The Nazi Four Year Plan

Discussions on the economic history of the nations taking part in WW2, from the recovery after the depression until the economy at war.
David Thompson
Forum Staff
Posts: 23722
Joined: 20 Jul 2002, 20:52
Location: USA

The Nazi Four Year Plan

#1

Post by David Thompson » 07 Oct 2004, 19:40

This description of the Four Year Plan is taken from "Document 2827-PS: [The Third Reich [Das Dritte Reich]: The Four Year Plan] [partial translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume V: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: GPO, 1946. pp. 474-478.
[The Third Reich [Das Dritte Reich], Pages 250-253.]

The Four Years Plan comprises a generous utilization of German ability and German inventive spirit, the creation of numerous new industries, a comprehensive and systematic directing of economy and last but not least an education of the entire nation for responsible economic conduct in all the big and little matters of daily life.

The Fuehrer charged Pg [party Comrade] Goering with this immense task, who had been appointed already on 27 April (see para 6) commissioner for all matters concerning foreign currency and raw materials. The "Decree for the execution of the Four Years Plan" dated 18 October stated as follows:
"The realization of the new Four Years Plan announced by me during the party congress of Honor, requires a unified direction of all forces of the German nation, and the strict coordination of all agencies of party and state which are concerned. I charge Prime Minister [Ministerpraesident] Col. General Goering with the execution of the Four Year Plan.

Prime Minister Col. General Goering will take the measures necessary for the accomplishment of the tasks given to him, and has the authority to issue decrees and general administrative directives. He is, for this purpose, authorized to question and issue directives to all authorities, including the highest Reich authorities, and all agencies of the party, its formations and attached organizations.

Berchtesgaden, 18 October 1936. The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler"


And PG Hermann Goering went about the accomplishment of these tasks with his characteristic energy and vigor. On 24 October the press was able to publish the First Decree by Prime Minister Goering on the Execution of the Four Years Plan [Voelkischer Beobachter, 298th
Edition], which contained the necessary organizational preparations as to the method and distribution of the work.
"The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has charged me with the execution of the new Four Years Plan announced by him at the party congress of honor. I shall accomplish that mission in spite of any obstacles and difficulties that may arise. Just as I am responsible to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor for the success of the plan as a whole, the persons whom I designate to work with me on this task will be responsible to me for their respective duties.

Only by strict fulfillment of duty and cheerful cooperation of all concerned can the goal we have fixed be attained. The fulfillment of the task given to me will be carried out with the most comprehensive employment of the competent agencies, whose responsibility continues without limitations. New offices will be established only if absolutely necessary. All persons or organizations of the party and state participating in this plan are subject to my instructions.

I shall exercise my authority under the official title of "Prime Minister Col. General Goering, Commissioner for the Four Years Plan".
In the second part of this decree Prime Minister Col. General Goering states that for the making of basic decisions he will avail himself of the cooperation of the special ministers concerned, formed into a ministerial committee. State Secretary and Chief of the Reich Chancellery Dr. Lammers and Dr. of engineering Keppler will be members of this ministerial committee as Chief Experts for the development of German raw and working materials. The following will also attend these discussions: The deputy of the Prime Minister in all current affairs, State Secretary Koerner, and the chiefs of the business groups of the Four Years Plan.

In the third part of the decree the organization is regulated with which Prime Minister Col. General Goering will accomplish the tasks which were delegated to him by authority of the Fuehrer. The detailed directives concerning this matter read as follows.
I. In all current matters pertaining to the Four Years Plan I shall be represented by State Secretary Koerner.

Ministerialrat Marotzke will be the personal delegate [Referent] of the State Secretary.

II. The business matters are divided into the following groups:

1. Production of German raw and working materials;

2. Distribution of raw materials;

3. Arbeitseinsatz (utilization of labor);

4. Agricultural production, as far as it is connected with the Four Years Plan;

5. Price control;

6. Foreign currency matters.

Questions dealing with the press will be handled for all business groups by the Ministerial-dirigent Dr. Gritzbach as chief of my press bureau.

III. The tasks of the group "Production of German raw and working materials" are handled by:

1. a. Office for German raw and working materials. It is responsible for:

1. Stepping up the production of German industrial raw materials.

2. Planning and executing the manufacture of German working materials with exception of the ones listed in b; the Reich agency for regional planning [Reichsstelle fuer Raumordnung] is to be consulted in the selection of suitable manufacturing sites.

