Armored units in 1940 on the western front

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David Lehmann
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Armored units in 1940 on the western front

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Post by David Lehmann » 01 May 2005, 00:06

Hello,

This article has been simplified compared to my .doc / .pdf file since I did not attach pictures like the divisional insignia. I could also not easily add the different tables.

Best regard,

David

ARMORED UNITS IN THE 1940 WESTERN CAMPAIGN

1. GERMAN ARMORED UNITS

On 1st September 1939, the German Army is still immature, it lacks some equipment and is far from being organized around the Blitzkrieg concept. The chain of command is still very classical and the armored units have not the importance they will gain later in 1940. 5 Korps include motorized units but there is no specific group dedicated to large mechanized operations beyond the tactical level.
The Panzerwaffe formed in 1934 includes in 1939 7 Panzerdivisionen and 4 Leichten-Divisionen (light armored divisions) beside 4 ID (mot). It is the most powerful element of the Heer but only 16% of the tanks are armed with a 3.7cm or a 7.5cm gun, 84% of the tanks are Panzer I, Panzer II or command tanks. At the tactical, mobility and flexibility level the German mechanized units were superior to their Polish opponents in 1939 but the inter-arms cooperation (tank/infantry/artillery/air support) was not yet mature even if already tested on the very basic level in Spain with the Panzer I and several crews.
The size of the Panzerwaffe is too limited in 1939 and its practical use is not yet well defined, the old school favoring the classical warfare is still powerful in the German high command. All the Panzerdivisionen and Leichten-Divisionen are completely scattered ; only the 10th Armee has in some extend some concentrated mechanized troops. The Panzerwaffe of September 1939 is not mature and not directed towards a specific point (Schwehrpunkt) of the front. Fall Weiss allowed testing some tactical principles that the German HQ wanted to upscale. The Germans did more than replace losses between the Polish and French Campaigns. They created new divisions and improved their army in terms of equipments, chain of command and doctrine.

The German forces had been reorganized after the campaign in Poland (Fall Weiss) :
• At the eve of Fall Gelb there are 155 German divisions available (136 engaged), including 2 Waffen-SS motorized divisions instead of 105 divisions (63 engaged) in September 1939. The Leichten-Divisionen have been transformed into Panzerdivisionen. The Leichten-Divisionen have been transformed into Panzerdivisionen. Created in 1936, these Leichten-Divisionen were based on the model of the French DLM. In Germany like in France, the cavalry wanted its own tanks because it was frightened to loose influence. After Fall Weiss the 1., 2., 3. and 4. Leichten-Divisionen became the 6., 7., 3. and 4. Panzerdivisionen and the 5. PzD had been created. The German army in May 1940 had therefore 10 Panzer Divisionen, 6 ID (mot) and 1 newly created Kavalerie division.
• The 3. and 4. Wellen Infanterie Divisionen from the Polish campaign were largely improved, younger men were enlisted and the equipment was modernized. In 1940, 15 of these divisions were frontline units.
• The chain of command is less centralized and more flexible whereas in Poland the command structures were very traditional. Add to that the important communication means (many radio sets), a well organized logistics and you have a powerful army.
• The German tactics with good inter-arms cooperation (tank / aircraft couple, close air support provided by the Ju87s and Hs123s, omnipresent tactical air reconnaissance) were not mature in Poland but they are ready for Fall Gelb. The first trials with air-ground cooperation were to be held in Grafenwöhr training area 21st - 25th August 1939, but cancelled due to the oncoming war. Therefore, in September 1939 the Germans had no new Blitzkrieg tactics to use.

A complete new HQ and ad-hoc structure is created with Gruppe Kleist for the initial phase of Fall Gelb. It includes 3 motorized army corps, regrouping 5 armored divisions and 3 motorized infantry divisions, directed towards the Ardennes. Unlike in Poland, the mechanized elements are well concentrated and have a real strategic role. They are well supported by the VIII.Fliegerkorps concentrating all the 300 Ju87 dive bombers and 42 Hs123 assault biplanes. The 5.PzD and 7.PzD of the XV.Armee Korps (mot.) are only several kilometers north of Gruppe Kleist. Therefore 7 Panzerdivisonen are concentrated against the weak area of the Ardennes. In the area of Sedan, 1500 aircrafts are concentrated on a small area to support the German attack. It is the very first time in History that such armored and air support forces are concentrated on such a small area.

During the initial phase of Fall Gelb, the Germans used also extensively airborne troops (paratroopers and glider troops) and commandos (in German uniforms, in allied uniforms or in civilian clothes – Brandenburger commandos, assault engineers or elite infantry of the "Grossdeutschland" regiment etc.). Such a concentration of commandos and airborne troops having a real strategic role is probably also a first time in History.

Compared to the Polish campaign, in France the armored units were better armed (more tanks were armed with 3.7cm and 7.5cm guns (16% - 452 tanks - in Poland and 36% - 955 tanks - in France) and also better armored. There were Panzer IV Ausf.A/Bs in Poland but more Panzer IV Ausf.C/Ds in France. There were lightly armored early Panzer III in Poland but more Panzer III E/F in France. The Panzer II was built with 14.5mm armor and up-armored after the Polish campaign for the invasion of France. Also the early Panzer IIs had no vision cupola for the commander, which reduced probably the tactical awarness. The cupolas were retrofitted to the existing tanks over a period of time. The first Panzer III armed with a 5.0cm gun left the production line in July 1940. During that month 21 were built and 17 of these accepted by Army (according to Blatt G112, 15th December 1940 "Überblick über den Rüstungstand des Heeres"). Apparently if 5.0cm shells were already in production in June 1940 it was because the 5.0cm PaK38 were slowly being produced at this time, not because of Panzer III with 5.0cm guns used in France in 1940.

--> For all these reasons, the 1940 western campaign can be seen as the best example of the so-called Blitzkrieg. It worked also later against Greece and Yugoslavia but it couldn't work anymore in Russia which was too big.


The Panzerwaffe had 2636 German tanks on 10th May 1940 :

[Table giving the tank strength of the different Panzerdivisionen and the repartition of the different tanks]

These 2636 tanks include 965 ones (37%) armed with a 3.7cm or 7.5cm gun. Not counting here the additional 99 Panzerjäger I and 24 StuG A. Which leads to 2759 AFVs and 1088 ones (39%) armed with a 3.7cm, 4.7cm or 7.5cm gun. All the German tanks were concentrated in the 10 Panzerdivisionen. The German Panzerdivisionen might be very different in composition from one to an other and during the campaign itself because of various attachments at different times. The type 1 Panzerdivisionen (Guderian model) like the 1., 2. and 10.PzD and the type 1 bis like the 3.,4. and 5.PzD had 2 tank regiments with 2 battalions each. The type 2 Panzerdivisionen, originating from the transformation of the Leichten-Divisionen, are the 6., 7. and 8.PzD. They had a single tank regiment but with 3 battalions. Finally the 9.PzD was a "reduced" type 2 Panzerdivision with only one tank regiment of 2 battalions. Except the atypical 9.PzD which is engaged in the Netherlands, a Panzerdivision had a mean of 270 tanks including 170 light tanks and 100 medium tanks. The Panzer 35(t)s are concentrated in the 6.PzD and the Panzer 38(t)s are all in the 7.PzD and 8.PzD.



2. FRENCH ARMORED UNITS

During World War 1, the French tanks were part of the artillery and called AS for "artillerie d'assaut" (assault artillery … and not special artillery as it is often written). General Estienne, father of the French tanks, was indeed from the artillery. He worked since 1915 to use mobile and armored guns. The main task of the tanks was nevertheless to support the advance of the infantry.
In 1920, the tanks became part of the infantry with more than 3,000 FT17 tanks available. In 1940, 1297 FT17 tanks were still in service : 1062 tanks in France and 235 in the colonies. From the 1062 FT17 tanks in France, 462 were in combat units and many others were in airfield protection platoons, anti-paratroops tank companies, regional platoon of protection tanks, important buildings protection platoons etc.
During the inter-wars period, the infantry and the cavalry developed their tanks separately. The infantry had tanks long before the cavalry but created big armored/mechanized units (divisions) later. The cavalry first used only armored cars.

The development of the French tanks was hampered by several factors :
• The disarmament conference at Geneva and the League of Nations with the post-WW1 pacifism. Germany left the League of Nations and developed its own tanks despite the interdiction of the Versailles treaty.
• Financial and political issues from 1919 to 1930 leading to the main effort on light tanks instead of medium main battle tanks. They appeared less offensive and therefore in adequacy with the international pacifist context. From 1928 to 1934, only 2.4% of the budget for armament production was dedicated to the tanks.
• Too many dispersed efforts and projects
• Not one single arm (independent or not) regrouping all the AFVs. There were infantry and cavalry tanks whereas in Germany the Panzerwaffe became an independent arm concentrating all the tanks.

In 1936, the French army had still some 700,000 horses. Nevertheless, in 1940 it had 400,000 motorized vehicles including motorcycles, cars, trucks, tanks, armored cars etc. (more or less equivalent to the German army, the small US army for example had 12,000 vehicles at the same time which shows how quickly it increased its size afterwards).

In the cavalry the DLC = Division Légere de Cavalerie = Light Cavalry Division included some tanks and armored cars but the main armored unit was the DLM = Division Légere Mécanique = Light Mechanized Division. The term "light" referred to its speed and mobility not its strength since it was more powerful than the armored division of the infantry.

In the infantry the armored division was the DCR = Division Cuirassée de Réserve = Reserve Armored Division (cuirassée means armored). The acronym DCR was chosen in order to differentiate it from the already existing DC (= Division de Cavalerie = Cavalry Division). But it was indeed originally meant as "Division Cuirassée de Réserve", the word "reserve" being a political choice. These new units would not be ready until 1940 and were initially assigned to the HQ reserve, thus their name. But once in the field they were simply known as "Divisions Cuirassées", which was technically abbreviated as DCu, yet DCR was often retained (leading to the use of DCr). The BCC (bataillon de char de combat) were the tank battalions included in the DCR but on 10th May there were still about 35 BCC available for the armies beside several companies (CACC = Compagnie Autonome de Chars de Combat = independent tank company). They were dispersed in all the armies and all over the territory to support the infantry. During peacetime the BCC were depending from RCC = Régiment de Chars de Combat = tank regiments.


In 1940 the main tanks were :

Infantry tanks :
• Renault FT-17BS (light)
• FT-17c (light)
• FT-17m (light)
• FCM36 (light)
• Renault R35/39/40 (light)
• Hotchkiss H39 (light)
• Renault D1 (medium)
• Renault D2 (medium)
• Renault B1 (heavy)
• Renault B1bis (heavy)
• FCM-2C (very heavy)

Cavalry tanks :
• Hotchkiss H35/39 (light)
• Somua S35 (medium)


2.1 The French cavalry tanks

General Flavigny was the director of the cavalry from 1931 to 1936. In 1931, with general Weygand, he started big efforts to modernize the French cavalry and introduced motorized/mechanized elements, despite a low budget and many oppositions originating from pro-horse lobbies.

The development of the cavalry AFVs begun in 1930/1931 and three types of vehicles were studied :

• AMD = Auto-Mitrailleuse de Découverte = distant reconnaissance wheeled vehicles : Panhard P165/175, Laffly 80AM, Laffly 50AM, Laffly S15TOE were used at first but the main AMD in 1940 was the excellent Panhard P178. The Panhard 178, nicknamed "pan-pan", was a very good and reliable armored car. It has proven a superior designed armored car in 1940. It had a 2-men APX3 turret (hand-cranked) and its 25mm SA35 gun had good anti-tank capacities. The Panhard 178 was capable of relative high speed (72.6 km/h) and had two drivers (one forward and one backward) to change direction very quickly, increasing the overall maneuverability.

• AMR = Auto-Mitrailleuse de Reconnaissance = cross-country reconnaissance, tracked armored car / light tank : AMR-33 and AMR-35 ZT1, ZT2 and ZT3.

• AMC = Auto-Mitrailleuse de Combat = tracked (or half-tracked) vehicle that has better armament and armor, capable of heavy combat : at first the Panhard-Schneider P16 Mle1929 (used as AMR in 1940), Renault AMC-34 (YR), Renault AMC-35 (ACG1), Hotchkiss H35/39 and the most important, the very good Somua S35. The Somua S35 was fast, well armed and well protected. It was very liked by its crews who pulled away the embossed "SOMUA" plates and welded them on their new Sherman tanks in north Africa.

