61st Anniversary of Zitadel

[Dora]

All,
One aspect of the Kursk (Unternehmen Zidadele) offensive that I have not seen mentioned was that it represented the Ost Hee's loss of their last strategic panzer reserve for the rest of the war in the east. The painstaking collection of the best of the panzerwaffen and Waffen SS panzer divisions to be squandered on such an obviously and deeply defended zone was the height of stupidity.

The German ability to plan, manufacture, train and equip such a powerful mechanized force was an opportunity that would never arrive again, on either front. The Wehrmacht intelligence failure to detect the throroughly prepared Russian defenses and the many delays that added to the enemies preparations (including the sudden Russian pre-offensive artillery bombardment and the premature commitment of the PzKw Mk. V "Panther" prior to completing its development and testing and the revealing of this new weapon to the Soviets) are symptomatic of the meddeling of Hitler in Wehrmacht planning and operations and to the overall defeat of Germany in World War II.
Dora

[Doppleganger]

All,
One aspect of the Kursk (Unternehmen Zidadele) offensive that I have not seen mentioned was that it represented the Ost Hee's loss of their last strategic panzer reserve for the rest of the war in the east. The painstaking collection of the best of the panzerwaffen and Waffen SS panzer divisions to be squandered on such an obviously and deeply defended zone was the height of stupidity.

Indeed it was. I wonder how the Ostfront in 1943 would have been shaped had Erich von Manstein been allowed to carry out his preferred plan of trying to lure the Soviet Southern front into the Donets Basin and then trap them with the Sea of Azov behind them. Had that happened and been successful Kursk would have probably been encircled anyway. But then this is probably the wrong thread to discuss such a scenario.

I also wonder what would have happened had Hitler not called off Zitadelle on 11 July. I was under the impression that Kursk was there for the taking but news on other fronts, notably the start of Operation Husky by Anglo-American forces in Sicily made Hitler nervous.

[Qvist]

All,
One aspect of the Kursk (Unternehmen Zidadele) offensive that I have not seen mentioned was that it represented the Ost Hee's loss of their last strategic panzer reserve for the rest of the war in the east. The painstaking collection of the best of the panzerwaffen and Waffen SS panzer divisions to be squandered on such an obviously and deeply defended zone was the height of stupidity.

The German ability to plan, manufacture, train and equip such a powerful mechanized force was an opportunity that would never arrive again, on either front. The Wehrmacht intelligence failure to detect the throroughly prepared Russian defenses and the many delays that added to the enemies preparations (including the sudden Russian pre-offensive artillery bombardment and the premature commitment of the PzKw Mk. V "Panther" prior to completing its development and testing and the revealing of this new weapon to the Soviets) are symptomatic of the meddeling of Hitler in Wehrmacht planning and operations and to the overall defeat of Germany in World War II.

Well, this is again contradicted by cold analysis and is not essentially less mythic than previously mentioned factors. German tank losses at Kursk were far from debilitating and represented only a fraction of German tank losses in 1943. No Panzer division was "squandered" at Kursk, and again, the scale of losses were not essentially different from the ones incurred in other major operations during the summer or winter. Germany did not lose it's "Panzer reserve" at Kursk - German tank losses in 1943 was a steady, grinding affair where Kursk does not stand out especially.

As for the ability to "plan, manufacture, train and equip such a mechanised force", this is again back into old familiar mythical landscapes. With the Soviets for the time being ceding the initiative, and with the longest unbroken lull of the whole war behind them, the German Panzer forces were in unusually good shape, that is so. But the notion that the forces assembled at Kursk represented an unprecedented collection of armoured force, with handpicked divisions specially trained to a high pitch of efficiency, superbly equipped - a sort of Panzer Grand Armada - is not a tenable one. Reality was somewhat different. Several units complained of lacking time to train replacements properly. The general standard of the tanks was much lower than what would be average half a year later. And most importantly, practically every Panzer Division that took place in the offensive went into action seriously understrength in tanks. This was not a highly planned and manufactured special force. German tank strength in the East, BTW, was higher in December 1943 than it was in July - so so much for the oft-heard impossibility of reploacing losses at Kursk.

Again - there's nothing essentially special about Kursk.

cheers

[Qvist]

Hello Dora

So sorry - I should have clarified that. They are combined Soviet/allied.

cheers

[Mark V.]

Newton, did a pretty good start in analyzing the battle and its effects with his book "Kursk: The German view". Unfortunately he based his conclusion (Kursk as a decisive battle) mainly on the heavy combat losses of 9.Armee.

[Topspeed]

Mark V.

I tought you lived in Finland..now you moved to Slovenia ?

