Ultra Messages Sent to Crete Before the Battle

[Nucleicacidman]

OL 2151 1845 hours 28.4.41

OL messages sent to Cairo only will carry OL three digit numbers in current series. Messages to Cairo and A.O.C Crete carry OL 2000 and up in current series. Numbers thus show distribution each message.



OL 2155 1615 hours 1.5.41

It is learnt that to enable the GAF [German Air Force] to carry out operations planned for the coming weeks, enemy will not mine Suda Bay nor destroy aerodromes on Crete. This message cancels OL 2154.


OL 2157 0325 hours 3.5.41

There are indications that air transport units will not be ready for large scale operations before 6th May earliest. Other preperations apprear to be complete.

*Meaning, German preperation


OL 2165 2150 hours 4.5.41

There is evidence that on May 4th staff of the 7th Fliegerdivision moved to Salonika, and that it will move to Athens about May 8th.


OL 2167 2340 hours 6.5.41

Preparation for operation against Crete probably complete on 17 May. Sequence of operations from zero day onward will be parachute landing on 7th Fliegerdivision plus corps troops 11th Fliegerkorps to sieze Maleme Candia [Heraklion] and Retimo [Rethymno]. Then dive bombers and fighters will move to Maleme and Candia. Next air landing of remainder 11th Fliegerkorps including headquarters and subordinated army units. Then flak units further troops and supplies. Third mountain regiment from 12th Army detailed, elements of armoured units be under 11th Fliegerkorps. Admiral South-East will provide protection with Italian torpedo boats flotillas minesweepers and possible U boats. Sea transport by German and Italian vessels. Operation to be preceded before zero day by shapr attack on RAF military camps and anti-aircraft positions.


OL 2168 1005 hours 7.5.41

Flak units futher troops and supplies mentioned our 2167 are to proceed by sea to Crete. Also three mountain regiments thought more likely than third mountain division.


OL 2169 1735 hours 7.5.41

Melos to be occupied by Germans on 7th May with a view to preparation aerodrome.



OL 2170 1830 hours 7.5.41


Futher to 2167 this series concerning projected German attack on Crete. Following its estimated scale of attack and suggested timetable. Suggested timetable. First day or first day minus one - sharp bombing attack on air force and military objectives. First day - parachute landings and arrival of some operations aircraft. On first or second day arrivel of landing troops with equipment including guns, motor cycles and possible light AFVs [armored fighting vehicles]. Second day - arrive of seaborne forces and supplies after arrival of airlanding detachments. Estimated scale of parachute and air landing attack. Number of troops carrying aircraft at present available in the area is about 540. This could be increased to 600 if required. Subject to operational facilities for the highest number being the scale of a parachute attack on the first day could be 12,000 men in two sorties. Scale of air landing of troops and equipment on second day could be 5,000 men, and four hundred tons of equipment or equivalent, carriec by 600 Ju 52s. If an air landing operation took place on first day parachutists effort would be reduced by about 50%. A preliminary bombing attack would probably be made by long range bombers and twin engined fighters based in Bulgaria Salonika Athens and possibly Rhodes. Maximum efforts for a day estimated at 105 long range bomber sorties and 100 twin engined fighter sorties. Aircraft available as occupying air force - 60 Me 190s and 90 Ju 87s. Start from landing grounds in Peleponnese. Position of landing grounds not known but Germans are believed to be searching for suitable sites. Athens area is the operational area from which airborne attack will probably start. All above scales of effort are the maximum weight which it is believed could be attained. No account has been taken of effect of our action or possible lack of operational facilities in the Athens area for the maximum number of aircraft available. Foregoing from director of intelligence.

More coming. I want to post this, in case I lose on accident. I'm typing these from a book, so it takes me a while - sorry for any inconvenience. Also, my apologies for the choppyness - it seems that Ultra was more worried about speed than grammar.

[Nucleicacidman]

OL 2/284 1900 hours 13.5.41

Twin engined aircraft will probably attack aerodromes on Crete on May 14th.



OL 2/302 1745 13.5.41

The following summaries intentions against Crete from operation orders issued.

Para 1. The island of Crete will be cauptured by the 11th Air Corps and the 7th Air Division and the operation will be under the control of the 11th Air Corps.

Para 2. All preparation, including the assembly of transport aircraft, fighter aircraft, and dive bombing aircraft, as well as of troops to be carried both by air and sea transport, will be completed on 17th May.

