Hitler's Caucasus Armies
Hitler's Caucasus Armies
I was wondering if you good folks could help me with a few questions on Hitler's two armies in the Caucasus in 1942/43 - the First Panzer Army and the 17th Army.
What were the battle strengths of the two armies? Why were they stalled in the Caucasus?
As well, I would like to know whether Hitler ever considered using either of these two armies to relieve the 6th army surrounded at Stalingrad. It would not seem unreasonable at first glance that either of these two armies could have attacked the Soviets on the southern flank to relieve some of the preasure around the kessel.
What were the battle strengths of the two armies? Why were they stalled in the Caucasus?
As well, I would like to know whether Hitler ever considered using either of these two armies to relieve the 6th army surrounded at Stalingrad. It would not seem unreasonable at first glance that either of these two armies could have attacked the Soviets on the southern flank to relieve some of the preasure around the kessel.
- Benoit Douville
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I don't think Hitler and the OKW ever considered using these armies for a relief operation at Stalingrad simply because they were also tied down by Soviet attacks. With their rear threatened it was only one solution: retreat. The 1st Panzer Army barely escaped through Rostov, while the 17th Army pulled back along the coast to the Taman peninsula where it held out against six (IIRC) Soviet offensives until September 1943, when it was evacuated to Crimea over the Kerch Straits.
They may have been of no use in the Caucasus, but I think you're getting the campaign upside down.
The whole point of Blau was to seize the Caucasus. Stalingrad was just a step along the road. It was Hitler's inversion of this original concept that distorted the whole campaign.
Throughout the drive towards Grozny, Kleist's divisions were constantly short of fuel and air support, as more and more was diverted to Stalingrad. By November, they simply didn't have the supplies to sweep down from the hills to destroy the southern prong of the Russian encirclement. If you look at a contemporary map, you will see that the main railways run from the Rostov/Kerch area to the south and south-west - in other words, units in the Caucasus would find it far easier to withdraw northwest towards Rostov/Kerch than directly north towards Stalingrad.
Prit
The whole point of Blau was to seize the Caucasus. Stalingrad was just a step along the road. It was Hitler's inversion of this original concept that distorted the whole campaign.
Throughout the drive towards Grozny, Kleist's divisions were constantly short of fuel and air support, as more and more was diverted to Stalingrad. By November, they simply didn't have the supplies to sweep down from the hills to destroy the southern prong of the Russian encirclement. If you look at a contemporary map, you will see that the main railways run from the Rostov/Kerch area to the south and south-west - in other words, units in the Caucasus would find it far easier to withdraw northwest towards Rostov/Kerch than directly north towards Stalingrad.
Prit
Hello "Haunted" neighbour -
Here's an OoB for 15 November 1942, which may help show you the strengths involved in the southern thrust:
HEERESGRUPPE “A”: (Army Group “A”):
HGrp. Reserves:
- 381 Fld Trg Div
Befh.HGrp-A:
- 444 Sec.Div.
- 454 Sec.Div.
FIRST PANZER ARMY: [Pz.A.O.K.-01]:
A.O.K. Reserves:
- 50 Inf.Div. (most)
XL (40) Panzer K.:
- 3 Pz.Div.
LII (52) A.K.:
- 50 Inf.Div. (part)
- 5 PzGR-SS (most)
- 111 Inf.Div.
- 370 Inf.Div.
III (03) Panzer K:
- 2 (Rum) Mtn.Div.
- 13 Pz.Div..
- 23 Pz.Div..
- 5 PzGR-SS (part)
SEVENTEENTH ARMY: [A.O.K.-17]:
XLIX (49) MtnK:
- 97 Jag.Div. (part)
- 46 Inf.Div.
- 1 Mtn.Div.
- 4 Mtn.Div.
XLIV (44) A.K.:
- 101 Jag.Div.
- 97 Jag.Div. (most)
LVII (57) Panzer K.:
- 1 (Slov) Fast Div
- 125 Inf.Div.
- 198 Inf.Div.
(Rum) Cav.Corps:
- 6 (Rum) Cav.Div.
- 9 (Rum) Cav.Div.
- 19 (Rum) Inf.Div.
