Italian designs on Greece

[uglystkvictm]

If the Italian invasion of Greece had been the success that Mussolini expected what would have been the fate of Greece without German influence. Did Mussolini intend to establish an Italian-controlled puppet government in Greece or did he intend to outright annex the nation. If he had annexed the nation would of Bulgaria gotten its outlet to the Aaegan Sea. Interested in facts and opinions.

[Canon in D]

Well, in my humble opinion, I do believe Mussolini would have annexed Greece outright. He would have started another North Africa, only in Europe. Albania would have joined the lot as would Yugoslavia. All this, of course, pertaining had Italy won the conflicts.

[DrG]

The full annexion of Greece was never planned; the aim of the attack was a change in the Greek government, that had to be replaced with an Italophile one (or even, if possible, with a pro-Italian change in the policy of gen. Metaxas' govern). But even if Greece had accepted the ultimatum or had surrendered without the German attack, probably the island of Corfù and Ciamuria (Chamuria, Chameria, or whatever is the English spelling; it's the Greek border region near Albania) would have been annexed by Italy and Albania. If Bulgaria had taken part to the attack (as proposed in Oct. 1940), certainly would have got at least a part of Thrace, re-gaining a Mediterranean coast; if instead Greece had surrendered without any Bulgarian help to Italy nothing would have been given to that country.
Historically, after the occupation of Greece, Italy de facto annexed the Ionian islands (not only Corfù), placing them under an autonomous civilian administration led by Piero Parini, and the Sporades and Cyclades, administrated by the government of the Italian Aegean Islands (the official name of the Dodecanese). Moreover, an Albanian administration (first step for a post-war annexion), under the direction of Gemil Dino, of Chamuria was proposed in July 1941, but the opposition of the local Greek population stopped the plan, that was not liked also by Italian generals and some diplomats.
These changes of administration probably wouldn't have occurred, or would have been less, if the central Greek govern had been under the full Italian control; instead, in real history, they were caused to take some strategic areas out of the possible control of the Germans, that had an important influence on the Greek collaborationist governs of gen. Tsolakoglou and then of Ioannis Rallis.

[GLADIVM]

In the meeting held on 15 October 1940 shortly before the Greek campaign , Mussolini , so pointed out Italian territorial aims :

- Occupation of Epirus region
- Occupation of Ionian islands of Zante , Cefalonia & Corfu'
- If possible advance towards and occupation of Thessaloniki

Only after these objectives had been reached would have been considered if a further advance till Athens was feasible

The main aim of the war was to integrate completly Greece in the political & economic sphere of Fascist influence and never was intended to annex Greece to Italy

Yours

GLADIVM

[uglystkvictm]

??If possible advance towards and occupation of Thessaloniki??

Wow I could be wrong but it was my understanding that the Italian War Plan that was drawn up in Greece did invole the occupation of the entire country. Thessaloniki wasn't a possibility, Thessalonkiki was the inital goal of the offensive to split Greek forces followed by the drive on Athens and Bulgaria's entry into the conflict. I think we need to remember that Mussolini was trying to match Hitlers achievements not make a simple land grab.

[DrG]

Gladium's brief reconstruction of Mussolini's directives (based on gen. Visconti-Prasca's plan) is perfectly correct. The aim was of forcing the Greek govern to surrender without the need of fighting a long war or the occupation of whole Greece (after the Greek surrender, of course, Italian troops would have been "invited" by the new puppet govern to defend some strategic positions).

[uglystkvictm]

I still find it hard to believe that the Greeks would just surrender and yield to Mussolini's will after only small amounts of territory were lost, and they would just accept being an Italian puppet. I would have imaged it would take a real knock-out punch, like the capture of Athens, for the Greeks to surrender. Also I think as long as the British held up the fight the Greeks would as well. So was Mussolini and his Generals foolish enough to just expect their enemy to surrender after a few initial defeats?

[GLADIVM]

Unfortunately the Duce , Ciano & some of the military leaders believed in their own propaganda and had convinced themselves that the Greece operation was little more of a walk-in , similar to the invasion of Albania in April 1939 .

At the same meeting Ciano told the Duce that the Greek population was indifferent to all events , even an Italian invasion and that Greek soldiers had little wish to fight !!!

Mussolini did not expect that the campaign to develope in a fully fledged war but believed it would be over in a short time , otherwise why attack in winter , with insufficent forces and in an unhospitable country with few roads ?
Italian leadership believed that the situation would have been resolved more in a political than military way .