In 1932, 3 hybrid cavalry divisions (horses / armoured cars) are created but it remained a "oil and oats" solution, mainly because of the horse traditions and also because the modern armored cars and tanks were at first only slowly available. These DC = Division de Cavalerie = Cavalry Division were made up of half conventional horse mounted cavalry and half armored cars. The trainings revealed the issues of such units : if the armored cars moved at 25-45 km/h they were too fast for the horses and could not hold alone the area they just took, if the unit moved at 8 km/h, the rhythm of the horses, the armored cars' engine was overheating.
On 10th February 1940, there were 50% less horses in these units, 1 cavalry brigade instead of 2. This enabled to create more such units thanks to all the newly available tanks and armored cars. From the 3 hybrid units 5 DLC were created.

Each DLC includes about 7,800 men, 2,000 horses and 2,100 vehicles :
• 1 divisional HQ
• 1 cavalry brigade (BC = Brigade de Cavalerie) of 2 cavalry regiments (horse mounted)
• 1 light motorized brigade (BLM = Brigade Légère Motorisée) with :
--o a RAM (Régiment d’Auto-Mitrailleuses = armored cars regiment) including 13 Hotchkiss H35 tanks and 12 Panhard 178 (+1 radio car + 2 reserve armored car)
--o a RDP (Régiment de Dragons Portés = mechanized cavalry regiment) of 2 battalions including 23 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1 and 5 motorcycle platoons
• 1 divisional AT squadron (EDAC = Escadron Divisionnaire Anti-Char)
• 1 divisional repair and recovery squadron
• 1 motorized artillery regiment (75mm Mle1897 and 105mm C with all-terrain tractors)
• 1 motorized AT battery (BDAC = Batterie Divisionnaire Anti-Char)
• 1 motorized engineer company (sapeurs-mineurs company)
• 1 mixed signals company
• 1 HQ horse-drawn transport company
• 1 HQ motor transport company
• 1 divisional quartermaster group
• 1 divisional medical group

Therefore each DLC had only an AFVs strength of 13 tanks and 35-37 armored cars = 48-50 AFVs. A DLC could in no way compete with a German Panzerdivision but they will nevertheless face them.

During combats, the 2 components (horse vs motorized) are often separated, the armored cars joining other motorized/mechanized elements. These hybrid characteristics could also be found in the motorized reconnaissance "battalions" of infantry divisions or army corps : 7 GRDI (= Groupe de Reconnaissance de Division d'Infanterie), 5 of them including armored cars, and 3 GRCA (=Groupe de Reconnaissance de Corps d'Armée).

In 1932-1935, the first fully motorized unit, the 1e DLM, was born and developed. The 2e DLM was born in 1937 and the 3e DLM in February 1940. There will be 3 DLMs on 10th May 1940 (1e DLM, 2e DLM and 3e DLM) forming the French cavalry corps under command of general Prioux. The DLM is more powerful than the DCR, faster and more mobile. It is a unit fully adapted to modern mobile warfare.

The 1e DLM and 2e DLM became very well trained divisions (even at the divisional an corps level) with efficient crews and specialists. Manoeuvres and trainings were organized at large scale in 1935, 1936, 1937 1938, 1939 and the last divisional training in 1940.. They included deep penetration behind fortifications, cooperation with close air support and close inter-arms cooperation. The crew knew their tanks and how to operate them. The gunners were skilled and trained. The 3e DLM formed in 1940 had only reservists who did their military service on horse and some of them discovered their tank a short time before being engaged, except some officers and specialists originating from the other DLMs.

The cavalry corps and the corresponding HQ is created at the mobilization beginning September 1939. It is under the command of general Prioux until 25th May 1940 when he took command of the 1st army and general Langlois replaced him at the head of the cavalry corps. The cavalry corps contains initially only the 1e DLM and 2e DLM. The 1e DLM is then attached to the 7th army to operate in the Netherlands on 10th May 1940. It is replaced in the cavalry corps by the 3e DLM on 26th March 1940. During the 1940 western campaign the cavalry corps will regroup 1, 2 or the 3 DLMs. During the battle of Hannut, general Prioux had the actual command of a real French tank corps facing a German tank corps. They inflicted heavy losses to the Germans. The use of such a French tank corps is unique during the 1940 campaign except perhaps the formation of the "groupement Buisson" beginning June for the battles on the Aisne and Retourne Rivers south of Rethel which grouped the 3e DCR and the 7e DLM.


Each DLM included about 10,400 men and 3,400 vehicles :
• 1 divisional HQ
• 1 light motorized brigade (BLM = Brigade Légère Motorisée) with 2 armored cavalry regiments (RC = Régiment de Cuirassiers or RD = Régiment de Dragons).
1e DLM : 174 tanks (+ 16 reserve tanks) in the 1e BLM
• 4e RC (43+4 Hotchkiss H35 and 44+4 Somua S35)
• 18e RD (43+4 Hotchkiss H35 and 44+4 Somua S35)
2e DLM : 174 tanks (+ 16 reserve tanks) in the 3e BLM
• 13e RD (43+4 Hotchkiss H35 and 44+4 Somua S35)
• 29e RD (43+4 Hotchkiss H35 and 44+4 Somua S35)
3e DLM : 174 tanks (+ 16 reserve tanks) in the 5e BLM
• 1e RC (43+4 Hotchkiss H39 and 44+4 Somua S35)
• 2e RC (43+4 Hotchkiss H39 and 44+4 Somua S35)
• 1 light motorized brigade (BLM = Brigade Légère Motorisée) with 1 armored reconnaissance regiment (regiment de découverte) and 1 RDP (Régiment de Dragons Portés = mechanized cavalry regiment)
1e DLM : 107 armored cars in the 2e BLM
• 6e RC : 40 Panhard 178 (+1 radio car + 2 reserve armored car)
• 4e RDP : 67 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1 (+2 reserve armored cars)
2e DLM : 107 armored cars in the 4e BLM
• 8e RC : 40 Panhard 178 (+1 radio car + 2 reserve armored car)
• 1e RDP : 67 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1 (+2 reserve armored cars)
3e DLM : 107 tanks / armored cars in the 6e BLM
• 12e RC : 40 Panhard 178 (+1 radio car + 2 reserve armored car)
• 11e RDP : 22 Hotchkiss H35 and 47 Hotchkiss H39
• 1 divisional AT squadron (EDAC = Escadron Divisionnaire Anti-Char)
• 1 divisional repair and recovery squadron
• 1 motorized artillery regiment (with all-terrain tractors)
• 1 motorized AT battery (BDAC = Batterie Divisionnaire Anti-Char)
• 1 motorized AA battery (BDAA = Batterie Divisionnaire Anti-Aérienne)
• 1 engineer battalion (3 motorized companies plus a bridging company)
• 1 telegraph company
• 1 radio company
• 1 carrier-pigeon detachment
• 1 HQ motor transport company
• 1 divisional quartermaster group
• 1 divisional medical group

On 10th May 1940 the cavalry consisted in :
• 5 Divisions Légères de Cavalerie (DLC)
• 3 Divisions Légères Mécaniques (DLM)
• 1 Brigade de Cavalerie (BC)
• 3 Brigades de Spahis (BS)
• 23 Groupes de Reconnaissance de Corps d'Armée (GRCA)
--o 20 normal (horses)
--o 3 motorized
• 105 Groupes de Reconnaissance de Division d'Infanterie (GRDI)
--o 52 normal (horses)
--o 7 motorized (5 with armored cars)
--o 46 reduced (in the colonies or late created units)
• A few corps francs de cavalerie (including armored cars) during the campaign
• 3 regiments in the 4e DCR of the infantry

During early June 1940, the remains of the 5 DLCs were to be converted to a DLM "type réduit", a reduced DLM :
• 1e DLC as 4e DLM
• 2e DLC as 5e DLM
• 3e DLC as 6e DLM
• 4e DLC as 7e DLM
• 5e DLC as 8e DLM
The deteriorating military situation meant only 4e DLM and 7e DLM were actually formed.

The 1e DLM, 2e DLM and 3e DLM are also reconstituted beginning June, as reduced DLMs, with men evacuated from Dunkirk and who returned to France after a transit in Great Britain. These 5 DLMs fought until 25th June 1940.

The cavalry tanks are organized in "escadrons" (1 escadron = 1 squadron) and in "pelotons" (1 peloton = 1 platoon). For example in a cavalry unit like the 4e Régiment de Cuirassiers there are : 44 Somua S35 and 43 Hotchkiss H35 (+4 reserve tanks of each model) :

• 1 regiment command tank (1 Somua S35)

• 1 Somua S35 squadrons group = 43 Somua S35 :
--o 1 Somua S35 squadrons group command tank (1 Somua S35)
--o 1st squadron (21 Somua S35) (one "escadron" with 4 "pelotons")
---- 1 squadron commander tank
---- 4 platoons of 5 tanks
--o 3rd squadron (21 Somua S35s) (one "escadron" with 4 "pelotons")
---- 1 squadron commander tank
---- 4 platoons of 5 tanks

• 1 Hotchkiss squadrons group = 43 Hotchkiss H35 :
--o 1 squadrons group command tank (1 Hotchkiss H35)
--o 2nd squadron (21 Hotchkiss H35) (one "escadron" with 4 "pelotons")
---- 1 squadron commander tank
---- 4 platoons of 5 tanks
--o 4th squadron (21 Hotchkiss H35) (one "escadron" with 4 "pelotons")
---- 1 squadron commander tank
---- 4 platoons of 5 tanks


2.2 The French infantry tanks

After World War 1, the Schneider and Saint-Chamond tanks were retired and mostly only FT17 tanks were available. The Renault FT17 light tanks were replaced by the Renault D1, Renault R35 (later R39 and R40), Hotchkiss H39 and FCM36. In 1935, The Renault R35 and the Hotchkiss H35 tanks were produced but already in 1937 they appeared insufficient. The Renault R35 was adopted by the infantry and the Hotchkiss H35 by the cavalry only. It was rejected by the infantry which accepted only the later Hotchkiss H39, better armored (40mm) and with a more powerful engine (120 hp on 2800 rpm for 36.5 km/h onroad and 16km/h in medium difficult offroad). The 37mm SA38 L/33 gun was nevertheless rare and most of the tanks had only the 37mm SA18 L/21 gun. The heavier Renault D2 was produced in 1937.

The Renault B1bis tank was developed between 1921 and 1938. During this time it became heavier (increased armor to 60mm) and more intricate and despite an always more powerful engine (307 hp) it had lost in autonomy compared to the initial project. The B1bis was before all conceived in the 20's and 30's as infantry support tank, transported by railway behind the frontline, used to pierce the frontline by neutralizing the MG nests and fortifications, moving at the speed of the infantry, opening the way to the infantry and the cavalry which were in charge of exploiting the breakthrough. Destroying a strongpoint and moving then to the next position to neutralize. The B1bis tank's autonomy (about 150 km) was therefore totally sufficient according to this doctrine and was in fact not bad at all compared to the other tanks of 1940. Nevertheless this heavy tank used a lot of fuel, especially during combats because the tank had to turn on the spot to aim the 75mm hull gun. The practical autonomy was of about 6 hours. The Renault B1bis tank is able to cross ditches 2.75m wide, to climb slopes at 41° (90%) (on hard ground) and to cross obstacles 1.33m high.
General Delestraint managed to use this tank at the rhythm of a medium tank, engaging it successfully in tank vs tank warfare, but it was not able to follow the fast and mobile strategic warfare imposed by the German Panzerwaffe. The infantry high command refused to equip the DCR with the Somua S35 tanks of the cavalry, despite being better adapted to mobile tank vs tank combats.

Both the Hotchkiss H39 and the heavy B1bis were better tanks than the Renault R35 in terms of speed and mobility. Beside all the infantry and cavalry AFVs that were mentioned, some 30 others AFVs were studied and tested.

All the BCCs which were used to from the DCRs were already available, they were not new units but the creation of an armored division was a new project. The first half DCR was born on 2nd September 1939 and a second one on 5th September 1939. The 1e DCR and 2e DCR were created on 16th January 1940 and the 3e DCR on 20th March 1940. Since at least 4 months training were required to make of these DCRs operational units, the 3e DCR was not completely ready on 10th May 1940. A 4e DCR will be created on the field during May 1940.
On 10th May 1940, beside the French cavalry units, the 10 Panzerdivisionen concentrating all the German tanks encountered the 3 new DCRs and about 30 BCCs dispersed in the armies from Switzerland to the North Sea / Channel.