3. Furtherance of research required for the mentioned tasks.

4. The mineral oil industry including the processing [Bewirtschaftung] of materials imported from abroad or otherwise produced outside the Four Years Plan.

Lt. Col. of the General Staff Loeb, is designated chief of the bureau. The financial questions of the development program are to be handled in conjunction with the Reichsministries of Finance and Economics.

b. Dr. of engineering Keppler. The planning and carrying out of the production of industrial fats is incumbent upon him.

In addition Prime Minister Col. General Goering has appointed Dr. Keppler, whose former plenipotentiary powers have been incorporated into the more comprehensive mission of the Prime Minister, to be his personal adviser for questions on the development of German raw and working materials, and as a particularly important mission has given him the special task of reorganizing the geophysical exploration of the German soil and of promoting most vigorously.

The financial questions of the development program are also to be handled in conjunction with the Reichministries of Finance and Economics.

2. The distribution of raw materials will be handled by Prime Minister Koehler of Baden, as commissioner for the distribution of raw materials in conjunction with the Reichsministry of Economics and the Reich Office for Foreign Currency [Reichsdevisenstelle], who at the same time will retain his duties in the land of Baden.

Prime Minister Koehler is responsible to me for the proper distribution of the raw materials to the various requirements taking into consideration their urgency, and for corresponding work on the part of the supervisory agency; by my orders, he also will handle all questions having to do with the importation of foreign raw materials in cooperation with the competent departments or the agencies which I shall charge with the carrying out of transactions for the purpose of procuring raw materials.

3. The utilization of labor will be handled by Ministerialdirector Dr. Mansfeld as commissioner for labor utilization in conjunction with the Reichsminister of Labor, as well as President Dr. Syrup. (Both will at the same time retain their duties in the Reichsministry of Labor or in the Reich institute.)

4. The agricultural production connected with the Four Years Plan will be handled by State Secretary Backe (retaining his previous duties in the Reichs ministry of labor).

5. Provincial governor [Oberpraesident] and Gauleiter Josef Wagner will handle price control according to the provisions of the law to be promulgated (retaining his former duties).

6. Foreign Currency matters will be directed by Ministerialdirector Staatsrat Neumann. He will handle, in addition, matters of general nature which may come up, will take care of the maintenance of liaison between the various groups, and will cooperate in the promulgation of laws and decrees. Ministerialrat Gramsch will be at his disposal.

The last part of the decree regulates the cooperation of the various business groups among themselves.

Gothard
Member
Posts: 511
Joined: 09 May 2005, 01:45
Location: Tustin, California

#2

Post by Gothard » 26 May 2005, 15:01

What was the 4 year plan you ask ?

In May 1936 the Nazi "Economic Miracle" was ended. Factories were closing down for lack of raw materials. Foreign currency holdings were gone and the flow of imports of food and raw materials were drying up.
The first creeping signs of Inflation were raising their ugly heads as Consumer industries began to woo the idle war industry workers away with promises of higher wages and prices were slowly rising as demand outpaced the supply of consumer goods... Black clouds were gathering on the horizon and Hitler was buffeted with bad news from every direction. German Industry was bankrupt. The economy was collapsing, It was all over. The Nazi's had failed and his dream was over. There was no money to had from anywhere, no credits or loans or bond issues or taxes or tricks... he'd already used em all.


Gothard
Member
Posts: 511
Joined: 09 May 2005, 01:45
Location: Tustin, California

#3

Post by Gothard » 26 May 2005, 16:23

Hitler had only 1 option.
He needed to cut the pace of rearmament and focus on fulfilling domestic demands for more goods and Manufactered goods for export to generate foreign currency. Dr. Schacht told him so in no uncertain terms.