V (05) A.K.:
- 10 (Rum) Inf.Div. (1/3)
- 3 (Rum) Mtn.Div.
- 9 Inf.Div.
- 73 Inf.Div.
Befehlshaber.d.Crimea: [HQ: XLII (42) A.K.]:
(Rum) Mtn.Corps:
- 1 (Rum) Mtn.Div.
- 4 (Rum) Mtn.Div.
- 5 Luft.Fld.Div.
- 10 (Rum) Inf.Div. (2/3)
Best regards -
Here's an OoB for 15 November 1942, which may help show you the strengths involved in the southern thrust:
HEERESGRUPPE “A”: (Army Group “A”):
HGrp. Reserves:
- 381 Fld Trg Div
Befh.HGrp-A:
- 444 Sec.Div.
- 454 Sec.Div.
FIRST PANZER ARMY: [Pz.A.O.K.-01]:
A.O.K. Reserves:
- 50 Inf.Div. (most)
XL (40) Panzer K.:
- 3 Pz.Div.
LII (52) A.K.:
- 50 Inf.Div. (part)
- 5 PzGR-SS (most)
- 111 Inf.Div.
- 370 Inf.Div.
III (03) Panzer K:
- 2 (Rum) Mtn.Div.
- 13 Pz.Div..
- 23 Pz.Div..
- 5 PzGR-SS (part)
SEVENTEENTH ARMY: [A.O.K.-17]:
XLIX (49) MtnK:
- 97 Jag.Div. (part)
- 46 Inf.Div.
- 1 Mtn.Div.
- 4 Mtn.Div.
XLIV (44) A.K.:
- 101 Jag.Div.
- 97 Jag.Div. (most)
LVII (57) Panzer K.:
- 1 (Slov) Fast Div
- 125 Inf.Div.
- 198 Inf.Div.
(Rum) Cav.Corps:
- 6 (Rum) Cav.Div.
- 9 (Rum) Cav.Div.
- 19 (Rum) Inf.Div.
V (05) A.K.:
- 10 (Rum) Inf.Div. (1/3)
- 3 (Rum) Mtn.Div.
- 9 Inf.Div.
- 73 Inf.Div.
Befehlshaber.d.Crimea: [HQ: XLII (42) A.K.]:
(Rum) Mtn.Corps:
- 1 (Rum) Mtn.Div.
- 4 (Rum) Mtn.Div.
- 5 Luft.Fld.Div.
- 10 (Rum) Inf.Div. (2/3)
Best regards -
I thought that the decisive battle took place in Stalingrad not because Stalingrad was strategically vital for either but because Stavka had decided to fight a decisive battle there? Meanwhile Caspian Sea oil had real importance.Benoit Douville wrote:Yep, they should have been in Stalingrad instead of being on top of Mt-Elbrus who had no military strategy value at all.
Hi,
Jari:
Bless the people who like to help others
Jari:
Only because the town bore Stalin name, thus Hitler, mainly, tried hard to captured it only for the prestige.I thought that the decisive battle took place in Stalingrad not because Stalingrad was strategically vital for either but because Stavka had decided to fight a decisive battle there?
Bless the people who like to help others
Yes, it wasn't just a matter of prestige. However, Stalingrad as of itself didn't possess any uniquely critical qualities - it just happened to be situated in a certain spot, and Germans just happened to find it hard to capture. Volga traffic could have been controlled from many other spots on the west bank. Presence in city of Stalingrad wasn't crucial for getting to the Caspian.Victor wrote:There was more to Stalingrad than just the name. My impression is that it was a good position to control traffic on the Volga, where much of the Caspian oil passed.
- Benoit Douville
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Stalingrad did have strategic signifigance
I think Stalingraad did have strategic signifigance.
The concept of the original plan was to take the Baku oilfields, I cant remember but one of Hitlers directives, possibly twenty something clearly defined the mission. I think this mission included the continuation of these forces in to Persia, linking up with the Afrika core, in order to cut off Britains oil supplies.
There is also a famous photo of Hitler cutting a cake, and taking the slice with Baku written on it.
Obviously since the Volga was the main trade artery of the USSR, at this time, it made sense to cut it. Stalingraad is situated on the Volga bend that bulges far out towards the West, and therefore to the German lines, have a look at a map to check this !
