Was material preponderance of enemy alone Germany's undoing?

[Einsamer_Wolf]

SALUT!

Another thread discussing how the Panther matches up to the T 34 has raised the issue of Soviet strategy of simply lodging an unending stream of men, weapons and materials at the deutsche Wehrmacht. The question I suppose is if this alone is what defeated the Germans, or if there is more to it than this. To start from where the other thread led off, I am reproducing the last couple of posts below.

Einsamer Wolf

I agree, throwing hundreds upon hundreds of tanks and thousands of men againgst a companie of German tanks resulting in the loss of some 50 tanks and 150 men, only to destroy, let's say, 2 german tanks, an AT gun and 30 german soldiers.. that's not strategy... that's use of numerical superiority.

Regards,
Sbf.Koch

This should really be started on another thread. But this is why I denounce Hitler, but from the perspective of a national-socialist or German nationalist wary of liberal democracy and scornful of the Stalin and Soviet Bolshevism. He picked way too many fights than Germany could ever hope to resolve favorably. It is particularly sad given the discipline, the heroism, and the self-sacrifice that the deutsche Wehrmacht exemplified throughout the war.
On a closing note--I finished Glanz's Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: Operation Mars a month or so ago. Sometimes it hard for me to follow the day by day logistics. But I do have a good impression of the kind criminal, reckless disregard the Soviet generals had for men that we are talking about here. The end of the book features a summary of losses on each side. The Germans' were not minimal. But the Soviet losses were massive. Whole battalions utterly destroyed. Others facing attrition rates of 80% or more. I think it is a good of volume as any demonstrating this tendency in Soviet "strategy."

Einsamer Wolf

PS--I am going to cut and paste this posting, start a new thread in Heer and Waffen SS

[David C. Clarke]

One of the points of "Operation Mars" was that it prevented any reinforcement of Army Group South and the poor men in the Stalingrad kessel by German troops from Army Group Center. If you look at it from a Strategic point of view, Operation Mars, coming when it did as a companion offensive to Operation Uranus(which encircled the Germans at Stalingrad) was a brilliant example of Soviet strategic planning.
In this case, the execution of the plan failed, but it still prevented the Germans from escaping the Stalingrad debacle by shifting troops.

Once again and I've said this before, after October of 1942, the Germans were simply "out-generaled" by a Soviet leadership much more in touch with the realities of the strategic options on the Ostfront.

If there is a constant outcry about Soviet preponderance of men and material, then the people making the outcry should ask themselves, "well, how did this happen?" Or, "well the same preponderance didn't prevent the Germans from nearly reaching Moscow in 1941, so why did it matter so much in 1943, 44 and 44?"

The simple answer is that the Red Army got better and its leaders learned from their mistakes, the German Army got worse and it's leadership didn't learn from its mistakes.

Cheers,
~D, the EviL

[Konig_pilsner]

Once again and I've said this before, after October of 1942, the Germans were simply "out-generaled" by a Soviet leadership much more in touch with the realities of the strategic options on the Ostfront.

I think u mean from the start of winter 1941.

Again and again the Red Army would withdraw during the summer and fall, waiting for winter to counter attack. When it happened in Moscow, I can understand the Germans surprise. When it happened at Stalingrad one must start to ask what were they thinking. Finally, when it happened at Kursk, u know the German strategy was based on incompotence and wishful thinking, two things that became their hallmark for the latter years of the war.

KP

[dks]

Hello All,

Carrying my thoughts from the other thread, a good book I have been reading along with Glantz's books is:

"The Russo-German War 1941-45" by Albert Seaton.

Seaton goes into more of the strategic issues faced by both sides of that war. I recommend reading his book for more insite to the why's and how's of the Soviet response to the German invasion was the way it was.

Numerical numbers is not just a tactic that can be used in battle. It also is a strategic advantage in a war of attrition. Who can out last who was a major concern by both sides. The war in the east was a fight to the death and destruction of the other side.