Germany ranked about 9th place in Europe in motorization in 1935 with 1 vehicle per roughly 58 inhabitants.
France and Britain had 1 per 20 or double the rate and consumers within Germany were clamoring for Automobiles.
They led the world in Automobile production, ahead of even the USA by over 70%. Domestic Farm Tractor Production was next to nothing. Investment in Capital enterprise was still substantially below the 1928 level 71% in Production and 46% in consumer goods for a net decline of 62% in German Industry. Aircraft were up to 3200 in 1935 from 36 !!! in 1932 with 72000 workers employed for an average of 22.5 workers per plane per year. 2,151,000 Germans remained out of work. Arms orders in 1935 amounted to 5 billion dollars with 2.5 billion being covered by "mefo". Mefo was Basically a shadow company with a net value of 1 million dollars. A company receiving an arms order from the Wehrmacht could go to mefo and receive cash. ( this was done by the Reichsbank simply printing more cash every time Mefo submitted "mefo" bills. ) Thus increasing the amount of cash in circulation by many billions and reducing the spending power of the population, this raised the danger of inflation incredibly high - it was a dangerous gamble. Sales of seized properties covered it to some degree as did the wage holdings for such things as volkswagens, cheap houses, radios and vacations which the government subsidized to keep currency out of circulation short term. Treasury bonds and government notes also helped to keep cash supplies low but the reichsbank kept a firm hand on industry making public bond issues as can be seen in the low investment rates during the schacht years. Industry was forced to foot the bills. Shorterm German debt havered around 6 billion in 1935 with longterm debt of 20 billion and steeply rising. For all this, due to lack of materials overall production was gradually declining. During the summer of 1934 the second largest copper eloctrolysis plant in germany had shut down, Dynamit-Nobel a key exploses maker, The Deutsche Edelmetallwerke and opel automobile company had also declared states of emergency with suppplies and importers of Nickel and Rubber were removing their stocks from Germany due to non payment. Foreign trade was dropping by about 8% a year and the key world trading partners like the usa and the united kingdom had placed crippling embargos on germany over the Jewish question. Lowering the value of the mark against the dollar or the pound would have stimulated trade but there would have been a corresponding increase in the german foreign debt. Increased demands by agriculture for tractors and specialty equipment nullified the germans most important export industry - engineering . The Pro autarky policy led to government protection of certain industries and retaliatory tariffs from other countries. add to that the lack of motivation for manufacturers to pull away from lucrative arms contracts to sell overseas. By 1934 germany was trading at a global deficit at a time when consumer demand required industry to focus on domestic products due to increased employment. This was increasing consumer good demand and raising prices even more... with yet morre risk of inflation.

Gothard
Member
Posts: 511
Joined: 09 May 2005, 01:45
Location: Tustin, California

#4

Post by Gothard » 27 May 2005, 05:23

The Economic problems facing Hitler in the 1936 -1940 Economic Period.
1. Raw Materials
2. Inflation
3. Trade Deficit
4. Transportaion
5. Food
6. Consumer Demand

1. German deposits of bauxite, zinc, nickel and copper were tiny compared to the demand for those goods.
Chromium was wholly imported and 2/3 of all Iron and lead was imported. 90% of all textile raw materials.. cotton, linen, wool etc... were imported. Rubber and petroleum imports were near 100% of total use.

in 1930 at the height of Weimar Economic power Foreign trade stood at 22,429,000,000 Rm with 12,036,000,000 in exports and 10,393,000,000 in imports leaving the germans with a healthy 1,643,000, 000 Rm trade surplus.
by 1935 foreign trade had fallen 14 billion dollars to 8,429,000,000 Rm with 4,270,000,000 going to exports and 4,159,000,000 rm in imports. The trade surplus of nearly 2 billion rm was down to 111,000,000 rm

Compare the Gold and foreign currency reserves on the same dates: 2,806,000,000 rm in 1930 to a pathetic 91,000,000 rm ( add a negative balance of 6-8 billion in mefo currency ) in 1935. As demand increased for raw materials the cash to buy them was gone.

Reserves of all raw materials were hopelessly depleted.
over 600,000 acres of productive agricultural land was abandoned between 1934-35 alone further aggravating food shortages and increasing import demands. 29,348,000 hectares being under the plow in 1934 compared to 28,752,000 hectares in 1935 as a result of the Autobahn, Military bases and Fortificaton projects. Yes the Autobahn had an adverse affect on the german food supply. Although grains,beef,potatoe,milk and sugar production was nearly sufficient in 1935 ham,pork,fruit,eggs,fish,poultry and vegetables were in short supply and Legumes,fats like butter and margarine and especially vegetable oils of all types were at near disastrous levels.
German oil production was 425,000 tons mineral and 240,800 tons synthetc opposed to domestic consumption of 2,973,000 tons.