Juke T

[Qvist]

Newton, did a pretty good start in analyzing the battle and its effects with his book "Kursk: The German view". Unfortunately he based his conclusion (Kursk as a decisive battle) mainly on the heavy combat losses of 9.Armee

I have only seen excerpts, but I think his analysis in that regard is a little strange. Firstly, he is correct of course that the majority of 9th Army losses were in combat elements. But I do not see how that puts Kursk apart - the same would be the case in other (and more costly) battles. Secondly, he regards Zitadelle and the Orel operation as a single battle - in which case it of course gains in importance, though we are then no longer talking of the same battle.

cheers

[Mark V.]

I have only seen excerpts, but I think his analysis in that regard is a little strange.

Well, like I said it's a start and a pretty good one.

Firstly, he is correct of course that the majority of 9th Army losses were in combat elements.

And those numbers are quite impressive, not to mention they include only losses suffered till 9 July - 4.Pz.Div. for example had up to this date 10% casualties but ended it with around 50% (Neumann, 4.Panzer-Division). And these numbers makes you think of losses suffered by HG Süd (I guess this is what Newton should have done in the first place) which were probably just as high.

But I do not see how that puts Kursk apart - the same would be the case in other (and more costly) battles.

Yes, most certainly but again at least what the numbers suggest is that 9.Armee's Panzer Divisions were as a result severly weekend.

Secondly, he regards Zitadelle and the Orel operation as a single battle - in which case it of course gains in importance, though we are then no longer talking of the same battle.

Actually as far as I remember, he accepts Zetterling's definition of time scope of operation (5-17th July).

Otherwise his own analysis is just about the only thing interested in the book and that's just 50 pages in a book with over 400 pages .

[Mark V.]

Mark V.

I tought you lived in Finland..now you moved to Slovenia ?

Juke T

Yes, I moved there because of far better climate and food .

But seriously, you mixed me up with Mark V (without period) .

cheers
Mark V.

[Dora]

Qvist,
Thanks for the detailed reply to my comments on the outcome of the German Kursk offensive. My comments, the actual panzer losses notwithstanding, do bear out my conclusions.

The cancellation of the operation on 11 July (due primarily to the failure to make any further progress in the offensive and the fear Hitler had of the western Allied operation Husky) led to the Soviet lower Dnieper-Smolensk stretegic offensive. From 23 August 1943 to 23 December 1943 it was the greatest loss of Russian territory for the Germans in the history of the campaign, which included the loss of key Russian cities such as Kiev, Smolensk, Bryansk, Gomel and Zaporozhye. Such a drastic loss of land to Germany would not have been possible without the losses the German's suffered at Kursk and the consequent transfer of units to the west. Hence my statement that the Kursk operation was a needless squandering of armor that could have been better used in going over to the defensive and inflicting severe losses on Soviet forces.
Dora

[Doppleganger]

All,
One aspect of the Kursk (Unternehmen Zidadele) offensive that I have not seen mentioned was that it represented the Ost Hee's loss of their last strategic panzer reserve for the rest of the war in the east. The painstaking collection of the best of the panzerwaffen and Waffen SS panzer divisions to be squandered on such an obviously and deeply defended zone was the height of stupidity.

The German ability to plan, manufacture, train and equip such a powerful mechanized force was an opportunity that would never arrive again, on either front. The Wehrmacht intelligence failure to detect the throroughly prepared Russian defenses and the many delays that added to the enemies preparations (including the sudden Russian pre-offensive artillery bombardment and the premature commitment of the PzKw Mk. V "Panther" prior to completing its development and testing and the revealing of this new weapon to the Soviets) are symptomatic of the meddeling of Hitler in Wehrmacht planning and operations and to the overall defeat of Germany in World War II.

Well, this is again contradicted by cold analysis and is not essentially less mythic than previously mentioned factors. German tank losses at Kursk were far from debilitating and represented only a fraction of German tank losses in 1943. No Panzer division was "squandered" at Kursk, and again, the scale of losses were not essentially different from the ones incurred in other major operations during the summer or winter. Germany did not lose it's "Panzer reserve" at Kursk - German tank losses in 1943 was a steady, grinding affair where Kursk does not stand out especially.

As for the ability to "plan, manufacture, train and equip such a mechanised force", this is again back into old familiar mythical landscapes. With the Soviets for the time being ceding the initiative, and with the longest unbroken lull of the whole war behind them, the German Panzer forces were in unusually good shape, that is so. But the notion that the forces assembled at Kursk represented an unprecedented collection of armoured force, with handpicked divisions specially trained to a high pitch of efficiency, superbly equipped - a sort of Panzer Grand Armada - is not a tenable one. Reality was somewhat different. Several units complained of lacking time to train replacements properly. The general standard of the tanks was much lower than what would be average half a year later. And most importantly, practically every Panzer Division that took place in the offensive went into action seriously understrength in tanks. This was not a highly planned and manufactured special force. German tank strength in the East, BTW, was higher in December 1943 than it was in July - so so much for the oft-heard impossibility of reploacing losses at Kursk.