David's points are well founded and reflect the realities of the times.

dks

[Sbf.Koch]

Finally, when it happened at Kursk, u know the German strategy was based on incompotence and wishful thinking, two things that became their hallmark for the latter years of the war.

KP

Wishful thinking? incompotence? Hitler, from a strategic point of view, was right to order this counter-attack. He clearly saw the Red Army was soon 'undefeatable' because by that time, reorganisation was getting dangerously close to complete. This was probably his last chance to regain the offensive and push the red army even further back.
However, the 'go' signal was given too late. The operation had been postponed for some months, mainly due to the fact that the new tanks (e.g. Panther) weren't delivered in time, plus alot more logistic problems. In these months, the Red Army set up formidable (or better: huge) defensive lines, sometimes up to 30km deep.
Had the troops (or the better part of them) been ready 2 months earlier, and Hitler would have attacked, he indeed might have regained the offensive and who knows what would have happened then... at least it would have postponed the war for some time more!

Regards,
Sbf.Koch

[David C. Clarke]

Even Manstein felt that there was no need to attack at Kursk. The Germans would have done better on the defensive, as the Red Army was still learning how to handle large scale offensives. Kursk ultimately bought the Russians more time, not the Germans.

Cheers,
~D, the EviL

[Einsamer_Wolf]

Even Manstein felt that there was no need to attack at Kursk. The Germans would have done better on the defensive, as the Red Army was still learning how to handle large scale offensives. Kursk ultimately bought the Russians more time, not the Germans.

Cheers,
~D, the EviL

David--Kursk, as I understand it, was insisted upon by Uncle Addie. Everybody knows it was foolish to go an offensive, including most of the German High Command. There is one issue where I do find fault with the German High Command--all too often they bowed under Hitler's pressure. Easy for me or anyone else to say that.
I will retort your comment earlier about the Soviets outflanking the Germans in just a few short sentences. Operation Mars and Kharkov, which happend late 42 and Spring 43 are both instances in which the Soviets were soundly defeated by superior German tactics and strategy, even though they enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority. Even at Kursk, the Germans, though defeated, scored a tremendous amount of enemy kils that only the Soviet Union with its prepoenderance of men and hardware could absorb. Again I think the Soviet's employed a crass style of warfare that relied too heavily on this. No other nation could withstand it--either in terms of manhood or popular support.

EW

[Sbf.Koch]

I most certainly agree - the extent of complete ignorance of human lives showed by most of the Soviet high command was so staggering that I cannot see how a man, a government can be so completely inhumane. They had just as little respect for life as the Wannsee-conspirators (holocaust-planning). Who said the Red army was heroic???

David C. Clarke wrote:

The Germans would have done better on the defensive, as the Red Army was still learning how to handle large scale offensives.

So what you're saying is the germans would have done better to adopt a complete defensive strategy? In my opinion, the only way to defenitely defeat such a huge country is to prevent it from taking the offensive. Learning or not.

[Tom Nutter]

[Posted: Mon Sep 20, 2004 9:54 pm Post subject:

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Once again and I've said this before, after October of 1942, the Germans were simply "out-generaled" by a Soviet leadership much more in touch with the realities of the strategic options on the Ostfront.

If there is a constant outcry about Soviet preponderance of men and material, then the people making the outcry should ask themselves, "well, how did this happen?" Or, "well the same preponderance didn't prevent the Germans from nearly reaching Moscow in 1941, so why did it matter so much in 1943, 44 and 44?"

The simple answer is that the Red Army got better and its leaders learned from their mistakes, the German Army got worse and it's leadership didn't learn from its mistakes.