5,290,000 tons of iron ore were produced in germany as opposed to 14,061,000 tons imported.
1,100,000 tons of copper produced compared to 400,000 tons imported
180,000 tons of zinc produced to a mere 17,000 imported
various leads around 200,000 tons to 80,000 tons imported
tin imports averaged 14,000 tons
about 35,000 tons of nickel and nickel ores were imported.
8,000 tons of bauxite compared to 505,000 tons imported.

User avatar
sopas
Member
Posts: 181
Joined: 28 Sep 2002, 08:37
Location: Spain

#5

Post by sopas » 04 Jun 2005, 03:13

If the nazis ruined the economy and the country was backrupt by 1936, then how the hell can you explain the building of such tremendous military war machine, the abolition of unemployment, construction of autobahn, Nürnberg buildings, etc, etc? If Hitler ruined Germany's economy even before the war broke up, why the hell was the vast mojority of the Germans in favor of Hitler in the 30's? In 1938, Hitler was like a national hero.

Gothard
Member
Posts: 511
Joined: 09 May 2005, 01:45
Location: Tustin, California

#6

Post by Gothard » 05 Jun 2005, 20:25

Hitler stole from Peter to pay Paul. With the Anschluss and the annexation of the Rhineland he got hold of the Austrian foreign currency and gold reserves ( austria was the financial powerhouse of southern europe ) He gained major amounts of resources and industrial capital when he took over Czechoslovakia. Hitler did some great stuff with the Germany economy but it was all on credit and the hard cash was gone. The people loved him as long as they had clothes to wear and food to eat. With the critical situation in raw materials Hitler had to make a choice between butter or guns - he chose guns. If his economy was so healthy he wouldve increased the supply of domestic consumer goods and eased price and wage restrictions.

User avatar
sopas
Member
Posts: 181
Joined: 28 Sep 2002, 08:37
Location: Spain

#7

Post by sopas » 06 Jun 2005, 15:01

Yes, but the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia was in 1938 not in 1936.

Gothard
Member
Posts: 511
Joined: 09 May 2005, 01:45
Location: Tustin, California

#8

Post by Gothard » 06 Jun 2005, 15:25

absolutely. Prior to 1936 Gertman Industry had been required by law to maintain stocks of raw materials sufficient to maintain production for 3 to 6 months. This was partially as a result of the disastrous blockade in WW1. in 35-36 those restrictions were lifted. In addition the 4 year plan nationalized agriculture and the chemical industry to a greater degree, allowing the germans to divert phosphate production to munitions. The Saarland was returned to Germany after a plebiscite and the Germans immediately began exploiting its coal and Iron resources. The activitity prior to 1938 is regarding Austria is very intriguing - the manuevrs of international banking , the great depression and the failed customs union, the assasination of Dollfuss..etc.. Hitlers focus was on Austria from day 1, and i think he anticipated the spoils. The four year plan wes basically nationalizing and consolidating control over raw materials within germany and directing the foreign policy of the mnation towards aqcuisition of more raw materials. The way that it was presented to the German public in thee shape of a 4 year plan was merely to sell it to the public in an attempt to get the public to lower their demand and consumption of raw materials and submit to rationing and wage and price controls to an even higher degreee.

The Depletion of all National stocks of raw materials and those held by Industry. Ruthless exploitation of National raw material resources regardless of cost using concentration camp labour. Persuading the public thru propaganda to sharply curtail consumer spending - thus making more raw materials available to industry resulted in a slight windfall for the German economy. Add to this the MEFO bills, seized assets of Jews and "Anti socials", as well as the continued bilateral trade with northern, eastern and southern europe at the expense of global trade.

this was enough to carry the economy thru to its next major crisis in 1938 ...

Andreas
Member
Posts: 6938
Joined: 10 Nov 2002, 15:12
Location: Europe

#9

Post by Andreas » 06 Jun 2005, 15:47

Gothard wrote:absolutely. Prior to 1936 Gertman Industry had been required by law to maintain stocks of raw materials sufficient to maintain production for 3 to 6 months. This was partially as a result of the disastrous blockade in WW1. in 35-36 those restrictions were lifted.
Very interesting, thanks for that.

