What is your opinion about Graziani?
How good officer he was?
I really dont know that much about him..
General Graziani
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Christian W.
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Lupo Solitario
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Rodolfo Graziani was not a stupid; he was a good commander for colonial campaigns, and this includes being a butcher. He never recovered the wounds suffered in a strike in 1937 and his leadership suffered of it.
I don't know why he accepted to become the RSI miltary commander, I believe for his personal hate for Badoglio
I don't know why he accepted to become the RSI miltary commander, I believe for his personal hate for Badoglio
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MVSNConsolegenerale
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Not stupid, but I can only gauge his effectiveness as a leader in the war: which was not that effective. I think you are right, he did well in the past so he couldn't have been completely incompetant, but he definately seems that way when you look at him in ethiopia 1940.Lupo Solitario wrote:Rodolfo Graziani was not a stupid; he was a good commander for colonial campaigns, and this includes being a butcher. He never recovered the wounds suffered in a strike in 1937 and his leadership suffered of it.
I don't know why he accepted to become the RSI miltary commander, I believe for his personal hate for Badoglio
- MVSN
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Lt.-Colonel
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Steen Ammentorp
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Just to clarify. Graziani wasn't in Ethiopia in 1940 but in North Africa (present Libya).MVSNConsolegenerale wrote: Not stupid, but I can only gauge his effectiveness as a leader in the war: which was not that effective. I think you are right, he did well in the past so he couldn't have been completely incompetant, but he definately seems that way when you look at him in ethiopia 1940.
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Steen Ammentorp
The Generals of World War II
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Allen Milcic
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Lt. Colonel:Lt.-Colonel wrote:Grazinai was incompetent and war-criminal. He managed to defeat Etiopians only with massive usage of chemical weapons...
Now, we all know what happened when he faced more dangerous opponents...
Kindly provide sources for these kinds of allegations or do not bother posting them.
Allen/
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Lt.-Colonel
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Graziani wasn't in Ethiopia, well:
Enciklopedija Leksikografskog zavoda, 3:Firk-Jugoslavija, Zagreb MCMLIX, Leksikografski zavod FNRJ
There are several people around here who can confirm this (5th sentence):..."In Ethiopian-Italian war he commanded troops in Somalia..."
On use of gas, I knew about that but I thought that it was only an isolated incident, but I saw a movie by timewatch called "Inheritance (or Legacy)of Fascism", yesterday where Italian historians talked about massive use of gas by both, Badoglio and Graziani and they even displayed official authorisation of Mussolini for them to use gas. I cannot exactly tell the amount of gas-shells given to infantry, but I am 100% sure they said it was 500 tons of 280kg bombs for the airforce. They showed at least a dozen pictures of hanged Ethiopians and Italian soldiers posing underneath the gallows- They showed bombed hospitals, documentaries on civilian casulties of iperite poisoning...
I will dig some more into books tomorrow, but as far I remember, Churchill wrote in "Gathering Storm" about British Parliament protests against the Italian breaking of various conventions, including those which regulate the use of chemo-weapons.
I'll check out the 2nd part of that movie and post the details on it's name and names of those Italian historians ASAP.
Lt-Col,
Salute
P.S. Is his shameful defeat in Cyrenaica by the hands of the much smaller British forces also a dispute?
Enciklopedija Leksikografskog zavoda, 3:Firk-Jugoslavija, Zagreb MCMLIX, Leksikografski zavod FNRJ
There are several people around here who can confirm this (5th sentence):..."In Ethiopian-Italian war he commanded troops in Somalia..."
On use of gas, I knew about that but I thought that it was only an isolated incident, but I saw a movie by timewatch called "Inheritance (or Legacy)of Fascism", yesterday where Italian historians talked about massive use of gas by both, Badoglio and Graziani and they even displayed official authorisation of Mussolini for them to use gas. I cannot exactly tell the amount of gas-shells given to infantry, but I am 100% sure they said it was 500 tons of 280kg bombs for the airforce. They showed at least a dozen pictures of hanged Ethiopians and Italian soldiers posing underneath the gallows- They showed bombed hospitals, documentaries on civilian casulties of iperite poisoning...
