Rough estimates OK.
Also, on hearing from a few members on this site previosly, there was a conversation on large amounts of gear being held back from the troops, what might this have consisted of and maybe to the actual amount of it?
Thanks all
Italian Army statistics wanted
Italian Army statistics wanted
Hi, was wondering what the total force of the Italian army was at any one time up to 1943 and possibly what percentage of that was deployed in action.
Rough estimates OK.
Also, on hearing from a few members on this site previosly, there was a conversation on large amounts of gear being held back from the troops, what might this have consisted of and maybe to the actual amount of it?
Thanks all
Rough estimates OK.
Also, on hearing from a few members on this site previosly, there was a conversation on large amounts of gear being held back from the troops, what might this have consisted of and maybe to the actual amount of it?
Thanks all
This on the Army Divisions and their deployments in early 1943:
Greek Occupation--9 divisions
Yugoslav Occupation--13 divisions
Albanian Occupation--4 divisions
Sardinia Garrison--3 divisions
Corsica Garrison--2 divisions
Vichy France Occupation--3 divisions
Italy & Sicily--11 divisions
Add around a dozen Italian divisions still on active duty( in Tunisia and/or remnants returning from Russian service) then the majority of deployment was on occupation/garrison duties.
Source:Osprey The Italian Army 1940-45 Volume One.
Greek Occupation--9 divisions
Yugoslav Occupation--13 divisions
Albanian Occupation--4 divisions
Sardinia Garrison--3 divisions
Corsica Garrison--2 divisions
Vichy France Occupation--3 divisions
Italy & Sicily--11 divisions
Add around a dozen Italian divisions still on active duty( in Tunisia and/or remnants returning from Russian service) then the majority of deployment was on occupation/garrison duties.
Source:Osprey The Italian Army 1940-45 Volume One.
20/11/42
Greek Occupation--12 divisions
Yugoslav Occupation--19 divisions
Albanian Occupation--3 divisions
Sardinia Garrison--2 divisions + 2 coastal Divs
Corsica Garrison--2 divisions
Vichy France Occupation--6 divisions
Italy & Sicily--12 divisions + 10 coastal Divs
North Africa 12 divs
Russia 10 divs
Active fronts N Africa and Russia ie 22 divs out of 78 (+ 12 coastal)
Greek Occupation--12 divisions
Yugoslav Occupation--19 divisions
Albanian Occupation--3 divisions
Sardinia Garrison--2 divisions + 2 coastal Divs
Corsica Garrison--2 divisions
Vichy France Occupation--6 divisions
Italy & Sicily--12 divisions + 10 coastal Divs
North Africa 12 divs
Russia 10 divs
Active fronts N Africa and Russia ie 22 divs out of 78 (+ 12 coastal)
Is there a particular reason why so many divisions were in waiting?
Possibly due to short falls in heavy equipment (tanks, planes) rendering them ill-equiped for battle?
I just find it strange that so many divisions were raised for only 25% of them to be used at any one time.
I do calculate that getting so many men in N Africa for instance does also have its share of problems with transport but my only conclusion would be that less divisions would have been supplied much better instead of supplying 78 total divisions.
Any thoughts?
Possibly due to short falls in heavy equipment (tanks, planes) rendering them ill-equiped for battle?
I just find it strange that so many divisions were raised for only 25% of them to be used at any one time.
I do calculate that getting so many men in N Africa for instance does also have its share of problems with transport but my only conclusion would be that less divisions would have been supplied much better instead of supplying 78 total divisions.
Any thoughts?
The Divisions in Yugoslavia(to elaborate Croatia and Bosnia) did experience some severe fighting against Tito and suffered around 1,500 killed in action up to 1943.The huge occupation force in the Balkans(some 30 or more divisions) was also a reflection of the German desire to forgo their own units in this role as much as possible.
Mechanisation was a definite problem--the army began the war with 49,000 motor vehicles,down to 39,000 by 1941,only 30,000 by 1942.The army had no tracked or half-tracked transport and its wheeled trucks were not designed for off-road movement.The 8th Army in Russia also took the cream of the equipment,especially artillery.In contrast the North African forces had no modern 75mm howitzers,AT guns,or sufficent vehicles,due to the drain on the Russian Front commitment.
Perhaps Mussolini's comments, based on the poor performance of the Italian army in Albania in 1940, should have been adopted in hindsight(regardless of its slur against the southern Italians):
In the future we shall create an army of professionals,selecting them out of the twelve or thiteen million Italians in the Valley of the Po and in the regions of Central Italy.All the others will be put to work making arms for the warrior aristocracy.
Mechanisation was a definite problem--the army began the war with 49,000 motor vehicles,down to 39,000 by 1941,only 30,000 by 1942.The army had no tracked or half-tracked transport and its wheeled trucks were not designed for off-road movement.The 8th Army in Russia also took the cream of the equipment,especially artillery.In contrast the North African forces had no modern 75mm howitzers,AT guns,or sufficent vehicles,due to the drain on the Russian Front commitment.
Perhaps Mussolini's comments, based on the poor performance of the Italian army in Albania in 1940, should have been adopted in hindsight(regardless of its slur against the southern Italians):
In the future we shall create an army of professionals,selecting them out of the twelve or thiteen million Italians in the Valley of the Po and in the regions of Central Italy.All the others will be put to work making arms for the warrior aristocracy.
