battle #110,
I developed an interest in the equipment of 11th Panzer division during late summer of 1944. There was a division photo history some years ago and long out of print, which I have been unable to obtain.
Is anyone aware of any current or available publications which show the equipment of this unit?
Thank you,
Tom Nelson
11. Panzer-Division 1944
-
Bayerlein spirit
- Member
- Posts: 427
- Joined: 20 Dec 2002, 02:30
- Location: France (Lyon)
11°Pz southern France
11°Pz southern France
By 14 August 1944, anticipating that an Allied assault was imminent and that the blow might well fall in the Marseille-Toulon region, the German commanders had begun to move both the 11th Panzer and two infantry divisions east across the Rhone.
After landing, between 17 and 19 August, the two American divisions pushed west, their projected route of advance passing north of Toulon and Marseille and leading directly to the Rhone and Avignon, the location of Wiese's command post. At the same time, the Nineteenth Army commander tried desperately to establish a north-south defensive line, using first the 242d Division centered around Toulon and then the 244th Division guarding Marseille, together with various bits and pieces of the 189th and 198th Divisions as they ferried across the Rhone. His efforts were to no avail against the fast-moving Americans. On the evening of 20 August and with Patch's approval, he ordered Task Force Butler west toward Montelimar, a small French city on the east bank of the Rhone directly astride the German evacuation route. There Butler was to establish blocking positions and await the arrival of the 36th Division, elements of which were already headed toward Digne and Sisteron.
Complicating matters was the inexperience of the 36th Division commander, General Dahlquist, one of the few new senior officers in Truscott's corps, as well as the indecision of his superiors. On the afternoon of the 21st, for example, Truscott and Patch had received an ULTRA intercept informing them that elements of the 11th Panzer Division had crossed the Rhone and were headed directly for Aix-en-Provence. If Wiese's situation below Avignon had been greatly eased by Truscott's inaction, his problems to the north were only beginning. Sometime on the 21st the German army commander had received word that American combat forces, including armor and artillery, had begun interdicting traffic a few miles above Montelimar, between the Drome and Roubion Rivers. Local troops had repulsed an attack against Montelimar itself, but the Americans had occupied the hill masses to the north and northeast in strength. Wiese's immediate response was to urge Maj. Gen. Wend von Wietersheim, commander of the 11th Panzer Division, to hasten efforts to ferry his heavy vehicles across the Rhone and move north as quickly as possible to secure the German route of withdrawal. In fact, the small armored team which Wiese had earlier sent to Aix-en-Provence—which had been duly reported to Truscott via ULTRA channels—had been merely a ruse, something to keep the Americans guessing. But von Wietersheim would have a difficult time moving his armor north, and the Germans would now begin to pay for their ill-thought-out withdrawal plans and the absence of any security elements west of the Rhone above Avignon. The ensuing struggle around Montelimar ultimately pitted the U.S. 36th Division against von Wietersheim's panzers and, as they arrived northward, the surviving infantry divisions of the Nineteenth Army. In brief, the battle, which lasted for about nine days, from 21 to 29 August, saw both sides commit increasingly larger forces against the other with indecisive results. The retreating German units ultimately forced their way to Lyon, but suffered horrendous casualties in the process. Butler's actions on the very first day typified the American dilemma. Shooting up whatever attempted to move north of Montelimar during the afternoon of the 20th, the task force lacked the infantry to physically occupy the road, especially at night, or the munitions to interdict the highway by fire alone, despite the arrival of two corps artillery battalions dispatched by Truscott.
Instead, Butler focused his strength on Hill 300, a sharp north-south ridgeline about four miles north of Montelimar overlooking the main road near the river village of La Coucourde. By night, American armor generally pulled back into the Condillac Pass area, immediately north of Hill 300, where Butler established his command post.
Fortunately for the Americans, von Wietersheim's transportation problems were equal to their own, with the number of ferries capable of carrying his 45-ton Mark V Panther tanks limited, the roads crowded, fuel at a premium, and incessant Allied strafing attacks forcing him and his fellow commanders to make most of their movements by night. But as it slowly arrived in the critical region, the German armored division proved equally aggressive.
On 22 August von Wietersheim's armored reconnaissance battalion, the first element of the 11th Panzer Division to arrive at Montelimar, launched an immediate attack, moving east along the southern bank of the Roubion and then striking north behind Butler's positions. The dangerous thrust was thrown back by some late armored arrivals of Task Force Butler from Sisteron.
On the 23d and 24th, von Wietersheim repeated these flanking attacks with greater strength but less success as Dahlquist, assuming command of the battle from Butler, positioned more of his newly arriving forces on the Roubion front. Both sides also launched attacks and counterattacks against one another in the immediate vicinity of Montelimar with equally indecisive results. But to the north German infantry was finally able to clear the western slopes of Hill 300 of Americans, allowing the German withdrawal to resume.