Each DCR included about 6,400 men and 1,700 vehicles :
• 1 divisional HQ
• 1 heavy tank half-brigade of two heavy tank battalions
1e DCR : 62 + 1 command tank = 63 Renault B1bis (+6 reserve tanks)
• 28e BCC : 31+3 Renault B1bis
• 37e BCC : 31+3 Renault B1bis

2e DCR : 62 + 1 command tank = 63 Renault B1bis (+6 reserve tanks)
• 8e BCC : 31+3 Renault B1bis
• 15e BCC : 31+3 Renault B1bis

3e DCR : 62 Renault B1bis (+6 reserve tanks)
• 41e BCC : 31+3 Renault B1bis
• 49e BCC : 31+3 Renault B1bis

4e DCR : 49 Renault B1bis (+3 reserve tanks) and 19 Renault D2
• 46e BCC : 31+3 Renault B1bis
• 47e BCC : 18 Renault B1bis
Attachements :
• 19e BCC : 40+5 Renault D2
• 1 light tank half-brigade of two light tank battalions
1e DCR : 80 Hotchkiss H39 (+10 reserve tanks)
• 25e BCC : 40+5 Hotchkiss H39
• 26e BCC : 40+5 Hotchkiss H39

2e DCR : 80 Hotchkiss H39 (+10 reserve tanks)
• 14e BCC : 40+5 Hotchkiss H39
• 27e BCC : 40+5 Hotchkiss H39

3e DCR : 62 Renault B1bis (+6 reserve tanks)
• 42e BCC : 40+5 Hotchkiss H39
• 45e BCC : 40+5 Hotchkiss H39

4e DCR : 80 Renault R35 (+10 reserve tanks), 39 Somua S35, 40 Hotchkiss H39
• 2e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/39
• 24e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/39
Attachements :
• 3e RC : 39 Somua S35 + 40 Hotchkiss H39
• 1 mechanized infantry battalion (BCP = Bataillon de Chasseurs Portés)
• 1 motorized artillery regiment (with all-terrain tractors)
• 1 motorized AT battery added to the two first DCR in February 1940
• 1 motorized engineer company
• 1 mixed signals company
• 1 HQ motor transport company
• 1 motor transport company
• 1 divisional quartermaster group
• 1 divisional medical group

The above composition was not final, there were to be further changes. It soon became apparent in training that the division had too few infantry. An extra battalion was planned to be added but the Germans attacked before anything was done. The lack of reconnaissance troops was also noted and something was planned to remedy this : a 131e, 132e and 133e GRDI each of a motorcycle squadron and an AMR squadron began to form in early June 1940. The 3 motorcycle squadrons were to come from the 7e RDP, a unit of the projected 4e DLM. Fall Rot, the second stage of the German offensive on the Somme and Aisne Rivers, beginning June, forced to cancel the formation of these units.

The 4e DCR was exception to the above organization as it was effectively an emergency formation initially used to block German progress towards Paris (involved in battles like Montcornet and Crécy-sur-Serre) and later to eliminate the German bridgehead at Abbeville on the Somme River. Formed on 15th May 1940, with only a few units ready when ordered to the front it was nearly two weeks before it reached its peak strength beginning June. The units were not trained to act together and at the beginning even the engineers were used as supporting infantry. The 4e DCR seems strong but the units were at first engaged one by one as they arrived and had often not their theoretical strength.

The tanks from the infantry are organized in "compagnies" (1 compagnie = 1 company) and sections (1 section = 1 platoon) :

 Renault B1bis company – heavy tanks :
company commander : 1x B1bis
1st platoon (section) : 3x B1bis
2nd platoon (section) : 3x B1bis
3rd platoon (section) : 3x B1bis = 10 tanks

For the whole battalion :
3 companies = 30 tanks
+ 1 battalion command tank = 31 tanks
+ 3 reserve tanks in the "compagnie d'échelon" = 34 tanks in a B1bis battalion.

 Renault R35 company – light tanks :
company commander : 1x R35
1st platoon (section) : 3x R35
2nd platoon (section) : 3x R35
3rd platoon (section) : 3x R35
4th platoon (section) : 3x R35 = 13 tanks

For the whole battalion :
3 company = 39 tanks
+ 1 battalion command tank = 40 tanks
+ 5 reserve tanks in the "compagnie d'échelon" = 45 tanks


NUMBER OF FRENCH TANKS IN FRANCE ON 10th MAY 1940, IN COMBAT UNITS : 2307 (2777)
• Hotchkiss H35 : 328
• Hotchkiss H39 : 474
• Renault R35/39 : 900
• FCM36 : 90
• Somua S35 : 264
• Renault D2 : 45
• Renault B1bis : 206
 Modern tanks : 2307

• Renault FT17 : 462 (obsolete)
• FCM-2C : 8 (obsolete)
 Obsolete tanks : 470



3. BRITISH ARMORED UNITS

On May 1940, 23 years after the first tank attack led by 49 British tanks, Great Britain has only achieved one exemplar of a kind of basic armored unit but grossly without supporting infantry, artillery, engineers or services.

In 1927, an experimental armored unit is tested by the British with 65 tanks, 16 tankettes, one motorized infantry battalion, supporting artillery and engineers. It is disbanded 2 years later and judged without interest.
In 1931, other trials are made with the 1st brigade, Royal Tank Corps (RTC), but the unit is only created for summer trainings.
In 1934, 4 battalions of the RTC are permanently regrouped : 150 obsolete tanks. One training of this mobile force proved to be a complete failure : bad coordination, the tanks were completely dispersed, isolated and "neutralized" one by one. This led the armored unit project to be completely neglected.
In 1934, Great Britain tested 1 tank brigade while the German had 1 operational battalion. In 1935, they had still 1 experimental tank brigade but the Germans had already 3 armored divisions. In 1937, there was a project for a possible armored division and the Germans had 4 armored divisions. The reluctance of the British high command delayed the development of an armored arm.

In 1934, the British high command had a project of reorganization of the army, implying the motorization of the cavalry but it faced the opposition of the pro-horse lobbies, which were even stronger than in France or Germany. At first Dragoons, Lancers, Hussars and Horse Guards didn't want to change their traditions.
Between the cavalry and the new and tiny RTC the relations were often very bad, the first one seeing the new one as being devoid of elegance and traditions.
Nevertheless, major general Blakiston-Houston, general inspector of the cavalry, announced that there was no future for the horse mounted cavalry. The regiments would have to be transformed in mechanized/motorized units, beginning with 3rd Hussars, Queen's Bays, 4th Hussars and 9th Lancers. The lack of equipments delayed the operation, which happened only on the paper.

The first modern tanks appeared only in the 3rd Hussars during 1937. The first operational unit is the 4th Hussars in November 1937. The last horse unit disappeared in 1941.

The RTC, whose expansion was strongly slowed down in 1934, continued its development during May 1937. 9 battalions were formed in 1938 and 5 others in 1939. This development created tensions between the cavalry and the RTC. The Royal Armored Corps (RAC) was therefore created, concentrating all the AFVs. Great Britain avoided therefore the cavalry/infantry tanks rivalry that can be found in France, but developed its mechanized units years later.

Germany was creating an independent and powerful Panzerwaffe. In France the industrial effort was similar to the German one but less efficient due to the inability to choose a unique doctrine and to unify all the AFVs in one arm (independent or not). United Kingdom had lost considerable time and was the last one to choose to have powerful armored units. The first modern British tanks, the A9 and A13 cruisers, are only available in December 1938.

In October 1939, the new born 1st armored division (AD) had in charge the defense the south British coast and is completely dispersed, all trainings being cancelled. In January 1940, the 1st AD was again grouped and went on with the training. On 16th/17th May 1940, 1 week after the German attack, the 1st AD (general Evans) was sent to France, without artillery, infantry or engineers. The AA and AT units are incomplete. The British AT units received French 25mm AT guns (a total of 220 25mm SA34/37 for the BEF). Several tanks had no guns, no episcopes or no radio set and there are grossly no spare parts. Part of the 1st AD remained to defend Calais.


NUMBER OF BRITISH TANKS IN FRANCE ON 10th MAY 1940 : 308
• 4th battalion Royal Tank Regiment : 50 Matilda I and 5 Vickers MkVIb
• 7th battalion Royal Tank Regiment : 23 Matilda II, 27 Matilda I and 7 Vickers MkVIb
• 13th / 18th Hussars (1st Division) : 28 Vickers MkVIb
• 4th / 7th Dragoon guards (2nd Division) : 28 Vickers MkVIb
• Lothian & Border Horse (48th Division) : 28 Vickers MkVIb
• 15th / 19th Hussars (3rd Division) : 28 Vickers MkVIb
• Innskilling Dragoon guards (4th Division) : 28 Vickers MkVIb
• East Riding Yeomanry (3rd Corps) : 28 Vickers MkVIb
• Fife & Forfar Yeomanry (51st Highland division) : 28 Vickers MkVIb

TOTAL :
• Matilda I : 77
• Matilda II : 23
• Vickers MkVIb : 208
Only the 23 Matilda II are armed to fight against tanks, the other tanks have only MGs.

The 1st Armoured Division is arriving on 17th May 1940 only :

2nd Armoured Brigade
o 2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen's Bays)
o 9th Queen's Royal Lancers
o 10th Prince of Wales Lancers

3rd Armoured Brigade
o 2nd battalion Royal Tank Regiment (not present in France)
o 3rd battalion Royal Tank Regiment
o 5th battalion Royal Tank Regiment

Tank strength :
• Vickers MkVIb : 134
• Cruiser MkI (A9) : 24
• Cruiser MkII (A10) : 31
• Cruiser MkIII (A13) : 95

 284 extra tanks but only 150 cruisers able to fight against tanks.

The British tanks except the Matilda II were all too lightly armored and the crew inexperienced. All the British light tanks could be easily penetrated even by the German 2.0cm guns which were not efficient against the French tanks. Some of these British tanks were fast but they did not use this potential advantage to hit and run. As described by German testimonies in Abbeville for example : while fired on, the British tanks generally just stopped to fire or to regroup, allowing the German AT gunners to concentrate easily on sitting ducks. The French tanks at least, even the lighter ones, had the luck to have a 40mm thick armor.
In Abbeville and Arras alone the British lost 167 of their 588 tanks (28% losses) in hours. The first attack on Abbeville for example was led by the 1st AD which lost 120 tanks out of 165 (73% losses), the attack failed in only 2 hours. The counter-attack in Arras involved 60 Matilda I and 16 Matilda II but also 60 French tanks (45 Hotchkiss H35 of the 13e BCC and 15 Hotchkiss H39 + Somua S35 of the 3e DLM). It cannot be called a success with the heavy losses that were sustained by the British troops before retreating : 62% of the British tanks (47 tanks), about 50% in the infantry and 75% of the reconnaissance vehicles (16 armored cars). The French troops covering the right flank were soon confronted to direct 10.5cm artillery and Flak fire as well as Pak and tanks. They were even fired at by British AT guns. They destroyed at least 3 Panzer IV and 6 Pz38(t) from the Pz.Rgt.25 when covering the retreat of the British troops. The French lost about 20 tanks and the Germans about 20 tanks during the battle of Arras.
Several other British tanks were lost around Calais and Boulogne but most of the remaining tanks simply abandoned or lost due to mechanical breakdowns and could not be recovered and repaired in front of the advancing German troops. The 1940 British army shared the same weaknesses as the bulk of the contemporary French one like the inability to wage mobile battles, slow-thinking command, and what we would today call poor C3I, and did no better job in May/June 1940 than the French army. They were beaten the same way and led their battles more or less according to the same tactics of infantry support.
Last edited by David Lehmann on 06 Jul 2005, 09:59, edited 3 times in total.

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Post by David Lehmann » 01 May 2005, 00:07

4. COMPARISON OF FRENCH AND GERMAN ARMORED UNITS

4.1 Organization of armored units

[Table comparing the DLM / DCR / Panzerdivision]

This table gives just grossly a comparison, specific units may vary from this composition on both sides.