I will dig some more into books tomorrow, but as far I remember, Churchill wrote in "Gathering Storm" about British Parliament protests against the Italian breaking of various conventions, including those which regulate the use of chemo-weapons.
I'll check out the 2nd part of that movie and post the details on it's name and names of those Italian historians ASAP.
Lt-Col,
Salute
P.S. Is his shameful defeat in Cyrenaica by the hands of the much smaller British forces also a dispute?
This conversation seems to be going in a few directions here.
With regard to Graziani as a competent commander, there is evidence to support several conclusions. I think everyone would agree that The Italian forces in North Africa were not prepared for a campaign against the British. They had not built up the stores of food, water, ammo or fuel to sustain a drive to the Suez, let alone even deeper into British territory. They suffered from tremendous shortages of spare parts and had organizational problems that caused the deaths of too many brave men. Graziani brought these points up to the Duce more than once. Others did as well.
Graziani did well in smashing the Libyan rebels in the twenties and performed well against the Ethiopians, but he should have noted the poor coordination and communications between units under his command. This would have fatal consequences for him against the Brits. It seems clear that his leadership in this campaign was pretty poor. He remained at this command post in Tripoli. He could at least have been located in Bengazi.
Because of the poor communications, he reacted slowly to the blitz attacks of the Brits. He allowed his nerve to be quickly broken after the destruction of his armored force.
Another variable is the quality of the troops given him. If we look at the tragic history of the Cattanzaro Division, we can see a pattern repeated all to often by the Italian command ( I mean the Duce here, not the Commando Supremo). This division was evaluated as being unfit for front line service by the Italian Army command. It was sent to Africa only weeks after it was formed and the officers and men had not completed their training, let alone form any kind of deeper comradery. This unit was posted behind the front, but guarded a key point in the Italian communications. It was ambushed by elements of the 7th Armored Brigade along the Via Balbia and smashed heavily with many of its ranks giving up at the first shots. The remnants of this unit were sent to Sollum where their low morale contributed to the early surrender of this fort. This example is extreme, but does illustrate a weakness.
Personally I like Graziani. He was a loyal Fascist and served his country well for twenty years or so, but he lacked energy when he had a real opponant to fight and could have done much more to prepare his forces in the way of preparing for a sustained offensive. On a scale of 1-5 with 5 being the best, I would not venture to give him more than a 2 1/2.
With regard to Graziani as a competent commander, there is evidence to support several conclusions. I think everyone would agree that The Italian forces in North Africa were not prepared for a campaign against the British. They had not built up the stores of food, water, ammo or fuel to sustain a drive to the Suez, let alone even deeper into British territory. They suffered from tremendous shortages of spare parts and had organizational problems that caused the deaths of too many brave men. Graziani brought these points up to the Duce more than once. Others did as well.
Graziani did well in smashing the Libyan rebels in the twenties and performed well against the Ethiopians, but he should have noted the poor coordination and communications between units under his command. This would have fatal consequences for him against the Brits. It seems clear that his leadership in this campaign was pretty poor. He remained at this command post in Tripoli. He could at least have been located in Bengazi.
Because of the poor communications, he reacted slowly to the blitz attacks of the Brits. He allowed his nerve to be quickly broken after the destruction of his armored force.
Another variable is the quality of the troops given him. If we look at the tragic history of the Cattanzaro Division, we can see a pattern repeated all to often by the Italian command ( I mean the Duce here, not the Commando Supremo). This division was evaluated as being unfit for front line service by the Italian Army command. It was sent to Africa only weeks after it was formed and the officers and men had not completed their training, let alone form any kind of deeper comradery. This unit was posted behind the front, but guarded a key point in the Italian communications. It was ambushed by elements of the 7th Armored Brigade along the Via Balbia and smashed heavily with many of its ranks giving up at the first shots. The remnants of this unit were sent to Sollum where their low morale contributed to the early surrender of this fort. This example is extreme, but does illustrate a weakness.