Still unhappy with the situation, Wiese ordered von Wietersheim to clear the Americans from the entire area on 25 August. In addition to his armored division, the army commander put the bulk of the 198th Infantry Division, which had now arrived, together with two Luftwaffe air defense regiments and a medley of other units, including several railway guns, at his disposal. Complying, von Wietersheim launched five separate attacks on 25 August in an effort to keep the American center occupied while his armor struck deep into both flanks along the Roubion and Drome Rivers, surrounding the American position. But lack of coordination hampered the complicated series of attacks, which met strengthened American resistance.
Dahlquist was able to assemble his entire division as well as additional munitions supplies in the area. By that evening the American commander had not only been able to avoid encirclement, keeping secure his supply lines east, he had also managed to block the main highway just below La Coucourde with an infantry-tank team after the Germans had inadvertently left the area undefended. Only an impromptu midnight cavalry charge by German heavy tanks, led personally by a disgusted von Wietersheim, restored German control of the immediate roadway, knocking out ten of the lighter American tanks and tank destroyers in the process.
Despite von Wietersheim's success in keeping the road open— save for harassing American artillery fire—the situation of the Nineteenth Army was becoming increasingly desperate. In the south the two ports had been invested, allowing Patch to begin directing more supplies to Truscott's VI Corps and in turn allowing Truscott to push O'Daniel's 3d Division west and then north in pursuit of the withdrawing Germans. At the same time the VI Corps commander also sent Eagles' 45th Division north, backstopping Dahlquist's positions in the Montelimar region with one regiment and sending the bulk of the division toward Grenoble.
In the north, far above Lyon, Blaskowitz's forces from western France—a corps headquarters, two infantry divisions, and an assortment of other odds and ends—were still desperately fleeing east, as was most of the German civil-military establishment that remained in France. Harassed by Allied air attacks and the increasingly bolder French Resistance, it was only a matter of time before some of these columns would be overrun by Patton, or another aggressive Allied commander. For all these reasons, on 26 August Wiese ordered von Wietersheim to begin moving the bulk of the 11th Panzer Division to Lyon, leaving the Montelimar region in the hands of General Baptist Kniess, commander of the LXXXV Corps which had just arrived.
Between 26 and 28 August, Kniess had his withdrawing infantry divisions keep up the attacks against the 36th Division in the Roubion and Drome areas and in the hill masses in between. But his actions were primarily defensive, keeping Dahlquist too occupied with his flanks to launch a determined attack on the road while German forces moved north, many traveling on the western bank of the Rhone. Meanwhile, a rear guard engineer unit tried to keep the 3d Division at bay to the south. O'Daniel's forces had entered an undefended Avignon on 24 August and were pushing north in pursuit of Wiese's columns, their progress delayed primarily by shortages of fuel and vehicles.
By 27 August the bulk of the 11th Panzer Division had crossed north of the Drome together with almost all of the retreating infantry divisions. Only General Otto Richter's 198th Infantry Division remained at Montelimar, with the rear guard engineer detachment to the immediate south. On the night of 27-28 August, Richter led his remaining two regiments, together with a miscellany of other Germans who still hoped to elude capture, in an impromptu scramble north. In the process, one group ran straight into a major 36th Division offensive against Montelimar itself, leading to the capture of General Richter and about 700 of his troops, with the Americans suffering some 100 casualties.
As units of the 36th and 3d Divisions converged on Montelimar the following morning, they took approximately 500 prisoners, while a more thorough sweep of the battle area in the days that followed netted approximately 2,500 more. The Nineteenth Army had made good its escape, but had suffered terrible losses in the gauntlet through which the 36th Division had forced it to run.
With the fighting at Montelimar over and the southern ports secured about the same time, supplies once again began flowing to the VI Corps. Truscott was eager to begin the pursuit north. The 3d Division flowed through Montelimar almost without pause heading north toward Lyon, while the 45th Division took a slightly easterly route, moving through Grenoble and then north along the Swiss border. There was no appreciable resistance. Joining them was the 36th Division, now moving behind the 3d; lead elements of a French Algerian infantry division following in the wake of the 45th; and west across the Rhone the 1st French Armored Division, which had recently landed on the coast, moving rapidly up the river's opposite bank.
If Truscott and Patch refused to pause, neither could Wiese or Blaskowitz. With the Americans and French in hot pursuit, the Nineteenth Army commander instructed von Wietersheim, whose armored division was now just about the only effective combat unit left in his command, to cover the withdrawal of his forces farther north to Dijon.
At Dijon, Blaskowitz hoped that Wiese could form a loose cordon for a few days to allow for the arrival of those German forces streaming in from western France. That accomplished, Blaskowitz intended to withdraw what was left of his army group directly east into the Vosges Mountain-Belfort Gap area, establishing a juncture with the retreating northern army groups along the trace of the Franco-German border. Wanting no repeat of the Montelimar affair, von Wietersheim's armor was to secure the eastern flank of the withdrawal, gradually pulling back in a northeasterly direction to the Belfort Gap. While Wiese's infantry divisions plodded through Lyon and farther north during the first days of September, von Wietersheim thus prepared to fight a delaying action against the pursuing Americans.