At the risk of being branded "pro-German", I wonder which "Germans" were "'out generaled' by a Soviet leadership much more in touch with the realities of the strategic options on the Ostfront"? Is the term "Germans" meant in the collective sense, thus encompassing ALL German generals? If so, such a characterization would certainly be consistent with much recent professional scholarship on the German army, in the manner of Daniel Goldhagen's assertion that ALL Germans (man, woman and presumably children not yet capable of reason) participated in, or desperately wanted to participate in, the Holocaust. But if such a view is consistent with recent scholarship, is it consistent with reality? The time has long since passed, it would seem, thanks to the work of the late John Erickson, David M. Glantz, Jonathan House, Steven Newton and others, when anyone who has studied the Second World War would suggest that the Red Army overcame the Heer ONLY because it possessed substantial superiorities in men and material. Put another way, no one any longer doubts that a desperate war brought to the forefront skilled, capable, daring and courageous Russian general officers, or that the troops they commanded were of the same stamp. Do these facts, however, lead to the conclusion that as the quality of Soviet leadership improved, that of the Heer declined? Since many, perhaps most, of the German general officers who commanded the Heer during its successful campaigns in Poland, the West, the Balkans, North Africa and the Soviet Union were still in positions of command after October, 1942, is it reasonable to suppose that they suddenly became stupid? Should we include among such stupid German generals Manstein, whose "back of the hand" counteroffensive at Kharkov in the winter of 1942-43 is regarded as something worthy of admiration? (It is possible, of course, that recent scholarship has shown Manstein to be a fool as well in this particular instance, but I am not aware of it). Is Generaloberst Gotthard Heinrici, whose blunting of the Soviet offensive in the Seelow Heights exposed the redoubtable General Chuikov to the wrath of Marshal Zhukov, to be included among the incompetent generals of the Heer? If these more famous German generals should not be included in the ranks of incompetents not "in touch with the realities of the strategic options on the Ostfront", then perhaps we should look to those of less renown. Say, for example, Generaloberst von Kuechler, commander Army Group North, and his subordinates General Lindemann (commander, 18th Army), Generalleutnant Sponheimer (21st Infantry Division), Generalmajor Ortner (69th Infantry Division), Generalmajor Altrichter (58th Infantry Division) and Generalmajor Grase (1st Infantry Division), among others, who engaged in a detailed critique of German defensive doctrine in light of their various experiences on the Ostfront over the past two years, with the result that German defensive doctrine was altered to deal with the "realities....of the Ostfront"?

None of this is to say that there were not incompetent general officers in the German army. To take this view would equally deny reality. There were, of course, still incompetent general officers in the Red Army after October, 1942---or at least instances of incompetence, hence the title of Glantz's book "Zhukov's Greatest Defeat", suggesting that there were other defeats attributable to Marshal Zhukov. (It is, of course, a recurrent theme in Colonel Glantz's scholarship that many errors of Soviet generalship were successfully hidden for fifty years or more).

We may also reasonably ask, it seems to me, whether "the same preponderance" (of Russian human and material resources over those of the Germans) was present in '41-'42 and '43-'45. Unless I am mistaken, the preponderance of Soviet manpower and weaponry over the Germans accelerated steadily after the winter of 1941-42. In any event, the numbers, and the relationship between those numbers, did not stay the same during the periods in question.

Even Manstein felt that there was no need to attack at Kursk. The Germans would have done better on the defensive, as the Red Army was still learning how to handle large scale offensives. Kursk ultimately bought the Russians more time, not the Germans.

It might be better to say that Manstein was only one of the German general officers who felt there was no need to attack at Kursk. Generaloberst Guderian comes to mind. If I remember correctly, even the Fuhrer said that the idea "made his stomach turn over".

Like much in military history, the Second World War does not admit of facile answers. If German leadership (here I refer to the general officers and their subordinates) was in decline, then it seems to me it would be useful to try to come to grips with how the Heer managed to stay on its feet for as long as it did.

Regards.

Tom




[/quote]

[menel]

The difference between STAVKA and OKH is that Stalin pointed only general strategic targets while Hitler pointed single villages in the midle of nowhere.German generals could by ten times better then russian but their were not in command.