Thanks Moulded, but in that last comment of Mussolini's, I'd have plenty to say, but wont.
Seems his little empire in the north was doing wonders after 1943.
Maybe if he should have stayed out of war in the first place, at least that's what most wanted anyway, compared to what he dragged the country through for his glory.
Bye
Seems his little empire in the north was doing wonders after 1943.
Maybe if he should have stayed out of war in the first place, at least that's what most wanted anyway, compared to what he dragged the country through for his glory.
Bye
Last edited by Napoli on 24 Jun 2003, 10:08, edited 1 time in total.
Mussolini's whim of equating numbers with quality equipped units was a folly.Fine,you might have the manpower base,but you also need the equipment.
Badaglio informed Mussolini that even in 1940 only 20% of the divisions were considered effective.With something like 63 divisions available by the end of that year,Il Duce in all his wisdom wanted to raise another 23 in 1942.He nearly meet this target but raised only another 20.
Mussolini was good at passing the buck on failure---nominating certain generals,officials or using the regional prejudices he held against many of his troops.He even called the King "a little sardine."
I think most of us here would agree that a professional,smaller deployment of equipped divisions(say 30 or so) would have worked out better,quality instead of quantity,regardless of regional background.With each division costing at least 90 million lire to raise,more funding would have been left over for equipment anyway.
Badaglio informed Mussolini that even in 1940 only 20% of the divisions were considered effective.With something like 63 divisions available by the end of that year,Il Duce in all his wisdom wanted to raise another 23 in 1942.He nearly meet this target but raised only another 20.
Mussolini was good at passing the buck on failure---nominating certain generals,officials or using the regional prejudices he held against many of his troops.He even called the King "a little sardine."
I think most of us here would agree that a professional,smaller deployment of equipped divisions(say 30 or so) would have worked out better,quality instead of quantity,regardless of regional background.With each division costing at least 90 million lire to raise,more funding would have been left over for equipment anyway.
The raising of so many divisions would have seemed a fine idea if contemplating a WW1 trench/stagnant style of war?
Still I say it would have been possible even by 1941 to realise scaling back manpower in preference to more gear for the dollar value.
Anyone else want to consider adding their thoughts?
Still I say it would have been possible even by 1941 to realise scaling back manpower in preference to more gear for the dollar value.
Anyone else want to consider adding their thoughts?
In a meeting on 6/3/42 Cavallero noted that Italy's levels of production could barely sustain fewer than 20 divisions in contact with the enemy.
Even when new plant and machinery had been ordered eg by the Army in 1938 for new artillery, when such plants came on line in 1941-2 energy shortages limited production. For example 2/42 saw only 170 47mmAT guns produced instead of the planned 290 because of coal and electricity shortages.
Italy's GDP peaked in 1939 whereas other WW2 nations peaked in 1942 and later. Her limited industrial base restricted the production of weapons, Many Italian designs were of good quality eg the Cannone da 149/40 modello 35, but of the 590 on order by 1940 only a few were built at one point there were 3 in Italy, 12 in N Africa and 36 in Russia.
If men had been diverted into production rather than serving in army divisions this problem of a poor industrial base would have still existed. Italy lacked most of the basic materials required for an industrial nation relying on for example coal imports from Germany and oil shipped from Rumania.
A concentration of the limited resources available in a few divisions on one front would have been more useful. Limiting any troops sent to Russia to those unsuited to N Africa eg the Alpini who would have been useful in the Caucasus mountains and concentrating mechanised equipment and the limited AFV and artillery resources in N Africa might have improved the combat capability of divisions in N Africa
If these units had undergone the type of thorough training that produced for example the Folgore parachute division, or had utilised the experiences gained by the Ariete armoured division it is possible that thses new Italian units would have been of great assistance to the Axis cuase in africa..
Even when new plant and machinery had been ordered eg by the Army in 1938 for new artillery, when such plants came on line in 1941-2 energy shortages limited production. For example 2/42 saw only 170 47mmAT guns produced instead of the planned 290 because of coal and electricity shortages.
Italy's GDP peaked in 1939 whereas other WW2 nations peaked in 1942 and later. Her limited industrial base restricted the production of weapons, Many Italian designs were of good quality eg the Cannone da 149/40 modello 35, but of the 590 on order by 1940 only a few were built at one point there were 3 in Italy, 12 in N Africa and 36 in Russia.
If men had been diverted into production rather than serving in army divisions this problem of a poor industrial base would have still existed. Italy lacked most of the basic materials required for an industrial nation relying on for example coal imports from Germany and oil shipped from Rumania.
A concentration of the limited resources available in a few divisions on one front would have been more useful. Limiting any troops sent to Russia to those unsuited to N Africa eg the Alpini who would have been useful in the Caucasus mountains and concentrating mechanised equipment and the limited AFV and artillery resources in N Africa might have improved the combat capability of divisions in N Africa
If these units had undergone the type of thorough training that produced for example the Folgore parachute division, or had utilised the experiences gained by the Ariete armoured division it is possible that thses new Italian units would have been of great assistance to the Axis cuase in africa..