1.... Map southern France 15-28 august 1944
2.... 11th Panzer Montélimar 23 august 1944
3.... 11th Panzer Montélimar 23 august 1944
By 14 August 1944, anticipating that an Allied assault was imminent and that the blow might well fall in the Marseille-Toulon region, the German commanders had begun to move both the 11th Panzer and two infantry divisions east across the Rhone.
After landing, between 17 and 19 August, the two American divisions pushed west, their projected route of advance passing north of Toulon and Marseille and leading directly to the Rhone and Avignon, the location of Wiese's command post. At the same time, the Nineteenth Army commander tried desperately to establish a north-south defensive line, using first the 242d Division centered around Toulon and then the 244th Division guarding Marseille, together with various bits and pieces of the 189th and 198th Divisions as they ferried across the Rhone. His efforts were to no avail against the fast-moving Americans. On the evening of 20 August and with Patch's approval, he ordered Task Force Butler west toward Montelimar, a small French city on the east bank of the Rhone directly astride the German evacuation route. There Butler was to establish blocking positions and await the arrival of the 36th Division, elements of which were already headed toward Digne and Sisteron.
Complicating matters was the inexperience of the 36th Division commander, General Dahlquist, one of the few new senior officers in Truscott's corps, as well as the indecision of his superiors. On the afternoon of the 21st, for example, Truscott and Patch had received an ULTRA intercept informing them that elements of the 11th Panzer Division had crossed the Rhone and were headed directly for Aix-en-Provence. If Wiese's situation below Avignon had been greatly eased by Truscott's inaction, his problems to the north were only beginning. Sometime on the 21st the German army commander had received word that American combat forces, including armor and artillery, had begun interdicting traffic a few miles above Montelimar, between the Drome and Roubion Rivers. Local troops had repulsed an attack against Montelimar itself, but the Americans had occupied the hill masses to the north and northeast in strength. Wiese's immediate response was to urge Maj. Gen. Wend von Wietersheim, commander of the 11th Panzer Division, to hasten efforts to ferry his heavy vehicles across the Rhone and move north as quickly as possible to secure the German route of withdrawal. In fact, the small armored team which Wiese had earlier sent to Aix-en-Provence—which had been duly reported to Truscott via ULTRA channels—had been merely a ruse, something to keep the Americans guessing. But von Wietersheim would have a difficult time moving his armor north, and the Germans would now begin to pay for their ill-thought-out withdrawal plans and the absence of any security elements west of the Rhone above Avignon. The ensuing struggle around Montelimar ultimately pitted the U.S. 36th Division against von Wietersheim's panzers and, as they arrived northward, the surviving infantry divisions of the Nineteenth Army. In brief, the battle, which lasted for about nine days, from 21 to 29 August, saw both sides commit increasingly larger forces against the other with indecisive results. The retreating German units ultimately forced their way to Lyon, but suffered horrendous casualties in the process. Butler's actions on the very first day typified the American dilemma. Shooting up whatever attempted to move north of Montelimar during the afternoon of the 20th, the task force lacked the infantry to physically occupy the road, especially at night, or the munitions to interdict the highway by fire alone, despite the arrival of two corps artillery battalions dispatched by Truscott.
Instead, Butler focused his strength on Hill 300, a sharp north-south ridgeline about four miles north of Montelimar overlooking the main road near the river village of La Coucourde. By night, American armor generally pulled back into the Condillac Pass area, immediately north of Hill 300, where Butler established his command post.
Fortunately for the Americans, von Wietersheim's transportation problems were equal to their own, with the number of ferries capable of carrying his 45-ton Mark V Panther tanks limited, the roads crowded, fuel at a premium, and incessant Allied strafing attacks forcing him and his fellow commanders to make most of their movements by night. But as it slowly arrived in the critical region, the German armored division proved equally aggressive.
On 22 August von Wietersheim's armored reconnaissance battalion, the first element of the 11th Panzer Division to arrive at Montelimar, launched an immediate attack, moving east along the southern bank of the Roubion and then striking north behind Butler's positions. The dangerous thrust was thrown back by some late armored arrivals of Task Force Butler from Sisteron.
On the 23d and 24th, von Wietersheim repeated these flanking attacks with greater strength but less success as Dahlquist, assuming command of the battle from Butler, positioned more of his newly arriving forces on the Roubion front. Both sides also launched attacks and counterattacks against one another in the immediate vicinity of Montelimar with equally indecisive results. But to the north German infantry was finally able to clear the western slopes of Hill 300 of Americans, allowing the German withdrawal to resume.
Still unhappy with the situation, Wiese ordered von Wietersheim to clear the Americans from the entire area on 25 August. In addition to his armored division, the army commander put the bulk of the 198th Infantry Division, which had now arrived, together with two Luftwaffe air defense regiments and a medley of other units, including several railway guns, at his disposal. Complying, von Wietersheim launched five separate attacks on 25 August in an effort to keep the American center occupied while his armor struck deep into both flanks along the Roubion and Drome Rivers, surrounding the American position. But lack of coordination hampered the complicated series of attacks, which met strengthened American resistance.