Anyhow they were not the only ones to live in dreamland at the times , was not Hitler himself who before the invasion of Soviet Union said " Just a Kick at the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down " ?

Yours

GLADIVM

[Lupo Solitario]

So was Mussolini and his Generals foolish enough to just expect their enemy to surrender after a few initial defeats?

Oh, no. They expected Greeks would had surrendered without any fighting! They believed having to sweat no more than Germans in ocupying Romania.

The "trick" was that Ciano's men had spent summer 1940 in bidding Greek leadership to surrender at first shot, exactly as they had done in Albania the year before.
Or, at least, that's what Ciano and Mussolini believed. Reality is that nobody still knows where money spent to bid greek generals had ended.

Given this element, it's clear that there was no need for a REAL invasion plan. The order was simply for the Albania garrison "go forward and occupy", stop. From generals to last recruit, nobody expected to suffer a shot.
As a result, while the italian plan for a war against greece required 25 divisions, Italy attacked Greece with 7 divisions and without a operative plan and support.

To complete the fresco, we should tell that Ciano operated thru an his personal amatorial bunch, distrusting professionals. So, whenever the italian embassy at Athens communicated "Hey, greeks are preparing for war!", he simply didn't believe them...

[Victor]

Oh, no. They expected Greeks would had surrendered without any fighting! They believed having to sweat no more than Germans in ocupying Romania.

Germany never occupied Romania. The first Wehmacht troops that entered Romanian soil belonged to the German Military Mission. They arrived on 12 October 1940 at the invitation of the Romanian state. The invitation was given several months before by King Carol II and then repeated by general Antonescu in September. Aside from the military mission, which had the task to train several Romanian units according to German war experience, AA defence units later entered the country to assist in the defence of the Prahova Valley oil facilities. Romania was never under German occupation and all the Germans consumed had to be paid for. The only attempt to establish an occupation was after 23 August 1943 and it failed as the German forces were seriously outnumbered.

The situation with Greece is hardly comparable.

[Lupo Solitario]

Oh, no. They expected Greeks would had surrendered without any fighting! They believed having to sweat no more than Germans in ocupying Romania.

Germany never occupied Romania. The first Wehmacht troops that entered Romanian soil belonged to the German Military Mission. They arrived on 12 October 1940 at the invitation of the Romanian state. The invitation was given several months before by King Carol II and then repeated by general Antonescu in September. Aside from the military mission, which had the task to train several Romanian units according to German war experience, AA defence units later entered the country to assist in the defence of the Prahova Valley oil facilities. Romania was never under German occupation and all the Germans consumed had to be paid for. The only attempt to establish an occupation was after 23 August 1943 and it failed as the German forces were seriously outnumbered.

The situation with Greece is hardly comparable.

Exactly, mine was hyrony...had rumenians fought against germans? no.
The same Italians believed against Greeks

The often reported Mussolini's phrase was:
"I've learned by newspapers he had occupied Rumania? Well, he will learn by newspapers I have occupied Greece!" (Mussolini used just the verb "to occupy", I'm sorry...)

bye

[DrG]

Given this element, it's clear that there was no need for a REAL invasion plan. The order was simply for the Albania garrison "go forward and occupy", stop. From generals to last recruit, nobody expected to suffer a shot.

The option of a Greek resistance was considered, but if the Greek army hadn't surrendered quickly, it was planned to send new divisions in Albania for a longer campaign. It was thought a remote chance, but not forgotten.

As a result, while the italian plan for a war against greece required 25 divisions, Italy attacked Greece with 7 divisions and without a operative plan and support.

No plan required 25 divisions. Gen. Guzzoni had made a plan in Aug. 1939 with 18 divisions (but 2 garrisoning the Yugoslav border). Then, at the end of 1939, gen. Pariani modified it, changing the targets (not only Salonike, but also Epirus), adding 2 divisions (one in reserve), for a total of 20 (but 3 were to garrison the Yugoslav border).
In Aug. 1940 gen. Geloso made a new plan, this time for the occupation of only Epirus and with the help of Bulgaria (not necessary an attack, it was enough that it kept Greek divisions at its border because of a Bulgarian offensive attitude); the divisions were 10 (2 at the Yugoslav border). The final plan, of Oct. 1940, was for only 9 div (2 at the Yugoslav border), and the Bulgarian support was not expected; it was hoped that the revolt of the Albanians of Epirus and the defection of some corrupted Greek generals would have compensated for the lack of Bulgarians (that didn't intervene mostly because of the attitude of Turkey, that threatened war, with their 37 divisions in Thrace, if Bulgaria had attacked Greece).