Para 3. Transport of seaborne troops will be in cooperation with admiral southeast, who will ensure the protection of German and Italian transport vessels (about twelve ships) by Italian light naval forces. These troops will come under the orers of the 11th Air Corps immediately on their landing in Crete.

Para 4. A sharp attack by bomber and heavy fighter units to deal with the allied air forces on the ground as well as their anti-aircraft defences and military camps, will precede the operation.

Para 5. The following operations will be carried out as from day one. The 7th Air Division will make a parachute landing and seize Maleme, Candia, and Retimo. Secndly. Dive bombers and fighters (about 100 aircraft of each type) will move by air to Maleme and Candia. Thirdly. Air landing of 11th Air Corps, including corps headquarters and elements of the Army placed under the command including the 22nd Division. Fourthly. Arrival of the seaborne contingent consisting of anti-aircraft batteries as well as of more troops and supplies.

Para 6. In addition the 12th Army will allot thre Mountain Regiments, as instructed. Further elements consisting of motor-cyclist, armoured units, anti-tank units, anti-aircraft units will also be alloted.

Para 7. Depending on the intelligence which is now awaited, also as the result of air reconnaissance, the aerodrome at Kastelli [Pediados] sout east of Candia and the district west and south west of Canea will be specially dealth with, in which case seperate insutructions will be included in detailed operation orders.

Para 8.Transport aircraft, of which a sufficient - about 600 - will be alloted for this operation, will be assembled on aerodromed in the Athens area. The first sortie will probably carry parachute troops only. Further sorites will be concerned with the transport of the air landing contingent, equipment and supplies, and will probably include aircraft towing gliders.

Para 9. With a view to providing fighter protection for the operations, the possibility of establishing a fighter base on Skarpanto will be examined.

Para 10. The Quartermaster General's brach will ensure that adequate fuel supplies for the whole operation are available in the Athens area in good time, and an Italian tanger will be arriving at the Piraeus before May 17th. This tanker will probably also be available to transport fuel supplies to Crete. In assembling supplies and equipment for the invading force it will be borne in mind that it will consist of some 30 to 35,000 thousan men, of which some 12,0000 will be the parachute landing contingent, and 10,000 will be transported by sea. The strength of the long range bomber and heavy fighter force which will prepare the invasion by attacking before day one will of approximately 150 long range bombers and 100 heavy fighters.

Para 11. Orders have been issued that Suda Bay is not to be mined, nor will the Cretan aerodromes be destroyed, so as not to interfere with the operations intended.

Para 12. Plottings prepared from the air photographs of Crete on one oer ten thousand scale will be issued to units participating in this Operation.

The rest, which are considerably shorter, will be supplied to you later today, or tomorrow.

[Nucleicacidman]

OL 5/313 0420 hours 14.5.41

If reconaissance fails to reveal shipping targets on 14th May Junkers 88 dive bombers gruppe 1 LG1 will attack Suda Bay.

*A mistake - he probably meant the Ju 87 Stuka - the 88 was not a dive bomber.


OL 6/314 1015 hours 14.5.41

In future the word Colorado will be used instead of the word Crete in all messages this series.


OL 8/337 0500 hours 16.5.41

On 16th May attacks by heavy fighters on British aircraft at Heraklion aerodrome intended also transfer to Scarpanto - aerodrome probably south point of island - of about 20 Junker 87 aircraft to close Kaso strait.


OL 9/339 0806 hours 16.5.41

Further evidence indicates that day one for operation agaisnt Colorado [Crete] is 17th May but postponement by 48 hours appears likely.


OL 10/341 1410 hours 16.5.41

From further information postponement day one for operation against Colorado confimed. 19th May seems earliest date.


OL 12/370 0155 hours 19.5.41

On May 19th at 0900 hours GMT conference of officers commanding air force units will tak place at Eleusis aerodrome. Discussions concern operation against Colorado, particularly Malemes, Caena Retimo and Iraklion. Sorties by all units in spite of this conference. Single-engined fighters for Molaoi - in strength of about one flight at a time - will repeatedly attack aircraft on Malemes aerodrome on 19th. Dive bombers on Scarpaton also expected to operate probably on shipping. It seems today Monday may be day minus one.

Finished - as I uncover more I will update.

[Jon G.]

It's interesting how well-informed the British were, yet they failed to avert the invasion - or at least the seaborne part of it. Apparently, the Luftwaffe were the sloppiest users of Enigma.

However, commanders in the field were never allowed to act on information gained from Ultra alone. The information was not wired to the select few who had clearance to know, but delivered in person by an intelligence officer who took the decrypts back once they had been read.