Dahlquist was able to assemble his entire division as well as additional munitions supplies in the area. By that evening the American commander had not only been able to avoid encirclement, keeping secure his supply lines east, he had also managed to block the main highway just below La Coucourde with an infantry-tank team after the Germans had inadvertently left the area undefended. Only an impromptu midnight cavalry charge by German heavy tanks, led personally by a disgusted von Wietersheim, restored German control of the immediate roadway, knocking out ten of the lighter American tanks and tank destroyers in the process.
Despite von Wietersheim's success in keeping the road open— save for harassing American artillery fire—the situation of the Nineteenth Army was becoming increasingly desperate. In the south the two ports had been invested, allowing Patch to begin directing more supplies to Truscott's VI Corps and in turn allowing Truscott to push O'Daniel's 3d Division west and then north in pursuit of the withdrawing Germans. At the same time the VI Corps commander also sent Eagles' 45th Division north, backstopping Dahlquist's positions in the Montelimar region with one regiment and sending the bulk of the division toward Grenoble.
In the north, far above Lyon, Blaskowitz's forces from western France—a corps headquarters, two infantry divisions, and an assortment of other odds and ends—were still desperately fleeing east, as was most of the German civil-military establishment that remained in France. Harassed by Allied air attacks and the increasingly bolder French Resistance, it was only a matter of time before some of these columns would be overrun by Patton, or another aggressive Allied commander. For all these reasons, on 26 August Wiese ordered von Wietersheim to begin moving the bulk of the 11th Panzer Division to Lyon, leaving the Montelimar region in the hands of General Baptist Kniess, commander of the LXXXV Corps which had just arrived.
Between 26 and 28 August, Kniess had his withdrawing infantry divisions keep up the attacks against the 36th Division in the Roubion and Drome areas and in the hill masses in between. But his actions were primarily defensive, keeping Dahlquist too occupied with his flanks to launch a determined attack on the road while German forces moved north, many traveling on the western bank of the Rhone. Meanwhile, a rear guard engineer unit tried to keep the 3d Division at bay to the south. O'Daniel's forces had entered an undefended Avignon on 24 August and were pushing north in pursuit of Wiese's columns, their progress delayed primarily by shortages of fuel and vehicles.
By 27 August the bulk of the 11th Panzer Division had crossed north of the Drome together with almost all of the retreating infantry divisions. Only General Otto Richter's 198th Infantry Division remained at Montelimar, with the rear guard engineer detachment to the immediate south. On the night of 27-28 August, Richter led his remaining two regiments, together with a miscellany of other Germans who still hoped to elude capture, in an impromptu scramble north. In the process, one group ran straight into a major 36th Division offensive against Montelimar itself, leading to the capture of General Richter and about 700 of his troops, with the Americans suffering some 100 casualties.
As units of the 36th and 3d Divisions converged on Montelimar the following morning, they took approximately 500 prisoners, while a more thorough sweep of the battle area in the days that followed netted approximately 2,500 more. The Nineteenth Army had made good its escape, but had suffered terrible losses in the gauntlet through which the 36th Division had forced it to run.
With the fighting at Montelimar over and the southern ports secured about the same time, supplies once again began flowing to the VI Corps. Truscott was eager to begin the pursuit north. The 3d Division flowed through Montelimar almost without pause heading north toward Lyon, while the 45th Division took a slightly easterly route, moving through Grenoble and then north along the Swiss border. There was no appreciable resistance. Joining them was the 36th Division, now moving behind the 3d; lead elements of a French Algerian infantry division following in the wake of the 45th; and west across the Rhone the 1st French Armored Division, which had recently landed on the coast, moving rapidly up the river's opposite bank.
If Truscott and Patch refused to pause, neither could Wiese or Blaskowitz. With the Americans and French in hot pursuit, the Nineteenth Army commander instructed von Wietersheim, whose armored division was now just about the only effective combat unit left in his command, to cover the withdrawal of his forces farther north to Dijon.
At Dijon, Blaskowitz hoped that Wiese could form a loose cordon for a few days to allow for the arrival of those German forces streaming in from western France. That accomplished, Blaskowitz intended to withdraw what was left of his army group directly east into the Vosges Mountain-Belfort Gap area, establishing a juncture with the retreating northern army groups along the trace of the Franco-German border. Wanting no repeat of the Montelimar affair, von Wietersheim's armor was to secure the eastern flank of the withdrawal, gradually pulling back in a northeasterly direction to the Belfort Gap. While Wiese's infantry divisions plodded through Lyon and farther north during the first days of September, von Wietersheim thus prepared to fight a delaying action against the pursuing Americans.