Again - there's nothing essentially special about Kursk.

cheers

A good deal of the myth of Kursk has been generated by Soviet accounts and propaganda and so it's not as important as most people think it actually was. You will hear some people even state that it was the turning point of the Ostfront, which is crazy. However, this doesn't take away from the fact that it was an unwise decision to launch Zitadelle which flew in the face of Blitzkrieg. Also, Zitadelle was winnable for Germany and on 11 July victory was in their grasp, from what I've read.

The real blow to Germany was the loss of 6th Army at Stalingrad. Germany may have been able to replace the equipment lost but they could never replace the manpower. It was manpower and not equipment that settled the Ostfront.

[VJ]

Zitadelle was winnable for the Germans? If you say so. Of course, after the first few days, only in the south was there any progress (at all), and that's only because the Soviets reinforced the north, expecting the main thrust to come through there.

Now, have you ever seen a map of the operational area itself and just how far the Germans managed to penetrate? I don't know. The situation just didn't look all that grand, if you ask me.

Regards,
VJ

[Qvist]

Zitadelle was winnable for the Germans? If you say so. Of course, after the first few days, only in the south was there any progress (at all), and that's only because the Soviets reinforced the north, expecting the main thrust to come through there.

Now, have you ever seen a map of the operational area itself and just how far the Germans managed to penetrate? I don't know. The situation just didn't look all that grand, if you ask me.

Regards,
VJ

That is not quite accurate. It is true that Central Front was somewhat stronger than Voronesh Front to begin with - but the latter was greatly strengthened by Steppe Front as the battle proceeded, and as Central Front was able to stop 9th Army largely by its own means within a relatively short time, it did not receive substantial reinforcements. A significantly larger number of Soviet troops fought in the South than in the North if you consider the whole operation, so Soviet dispositions are clearly not the chief explanation why progress were made in the South but not in the North. Among the more obvious reasons would be, I think - a) Manstein's forces were significantly stronger in armour than Model's, b) The tactics employed in the South were significantly more effective than the method chosen in the North (ie, a full-scale attack employing all armour from the outset as opposed to a futile attempt to break through the Soviet defensive system with infantry divisions) and c) late alterations to the attack plan in the South, thus depriving the Soviets of some of the advantage they possessed through detailed knowledge of the German attack plan.

cheers

[Qvist]

Qvist,
Thanks for the detailed reply to my comments on the outcome of the German Kursk offensive. My comments, the actual panzer losses notwithstanding, do bear out my conclusions.

The cancellation of the operation on 11 July (due primarily to the failure to make any further progress in the offensive and the fear Hitler had of the western Allied operation Husky) led to the Soviet lower Dnieper-Smolensk stretegic offensive. From 23 August 1943 to 23 December 1943 it was the greatest loss of Russian territory for the Germans in the history of the campaign, which included the loss of key Russian cities such as Kiev, Smolensk, Bryansk, Gomel and Zaporozhye. Such a drastic loss of land to Germany would not have been possible without the losses the German's suffered at Kursk and the consequent transfer of units to the west. Hence my statement that the Kursk operation was a needless squandering of armor that could have been better used in going over to the defensive and inflicting severe losses on Soviet forces.
Dora

Well, do you mean that if the Germans hadn't lost 250-300 of their approximately 3500 tanks and 70,000 of their 3.3 million men at Kursk, there would have been no conquest of the Ukraine?

The point is that whichever way you look at it, the German losses at Kursk were not big enough by any stretch of imagination to have had any sort of fundamental impact on the situation in the East. This is immediately apparent if you put them into a context of overall strength and losses in the summer of that year. The notion that the losses suffered at Kursk is the better part of the explanation of why the Germans fared badly in the subsequent period is quite simply obviously untenable.

cheers

[Qvist]

And those numbers are quite impressive, not to mention they include only losses suffered till 9 July - 4.Pz.Div. for example had up to this date 10% casualties but ended it with around 50% (Neumann, 4.Panzer-Division). And these numbers makes you think of losses suffered by HG Süd (I guess this is what Newton should have done in the first place) which were probably just as high.

Yes, they are very high - there are not too many other examples during the summer of losses that high during such a short period. Losses in HG South (in 4th Pz Army and AD Kempf I mean) were almost exactly similar 1-10 July. But the losses 9th Army suffered in the last two thirds of the month are almost equally high, and those of 2nd Pz Army (who also opposed the Orel offensive) are higher still. And the total for the operation as a whole is not particularly unique compared to other major operations of the time - and quite marginal when compared to the sum of other major operations July-September.

Yes, most certainly but again at least what the numbers suggest is that 9.Armee's Panzer Divisions were as a result severly weekend.

I have the exact figures around on some other thread - I'll see if I can find the link.

Actually as far as I remember, he accepts Zetterling's definition of time scope of operation (5-17th July).

In time - but not in space, as I recall.

cheers