Unlike the French units, the German Panzerdivision is a real little army, able to fight completely independently. It contains numerous tanks and a powerful infantry support. There are important supports : numerous AA guns and good artillery support, more engineers including assault engineers and an efficient supply system.
The French units have several imperfections in their organization and available equipments. There is a lack of modern signals, AA guns, infantry, modern fuel supply organization and river crossing elements compared to the German Panzerdivision. The DLM has a reconnaissance regiment but not the DCR. Each Panzerdivision has an Aufklärung Abteilung and a Kradschützen (motorcycle) battalion. In the DLM the motorized infantry was very well integrated like in the Panzerdivision. The French engineers lacked crossing equipments whereas the German engineers were better integrated in fast and mobile units. The signals are more modern on the German side. The French logistics is originally very efficient but is was shattered by the new fast warfare imposed by the Germans and showed its limits in 1940. Ammunition, food and fuel had therefore often to be transported by requisitioned civilian trucks/lorries. The towing/recovery units were also better organized in the Panzerdivision.


4.2 Concept of use of the armored units

The DLM has to provide intelligence and to make deep reconnaissance, to cover the deployments of the French armies and to fight the enemy AFVs. Once engaged, the DLM will fight like the Panzerdivision but without the massive air support and the numerous spotter aircrafts of the Germans. In Hannut for example each DLM had only 3 modern spotter aircrafts available.

The DCR has by far not the power or the mobility of a Panzerdivision. A DCR remains subordinated to an infantry army which leads the manoeuvre at his own rhythm. The DCR is used for local counter-attacks, heavy charges like an armored fist, but not deeper than 15-25 km. It is rather a "defensive war hammer", powerful but slow, compared to the "offensive and fine sword" constituted by a Panzerdivision.

The French armored units were not a separate arm ; they were depending from the infantry or the cavalry in 1940. The French tanks were intended to work closely with the infantry, allowing it to advance from one specific target to an other. French armored units are meant to fill a gap in a front, to counter-attack against an enemy offensive, to delay the enemy long enough to enable the deployment of infantry division on a rear frontline or to piece the enemy lines but only 15-25 km deep. A German Panzerdivision is able to penetrate 100 km in the rear of the enemy lines before having to be supplied.
The German Panzerwaffe was organized for the kind of war it wanted to fight in 1940. It was independent and in the center of the operational chain unlike the French armored units. Everything around was subordinated to it or thought to support it.

One must add that the German doctrine for the Panzerwaffe was very often to avoid combat against the French tanks. The Luftwaffe and/or AT guns had to neutralize the enemy tanks. They engaged AT guns, 8.8cm FlaK and 10.5cm field guns in direct fire against the tanks while the German tanks went deeper in the French lines, spreading like water and disorganizing the rear lines.


4.3 Number of tanks and common mistaken conclusion

On 10th May 1940, there are 2626 German tanks, 117 Panzerjäger I, 24 Sturmgeschütze, 38 15cm s.I.G.33 auf Pz.Kpfw.I, 6 8.8cm FlaK (Sfl) auf Sd.Kfz. 8 and 1252 armored cars for a total of 4063 AFVs.
There are 2307 modern French tanks (2777 tanks with the obsolete FT17 and FCM-2C tanks) and about 575 armored cars. For the British there are 308 tanks and 56 armored cars, 278 tanks for the Belgian army and 25 armored cars for the Dutch army.

There is therefore a comparable number of allied and German tanks with about 2900 tanks. If all the AFVs are counted there are 4020 allied vs 4063 German AFVs, with the obsolete French FT17 and FCM-2C tanks being counted. This apparent equality in the number of tanks is purely mathematical and just taken as such by many people. In the facts it is completely false.

All the about 3000 German tanks are concentrated in the 10 Panzerdivisionen unlike only about 960 French tanks in the DCR/DLM. Each DCR/DLM has less tanks than a Panzerdivision : there are grossly 10x300 German tanks against 6x160 French tanks and many dispersed battalions. That was the reality on the battlefield. The British 1st AD concentrated the cruiser tanks but did not really change the balance and was quickly neutralized. All the Belgian tanks were dispersed in small numbers in their infantry divisions, the higher number of Belgian tanks could be found in the 1e division de chasseurs ardennais with about 50 AFVs.

In the DLM/DCR 80-90 tanks are only light tanks unlike what was initially planned (only medium/heavy tanks). 80% of these light tanks are armed with the 37mm SA18 L/21 gun and only 20% with the 37mm SA38 L/33 gun. The 37mm SA18 is only adapted to infantry support. A tank armed with the 37mm SA18 gun can actually destroy armored cars, Panzer I and Panzer II tanks at 300-400m but has to go closer than 25-100m to have a chance to destroy a Panzer III or Panzer IV, whereas it can itself be destroyed at 300-400m by them.

The DLMs were led by the cavalry corps HQ and the different DCRs were commanded by an armored group HQ. Nevertheless, these HQs had insufficient means unlike the Panzerkorps which had fully operational HQs.

Thanks to more radio sets the German tanks were able to better coordinate and concentrate their attack, changing more easily the attack axis. The French tanks favored better armor (and armament if we exclude the 37mm SA18 gun) rather than communications and speed. This better tactical regulation resulted in much more concentrated German armor against allied tanks, usually 4 vs 1, sometimes even 8-10 vs 1 odds.


4.4 Fuel supply

In the French army there were 5-10 liters fuels cans but most of the fuel supply relied on fuel tank trucks or lorries carrying 50 liters fuel cans. For example each B1bis tank company had the fuel required for "4 days" of operations without being supplied by units higher than the battalion level.
• "1 day" in the tanks of the company themselves (10x 400l for the 10 B1bis tanks)
• "1 day" thanks to the Lorraine 37L TRC (fuel supply tractors) of the company (6x565l = 3390l)
• "1 day" thanks to the fuel tank truck of the company (3600l)
• "1 day" for each combat company thanks to the 50l fuel barrels provided by the battalion's supply company

Various fuel trucks where used by the French army for the strategic transport of fuel :
• Unic SU55 (5000 l) : 23
• Panhard K125 (5000 l) : 4
• Berliet VDCN (5000 l) : 80
• Renault AGR (5000 l) : 16
• Renault AGK (5000 l) : 340
• Berliet GDR7 (5000 l) : 400
• Matford F917-WS (5000 l) : 150
• Willeme (18000 l) : 0-50
• Renault AIB1 (9500 l) : ?
• Also a few White 920 (8000 l and 18000 l), Mack EXBX (18000l) and several Chevrolet conversions.
+ civilian requisitioned trucks.

For the cross-country/tactical supply on the battlefield other vehicles were used :
• Lorraine 37L TRC as mentioned (565 l fuel + ammunitions + oil + water) : 482
The Lorraine 37L TRC was very liked because of its armor + good cross country capacity, he could supply the first line troops.
• Renault 36R tractor with a 450 l trailer : 260
• Laffly/Hotchkiss S20 TL (1450 - 1900 l) : 39
• Lorraine 28 (2000 l) : a dozen
• Citroën-Kégresse P17 (2000 l) : 50
• + special dedicated trailers (450 l, 600 l and 800 l models) that could be towed by the tanks themselves, by tractors or tankettes.

In the German army nevertheless the use of the jerricans was more generalized and supply was quicker and easier on the frontline.


4.5 Tank carriers and towing / recovery elements

Until 1935/1937 most of the tank carriers were simply trucks with an embarkation ramp allowing the truck to carry the tank. This solution had been adopted in the 20's for strategic movements.
For the new light tanks (R35, FCM36, H35, H39 ...) special lifting-carrier trucks (camions "leveurs-porteurs") were also developed : Berliet GPE2 (1 produced), Berliet GPE3 (2 produced), Berliet GPE4 (32 produced) and Willeme DW12A truck (5 produced).
The theoretical strength was at first 3 lifting-carrier trucks for a battalion of 45 light tanks and later only 1 lifting-carrier truck complemented by 2 simple tank carrier trucks with no special device except a winch and an embarkation / disembarkation ramp. Of these tank carriers, 430 Bernard trucks had been ordered for example, but only 73 were delivered. 300 White-Ruxtall 922 US tank carriers had also been ordered but only one vehicle could be delivered. 5 ex-Spanish Autocar (US trucks) were also used.
Medium (D2, Somua S35 ...) or heavy (B1 and B1bis) tanks needed a dedicated trailer towed by a tractor (Somua MCL5, Somua MCL6, Laffly S35T, Laffly S45T or Latil M4T). There were two types of trailers : 20t and 30t. These trailers were produced by Titan, Coder, Lagache & Glazmann ... Theoretically there should be one trailer for a company of 10 Renault B1bis and two trailers for a squadron of 20 Somua S35 cavalry tanks. Only 60 20t trailers and 40 30t trailers had been delivered to the French army.
From 1935 on, the typical tow truck was the Somua MCL5, but this vehicle reached its limits with the B series heavy tanks because of its only 90 hp engine. Therefore the Laffly S45T had been developed but only 12 vehicles were delivered, explaining that the Somua MCL5 was sometimes replaced by the Laffly S35T.
The Laffly S35 had been originally developed to tow the 155mm GPF, 155mm GPFT and 220mm C Mle1916 heavy mortar. Only 225 Laffly S35 had been delivered, 170 of them in the towing version with a winch. That means that the Somua MCL5 was still widely in use and that in the artillery units the heavy pieces were still mostly towed by vehicles like the Latil TARH2. All these wreckers should have been replaced by the huge Latil M4TX (8x8, 140 hp) but this one only reached the prototype level in 1940. The Latil M4TX could easily tow 100t, that is to say it could easily tow a B1bis tank with blocked or destroyed tracks.


4.6 Training / Instruction

For the DCR, the training went generally not further than the battalion level. Only the individual tank / platoon / company and battalion warfare was at level. For the DLMs, the training was excellent for the 1e DLM and 2e DLM, even at the divisional and corps level but was rather insufficient for the 3e DLM which included many reservists. One of the best unit of the French army is probably the 1e DLM. This division has been very well trained for long, all the crew were highly motivated and knew very well their tanks (mechanics, functions, armament, tactics) etc. The division had practised division-scaled trainings and inter-arms trainings (tanks + infantry + artillery) before the war. This is a perfect example of a very good mechanized unit of the French army. In opposition there is for example the 7e RC (Régiment de Cuirassiers) formed after the 10th May 1940 had brand new tanks but 80% of the crew who were perfect rookies.
On the German side, as soon as 1935 the forming Panzerdivisionen had a coherent and continual training, even if Guderian like in France encountered strong opposition from pro-horse lobbies at the beginning. During the Spanish civil war several trials were made with the Panzer I, influencing the later organization of the German armored units. Nevertheless, listening to some people it seems that all the German tankers of 1940 acquired a high level of training in Spain in 1937, which is of course by far exaggerated. The Spanish civil war had also grossly nothing to do with the modern warfare of May 1940 which was even not applied in 1939 in Poland.
The maneuvers in Czechoslovakia allowed to train massive movements and the combats in Poland allowed to modify/adapt and modernize the Panzerwaffe which proved not sufficient in several cases and which was not concentrated in Poland.


4.7 Air support

Operational frontline aircrafts on 10th May 1940 on the western front :
France : 879
UK : 384 (total of 416 : 100 fighter (Hurricane + Gladiator) and 316 attack/bomber (Fairey Battle + Blenheim)
Belgium : 118
Netherlands : 72
Germany : 2589

The French air force was largely inferior to the German one, in numbers and quality, especially the bomber fleet which was really small in comparison.
The French air force had some 1900 aircrafts, of which only about 1,400 frontline aircrafts available (650 fighters, 240 bombers and 490 reconnaissance and observation). It was conceived as a defensive arm, in cooperation with / attached to the ground troops. It was therefore very dispersed and it explains the importance of the reconnaissance fleet working for the ground troops At the time of the German attack the French air force was just modernizing and reorganizing.
There were only 36 Dewoitine D520 fighters in May 1940, the others were Morane-Saulnier 406, Curtiss H75, Bloch 151, Bloch 152 and Potez 631 fighters. Only 400 fighters were operational on 10th May 1940.
Only 120 of the bomber/assault aircrafts were modern ones (10 Amiot 354, 55 Lioré et Olivier 451, 45 Bréguet 691 or 693, 10 Potez 633) with 85 being operational. The others were older ones : 75 Bloch 200 or 210, 10 Farman 221 or 222 and 35 Amiot 143 with about 100 considered operational.
From the 490 reconnaissance aircrafts only 370 are really operational and rather modern ones : Bloch 174, Potez 637 and Potez 63/11. Older Mureaux 115 and 117 were also still in use.
Great Britain sent 416 aircrafts in France and kept about 800 aircrafts in Great Britain but all the allied planes available (1340 French + 416 British + about 190 for Belgium and the Netherlands = 1946) was still inferior to the about 3,000 / 3,500 German aircrafts effectively used during the 1940 western campaign. Nevertheless the RAF was also active from Great Britain, especially during the battle of Dunkirk. At the beginning of the German attack mostly all the Dutch and Belgian aviation are destroyed on the ground as well as 232 French aircrafts.