Wow, now I have two balls!

[Nucleicacidman]

It's interesting how well-informed the British were, yet they failed to avert the invasion - or at least the seaborne part of it. Apparently, the Luftwaffe were the sloppiest users of Enigma.

However, commanders in the field were never allowed to act on information gained from Ultra alone. The information was not wired to the select few who had clearance to know, but delivered in person by an intelligence officer who took the decrypts back once they had been read.

Wow, now I have two balls!

According to Antony Beevor's "Crete: The Battle and the Resistance" as well as Karioblablah's (his name is SO HARD to spell without looking at the spine of the book!) "Ten Days to Destiny" Freiberg was overly cautious, thus giving the Germans time to regroup and capture Maleme airfield - consquently, allowing the Germans to land the 10th (?) Mountain Division. Also, I believe - although not sure - that the British were left in the dark by Ultra during the actual invasion.

[Gwynn Compton]

IIRC Freiburg knew exactly where the Germans were landing. His son though believes that Freiburg was acting on verbal instructions to not act completely in accordance with intelligence, and thus not give away the secret of Ultra. However, given the propaganda victory that a German defeat at Crete would create, as well as reducing the threat to British shipping in the E. Mediterranean, as well as increased the British threat to German interests in the Balkans, this seems somewhat unlikely.

What is more likely, along with Freiburg's overcautious attitude towards the crucial events at Malame, was that it appears Freiburg couldn't take his mind of the prospect of the main invasion coming from sea, and from this, it would seem he didn't trust that the British Navy could interdict any such force coming from the Greek mainland. Thus Allied units on Crete were crucially divided between protecting against both sea and air attack, which only complicated matters when it came to the crucial fighting at Malame.

Gwynn

[Peter H]

As Gwynn highlights Freyberg had too much information.As shown the seaborne transfer of elements of the 5th Mountain Division was known by him.When the required counterattack to take back Hill 170 was being planned Freyberg still left three NZ Battalions or so to guard the expected beachheads.They could have turned the balance in retaking the Malame position,hence win the battle for Crete.

Freyberg was a great Divisional commander,and a brave man,but in this case he erred on caution.

[Jon G.]

IIRC Freiburg knew exactly where the Germans were landing. His son though believes that Freiburg was acting on verbal instructions to not act completely in accordance with intelligence, and thus not give away the secret of Ultra. However, given the propaganda victory that a German defeat at Crete would create, as well as reducing the threat to British shipping in the E. Mediterranean, as well as increased the British threat to German interests in the Balkans, this seems somewhat unlikely.

Considering that the UK had just been kicked out of mainland Greece, the prospective propaganda victory in being able to simply hold Crete would have been slight indeed. It does not seem unlikely to me if Freyberg was ordered not to conduct any major troop movements corresponding to the Ultra intel he had been given verbally only (in all probability) Jeopardizing Ultra would not have been worth Crete.

On the other hand, GHQ Middle East could well have averted things by simply sending a few squadrons of fighter planes to Crete, and maybe even a few tanks - and that could have been done as simple part of strengthening the garrison there without giving away any secrets.

IIRC, Cunningham, whose Med. fleet suffered heavily during the evacuation from Crete estimated that three squadrons of fighter planes would have been enough.

Freyberg is hardly to blame for not being reinforced in these two key areas.

What is more likely, along with Freiburg's overcautious attitude towards the crucial events at Malame, was that it appears Freiburg couldn't take his mind of the prospect of the main invasion coming from sea, and from this, it would seem he didn't trust that the British Navy could interdict any such force coming from the Greek mainland. Thus Allied units on Crete were crucially divided between protecting against both sea and air attack, which only complicated matters when it came to the crucial fighting at Malame.

As it happened, the seaborne part of the invasion was averted, though I don't know to which degree the RN relied on Ultra intel for this. It could simply be that the Germans abandoned the seaborne part of their plan due to lack of suitable ships.

As it was, Crete was very much in the balance for a while, the Germans suffered heavily in taking it, and Ultra was not given away. That does not speak in Freyberg's discredit either.

[Peter H]

As regard aircraft resources,much criticism has been made of the size of the home based RAF Fighter Command in 1941.This force reached a peak war strength of 79 squadrons by mid-1941,all with the latest fighters.The constant fighter sweeps across occupied northern France and Belgium that started in that year has also be seen as a result of giving them something to do.

Too late for Crete,something like 30 squardons were sent off the move elsewhere from 1942.