1.... Map southern France 15-28 august 1944
2.... 11th Panzer Montélimar 23 august 1944
3.... 11th Panzer Montélimar 23 august 1944
- Attachments
-
- 11th Panzer Montélimar 23 august 1944 (2).jpg (102.24 KiB) Viewed 10864 times
-
- 11th Panzer Montélimar 23 august 1944.jpg (78.51 KiB) Viewed 10863 times
-
- map southern France 15 28 august 1944.jpg (237.28 KiB) Viewed 10871 times
-
Bayerlein spirit
- Member
- Posts: 427
- Joined: 20 Dec 2002, 02:30
- Location: France (Lyon)
11. PzDiv.
1..... Destroyed XIX° Army Montélimar 23 26 august 1944
2..... Destroyed XIX° Army Montélimar 23 26 august 1944
3..... panther 08 1944 provence 11°pz (probably)
2..... Destroyed XIX° Army Montélimar 23 26 august 1944
3..... panther 08 1944 provence 11°pz (probably)
- Attachments
-
- panther 08 1944 provence 11°pz.jpeg (66.66 KiB) Viewed 10848 times
-
- Destroyed XIX° Army Montélimar 23 26 august 1944.jpg (163.85 KiB) Viewed 10854 times
-
- Destroyed XIX° Army Montélimar 23 26 august 1944 (2).jpg (92.43 KiB) Viewed 10861 times
-
Bayerlein spirit
- Member
- Posts: 427
- Joined: 20 Dec 2002, 02:30
- Location: France (Lyon)
11. PzDiv.
1..2..3... 11th Panzer Lyon 1 september 1944
source (DIHP) + La vie quotidienne dans le Rhone pendant la seconde guerre mondiale Marcel Ruby . Ed HORVATH + (CHDR) Lyon
source (DIHP) + La vie quotidienne dans le Rhone pendant la seconde guerre mondiale Marcel Ruby . Ed HORVATH + (CHDR) Lyon
- Attachments
-
- 11th Panzer Lyon 1 september 1944.jpg (140 KiB) Viewed 10842 times
-
- 11th Panzer Lyon 1 september 1944 (2).jpg (164.49 KiB) Viewed 10840 times
-
- 11th Panzer Lyon 1 september 1944 (3).jpg (123.43 KiB) Viewed 10844 times
-
Bayerlein spirit
- Member
- Posts: 427
- Joined: 20 Dec 2002, 02:30
- Location: France (Lyon)
11°pz
G.W Schrodeck - " Die 11.Panzer-Division ", Podzun-Verlag
http://www.kwanah.com/txmilmus/36division/archives.htm unit in Montélimar Battle 22-28 august 1944
http://www.kwanah.com/txmilmus/36division/archives.htm unit in Montélimar Battle 22-28 august 1944
Last edited by Bayerlein spirit on 23 Jul 2003, 00:54, edited 1 time in total.
-
Bayerlein spirit
- Member
- Posts: 427
- Joined: 20 Dec 2002, 02:30
- Location: France (Lyon)
Méximieux
The 179th Infantry US saw heavy combat at Meximieux (15 km near Lyon) 1-3 September 1944...10 panzer destroyed for 11th Panzer-Division ( 5 Panther- 1 Hummel and other unidentified)
1...2...3...11th Panzer losses at Méximieux between 1 an 3 september 1944 (CHRD) Lyon
© François Lescel - "La Bataille de Meximieux" -
Collection l'Histoire Proche -DG Communication Lyon
1...2...3...11th Panzer losses at Méximieux between 1 an 3 september 1944 (CHRD) Lyon
© François Lescel - "La Bataille de Meximieux" -
Collection l'Histoire Proche -DG Communication Lyon
- Attachments
-
- 11th_panzer_lyon_1_september_1944__2_[3].jpg (78.29 KiB) Viewed 10813 times
-
- 11th_panzer_Méximieux_3_september_1944[1].jpg (61.35 KiB) Viewed 10818 times
-
- 11th_panzer_Méximieux_3_september_1944[2].jpg (83.2 KiB) Viewed 10820 times
-
Bayerlein spirit
- Member
- Posts: 427
- Joined: 20 Dec 2002, 02:30
- Location: France (Lyon)
11°Panzer
Thanx Timo it's a real pleasure to share picture 
1..... 11th Panzer vehicles north Lyon 3 09 1944
2..... 11th Panzer vehicles north Lyon 3 09 1944
1..... 11th Panzer vehicles north Lyon 3 09 1944
2..... 11th Panzer vehicles north Lyon 3 09 1944
- Attachments
-
- 11th Panzer north Lyon 3 09 1944.jpg (134.8 KiB) Viewed 10708 times
-
- 11th Panzer north Lyon 3 09 1944 (2).jpg (130.93 KiB) Viewed 10708 times
-
Bayerlein spirit
- Member
- Posts: 427
- Joined: 20 Dec 2002, 02:30
- Location: France (Lyon)
11 PANZER 1944
Losses in Méximieux 31 08 /04 09 1944
10 Panthers
1 Panzer III
2 Hummel
1 Italian Panzer
1 Captured M8 Greyhound
3 SdKfz251
10 Vehicles (trucks and light vehicles)
Who knows for Montélimar?