The German air force was conceived as an offensive arm with very numerous fighters and a powerful tactical bombardment/attack fleet to support the ground troops like an aerial artillery. They had 1,264 fighters (1016 single-seat fighters like the Me109 and Me110), 1,120 bombers (He111, Do17, Ju88), 342 Ju87 dive bombers concentrated in the VIII. Fliegerkorps for close air support, 42 Hs123 specialized in close air support, about 700 observation and reconnaissance planes (Fi156, Hs126, Do17, He111 and Ju88) and about 450 transport planes for a total of about 3900 aircrafts. The Germans had a powerful fighters fleet, which combined with a very powerful mobile AA artillery covering the advancing troops was decisive to gain the air superiority. More of the 892 destroyed French aircrafts were shot down by the AA guns than by the German fighters. On 13th May 1940, the Luftwaffe was able for the first time of history to concentrate about 1500 bombers and attack planes over the small area of Sedan were only weak French divisions were defending an overstretched front.

The Panzewaffe was actually trained to cooperate closely with the Luftwaffe, especially the VIII. Fliegerkorps, which concentrates all the 342 Junkers Ju87 dive bombers, specialized in close air support, and providing a new kind of mobile artillery to support the advance of the Panzerdivisionen. The Germans were able to concentrate all their tanks in the Panzerdivisionen but also all their dive bombers in one Fliegerkorps. The Germans had also the advantage of having omnipresent observation aircrafts to support them.



5. QUALITY OF THE FRENCH TANKS

French tanks were generally slower and less mobile than the German tanks. The German main advantages were speed, ability to concentrate tanks and better capacity to change the attack axis thanks to the radio sets.
The main French advantages were a thick armor even for the light tanks (40-60mm for the French tanks versus 13-30mm for the German tanks), able to resist to many German hits and sometimes a better armament with the 47mm SA35 L/32 gun. It is able to destroy all the German tanks up to 800-1000m but generally the French rate of fire is slower because of the 1-man turret where the commander is also spotter, loader and gunner.
French tanks were generally more adapted to heavy and brutal charges against slow or immobile targets but were not really conceived for a war in which speed and mobility rules. And this speed and mobility was created by the revolutionary Panzerdivisionen. Only the Somua S35 cavalry tank could really compete with the German tanks in terms of speed, mobility and autonomy.

5.1 Speed and autonomy of the tanks

Top Speed (km/h) and autonomy (by road, in km)

GERMAN TANKS
Panzer I : 40 170
Panzer II : 40 200
Panzer III : 40 165
Panzer IV : 40 165
Panzer 38(t) : 42 250
Panzer 35(t) : 35 190

FRENCH TANKS
Renault FT17 : 7.5 35
Renault AMC-34 (YR) : 40 200
Renault AMC-35 (ACG1) : 42 160
Renault R35 : 20 140
Renault R40 : 20 140
Hotchkiss H35 : 35 150
Hotchkiss H39 : 36.5 150
FCM36 : 24 225
Renault D1 : 18 90
Renault D2 : 23 100
Somua S35 : 44 255
Renault B1 : 28 180
Renault B1bis : 28 160
Renault AMR-33 : 54 200
Renault AMR-35 : 55 200

German tanks are generally faster and more mobile : 7-10 hp/ton for the French tanks which are heavier and 15-20 hp/ton for the German tanks. The autonomy of the French tanks is not that bad at all compared to German tanks. The autonomy was good for the Somua S35 cavalry tank, in adequacy with its role, but it remained insufficient for the Renault B1bis and the Hotchkiss H39 tanks.
Nevertheless, the Renault B1bis tanks used much fuel because the engine was not only used for advancing but also largely used for aiming the 75mm SA35 hull gun in combat. Even if not advancing the engine was used to make the tank turn in place and aim the 75mm SA35 hull gun. The maximum speed are good for the French tanks but due to lower hp/ton ratio they needed generally more time than German tanks to reach it.

The German tanks were generally able to move at about 30 km/h offroad. For a Renault R35, the top speed in medium difficult offroad terrain was only 8.7 km/h. The Hotchkiss H39 was better with 16 km/h in medium difficult offroad terrain and even the heavy Renault B1bis was better with 21 km/h (easy offroad) to 10-15 km/h (hard offroad). The mean speed of the Somua S35 was measured at 35 km/h onroad, 32.3 km/h in easy/medium offroad terrain (fields etc.) and 11.19 km/h in hard offroad terrain (rough, ditches etc.), which makes of it a tank able to compete with the German ones.


5.2 Conception of the turrets, the French 1-man turret issue

On the French side all of the tanks and armored cars had a 1-man turret except :
• FCM-2C (11 men with 3 in the front turret and 1 in a rear turret)
• AMD White (2-men turret)
• AMD Laffly 50AM (2-men turret)
• AMD Panhard 165/175 (2-men turret)
• AMD Panhard 178 (2-men turret)
• Renault AMC-35 (2-men turret)
• And actually the SOMUA S-35's APX1CE turret is sometimes described as a "one-and-a-half-man turret", as the enlarged turret ring (1.130m instead of 1.022m), compared to the APX1/4 found on the B1/B1bis, allowed the radio operator to provide assistance to the commander/gunner/loader. The radio operator could get out of his seat and stand up to function as the "loader".

Germans had 1-man turrets for their Panzer I and Panzer II (except the late war model Luchs with 2 men). In the Panzer II like in the Somua S-35 one crew member not sitting in the turret could be the loader. The Panzer III and Panzer IV had 3 men in the turret. The British Matilda I also had a 1-man turret.
In the French 1-man turret the commander is also spotter, loader and gunner and sometimes platoon or company/squadron leader. When looking for a new shell in the darkness of the hull (no ammunition stored in the turret), nobody is spotting or firing, the tactical awareness could therefore become rather bad. In the Renault B1bis or Somua S35 for example the situation is better because at least one crew member assisted the tank commander and acted as loader. The Somua S35 had a larger turret ring favoring such help.

The French tanks due to their 1-man turret were probably a bit more intricate to use. For rookie tank crews that has proven to be very hard, a rookie crew will probably be more effective in a German tank than in a French one. Lieutenant-colonel Baillou who was tank commander in the 3e DLM in 1940, officer in the 2nd French armored division in North Africa and France and instructor from 1945 to 1950 described well the issue of the 1-man turret. He also explained that c ontrary to the 1e DLM and 2e DLM who had well trained crews, the 3e DLM (except some officers from the other DLMs) had only reservists who did their military service on horse and some of them discovered their tank a short time before being engaged. To worsen the situation, most of the Somua of the 3e DLM went to combat with 2 crew members instead of 3, many tankers were in permission at the beginning of the combats and therefore nobody was there to help the commander to reload. In these tanks the Somua had really a 1-man turret instead of a 1 ½ one. This can explain why *one* German source (even not specified) is quoted in Gunsburg's article "battle of the Belgian plain" about the bad gunnery skills of the French tankers. The 3e DLM in Hannut which had a very high proportion of reservists sustained heavy losses while the more experienced crews of the 2e DLM (also less engaged) in the same battle had only light losses. Nevertheless the 3e DLM reservists inflicted significant losses to the elite of the Panzerwaffe. Each counter-attack made by a small formation of Somua S35 tanks was seen as critical by the Germans. For this division, there was of course the absence of tracer shells and the fact that grossly all the Hotchkiss tanks of the 3e DLM had 37mm SA18 L/21 guns with only poor anti-tank efficiency. It is a miracle that they could fight so well against the elite Panzerwaffe in Hannut. They had better tanks (considering the Somua S35 tanks) than most of the German crews but mostly with crews lacking training. In 1940, the French tanks like the Somua S35 had better armor and main gun than the German tanks but the crews of the 3e DLM were less experienced than their enemy. Other units had experienced crews. One can absolutely not generalize about bad French tankers as it is often said in a typical French bashing spirit.

In 1940, when the French crews were experienced with their tanks they were at the level of the German tankers. They knew how to operate their tanks, even if it was a bit different than for a German crew. The 2e DLM in Hannut / Gembloux had rather light losses and proved to be a dangerous opponent. Many German tanks were knocked out but as the ground was later controlled by the Germans they could recover/repair the damaged ones unlike the French which had also to abandon several tanks due to mechanical breakdowns. A French tank is more intricate and becomes really a deadly and efficient weapon only with experienced crews. A rookie crew will have several drawbacks. History has shown that the experienced French crews were at level with their German opponents. An other example of that is the engagement of 10 Somua S35 tanks of the 4e regiment de cuirassiers (1e DLM) in the town of Jolimetz on 18th May 1940 against half of the 5. Panzerdivision. In 10 vs 1 odd, the French lost 10 tanks (destroyed or abandoned) and the Germans 26 tanks, including many Panzer IVs. That is a perfect example of what well-trained French crews were able to do.
Baillou explained that in 1943-1945 the situation was inverted : they were more experienced than most of the German crews they met which on their side had better tanks (Panthers in his explanation). They also took advantage of a drawback of the Panther : when the slope was to important in a hilly countryside, the turret became too heavy to be rotated for the Panther, they had to turn all the tank. The French transposed the cavalry spirit to the French armored division of the liberation, and many officers were veterans from the DLMs, applying the cavalry speed and tactics but this time with the Sherman which had an intercom system and a radio. Often they checked the range of a target by firing tracer rounds with the coaxial machinegun. They had observed that until range X it corresponded grossly to the ballistics of the main gun. Many French tankers and commanders who were defeated in 1940 were again in armoured units for the liberation and drew their tanks in the heart of Germany and Austria.


5.3 Vision means in the French turrets

- Renault R35/39/40 and Hotchkiss H35/39 tanks vision means

Hull :
1x E2B episcope (early models) (28° vertical field of view) OR 1x PPL RX 180 P episcope (30° vertical field of view)
2x lateral slits

APX-R or APX-R1 turret (1350 kg with 37mm SA18 gun and 1540 kg with the 37mm SA38 gun) :
1x L.713 / L.739 sight (37mm SA18 gun) OR 1x L.767 sight (37mm SA38 gun)
3x diascopes (28° vertical field of view) (early) OR 3x PPL RX 160 episcopes (30° vertical field of view)
1x slit in the rear turret hatch

Cupola :
1x slit (150mm x 7mm slit protected by a 15mm thick armored shutter) (early) OR 1x PPL RX 180 P episcope (APX-R1) (30° vertical field of view)



- FCM-36 tank vision means

Hull :
1x PPL RX 160 episcope (68° horizontal field of view, 24° vertical field of view)
2x lateral slits

FCM turret (1287 kg) :
1x L.739 sight (37mm SA18 gun) OR 1x L.767 sight (37mm SA38 gun) but rare.
3x PPL RX 160 episcopes (68° horizontal field of view, 24° vertical field of view)
3x slits


- Renault B1bis tank vision means

Hull :
2x L.710 sights for the 75mm SA35 gun (stereoscopic telemeter, each with 3.5x magnification, field of view 11.15° and range ladders, adjustable drum up to 1600m).
1x adjustable slit with PPL RX 160 episcope (E2B episcope on the B1)
2x lateral slits
1x periscope (about 180° horizontal field of view)

APX4 turret (56mm armor, 2570 kg) :
1x sight for the 47mm SA35 gun (4x L.762 sight, + reticle, field of view 11.82°)
2x PPL RX 160 episcopes (68° horizontal field of view and +3° to -21° = 24° vertical field of view)

Cupola :
1x periscopic binocular (4x magnification, 8.91° field of view)
1x PPL RX 160 episcope (68° horizontal field of view and +2° to -22° = 24° vertical field of view)
1x Estienne slit (114° field of view – 120mm x 10mm slit protected by a 24mm thick armored shutter)


- Somua S35 tank vision means

Hull :
3x PPL RX 160 episcopes (68° horizontal field of view, 24° vertical field of view)

APX1CE turret (42mm armor, about 2100 kg) :
1x sight for the 47mm SA35 gun (4x L.762 sight, + reticle, field of view 11.82°)
2x PPL RX 160 episcopes (68° horizontal field of view, 24° vertical field of view)

Cupola :
1x periscopic binocular (4x magnification, 8.91° field of view)
1x PPL RX 160 episcope (68° horizontal field of view, 24° vertical field of view)
1x Estienne slit (114° field of view – 120mm x 10mm slit protected by a 24mm thick armored shutter)



5.4 Armor and turret rotation speed

Armor is the main advantage of French tanks with 40-60mm thickness (only 35mm for the Hotchkiss H35). It enables them to sustain numerous hits without being damaged. Many Renault B1bis received 40-140 3.7cm and even 7.5cm hits without having to break the combat and many German AT guns were simply crushed under their tracks, being unable to stop them.
With the Somua S35 such situations were also common and during the battles of Hannut/Gembloux many Somua S35 came back with 20-40 hits without serious damage. Even the lighter Renault R35/40 and Hotchkiss H35/39 resisted rather well to the German AT guns.
On French tanks cast armor allowed for better profiled armor. The armor was often round and had also often more sloped area than on the German tanks.