[Lupo Solitario]

Given this element, it's clear that there was no need for a REAL invasion plan. The order was simply for the Albania garrison "go forward and occupy", stop. From generals to last recruit, nobody expected to suffer a shot.

The option of a Greek resistance was considered, but if the Greek army hadn't surrendered quickly, it was planned to send new divisions in Albania for a longer campaign. It was thought a remote chance, but not forgotten.

italian leadership was for a short campaign. If war had to proceed it will be seen as a failure in some way

As a result, while the italian plan for a war against greece required 25 divisions, Italy attacked Greece with 7 divisions and without a operative plan and support.

No plan required 25 divisions. Gen. Guzzoni had made a plan in Aug. 1939 with 18 divisions (but 2 garrisoning the Yugoslav border). Then, at the end of 1939, gen. Pariani modified it, changing the targets (not only Salonike, but also Epirus), adding 2 divisions (one in reserve), for a total of 20 (but 3 were to garrison the Yugoslav border).
In Aug. 1940 gen. Geloso made a new plan, this time for the occupation of only Epirus and with the help of Bulgaria (not necessary an attack, it was enough that it kept Greek divisions at its border because of a Bulgarian offensive attitude); the divisions were 10 (2 at the Yugoslav border). The final plan, of Oct. 1940, was for only 9 div (2 at the Yugoslav border), and the Bulgarian support was not expected; it was hoped that the revolt of the Albanians of Epirus and the defection of some corrupted Greek generals would have compensated for the lack of Bulgarians (that didn't intervene mostly because of the attitude of Turkey, that threatened war, with their 37 divisions in Thrace, if Bulgaria had attacked Greece).

My fault, I was going on memory. Anyway 20 divisions were still four times the normal garrison of Albania. This would have required some month to form the invasion army (given also all the logistic troubles) while an ESSENTIAL element in italian plans was surprise...
Coming to contingency plans of summer 1940, they shared all those elements:
- the action would have been limited to occupation of Epirus and Ionian island
- there would have been *something* indipendent by italian military to make possible italian action or, if you prefer, action would have been possible only if an external action had helped italian troops

Visconti Prasca and his sponsors complicated all adding a not-so-well specified advance on remnant of Greece (with which forces, boh?) and mixing the command system in an absurd way so to let Visconti on command and not naming an upper rank commander (not to speak about some absurdity as the lonely advance of Julia on Metsovo Pass without any sort of support)

Needless to say, some stupid provocation during summer had alerted greeks who, in october, were just secretly preparing defences by two months while surprise continued to be a key element in italian plans...

[DrG]

The further advande in Greece was planned only after the destruction of the enemy units in Epirus: in other words it was to be made only after the defeat of Greece, thus not requiring new divisions. About the surprise, it was, as you pointed out, terribly compromised, and thus the Greeks had already mobilized most of their men; most surprising thing is, anyway, that this mobilization had been reported by the Italian attaché in Athens on 21 Oct. (total Greek soldiers: 310,000) and that the Supreme Command's diary reports, at the date of 24 Oct. 1940, the Greek forces are estimated at 320,000-350,000. But these info were not taken into account, like if Jacomoni's own Albanian spies were more reliable... :roll:
But the hurry for the occupation of Greece was caused also by the German intervent in Romania: not only it opened the way to further German expansions in the Balkans, maybe counter-balanced by a British landing in the already Anglophile Greece, but also it took away the most imporant source of oil for Italy. Imports were not stopped (at least until Jan. 1941, following the failed coup of the Iron Guard), but the greatly increased German influence on the Rumanian govern was seen as a danger for the Italian needs of oil (any German import would have come before the Italian ones, as pratically happened just few months later); thus Italy needed an indipendent source of oil: Soviet Union, but until the Aegean Sea was under the British control (also thanks to the Greek benevolence) it was impossible for Italian tankers to reach the Black Sea safely.

[JeffreyF]

If I may ask what were the Greeks doing to hinder transit of Italian merchant ships? The deals with the USSR for materials are interesting but I have not read much information on them.

On another note I'll attempt to stick my foot in my mouth quite far.

Planning these operations to expand into a larger contingent of troops is one thing. However it appears the infrastructure in place was not ready to handle this. Or at least not such a large influx so rapidly. Requiring an investment of materials that might have proved at least somewhat useful in Libya? Then again I imagine this could have been because there was not a command staff in place that could cope with the challenge properly.