[Einsamer_Wolf]

Dear Tom

An excellent post--very convincing. I cannot disagree with anything you wrote. I suppose when I posed the question as I did, I did so in the typically flamboyant, strident rhetorical style that many have come to associate with yours truly. (Of course, I will not venture to say how many enjoy this provocative writing style, and how many detract from it!)
Of course one cannot say that the tremendous preoponderance of men, hardware and material that the Soviets enjoyed is not the only reason the Soviets prevailed. But I do think it is the defining one. Yes, Soviet military leadership did blossom into something relatively competent from what it was in Operation Barbarossa. But still, the military strategy employed by the Soviets could only be successful because they could afford such a crass, disregard for the lives of their men. They had a seemingly unending pool of manpower, the people were desperate to stop Hitler at any cost to the point where they would tolerate this horrendous sacrifice in the name of victory (mostly because of ill-advised occupation powers that left an oportunity to liberate the Russian people from the Stalinist menace foregone), and because Stalin was a bloodthirsty, ruthless tyrant. In other words, the Soviet war effort, as it was carried out, could not have succeeded without this inherent advantage. So it is not unreasonalbe to claim that, but for this tremendous advantage, the Soviet Red Star would have fallen.

Einsamer Wolf

[Ron Klages]

It can be a mistake to try an answer a complex question with a single simple answer but I will go ahead and just that.

The allied forces greater resource numbers were very significant in the German defeat. The allies, especially the Soviet forces threw large numbers of both manpower and equipment aganist the Germans and while the German command in the field and the technical proficiency of their weapon systems were better the losses suffered by the Soviets was absorbed and accepted.

The simple look to me is a kill ratio analysis.

If 1 German tank can destroy 12 Soviet tanks then all the Soviets require is 13 tanks to win.

If a 10 German tanks can destroy 120 Soviet tanks then all the Soviets require is 130 tanks to win.

If a 100 German tanks can destroy 1200 Soviet tanks then all the Soviets require is 1300 tanks to win.

etc--etc--etc

In all out conventional war, resources and the logistics to get the resources to the troops is, I believe, the most important single element to victory.

Look at D-Day. The allies brought their own harbors with them for the invasion. The Germans in 1940 could hardly figure out how to get the troops to England for an invasion, let alone supply them. The allies also had fuel lines stretching to the continent under the channel. The Germans did not even have the vehicles to transport enough fuel to the Ardennes.
Yes, Germany was proficient in producing weapons up to nearly the end, but nowheres near the numbers that were being produced in Russia or the US.

In Korea, the Chinese overran the technically superior allied forces simply by shear numbers and they were stopped only by logistics problems and the weather.

So I repeat, greater numbers of personnel and equipment will greatly enable a victory, especially in the long run.


Ron Klages

[maxxx]

"god is always with the bigger battalions"
(if i remember it right, Napoleon said so....)

[Sbf.Koch]

Tom, thanks for your well-cosen words. I can't agree more with you and tom. The Soviet numerical superiority was not the only reason they eventually won, but the most important one. How many times have I read reports from German Field commanders, soldiers and Generals saying: We destroyed one Soviet tank after another, for hours and hours, mowing their infantry who stormed us in rows as if they fought the Napoleonic wars, though they kept coming, untill we ran out of ammunition and had to leave our PaK's and fixed guns...
Only after the fall of the USSR documents were revealed regarding Soviet commanders, showing how much of them had less than no respect for human lives.
They knew they outnumbered the Germans and all they could think of was that victory... So why not throw all recourses in and wait for them to get out of ammo?
I know not all commanders were like this - but keep in mind these commanders knew damn well they could win with numbers, and that sometimes makes a person rather 'rücksichtlos'...

[Eden Zhang]

Only after the fall of the USSR documents were revealed regarding Soviet commanders, showing how much of them had less than no respect for human lives.
They knew they outnumbered the Germans and all they could think of was that victory... So why not throw all recourses in and wait for them to get out of ammo?
I know not all commanders were like this - but keep in mind these commanders knew damn well they could win with numbers, and that sometimes makes a person rather 'rücksichtlos'...

If I recall correctly, disregard for human lives was not the only reason some commanders resorted to such tactics.

The Stalinist purges of the Army meant that lots of experienced and well trained officers were killed or no longer had command. This meant the gaps had to be filled by inexperienced and in some cases inept commanders.