The trade through the Volga was effectively cut for at least 6 months.
When this happened, Baku oil was dragged east wards ( in containers e.t.c. ) over the Caspian to Turkmenistan, then upwards by train possibly, towards the Urals.
Baku at this time produced the vast majority of Soviet oil, unlike today it only produces less than 10%. ( Today Siberia is the major oil producing region ).
One of the things that I have never understood is why the German bombers did not destroy the Baku oil fields when the Germans reached Grozny. This must have been one of the greatest German blunders, as the flight distance would have been about 200 mile between Grozny, and Baku. However I think the reason for this was that Hitler wanted to take these oilfields undamaged, and was very confidant of achieving this !
The concept of the original plan was to take the Baku oilfields, I cant remember but one of Hitlers directives, possibly twenty something clearly defined the mission. I think this mission included the continuation of these forces in to Persia, linking up with the Afrika core, in order to cut off Britains oil supplies.
There is also a famous photo of Hitler cutting a cake, and taking the slice with Baku written on it.
Obviously since the Volga was the main trade artery of the USSR, at this time, it made sense to cut it. Stalingraad is situated on the Volga bend that bulges far out towards the West, and therefore to the German lines, have a look at a map to check this !
The trade through the Volga was effectively cut for at least 6 months.
When this happened, Baku oil was dragged east wards ( in containers e.t.c. ) over the Caspian to Turkmenistan, then upwards by train possibly, towards the Urals.
Baku at this time produced the vast majority of Soviet oil, unlike today it only produces less than 10%. ( Today Siberia is the major oil producing region ).
One of the things that I have never understood is why the German bombers did not destroy the Baku oil fields when the Germans reached Grozny. This must have been one of the greatest German blunders, as the flight distance would have been about 200 mile between Grozny, and Baku. However I think the reason for this was that Hitler wanted to take these oilfields undamaged, and was very confidant of achieving this !
- Miha Grcar
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- Joined: 20 Aug 2004, 10:19
- Location: Europe
As I have read BLAU was originally a two stage offensive. First objective would be to reach Stalingrad and cutting the rest of Stalingrad from the rest of the Caucasus. Then, the forces would turn down and invade Caucasus in their full strenght. Because Hitler became obsessed with the idea that it was possible to capture two main objectives at once led to the transmitting some of the 4th Panzer army's forces to assist the 6th Army at Stalingrad. This had many drawbacks; Stalingrad was occupied by the Red Army and the 1st and the 17th armies didn't have enough supplies and airsupport because the logistical needs had to be satisfied at two big scenes - Stalingrad and the Caucasus.
Would the 6tz Army and the whole of 4th Panter army make a big difference in the Caucasus is still a thing of a debate (Kleis even claimed, that 4th PA was blocking his advance).
best,
Nibelung
Would the 6tz Army and the whole of 4th Panter army make a big difference in the Caucasus is still a thing of a debate (Kleis even claimed, that 4th PA was blocking his advance).
best,
Nibelung
re :- strategic position of Stalingraad
Soory I must add that even though Stalingraad is in a strategic position, there was no need to take it in order to cut the Volga.
Of course it was stupidity, because Stalingraad stretches about 20km along the West bank of the Volga, and regular supplies could be delivered along the length of the city, either by boat, or by traffic over the 'subsea bridges'.
Of course it was stupidity, because Stalingraad stretches about 20km along the West bank of the Volga, and regular supplies could be delivered along the length of the city, either by boat, or by traffic over the 'subsea bridges'.
- Miha Grcar
- Member
- Posts: 1474
- Joined: 20 Aug 2004, 10:19
- Location: Europe
Re: re :- strategic position of Stalingraad
By cutting the Volga the suplies would have to travel longer, which is a strategical advantage and by capturing it they would do just that.baggy wrote:Soory I must add that even though Stalingraad is in a strategic position, there was no need to take it in order to cut the Volga.
Of course it was stupidity, because Stalingraad stretches about 20km along the West bank of the Volga, and regular supplies could be delivered along the length of the city, either by boat, or by traffic over the 'subsea bridges'.
best,
Nibelung