Except for the Renault B1bis all the French armor are generally cast. The values of the angles are therefore difficult to give in a table because there is a huge number of rounded angles and parts. Nevertheless on can for example mention the surface of the front (turret and hull) really exposed to the enemy fire :
• For a Renault R35 : 2.00 m2 with only 0.65 m2 with a slope inferior to 30°
• For a Hotchkiss H35 : 6.00 m2 with only 3.24 m2 with a slope inferior to 30°
That gives a good idea of the few vulnerable surfaces of these little tanks.


• Hotchkiss H35 and H39 (APX-R and APX-R1 turret - hand 27 seconds + 10° traverse for the gun)
APX-R turret (1552 kg) is cast and hull is cast bolted armor.
The turrets are hand-cranked in the H35/39 and R35/39/40 tanks and could also be unlocked from the training crank and moved with the rotation of the gunner's body for quick snap-turns.

• Renault R35 and R40 (APX-R and APX-R1 turret - hand 27 seconds + 10° traverse for the gun)
APX-R turret (1552 kg) is cast and hull is made of 3 cast parts + RHA bolted armor elements.
The turrets are hand-cranked in the H35/39 and R35/39/40 tanks and could also be unlocked from the training crank and moved with the rotation of the gunner's body for quick snap-turns.

• Renault B1 (APX1 turret - electric 28 seconds + hand : 2°21 per wheel turn)
APX1 turret (2100 kg with the 47mm SA35 gun, 1.022m ring) is cast and hull is RHA bolted armor.

• Renault B1bis (APX4 turret - electric 36 seconds + hand 55 seconds)
APX4 turret (2570 kg with the complete armament, 1.022m ring) is cast and hull is RHA bolted armor.

• Somua S35 (APX1CE turret - electric 20-30 seconds + hand)
APX1CE turret (about 2100 kg, 1.130m ring) is cast and hull is cast welded armor.

• FCM-36 (FCM turret - electric 21 seconds + hand)
FCM turret (1287 kg) is cast and hull is RHA welded armor.

• Renault D1 (ST2 - electric + hand)
ST2 turret is cast and hull is RHA bolted.

• Renault D2 (APX1 and APX4 turret - electric 28 seconds (APX1) or 36 seconds (APX4) + hand)
APX1/4 turret (1.022m ring) in cast and hull is cast welded armor.

• AMR-33 and AMR-35
RHA bolted armor.

• AMC-34 and AMC-35 (AMC-35 = APX2 turret, AMC-34 = APX1 or APX2 turret)
APX2 turret is cast and both welded and bolted, the hull is RHA bolted armor.

• Panhard P-178 (APX3 turret)
Turret and hull are RHA bolted armor.

France's metallurgical industries were competitive in WW2 but French armor seems slighlty inferior in purity to German steels at the beginning of WW2. French steel was mainly extracted/produced in north-eastern France (Lorraine) but also imported from Sweden and Germany (the Ruhr was occupied by France after WW1 and during the 20's and many resources were taken from this area). French RHA was a Cr-Ni steel and delivered about the same effective protection as German Cr-Ni free steel, but slightly less than German Cr-Ni steels. There is therefore no deficiency multiplier for French RHA armor but French used very often cast armor. The rounded cast armor on some French tanks like the APX turrets, the hull front of the Somua S35 etc. plays an important role in defeating the German shells. The French army did not use FH RHA.
The German FH RHA benefit is sometimes reduced when using APC and APCBC shells. Almost all the French AT rounds were AP capped, except the shells from the 75mm SA35 L/17 (B1bis hull gun), the 25mm L/72 AT guns and the 25mm L/60 (or L/47.2 ?) AT gun from the Panhard 178. The British ammunitions were also uncapped during the battle of France.

Concerning the B1bis "invicibility", penetration from the front is minimized due to the frontal sloped armor, penetration on the turret is minimized due to rounded construction and the armor thickness in 60mm RHA on the front hull and 56mm cast on the turret (+ the gun mantlet on the front turret).

The 3.7cm PaK earned it's nickname of "door knocker" when faced against the British Matilda II tanks (only 23 in the 1940 western campaign) and/or the Renault B1bis tanks, the last one being called "Stahl Kolossus" among other nicknames. [The nickname may in fact only have been earned on the eastern front in 1941].

Concerning the usage of German APCR rounds (Pzgr.40) available for the PzKpfw III F in middle June 1940, the round is VERY light. After 250m, the APCR round looses its amount of overall energy at an incredible rate. After about 300m, standard AP shot will do more than APCR will be able to do. From 0-250m though, even the Renault B1bis and Matilda II are both at risk if a good shot from an APCR round is attained. Under 250m range from favourable angles, the B1bis is easily susceptible to penetration by the 3.7cm APCR round fired from the PzKpfw III F, especially in the side and rear hull which are vertical plates.

At most combat ranges from favorable angles, the B1bis is susceptible to penetration by the 4.7cm Pak(t) auf PzKpfw I Ausf B (PanzerJäger I Ausf. B), especially in the side and rear hull which are vertical plates.

The B1 bis, in most regards, is "invincible" to most rounds otherwise from all German calibers, including 7.5cm shells fired from the PzKpfw IV and StuG III. At close range (< 100m) the 7.5cm shells are a threat but not the 3.7cm AP shells which are in the wide majority of the cases not sufficient. The Renault B1bis, in most combat conditions is a very dangerous opponent. Once it looses it's ability to maneuver (e.g. track knocked off) or when outnumbered and loosing tactical awareness, it is a sitting duck for a skilled commander (with the help of smoke rounds also for example).
On 16th May in Stonne, a single B1bis tank (the B1bis "Eure" from Lieutenant Bilotte) pushed in the town itself into the German defenses and went back. He attacked a German column of Pz.Rgt.8 and destroyed 2 PzIV, 11 PzIII and 2 PaK guns. The first shots destroyed simultaneously the first (with the 47mm gun) and the last tank (with the 75mm gun) of the column. The first German tanks were at less than 50m range. The armor of the B1bis was scattered with 140 impacts, no one penetrated or really damaged the armor.
During the battle of Abbeville the B1bis "Jeanne d'Arc") sustained more than 90 impacts from 3.7cm PaK without being penetrated and simply crushed several AT guns.
The B1bis was almost invincible when engaged by 3.7cm AT guns if not a point-blank range and a lot of luck. Mostly all the B1bis that had been lost due to the enemy had been destroyed by 8.8cm Flak, indirect artillery fire, direct 10.5cm artillery fire and anti-tank mines. Many others have been abandoned after mechanical breakdowns or being out of fuel.


5.5 Rate of fire

Typical early WW2 ammunitions like the French 25mm, 37mm and 47mm were rather small and easy to handle, much lighter in weight compared to later bigger shells (the German 8.8cm shell for example). Big shells are more heavy and difficult to handle inside a tank. Practical rate of fire in tanks is about 4-12 rpm.

The French tank guns had a semi-automatic system on the breech (SA = semi-automatique = semi-automatic) : block opening, ejecting case and drawing a firing pin were automatic. The gunner had just to introduce the shell and to fire. After firing, the recoil opened the breech and the shell case was automatically ejected. This semi-automatic breech allowed winning precious time.

Not only caliber and ammo type used had an effect on rate of fire, also crew ergonomics and number and how their tasks were arranged played great role, especially in combat. In the APX4 turret of the B1bis tank, the practical rate of fire of the 47mm SA35 gun was 6 rpm in accurate aiming/firing (15 rpm theoretical) but it could drop down to 2-3 rpm in combat. The rate of fire of the 47mm turret gun in the B1bis is probably slightly lower than in the Somua S35 turret which had a larger one (APX1CE, CE means "chemin élargie", enlarged turret ring), enabling a crewman to provide direct help to the tank commander / gunner. Nevertheless the B1bis crew was often increased from 4 to 5 men, one additional man assisting the commander.

And last but not least factor, the training of the crew had obviously also an effect on rate of fire.

After firing many rounds the spent cases will be in the gunner's way on the floor of tank, stuck in the turret mechanism. The crew had to throw them out to avoid interfering with the movement of the turret and gun and dangerous. The B1bis and Somua S35 tanks for example had several little traps to get rid of ammunition cases.

The ergonomics and rate of fire was superior in German turrets. Therefore only well trained men were able to use the French turrets really efficiently but for new recruits a French turret was more intricate to operate than a German turret. The German tanks were generally firing 2-3 times more than the French ones but the French tanks could far better resist to the hits.


5.6 French guns and shells

There are 2307 modern French tanks (2777 tanks with the obsolete FT17 and FCM-2C tanks) and about 575 armored cars or light reconnaissance tanks. That makes 3056 French tanks (if the AMR33/35s are counted as tanks) :
• only about 480 French tanks armed with a 47mm SA35 (including the B1bis tanks with their 75mm hull gun)
• about 300-350 which have a 37mm SA38 gun.
• from the 279 AMR33/35s, 259 are only armed with a single 7.5mm or 13.2mm MG and 20 AMR35 have a 25mm SA35 gun, which is also better than the German 3.7cm gun.
That makes 800-850 French tanks (26-28%) with an excellent to good anti-tank capacity.

The characteristics of each gun and shell are detailed in an other document I have written but the different ones are listed here :

8mm Hotchkiss Mle1914 MG
- Cartouche Mle1886 D (am) (heavy ball)
- Cartouche de 8mm à balle traceuse (T)
- Cartouche de 8mm à balle perforante (AP)
- Cartouche Mle1932 N (very heavy ball)

7.5mm 'Reibel' MAC Mle1931 MG
- Cartouche Mle1929 C
- Cartouche Mle1929 D (heavy ball)
- Cartouche Mle1929 T (T)
- Cartouche Mle1929 P and TP (AP and APT)
- Cartouche Mle1929 I (Incendiary)

13.2mm Hotchkiss Mle1930 HMG
- Cartouche Mle1935 (heavy ball)
- Cartouche Mle1935 T (T)
- Cartouche Mle1935 PT (APT)
- Cartouche Mle1935 P (AP)

25mm SA35 (L/47.2 or L/60 ?)
- Cartouche de 25mm Mle1934 à balle perforante (charge forte) (AP)
- Cartouche de 25mm Mle1934 à balle traçeuse perforante (APT)

37mm SA18 and SA18 M37 L/21
- Obus de rupture Mle1892/1924 (APHE)
- Boulet de rupture Mle1935 (AP/API)
- Obus de rupture Mle1937 (AP)
- Obus explosif Mle1916 (HE)
- Boîte à balles Mle1908 (canister)
- Boîte à balles Mle1918 (canister)

The huge majority of the French tanks (2206-2256 tanks) are light tanks armed with the 37mm SA18 gun or only MGs. The 37mm SA18 gun can be used at 300-400m against the Panzer I and Panzer II but to knock out a Panzer III Ausf.E/F (the previous models are less armored and easier to destroy) or a Panzer IV Ausf.C/D, they have to get as close as < 25-100m, whereas the enemy can destroy them at about 300m (3.7cm KwK) to 500m (7.5cm KwK) and even from longer range if you consider the obsolete Renault FT17.