Personally I like Graziani. He was a loyal Fascist and served his country well for twenty years or so, but he lacked energy when he had a real opponant to fight and could have done much more to prepare his forces in the way of preparing for a sustained offensive. On a scale of 1-5 with 5 being the best, I would not venture to give him more than a 2 1/2.
Chemical weapons were used during the War of Ethiopia; the Italian leaders felt this was done lawfully because it was in reprisal to the crimes already done by Ethiopians (usually torture and murder of POWs).
The total weight of chemical bombs dropped on Graziani's Somalian front was of little less than 250 t; their influence on the land operations, although relevant, was far from determinant.
Anyway, my opinion of Graziani as leader in a modern war is quite modest, to say the least.
The total weight of chemical bombs dropped on Graziani's Somalian front was of little less than 250 t; their influence on the land operations, although relevant, was far from determinant.
Anyway, my opinion of Graziani as leader in a modern war is quite modest, to say the least.
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Steen Ammentorp
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Please note that I said 1940. I know perfectly well that he were in Ethiopia 1936-1938. He left in January 1938 and were unemployed until he became CGS in October 1939.Lt.-Colonel wrote:Graziani wasn't in Ethiopia, well:
Enciklopedija Leksikografskog zavoda, 3:Firk-Jugoslavija, Zagreb MCMLIX, Leksikografski zavod FNRJ
There are several people around here who can confirm this (5th sentence):..."In Ethiopian-Italian war he commanded troops in Somalia..."
Kind Regards
Steen Ammentorp
The Generals of World War II
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Steen Ammentorp
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In order to keep this thread on topic on Graziani as a person I have split the discussion in two. General discussion on Italian war crimes (or not) in Ethiopia 1935-1941 has been moved to this thread:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=72989
Please keep this thread focused on Graziani.
/Steen Ammentorp
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=72989
Please keep this thread focused on Graziani.
/Steen Ammentorp
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Christian W.
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gabriel pagliarani
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Od 1942 aktivam u neofasistickom pokritu "MSI"and MCMLIX = 1959 a.D. A fine "Titine" communist document indeed.Lt.-Colonel wrote:Enciklopedija Leksikografskog zavoda, 3:Firk-Jugoslavija, Zagreb MCMLIX, Leksikografski zavod FNRJ...
Largely unbelievable and I ask myself how is possible that in the modern democratic Hrvaska there are people not yet able to understand the difference existing between historical documents produced under red stranger tiranny and under national democracy. 8) If I only try to produce a fascist document about such argument I could be banned as neo-fascist, in the while you can show this trash without any real tutoring. 
MSI was a party founded by Giorgio Almirante after WW2, not in 1942. In 1942 there was PNF only. Even if formed by desbanded ex RSI soldiers it was never judged by law a neo-fascist party, and Scelba law explicitally prohibits the constitution of a new fascist party in Italy: the members of a neo fascist party could be jaled twice the time of any other insurgent against the power of the democratic state. Therefore previous MSI actually AN is not a fascist party.++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
As military leader Graziani was unefficient as much as Badoglio, but effectively there is an enormous difference between his leadership before Sept 8th 1943 and after the capitulation of the kingdom. In my poor opinion the difference was due to the 2nd in command in RSI HQ, Generale Scala. Scala probably was the best northern general that RSI could have: he avoided a collettive insurgency in North Italy by collecting in his HQ in Bergamo the best veterans still available survived to the fronts of Tunisia, Greece and URSS. So the Northern Repubblican Army even if extremely poor equipped and under the german hanging control performed much better than the southern Cobelligerant Royal Army. I wrote some points about this argument linked to Gen. Cinti biography in the thread "Ridotta Valtellinese"