Can you comment on the economic effect (if there was any) of the re-militarisation of the Rheinland?

All the best

Andreas

Gothard
Member
Posts: 511
Joined: 09 May 2005, 01:45
Location: Tustin, California

#10

Post by Gothard » 06 Jun 2005, 18:12

the Re militarization of the Rhineland was incredibly huge.

The French had created an alliance system postwar involving a military alliance with poland and the creation of the "Little Entente" at the behest of Czechoslvakia. The entire system was based on French military gauruntees and the backbone of those gauruntees was the physical presence of French troops on german soil. The removal of French troops made possible the entire Bilateral Trade concept as the now unsupported balkan states started moving into the German sphere of influence. It also humiliated the French considerably. As far as economically I think it allowed the Germans to sieze a lot of Jewish assets and Nationalize Rhenish Industries. Economically ya need to remember it was a border region region and fortifying it displaced entire communities and necessitated more spending on agricultural products. It was more of a political win that bought Germany prestige and trading partners than an econominc windfall. Concentration camp labor was also brought in - I dont think that wouldve been possible before the germans remilitarized. This enabled the germans to build synthetic plant and create entire new industrial base as was the case with the Goering werke. The western fortification system was built at great expense. without it I dont know if Hitler wouldve been so aggressive in the east. It did help ease the employment problem considerably but if the resources and labour had been aapplied to other more pressing projects....
all told :

Pro's = Opening up the eastern bilateral markets and destroying the security in eastern and southern europe including austria.
Increasing employment and expanding borders to cover the industrial base.
Seizing foreign and jewish capital.
Allowing captive workers into the region for construction and mining expansion.

Cons =
destruction of agricultural potential
increased costs of captial investment in labour, money and materials.
increased costs of fortifications in labour , money and materials.
relocation of the evacuated border regions , meaning new housing etc... at a substantial cost.

The majority of Rhenish industry was commercial / consumer based industry. Retooling a factory takes about 9 months on average so there wasnt an overnight switch to war production. A lot of the industry had to be turned around, once again at great cost and short term loss of capacity. In most cases they decided to just leve the consumer factories open.

In terms of raw goods compare total german military output 6 months prior to the remilitarization and 6 months after. You'll see a slight decline.

michael mills
Member
Posts: 8999
Joined: 11 Mar 2002, 13:42
Location: Sydney, Australia

#11

Post by michael mills » 09 Jun 2005, 04:30

What was the effect of the Great Depression on the German economy?

The comparison between 1930, the claimed "economic pinnacle" of Weimar Germany, and later years under National-Socialist rule, in particular the shrinking of Germany's international trade, seems to ignore the effect of the Depression, which as I understand it caused a gigantic reduction in the total volume of international trade.

With regard to the miltary re-occupation of the Rhineland in March 1936, the immediate trigger for that event was the conclusion of the military treaty between France and the Soviet Union, which created a new threat of encirclement for Germany, replacing the previous Franco-Polish encirclement which had been broken by the German-Polish non-aggression pact of January 1934.

von Adler
Member
Posts: 83
Joined: 16 Aug 2002, 12:49
Location: Ã…rsta, Stockholm, Sweden
Contact:

#12

Post by von Adler » 02 Aug 2005, 11:24

Very, very interesting information, Gothard. Thankyou very much.

Paul Lakowski
Member
Posts: 1441
Joined: 30 Apr 2003, 06:16
Location: Canada

#13

Post by Paul Lakowski » 11 Aug 2005, 02:01

Gothard wrote:

Arms orders in 1935 amounted to 5 billion dollars with 2.5 billion being covered by "mefo". .
Overy 'War and Economy in The Third Reich ', pp 60

"Total military Expenditure ,including the secret rearmament bills was RM 4.8 BRm from 1933 to 1935, the bulk of it falling in 1934-35."

Military expenditure was generally ~8% of Defence spending. During war this would double to 14-18%.

User avatar
Bronsky
Member
Posts: 825
Joined: 11 Apr 2003, 10:28
Location: Paris

#14

Post by Bronsky » 12 Aug 2005, 16:26

Paul Lakowski wrote:Overy 'War and Economy in The Third Reich ', pp 60

"Total military Expenditure ,including the secret rearmament bills was RM 4.8 BRm from 1933 to 1935, the bulk of it falling in 1934-35."
This doesn't necessarily conflict with Gothard's statement regarding orders passed to an amount of $ 5 bn. Most rearmament programs are multi-year things, so only a portion of a $5bn program would be spent on the first year.

