Darkwand wrote:Ive read in some history books that there was a belief that if sweden had said that it would support finland in a conflict with the USSR before the outbreak of war the stalin woulndn't have invaded ?
Is there any merit to this ? would this really have made a man like Stalin think twice? Personally I find it a little strange but considering that on paper the Swedish armed forces where the largest and best equipped in Scandinavia it would atleast have caused the plans to be revised.
On Sweden and the Winter war.
As a Swede I can't help feeling a bit off put by Finns perception that Sweden let Finland down during the Winter war,
This seems common to all, Mannerheim, Jacobsson, Turtola, Nivikivi- I do have a hard time to find a Finnish writer who does defend the Swedish actions during the winter war.
For instance Nivakivi understands that GB only sent 12 of the 60 Hurricane fighters Gripenberg asked for, while Sweden who sent one third of her total inventory of fighters where expected to done better. Sweden was the main benefactor of an independent Finland and Sweden and Finland had advanced plans for cooperation but none where politically ratified. The Judgement on what Sweden had started to discuss but not did was harder than the Judgement of was Sweden did. Agreed, lost expectations are worse than no expectations.
The German threat to Sweden is part that isn't very intuitive and the first time I read the standard work on Swedish-Finnish relations 1937-40 Walbäcks," Finlandsfrågan i Svensk politik" it took me some time to understands the line of thought within the Swedsh cabinet.
When I read Trotter's book I found that he also made some oversimplifications or misconceptions regarding Sweden’s role during the winter war so I have made this somewhat lengthy note.
Sweden between the Superpowers.
Max Jacobson simplified Scandinavian security politics at the eve of WW2 as
"Finland feared the Soviets, Denmark feared the Germans, the Sweden didn't know whom to fear most and the Norwegian’s didn't fear anyone."
Please note that the world and the leaders of small states had a different set of perceptions than we have today, League of Nations had failed and any dreams about small countries could join force and deter a major aggressive power where considered just dreams.
The mutual commitment that made NATO where simply not there, as proved by the fate of Czechoslovakia and Poland.
Sweden had a bad experience from world war one when siding with Germany in the trade war on Neutrality-theoretical reasoning. "A neutral could not take part in the blockade of one side" - This caused Sweden to get hurt by the British blockade without gaining any substantial benefits from Germany, except for some profiteers who managed to sell Swedish goods to Germany at outrageous profits. In the thirties Swedish foreign office where determined not to make the same mistake again and wanted to balance the combatants demands on Sweden.
Sweden and Great Britain
Great Britain’s strategy was to win the war by economic blockade but at the same time had to accept that "adjacent neutrals" continued to trade with Germany but only in quantities that where considered normal trade. To define normal trade was one of the major problems. The official trade statistics for 1938 where used in the Swedish - British negotiations. For the Neutrals this was mostly seen as a commercial agreement in witch you would try to maximise your own benefit. The political side where toned down by the neutrals either because of indifference with the Allied cause or fear of German retaliation.
For instance, fuel deliveries to Finland was exempted from British blockade as where replacement of Swedish fuels sent to Finland, this caused some hoarding from joint Swedish-Finnish interests. These was completely within both countries national interests and have not been noted as something extraordinary, since no one knew how long the winter war would last it was just prudent to order as large quantities as possible. On the other hand Swedish authorities did command Finnish oil shipments in Sweden after the winter war
The British Ministry of Economic Warfare believed that Germany could be strangled within seven months if Swedish deliveries of Iron ore where stopped. That was the main reason why Allied forces tried to get a foothold in Scandinavia.
Sweden and Germany:
Sweden had since 1934(?) a trade agreement with Germany and the most significant part where the Iron ore export quota.
Germans where very clear that they would consider a significant decrease of Swedish Ore export as a unfriendly act and that Allied troops on Swedish soil where explicitly seen as a cause of war. Volunteers moving as civilians were accepted but no combat ready military units. And if Sweden entered the winter war in support of Finland, Germany could no longer support Sweden due to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.
So the Swedish choices where:
- Keep low, give most possible material and financial help to Finland while trying to expand her own armed forces. Buying arms both from Germany and USA, the last ones delivered with British consent through the blockade line. And the more arms bought from abroad, the more was delivered to Finland.
- Declare war on USSR, and send as large a force to Finland as possible while keeping a guard against Germany. Swedish munitions production could not supply both the Finnish and the full Swedish army at the same time, only parts of the Swedish army could be engaged in combat while supporting the Finns. The net result would probably be that Finland could hold out a somewhat longer (bleed somewhat longer..) with the reinforcement of Swedish manpower but no major change to the overall situation.
And at the same time try to wriggle enough support from the Allies to make a difference without having to reduce the Iron ore export enough to invoke a German occupation. Swedish Foreign office had no hopes that the allies would allow Sweden to do that.
- Ally herself with Great Britain and thus explicitly declaring war on Germany, and at the same time send ”any” surplus forces to aid Finland.
Today, with hindsight, that would be the moraly correct action but with the Poles and Czech's experience of allied support not very advisable.
The only option that could have saved both Finland and Sweden where if the two countries made an alliance after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact where signed and Germany and USSR did struck a new deal keeping Sweden and Finland within the German sphere of influence.
And in such case I’d say Germany would have saved Finland not Sweden.
Cheers
/John T.