Hi andreas
The 80k are MIA in 1962, so they are really KIA. By then all the MIA who had become POW and survived would have been accounted for. Just to make that clear.
Very little is known about what happened after the collapse in Romania to those units caught in the encirclement, so to make a presumption based on what happened in Normandy with British estimates is fraught with dangers. We both know that combat in the east was somewhat less 'pretty' than in the west. My guess is that the total number of casualties will have a very low WIA figure, since wounded would not have been evacuated. For German reporting, the vast majority of the 150k KIA reported by the Soviets would have been MIA. What is the breakdown for the August number in terms of KIA/MIA/WIA?
Will check the breakdown when I get home. As said, I think the main point here is that a Soviet estimate is not a very good starting point even for speculation.
Yes, I do think it is reasonably accurate. Maybe 20-25% above at most. You have to remember that they would count anyone in uniform as a German casualty, including Blitzmaedels and rear-area administrators wearing a uniform. The Soviet number leaves you with a minimum of 118,000 casualties for all other sectors in August (I assume the 374k figure is for all fronts), but in reality much more, see last paragraph. Any reduction of the Soviet estimate for Romania increases this number, and at some point you will have a problem explaining where all these Germans were left.
Well, how can you know it is reasonably accurate if we have no German figures to judge them against? As said - the 374,000 figure is only for the East. Remember that Bagration went on all through August. Remember also that it is far from unusual that the combined losses of all major operations in a quarter amount to less than half the total losses, while sometimes they amount to far more - so it is fundamentally futile to make any assumptions in this regard.
If I understand you correctly, then I think that this approach is in trouble. The Germans clearly had a significant amount of combatants (Waffen-SS, Flakdivisionen, Luftwaffenfeld-/FJ-Divisionen, and scratch units from police and security elements) that would not be counted by the Heeresarzt, while in the Soviet case there were probably no significant combat formations that were not counted (unless there are vast amounts of NKVD divisions I never heard about). AFAIK Soviet figures should include airborne and airforce, and most likely naval units assigned to the front as well. They strike me as a lot tidier in that respect at least. So I do think there is a very serious apples and oranges problem here, one that negates any comparison of casualties on this basis, in my view. Add that to the Axis allies issue.
Here you have read too quickly my friend! As I clearly stated, the Heeresarzt figures DO include all Heer, Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe ground combat (including FJ) elements. Indeed, this is the normal formula in practically all German periodical reporting. FLAK divisions (as long as they are Heer) are included, as are, normally, Security divisions. What is omitted is basically Luftwaffe (except ground combat troops), Kriegsmarine and Wehrmachtgefolge. Wehrmachtsgefolge have their counterparts of omission on the Soviet side. Another element that is normally not included on either side is training units.
Since you mention it, the NKVD was in fact a very large organistion, and nor was it the only armed organisation not reporting to the general staff (and so not included here). According to Krivosheev, these suffered roughly 159,000 IL alone during the course of the war (which is not included in his loss figures, except in one table), and thus, with a fairly normal distribution, probably something like 450,000 casualties – a figure more than twice the losses of the Operational Fleets, and seven times those of the Air Force 1943-45. Also, the Partisan formations that "police and security formations" were primarily engaged against is not included in either Soviet strength or Soviet losses. Naval formations are, where applicable, often included in Krivosheev’s strength figures for operations, but they never account for more than a minimal part of the strength and losses. Also – they include numerous naval Infantry units, who are of course ground combat units who should be included, and who have no significant countepart on the German or axis side. If the distribution of officer casualties in the Red Navy is anything to go by, the losses of these constituted a very high proportion of Red Navy losses. As for the VVS, the air forces included are only those directly under the command of the Fronts. It is clear that their losses were so small that they have hardly any effect at all on the Soviet loss figures – only some 30,000 combat losses for the whole period 1943-1945, and roughly 45,000 if non-combat losses are included.
So, in summation – the figures for both sides include all main elements involved in the ground operations. Both sides omit elements that were armed, but who were not within the armed forces framework and who were not normally engaged in major ground operations or in supporting them directly. It seems obvious to me that these were not generally more numerous on the German side than on the Soviet, either in terms of losses or strength – particularly considering the Partisan issue, which comes in addition. The only major comparability issues AFAICS are: 1)Tthe inclusion of some air and naval formations on the Soviet side, but as said, it is clear that the losses these suffered were so small that their impact on the soviet loss figures are hardly even minimal. 2) more seriously, the nature of the strength definitions. for the germans, one commonly uses Iststärke figures. This is not because it is really suited for the purpose - it isn't, as it contains large numbers of wounded and men on leave, and does not contain HiWis - but rather because it is usually possible to find. The strength definition that is meant to provide actual strength (in principle, including HiWis, Fremdv. Truppenteile and all sorts of attached elements) is Tagesstärke. This is unfortunately rarer, and is frequently just for Verbände u. fechtende Heerestruppen (probably because it was the starting point for calculating Gefechts- and Kampfstärke, which are only relevant for these). The difference between the two is a major one: Normally Iststärke figures appear to be 15-25% higher than Tagesstärke figures, despite the latter including a broader category of force elements (again, in principle, I am uncertain if this broader inclusiveness was generally implemented in practice). The main point however, in terms of comparison, is not the inherent qualities of each definition, but rather their level of comparability with the Soviet ones. Here I have much too little knowledge to go on, but Z/F does state in the article quoted in the above post that the general character of the Soviet strength figures appear to be fairly akin to the Tagesstärke. If this is correct, then German strength based on Iststärke figures will be significantly and structurally overstated compared to the Soviet. Still, if you know where to find a documentary basis that is more relevant that this, I’d love to see it.
And “tidiness” doesn’t enter into it – it simply reflects different organisational realities, such as the fact that Naval and air forces were integrated under the same command as land forces inthe soviet system, while they were not in the German. We cannot retroactively determine the nature or definitions of reporting, we simply have to work from what was used while trying to take into account any critical differences. For both sides, one has a need for additional information or further refinement in many cases, but as comparisons go, I think this is as much “apples and apples” as can be hoped for, as long as allied losses can be determined additionally. And – I think we should bear in mind that the idea of perfect complementarity is a pipedream. Consider f.e. the air force issue. The soviet figures include the air formations under Front control, but not others. How do you organise the German figures to match that? Luftwaffe units weren’t under HG control, so that’s not an option. If you include all Luftwaffe elements, then you have a greater inclusiveness than on the soviet side. If you include none, then you have a smaller inclusiveness. There simply is no conceivable way of organising the figures that ensures perfect complementarity.
Axis losses is a separate issue, and is of course needed in this context.
Now, situations such as the one in Romania, or Bagration for that matter, are special in that they caused significant losses also among such categories as Wehrmachtgefolge, Luftwaffe ground non-combat units etc. I am not arguing that it is of no interest to find out how many these were. But I see no good reason why the normal definitory scope of losses ought to be amended to incorporate them for the purposes of loss comparison, to the extent that it is possible to do so, and it isn't obvious IMO that the appropriate loss figure to
use in a comparison is one that is as inclusive as possible. Exactly the same state of affairs pertain to the Soviet loss figures in 1941/42, which also does not correlate with German POW figures. Beyond the inherent advantages of using the definitory scope employed by the primary documentation itself (as long as this is adequate as opposed to flawless), there is also the issue of ensuring comparability over time, which disappears if one uses different definitory scopes for different operations. There is in any case no such thing as a perfect comparison, the main point IMO is touse an adequate formula, and be clear about what exactly a given figure contains and what it does not.
cheers
by Andreas on 24 Apr 2005 17:48 