This and inadequate (not to mention deliberately misleading) German public accounting explains why almost everybody agrees that German military spending was in the order of 5 BRM in 1933-35 but some of those who agree with this ballpark figure place military expenditure for FY 1933-34 at 1.9 BRM while the other half or so places it at RM 750 million with the rest in FY 1934-35.

There's a similar split for the 1936-38 period, with historians like Overy putting military expenditure at RM 10,271 million in FY 1936-37 and RM 10,963 million in FY 1937-38 whereas other figures (e.g. Schacht's or Wagenführ's) give RM 5,800 million in FY 1936-37 and RM 8,200 million in FY 1937-38. The Wagenführ index usually underestimates military spending, but his figures are above Overy's for FY 1938-39 (RM 18,400 million vs RM 17,247 million).

For fiscal year 1939-40 (i.e. 1 April 1939 to 31 March 1940) then we are talking of around 30 BRM. So either way, the increase is significant and the total armament effort is usually pegged at 40-50 BRM for the 1933-39 period.
Paul Lakowski wrote:Military expenditure was generally ~8% of Defence spending. During war this would double to 14-18%.
I don't understand how non-military expenditure could be >80% of the defense budget. Could you please explain what is meant here ?

Paul Lakowski
Member
Posts: 1441
Joined: 30 Apr 2003, 06:16
Location: Canada

#15

Post by Paul Lakowski » 12 Aug 2005, 19:06

Bronsky wrote:
Paul Lakowski wrote:Overy 'War and Economy in The Third Reich ', pp 60

"Total military Expenditure ,including the secret rearmament bills was RM 4.8 BRm from 1933 to 1935, the bulk of it falling in 1934-35."
This doesn't necessarily conflict with Gothard's statement regarding orders passed to an amount of $ 5 bn. Most rearmament programs are multi-year things, so only a portion of a $5bn program would be spent on the first year.

This and inadequate (not to mention deliberately misleading) German public accounting explains why almost everybody agrees that German military spending was in the order of 5 BRM in 1933-35 but some of those who agree with this ballpark figure place military expenditure for FY 1933-34 at 1.9 BRM while the other half or so places it at RM 750 million with the rest in FY 1934-35.

There's a similar split for the 1936-38 period, with historians like Overy putting military expenditure at RM 10,271 million in FY 1936-37 and RM 10,963 million in FY 1937-38 whereas other figures (e.g. Schacht's or Wagenführ's) give RM 5,800 million in FY 1936-37 and RM 8,200 million in FY 1937-38. The Wagenführ index usually underestimates military spending, but his figures are above Overy's for FY 1938-39 (RM 18,400 million vs RM 17,247 million).

For fiscal year 1939-40 (i.e. 1 April 1939 to 31 March 1940) then we are talking of around 30 BRM. So either way, the increase is significant and the total armament effort is usually pegged at 40-50 BRM for the 1933-39 period.
Paul Lakowski wrote:Military expenditure was generally ~8% of Defence spending. During war this would double to 14-18%.
I don't understand how non-military expenditure could be >80% of the defense budget. Could you please explain what is meant here ?
Vast majority of the defense budget was ALLWAYS consumed by salary , wealfare payments veteran payments, housing costs fuel costs etc etc. The 8% referes simply to weapons purchase [Tanks planes ships guns arty vehicles and all the ammo they consume in that year].

The key issue is that financing was not the limiting factor nor was steel allocation. Steel allocation to the military was flat from 1938 to 1944 [~ 800-900k per month] even though weaponary out put leaped 5 fold in the same period. Speer correcting poor industrial practices accounts for the bulk of the 'production mircale' ,experienced by nazis during the war . British Soviets and Americans adjust to these efficent production techniques in the 30s-20s while Nazis only came around to this in 1942/43 when Speer was able to do what Thomas and Bloomberg were unable to do....wrestle control of the industry into centralised atuhority through Hitlers support. Should have happened back in 1933-1935 under Bloomberg and Thomas, but such is the nature of corrupt dicatorships that surround themselves with 'yes men'.

Post Reply

Return to “Economy”