10 Panthers
1 Panzer III
2 Hummel
1 Italian Panzer
1 Captured M8 Greyhound
3 SdKfz251
10 Vehicles (trucks and light vehicles)
Who knows for Montélimar?
- Attachments
-
- 11PzlossesMeximieux31aug-03sept44.jpg (158.86 KiB) Viewed 10388 times
-
- 11PzlossesMontélimar28-31august 1944.jpg (121.73 KiB) Viewed 10387 times
-
Redbaron1908
- Member
- Posts: 2023
- Joined: 31 Dec 2002, 18:52
- Location: Texas
-
Bayerlein spirit
- Member
- Posts: 427
- Joined: 20 Dec 2002, 02:30
- Location: France (Lyon)
11 PANZER 1944
Bad surprise for these "Hummel" Méximieux-Rue du stade 01 09 1944
- Attachments
-
- 11PzKOHummelX2MeximieuxRueDuStade010944.jpg (146.93 KiB) Viewed 10225 times
-
Bayerlein spirit
- Member
- Posts: 427
- Joined: 20 Dec 2002, 02:30
- Location: France (Lyon)
11. Panzer-Division 1944
Add-on of this thread http://www.network54.com/Hide/Forum/thr ... 1058898133
I've been looking for data on the 11P.D. for a while now. This is very interesting, Thanks!!!
I do have a couple of questions. I see the Panthers have a 3 number identification system on their turrets. Was this true for other tanks in the 11th such as MKIVs? How about Marders? I've read that the 11th was one of only a couple of divisions that used the 2 number system, but other than pictures of early advances in Russia, I've never seen any other evidence of the 2 number system.
I do have a couple of questions. I see the Panthers have a 3 number identification system on their turrets. Was this true for other tanks in the 11th such as MKIVs? How about Marders? I've read that the 11th was one of only a couple of divisions that used the 2 number system, but other than pictures of early advances in Russia, I've never seen any other evidence of the 2 number system.
-
Ron Klages
- In memoriam
- Posts: 299
- Joined: 20 Oct 2002, 22:34
- Location: Lynnwood, Washington
11PD on 1 September 1944
During it's withdrawal up the Rhone Valleyt the division suffered 70% losses of it's p[anzers and self-propelled guns but managed to get through with almost all of it's APCs a, softskinned vehicles and heavy weapons. In August the division lost:
349 men KIA
536 men WIA
473 men MIA
and 310 men to other causes
for a total of 1668 men
From the Dugdale Series here is the situation he reports for the 11.PD on 1 September 1944:
414 officers
0 officials
3102 NCOs
11316 enlisted men
Total of 14832 men
*****************************
Panzer Regiment 15
Stab with 7 Panzer IVs and 7 Möbelwagens
I. Btl.
Stab with 4 Panzer Vs and 2 SdKfz 251/8s
1. Kp. with 5 Panzer Vs
2. Kp. with 6 Panzer Vs
3. Kp. with 7 Panzer Vs
4. Kp. with 8 Panzer Vs
II. Btl.
Stab with 1 Panzer IV and 4 Panzer IIIs
5.Kp. with 8 Panzer IVs
6.Kp. with no tanks
7.Kp. with no tanks
8.Kp. with no tanks
*********************************
Panzergrenadier Regiment 110
Stab with 11 SdKfz 251s
Inf. Gun Kp. with 2 Grilles and 2 SdKfz 251s
Engr. Kp. with 5 Sdkz 251s
I. Btl.
Stab with 2 SdKfz 251/3s and 3 SdKfz 251/1s
1.Kp. with 1 251/3, 2 251/2, 2 251/9 and 8 251/1
2.Kp. with 1 251/3, 2 251/2, 1 251/9 and 7 251/1
3.Kp. with 1 251/3, 2 251/2, 2 251/9 and 6 251/1
4.Kp. with 1 251/, 5 251/1 with 4 towing 12cm mortars and 4 251/9
II. Btl.
no armored vehicles just trucks and cars
III. Btl did not exist
*********************************
Panzergrenadier Regiment 111
Stab with no armored vehicles
Inf. Gun Kp. with 1 Grilles and 3 SdKfz 251s
Engr. Kp. with no armored vehicles just trucks
I. Btl.
no armored vehicles just trucks and cars
II. Btl.
no armored vehicles just trucks and cars
III. Btl did not exist
*******************************
Panzer Aufklärungs Abteilung 11
Stab
3 SdkFz 231s
10 SdKfz 222s
3 SdKfz 223s
3 Sdkfz 251/3s
4 SdKfz 251/1s
1 SdKfz 250/3
1. Kp. with no armored vehicles but light and medium cars
2.Kp. with
2 SdKfz 250/3s
3 SdKfz 250/10
19 SdKfz 250/1s
2 SdKfz 250/8s
2 SdKfz 250/7s
3.Kp. with
1 SdKfz 250/3
10 SdKfz 251/1s
4.Kp. with no armored vehicles but light and medium cars
5.Kp. with
1 SdKfz 251/3
4 SdKfz 251/9s
3 SdKfz 251/2s
3 SdKfz 251/1s
*******************************************
Panzerjäger Abteilung 61
Stab with no armored vehicles
1.Kp. with
1 StuG III and 8 Marders
2.Kp. did not exist
3.Kp. with 9 towed PaK 40s
After the lengthy fighting on the Eastern Front the unit was brought back to strength in France in the spring of 1944 by rebuilding using Reserve PJA 10 which had obsolete 4 Marder IIs [SdKfz 132] and 4 Marder IIIs [SdKfz 139]. Both of these types of Marder had the 7.62cm Russian Pak mounted.