37mm SA38 L/33
- Obus de rupture Mle1938 (APC)
- Obus explosif Mle1938 (HE)

Note concerning the the APX-R and APX-R1 turret armed with the 37mm SA18 or 37mm SA38 guns :
Elevation of -16° to +20°
Traverse of 5° right and 5° left but it could be blocked to aim only with the turret rotation and so that the coaxial MG was always well aligned with the main gun.

47mm SA34 L/30
- Obus de rupture Mle1892G (APHE)
- Obus explosif Mle1932 (HE)

47mm SA35 L/32
- Obus de rupture Mle1935 (APC)
- Obus explosif Mle1932 (HE)

75mm SA35 L/17.1
- Obus de rupture Mle1910 (APHE)
- Obus explosif Mle1915 (HE)
The 75mm HE shells are able to destroy the armored cars, Panzer I and Panzer II and are very efficient at short range against the tracks and lower parts of the heavier tanks. The HE shell has a penetration of 17mm/30° even at 800m.

The French tanks had all AP/APC/APHE AND HE shells unlike the British cruisers which had only AP shells and only HE shells in their CS version (infantry support). Nonethelss, in the French tanks and especially the light tanks, there were generally more HE shells than AP shells (3/5th HE shells), illustrating the infantry support role seen as primary task. The French tanks (except the 25mm guns and of course possibly the 8mm, 7.5mm and 13.2mm MGs) had no tracer shells unlike the German tanks. It was therefore often harder to find the range of a spotted target.

The only Pzgr.40 (APCR) shells produced only in June 1940 were for the 3.7cm L/45 KwK of the Panzer III. The OKW ammo consumption reports tells that during the whole battle of France about 63,000 3.7cm Pzgr. and 7,440 3.7cm Pzgr.40 were fired by tank guns. The 3.7cm PaK received not any 3.7cm Pzgr.40 during the battle of France. The production of the 4.7 cm Pzgr.40 for the 4.7cm PaK(t) and 4.7cm PaK36(t) started in May 1941. The APCR round introduced next after the 3.7cm Pzgr.40 was the 3.7cm Pzgr.40/37(t), which started in autumn 1940. The 2.0cm Pzgr.40 was introduced in December 1940 or the first months of 1941, the other Pzgr.40 types also until May 1941. The 7.5cm L/24 KwK37 of the PzIV Ausf.A/B/C/D or the StuG III Ausf.A in France in May/June 1940 could fire the K.Gr.rotPz. (AP) at 385m/s (penetration of 41mm/30° at 100m) but also a HEAT shell (Gr.38 HL/1) at 452m/s which was available in very small numbers but allowed a penetration of 45mm/30° at any range. There was no HEAT shell ready for the campaign in Poland. The Gr.38 HL/1 made the final tests in December 1939 and the shooting of the ballistic tables was finished in March 1940. The shell is listed in the ammo manual of the 7.5 cm KwK from July 1940. HEAT shells use chemical penetration instead of kinetic penetration thus the same amount of armor penetration could be achieved despite striking velocity. HEAT shells also tended to do better with striking armor plates at an angle, but were also easily defeated by employing spaced armor or side skirting. HEAT shells could also be used as a substitute for HE shells. HEAT shells in early WW2 Panzers were not strong enough to penetrate the stronger French tanks, however later revisions (Gr.38 HL/A, HL/B, HL/C) proved more successful on the eastern front.

If we exclude the direct artillery fire and the 8.8cm L/56 Flak, the 4.7cm Pak36(t) L/43.4 mounted on the Panzerjäger I seems to be the most dangerous gun for the French tanks (except the HEAT shell of the 75mm L/24 beyond 500m). The French 47mm L/53 AT gun is the best AT gun before the 5.0cm Pak38 and 7.5cm Pak40.
On the French side, the Laffly W15 TCC (tank destroyer) was really deadly against German tanks with its 47mm L/53 and the Mle1936 APCBC shells, still 72mm/0° at 1000m according to French tests.
The best French tank gun is the 47mm SA35 L/32 which is superior to the German tank guns. The best German tank guns are the 3.7cm L/47.8 (t) of the Panzer 38(t) and the 7.5cm L/24 KwK37 of the PzIV Ausf.A/B/C/D or the StuG III Ausf.A. The French 47mm SA35 gun is better than the German 3.7cm guns with AP shells but it is outclassed by the APCR shells of the 3.7cm L/45 at close range and by the 7.5cm L/24 gun at medium/long range with its HEAT shells. The APCR shells of the 3.7cm L/45 gun are able to penetrate the front armor of a Renault B1bis tank at 100m. The 47mm SA35 L/32 gun APC shells are slower than the AP shells of the 3.7cm L/45 gun (660 versus 745 m/s) but much heavier (1.620 kg versus 0.685 kg) and capped. The French 47mm has a higher KE and a better T/D ratio, leading to a better penetration.


[Table with the main guns, shells types, V°, penetration ... ]

kinetic energy of German and French shells :

Weapon name (shell) -- Kinetic Energy (1/2.m.v2) (J)
13.2mm Mle1930 (AP) -- 16,640
2.0cm L/55 Kw.K.30/38 (AP) -- 45,022
37mm SA18 L/21 (AP) -- 90,000
25mm SA34/37 L/72 (AP) -- 135,424
25mm SA35 (L/60 or L/47.2) (AP charge forte) -- 144,400
47mm SA34 L/30 (APHE) -- 170,496 + 50g explosive filler
37mm SA38 L/33 (APC) -- 173,959
3.7cm L/40 Kw.K.34(t) (AP) -- 185,667
3.7cm L/45 Kw.K. or Pa.K. (AP) -- 190,096
3.7cm L/45 Kw.K. or Pa.K. (APCR) -- 191,434
3.7cm L/47.8 Kw.K. 38(t) (AP) -- 229,219
47mm SA35 L/32 (APC) -- 352,836
7.5cm L/24 Kw.K.37 and 7.5cm L/24 Stu.K.37 (APCBC) -- 503,965
4.7cm L/43.4 Pa.k.36(t) (APC) -- 504,507
47mm SA37/39 L/53 (APCBC) -- 630,875
75mm SA35 L/17.1 (APHE) -- 722,000 + 90g explosive filler
75mm Mle97/33 L/36.3 (APHE) -- 1,076,480 + 90g explosive filler
8.8cm L/56 Fla.K.18 (APCBC) -- 3,047,398
Note about the 37mm and 47mm HE shells :
There were two HE shells for the German 3.7cm guns : the older 3.7cm Sprgr.18 with 26g explosive content and the newer 3.7cm Sprgr.40 with 45g explosive content. Both were produced before the battle of France started.
On the French side the HE shells had 30g (37mm SA18), 60g (37mm SA38) and 142g (47mm SA34 and SA35) explosive content.
In this table the penetration values are all from Jentz and are just enabling to have an idea of the various guns compared to each others. Analyzing the ballistics and penetration values is the object of an other document. Nevertheless when calculated, the penetration values at 0° impact angle and at a range of 100m are :

Main French guns
25mm SA35 L/60 (or 47.2) : about 57mm
37mm SA18 L/21 : about 37mm
37mm SA38 L/33 : about 44mm
47mm SA35 L/32 : about 58mm
47mm SA37 L/53 : about 84mm

Main German guns
3.7cm KwK/PaK L/45 : about 53mm (AP) and 90mm (APCR)
3.7cm KWK L/47.8 : about 55mm
4.7cm PaK(t) : about 78mm
7.5cm KwK/StuK L/2 : about 55mm (APCBC) and 52mm (HEAT)

It gives a good idea of the power of the main guns involved, keeping in mind that the French tanks had a 40-60mm armor and the German tanks had a 13-35mm armor.
In the French tanks and especially the light tanks, there were generally more HE shells than AP shells (3/5th HE shells), illustrating the infantry support role seen as primary task. The French tanks except the 25mm guns and of course the 8mm, 7.5mm and 13.2mm MGs had no tracer shells unlike the German tanks. It was therefore often harder to find the range of a spotted target.


5.7 French gunsights and gun accuracy

The quality of French tank optics were not at all inferior to the German ones, this is a false statement and an other myth usually spread. In fact they were of similar quality, perhaps a bit more complicated to operate. With the German optics it may have been more easy to determine the range of the target, but only for experienced crew since it was not an easy task. The French optics with their 4x magnification are more suited than German ones to engage targets at long range but the drawback is a smaller field of view which can become an issue during close combat.
In the French tanks, the tank turret gunsight consists of an aiming "v" or "+" and aiming ladders. The telescopic sights have generally a 4x magnification.
The L.762 telescopic sight of the 47mm SA35 gun has a 4x magnification, a 11.81° field of view and consists in a crosshair “+” with three aiming ladders. On the “+” reticle the horizontal line can be adjusted for the elevation. On the horizontal line of the “+” reticle, there are vertical long and short bars. One 2.50m high vehicle covered by a long line is at 500m and the same vehicle covered by a short line is at 1000m range. On the right of the “+” reticle there are two black range ladders : one for the AP shells and one for the HE shells. On the left of the “+” reticle there is one red range ladder for the coaxial MG.
The 75mm SA35 hull gun on the B1bis tank has two L.710 sights (sterescopic telemeter) with a 3.5x magnification, a 11.15° field of view and range ladders (no "v" or "+" reticle). The 75mm SA35 hull gun is a fixed gun with only elevation controls, thus left-right aiming is done via changing the tank's heading with the usual driving system or with the fine-tuned hydrostatic Naeder system.

Another surprising statement is about accuracy of French guns versus German ones. Accuracy is not a matter of nationality, only a matter of ballistics. All the ballistics tests proved that the French guns were very accurate. Some French tankers scored very well, others not so well. This was due to training, 1-man turret etc. but the guns by themselves were totally good ones. About the accuracy of the guns by themselves, here are two examples taken from real 1939-1940 shooting tests with the 47mm SA35 gun (Somua S35 and B1bis turret gun for example) and with the 75mm SA35 gun (B1bis hull gun), both with anti-tank shells :

For the 47mm SA35 :
• 15 shots at 200m : H+L = 10+20 = 30cm
• 10 shots at 500m : H+L = 55+53 = 108cm

For the 75mm SA35 : 10 shots at 400m : H+L = 30+28 = 58cm
During the battle of Abbeville one German 8.8cm FlaK was destroyed by the 75mm SA35 gun of a Renault B1bis at a range of 1500m.

MAIN GUNSIGHTS :

25mm SA35
Sight : L.711
Magnification : 4x
FOV : 10.13°
Reticle : V
Adjustable drum up to : 3450m

37mm SA18 and SA18 M.37
● For the Renault FT17/18C
Sight : L. ???
Magnification : 1x
FOV : 45°
Reticle : ?
Adjustable drum up to : ?

● For the Renault R35, Hotchkiss H35/39 and FCM36
Sight : L.713
Magnification : 4x
FOV : 11.25°
Reticle : V
Adjustable drum up to : 1000m for the AP shells and 1600m for the coaxial MG

Sight : L.739
Magnification : 4x
FOV : 11.25°
Reticle : ?
Adjustable drum up to : ?

The L.739 was probably introduced after the L.713 for the new Mle1935 and Mle1937 AP shells fired by the 37mm SA18 L/21 gun.

● For armored cars : Laffly 50AM, Panhard 165/175 and AMC P16 Mle1929. Either the sight used in the Renault FT17/18 (1x, 45°) or a sight like the L.698 used for the infantry gun (2x, 7.88°).

37mm SA38
Sight : L.767
Magnification : 4x
FOV : 11.25°
Reticle : +
Adjustable drum up to : ?

The L.713, L.739 and L.767 sights are similar, same shape and weight, only the range drums and the reticles are different due to the different shells.

47mm SA34
Sight : L.671
Magnification : 3.8x
FOV : 9.56°
Reticle : V
Adjustable drum up to : 1100m for the AP shells and 1600m for the coaxial MG

47mm SA35
Sight : L.724 for the APX1 turret
Magnification : 4x
FOV : 11.25°
Reticle : V and later +
Adjustable drum up to : 1500m for the AP shells and 1600m for the coaxial MG
The L.724 sight is 477mm +/- 4mm long and weights 1.4 kg.