The abteilung was awaiting the delivery of a full complement of 21 Jagdpanzer IVs. The personnel were in Saverne training on the Jagdpanzer IVs. They did not rejoin the division until late November.
****************************************
Panzer Artillerie Regiment 119
Stab with no armored vehicles
I. Btl.
Stab with 4 Panzerbeob. IIIs and 2 SdKfz 251s
1. Btty. with 4 Wespe
2. Btty. with 4 Wespe
3. Btty. with 3 Hummel
II. Btl.
Stab with no armored vehicles
4.Btty. with 6 10.5cm towed howitzers
5.Btty. with 5 10.5cm towed howitzers
III. Btl.
Stab with no armored vehicles
6.Btty. with 4 10.cm towed cannons
7.Btty. with 3 15cm towed howitzers
8.Btty. with 3 15cm towed howitzers
IV. Btl. did not exist
************************
Panzer Nachrichten Abteilung 89
Stab with no armored vehicled
1.Kp with trucks and cars only
2. Kp. with 7 SdKfz 251s
****************************
Panzer Pionier Btl. 209
Stab with 8 SdKfz 251s
1. Kp. with trucks only
2. Kp. with trucks only
3. Kp. with 20 SdKfz 251s
*****************************
Heeres Flak Abteilung 277
Stab with no armored vehicles
1.Btty. with 5 towed 8.8cm Flak guns and 2 2cm mounted Flak guns on SdKfz 10/4
2.Btty. with 5 towed 8.8cm Flak guns and 3 2cm mounted Flak guns towed
****************************
Here is the status of the Armored Vehicles:
Panzer IVs 5 operational, 5 in str and 6 in ltr
Panzer Vs 19 operational, 8 in str and 3 in ltr
StuG IIIs 1 operational
Marder IIIs 3 operational, 4 in str and 1 in ltr
Möbelwagens 7 operational
SdKfz 250s 23 operational, 3 in str and 4 in ltr
SdKfz 251s 128 operational, 6 in str and 4 in ltr
Armored Cars 13 operational and 3 in str
Grilles 3 operational
Hummel 3 operational
Wespe 6 operational and 2 in str
***************************************
Here is an accounting of the remaining divisional vehicles:
operational/ in short term repair
Kettenkrads 17/0
Motorcycles 238/36
Motorcycles with sidecar 29/3
civilian cars 659/64
cross country cars 254/13
civilian trucks 1049/109
cross country trucks 113/7
Maultiers 22/1
1 to 5 ton prime movers 21/4
8 to 18 ton prime movers 25/3
RSOs 2/0
************************************
This should provide a good look at the 11. PD in the late summer of 1944.
Best regards,
Ron Klages
349 men KIA
536 men WIA
473 men MIA
and 310 men to other causes
for a total of 1668 men
From the Dugdale Series here is the situation he reports for the 11.PD on 1 September 1944:
414 officers
0 officials
3102 NCOs
11316 enlisted men
Total of 14832 men
*****************************
Panzer Regiment 15
Stab with 7 Panzer IVs and 7 Möbelwagens
I. Btl.
Stab with 4 Panzer Vs and 2 SdKfz 251/8s
1. Kp. with 5 Panzer Vs
2. Kp. with 6 Panzer Vs
3. Kp. with 7 Panzer Vs
4. Kp. with 8 Panzer Vs
II. Btl.
Stab with 1 Panzer IV and 4 Panzer IIIs
5.Kp. with 8 Panzer IVs
6.Kp. with no tanks
7.Kp. with no tanks
8.Kp. with no tanks
*********************************
Panzergrenadier Regiment 110
Stab with 11 SdKfz 251s
Inf. Gun Kp. with 2 Grilles and 2 SdKfz 251s
Engr. Kp. with 5 Sdkz 251s
I. Btl.
Stab with 2 SdKfz 251/3s and 3 SdKfz 251/1s
1.Kp. with 1 251/3, 2 251/2, 2 251/9 and 8 251/1
2.Kp. with 1 251/3, 2 251/2, 1 251/9 and 7 251/1
3.Kp. with 1 251/3, 2 251/2, 2 251/9 and 6 251/1
4.Kp. with 1 251/, 5 251/1 with 4 towing 12cm mortars and 4 251/9
II. Btl.
no armored vehicles just trucks and cars
III. Btl did not exist
*********************************
Panzergrenadier Regiment 111
Stab with no armored vehicles
Inf. Gun Kp. with 1 Grilles and 3 SdKfz 251s
Engr. Kp. with no armored vehicles just trucks
I. Btl.
no armored vehicles just trucks and cars
II. Btl.
no armored vehicles just trucks and cars
III. Btl did not exist
*******************************
Panzer Aufklärungs Abteilung 11
Stab
3 SdkFz 231s
10 SdKfz 222s
3 SdKfz 223s
3 Sdkfz 251/3s
4 SdKfz 251/1s
1 SdKfz 250/3
1. Kp. with no armored vehicles but light and medium cars
2.Kp. with
2 SdKfz 250/3s
3 SdKfz 250/10
19 SdKfz 250/1s
2 SdKfz 250/8s
2 SdKfz 250/7s
3.Kp. with
1 SdKfz 250/3
10 SdKfz 251/1s
4.Kp. with no armored vehicles but light and medium cars
5.Kp. with
1 SdKfz 251/3
4 SdKfz 251/9s
3 SdKfz 251/2s
3 SdKfz 251/1s
*******************************************
Panzerjäger Abteilung 61
Stab with no armored vehicles
1.Kp. with
1 StuG III and 8 Marders
2.Kp. did not exist
3.Kp. with 9 towed PaK 40s
After the lengthy fighting on the Eastern Front the unit was brought back to strength in France in the spring of 1944 by rebuilding using Reserve PJA 10 which had obsolete 4 Marder IIs [SdKfz 132] and 4 Marder IIIs [SdKfz 139]. Both of these types of Marder had the 7.62cm Russian Pak mounted.
The abteilung was awaiting the delivery of a full complement of 21 Jagdpanzer IVs. The personnel were in Saverne training on the Jagdpanzer IVs. They did not rejoin the division until late November.
****************************************
Panzer Artillerie Regiment 119
Stab with no armored vehicles
I. Btl.
Stab with 4 Panzerbeob. IIIs and 2 SdKfz 251s
1. Btty. with 4 Wespe
2. Btty. with 4 Wespe
3. Btty. with 3 Hummel
II. Btl.
Stab with no armored vehicles
4.Btty. with 6 10.5cm towed howitzers
5.Btty. with 5 10.5cm towed howitzers
III. Btl.
Stab with no armored vehicles
6.Btty. with 4 10.cm towed cannons
7.Btty. with 3 15cm towed howitzers
8.Btty. with 3 15cm towed howitzers
IV. Btl. did not exist
************************
Panzer Nachrichten Abteilung 89
Stab with no armored vehicled
1.Kp with trucks and cars only
2. Kp. with 7 SdKfz 251s
****************************
Panzer Pionier Btl. 209
Stab with 8 SdKfz 251s
1. Kp. with trucks only
2. Kp. with trucks only
3. Kp. with 20 SdKfz 251s
*****************************
Heeres Flak Abteilung 277
Stab with no armored vehicles
1.Btty. with 5 towed 8.8cm Flak guns and 2 2cm mounted Flak guns on SdKfz 10/4
2.Btty. with 5 towed 8.8cm Flak guns and 3 2cm mounted Flak guns towed
****************************
Here is the status of the Armored Vehicles:
Panzer IVs 5 operational, 5 in str and 6 in ltr
Panzer Vs 19 operational, 8 in str and 3 in ltr
StuG IIIs 1 operational
Marder IIIs 3 operational, 4 in str and 1 in ltr
Möbelwagens 7 operational
SdKfz 250s 23 operational, 3 in str and 4 in ltr
SdKfz 251s 128 operational, 6 in str and 4 in ltr
Armored Cars 13 operational and 3 in str
Grilles 3 operational
Hummel 3 operational
Wespe 6 operational and 2 in str
***************************************
Here is an accounting of the remaining divisional vehicles:
operational/ in short term repair
Kettenkrads 17/0
Motorcycles 238/36
Motorcycles with sidecar 29/3
civilian cars 659/64
cross country cars 254/13
civilian trucks 1049/109
cross country trucks 113/7
Maultiers 22/1
1 to 5 ton prime movers 21/4
8 to 18 ton prime movers 25/3
RSOs 2/0
************************************
This should provide a good look at the 11. PD in the late summer of 1944.
Best regards,
Ron Klages
Re: 11. Panzer-Division 1944
I reopen this thread as I noticed that the second picture (see below) of the quoted post shows a "194 mm GPF chenillé St-Chamond" gun (German designation: 19,4 cm K485(f)) next to two German half-tracks. However, there is no trace of such gun in the 11 PzDiv inventory.Bayerlein spirit wrote:1..2..3... 11th Panzer Lyon 1 september 1944
source (DIHP) + La vie quotidienne dans le Rhone pendant la seconde guerre mondiale Marcel Ruby . Ed HORVATH + (CHDR) Lyon
This leads me to believe that the picture was actually not taken in September 1944 but possibly in June 1940 and the two half-tracks possibly intended to tow the abandoned French gun to a collection point.
Emmanuel