Sight : L.762 for the APX4 turret
Magnification : 4x
FOV : 11.81°
Reticle : +
Adjustable drum up to : 1500m for the AP shells and 1600m for the coaxial MG
The L.762 sight is 721mm +/- 4mm long and weights 2.6 kg.

On the “+” reticle the horizontal line can be adjusted for the elevation. The + reticle was preferred to the V reticle to materialize the horizontal. On the horizontal line of the “+” reticle, there are vertical long and short bars. One 2.50m high vehicle covered by a long line is at 500m and the same vehicle covered by a short line is at 1000m range. On the right of the “+” reticle there are two black range ladders : one for the AP shells and one for the HE shells. On the left of the “+” reticle there is one red range ladder for the coaxial MG.
There might be a L.731 sight for the APX1 CE turret (Somua S35) but there is no information about it at the moment.

75mm SA35
Sight : L.710 (two sights for a stereoscopic telemeter)
Magnification : 3.5x
FOV : 11.15° for each sight
Reticle : range ladders
Adjustable drum up to : 1600m

The Somua S35 or the Renault B1bis with their good armor and their powerful 47mm SA35 gun coupled to the well adapted 4x sight were able to destroy any German tanks at long range (800-1000m) unlike the German ones. A Panzer III had to come far closer to have a chance to destroy a Somua S35 and had grossly no single chance to destroy a Renault B1bis without using APCR shells. During the Hannut / Gembloux battles, even counterattacks led by 10 Somua S35s were viewed as critical on the German side.


5.8 Smoke shells and smoke dischargers

The French 37mm and 47mm tank guns had no smoke shells, only the 75mm guns (B1, B1bis, FCM-2C, FT-17BS, SAu40) were theoretically able to fire smoke shells but were probably never equipped with this kind of shells. The 75mm smoke shells like many other shells (canister shells, incendiary shells etc.) were probably restricted to the 75mm Mle1897 field guns, the 75mm Mle1897/33 AT guns and/or various 75mm AA guns. In the French army, smoke shells were apparently fired by the supporting mortars, field guns or howitzers, not by the tanks themselves.
Smoke dischargers were tested as prototypes on the Panhard 178 armored car for example and on the Renault AMC-35, which is the single French tank which might have used them on battlefield in very few cases.

The Pz.IV Ausf.A/B/C/D and the StuG III Ausf.A in France in 1940 could fire a smoke shell with the 7.5cm L/24. The German tanks were not equipped with smoke dischargers prior to 1941. The use of smoke dischargers was more generalized in the following battles in Russia and North Africa. They were mounted on the rear portions of the mudguards, facing forwards, or on the sides of the turret. For instance, on a Pz38(t), they would mount a 1/2 cylindrical shaped cylinder propped up by a piece of steel that would contain 3 smoke projectiles per side.
Nevertheless, beside the smoke shells fired by the artillery or by the Pz.IV or StuG III, the Germans modified several tanks by mounting a kind of smoke dispenser on the rear of the tank. It was a rack with German infantry smoke candles ("Nebelkerzen"). These candles just "burned" and made smoke on the rear of the tank instead of real smoke dischargers making a smoke screen in front of the tank. It is not sure that there was a triggering system from inside the tank. This system was already used in Poland in 1939.

In France in 1940, only the British (light tanks, infantry tanks as well as cruisers) could have smoke dischargers on their tanks but mostly on their CS (close support) variants. British had special CS variants of their tanks, which had nothing but smoke and HE shells. The cruiser tanks did not have on them anything other than AP shells. Four smoke dischargers (2 on each side of the turret) were usually mounted on tanks like the Matilda II or the cruiser A13 but only two smoke dischargers on tanks like the Matilda I or the Vickers MkIVb.


5.9 Radio sets and intercom

French tanks had less radio sets than their German opponents but it was not because of an inherent French bad design, it is all a matter of doctrine. The light tanks like the Renault R35/39/40 and the Hotchkiss H35/39 tanks only rarely had radio sets if they were not command tanks (platoon or company commander). For the Somua S35s it is roughly the same with only 1/5th of the tanks being equipped with a radio set. The first radio set in the B1/B1bis tanks was the ER53 Mle1932 (ER is Emetteur-Récepteur, or transmitter-receiver), with a 15km range. It was operated by morse key, broadcasted on a frequency range of 40-100m, and weighted around 80kg. Only 100 of these radio sets were produced. It was then replaced by the ER51 Mle1938, weighting 50kg only and operated by voice (3km range) and/or morse key (15-20km range) on the same frequencies. The communications had usually to be coded before being emitted unlike the German which emitted clearly. A tank or a unit was ordered to go to a precise location for example. Therefore the French radios were rarely efficiently used because it took too long compared to the German units. But even on the French side during offensive operations messages were sometimes send clearly and by voice to coordinate two companies for example. Nevertheless, in the heat of a combat and with all the noise, the radio was often not used at all and each tank manoeuvred roughly alone, keeping a view on the 2-4 other tanks of the platoon (infantry or cavalry) and if possible on other platoons.
The range of the radio set seems rather small for today tank warfare requirements but when you compare it to the German radio sets of the same period it is not worse. The more common radio in the PzIII and PzIV was the FuG 5 SE 10 U which had a range key / voice of 4 km / 2 km when moving (6 km / 4 km in station). When compared to the ER51 Mle1938, the voice range is similar and the French radio set has a much bigger range in morse key. But of course the German had more radios and were trained to operate them in order to gain a tactical / operational advantage. All the German tanks had a complete radio set except the Panzer I where it was only a receiver. The French tanks communicated otherwise by flags or the platoon commander went outside from one tank to an other, which of course could hardly be done during an intense battle.
The German Panzer III and Panzer IV had a complete intercom system, adding to the "serenity" of a German crew. In the Panzer I and Panzer II (1-man turret), which were the most numerous German tanks, there was apparently not always an intercom system.
In French tanks the crew communicated by speaking/shouting like. The tank commander gave generally his orders by hitting the drivers with his feet. In the B1bis there was also an order transmitter with some lights on the driver's instrument panel which allowed the commander in the turret to order simple thinks like : forward, turn right, turn left, speed up, slow down, warning, cease fire (the driver was also the hull gunner) etc. The radio operator of the crew had a specific aluminium helmet with a speaker and headphones. A complete drawing of an intercom system for the Renault B1bis can be seen in a document dated from March 1940.
It seems that this system was not only tested but issued to combat units and not all French tanks were devoid of intercom system. There is a photo of the B1bis "Ulm" (47e BCC) on which the tank commander seems to speak in a device. On an other photo of the B1bis "Tahure" (49e BCC), all the crew members have helmets with headphones instead of only the radio operator. According to testimonies from veterans, the Somua S35 tanks from the 18e RD (Régiment de Dragons) had also an intercom system in May 1940. On a photo from a Somua S35 of this precise unit the commander seems indeed to have a helmet with headphones etc.


5.10 Differential steering

The Somua S35 and the Renault B1/B1bis have a double differential steering. One track could go in one direction while the other could go in the opposite direction - allowing the tank to "turn on the spot". On the 1940 battlefield, only these French tanks posses this ability. All other tanks had to move forward/backward in some fashion for the ability to turn, and this could cause, in situations such as hull-down or good camouflaged position, to loose that advantage since you did have to move. In some extent there are therefore able to turn the hull faster than most other tanks in 1940, the differential steering allowed a better turn radius "on the spot".
The German tanks in 1940 did not have that feature, thus the two tracks could not rotate in different directions. One track was blocked to turn but this could be bad considering that you could possibly throw a track if your opposite track wasn't on the correct type of ground. The later Panther and Tiger tanks did have a kind of differential steering.


5.11 Survivability in the French tanks ?

The thick armor of the French tanks protected the crews very well. The crews of the B1bis tank kept all the campaign long a high morale and high confident in their tanks. Unusual for the time feature concerning at least the Somua S35 and the B1/B1bis tanks is the automatic fire extinguishing system. Made by "Telecamit", it is made of 3 pressurized tanks containing each a litre of methyl bromide. This extinguishing system was probably found in the other French tanks and for sure it was standard in the Panhard 178 armored cars. Situated between the access hatch and the firewall and near the driver, the extinguisher tanks are connected to sprinklers set around "hot "spots" (carburettors, fuel dump, fuel tanks, etc.). As a plus, the fuel tanks have a valve to prevent overfill and are self-sealing.


5.12 Crew armament ?

Each tank or armored car crew was armed with miscellaneous small arms, mainly pistols and revolvers. But according to a French cavalry officer manual from 1939 there were also hand grenades and explosives. In the AMR-33 and AMR-35 armored cars and in the Hotchkiss H35 tanks, the crew had 5 F1 hand grenades (defensive). In the Laffly 50AM, Laffly 80AM, Panhard TOE, Panhard 178, Schneider-Kégresse P16 Mle1929, Renault AMC-34, Renault AMC-35 etc. each crew had 10 F1 hand grenades (defensive) and 2 incendiary grenades. In each cavalry vehicle (including armored cars and tanks) there were also 4x 200g explosive charges (150g explosive) = "pétard de cavalerie", for various destruction tasks.
It is not clear if the infantry tank crews also had grenades but for sure pistols and revolvers. Some testimonies indicated that some men even received a MAS36 rifle.
In several occasions the tanks crews, especially from the B1bis tanks, once the tank knocked down, continued to fight with the small arms instead of retreating.
Last edited by David Lehmann on 06 Jul 2005, 10:16, edited 4 times in total.


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Post by David Lehmann » 01 May 2005, 00:10

6. Notes concerning French tanks vs German tanks warfare

For example, a combat involving a Somua S35 tank : the commander / gunner is standing in its turret and observes the horizon with the copula and its means of observation : periscopic binocular, PPL RX 160 episcope and Estienne slit.

Turret rotation speed of the Somua S35's APX1CE turret :
• electric powering for a 360° rotation in 20-28 seconds
• hand cranked for precise aiming
Of course the hull could also be rotated towards the enemy.

The tank commander / gunner spots the target in the copula and then brings the turret in the direction of the target thanks to the electric powering of the turret. A mark in the turret indicates when the gun is towards the spotted target. The APX1 (CE) and APX4 turrets were operated this way :
• 1 lever to block / unblock the turret
• 1 lever set right or left for the electric rotation (Ragonot engine : 1/4th hp, 12V - when not powered by the main engine), if the lever is neutral (central position) the rotation is automatically manual
• 1 wheel to rotate the turret by hand more precisely (about 2° per wheel turn)
Concerning the turret rotation speed, the widest arc it would usually be needed to turn a turret is 180° (if it's 181°, you might as well move it 179° to the other side, unless something is hampering the rotation). A Somua S35 could achieve a 180° rotation in 10-14 seconds.

The commander sits in his strap. He is rather blinded due to the modification of the light condition (relative darkness inside the turret versus light from the exterior through the optics) and then he puts one eye on the gunsight (L.762 sight, magnification 4x, field of view 11.81°, reticle +). He searches the target (again modification of the light condition) which is not easy due to the 4x magnification. This magnification is an advantage if engaging the enemy at long range. He aims precisely, with the manual rotation of the turret this time.
On the + reticle the horizontal line can be adjusted for the elevation. The + reticle was preferred to the V reticle to materialize the horizontal. On the horizontal line there are vertical long and short bars. One 2.50m high vehicle covered by a long line is at 500m and the same vehicle covered by a short line is at 1000m range.
On the right of the + reticle there are two black range ladders : one for the AP shells and one for the HE shells. On the left of the + reticle there is one red range ladder for the coaxial MG.

In the APX1 and APX4 turrets the left hand of the gunner is handling the wheel for the manual rotation of the turret (or the lever for the electric rotation), the right hand is firing the gun or handling the lever for the blocking/unblocking of the turret and the elevation is set with the shoulder.

From the tests (not in a combat situation) of the APX4 turret (which is smaller than the APX1CE of the Somua S35 but with the same copula) :
• Rotation of the copula, always by hand : 12 seconds for a rotation of 360°
• Time to look all around with the 3 means of observation (periscopic binocular, episcope, Estienne slit) and to return to the weapons : 5 seconds
• Time to find a target in the gunsight that has been first spotted in the copula's episcope : 3 seconds

Data from other APX4 turret tests with the coaxial machinegun :
• if the target is 5° away from the field of view of the gunsight, the overall time before opening fire is about 15 seconds.
• if the target is up to 90° away from the field of view of the gunsight, the overall time before opening fire could reach 28 seconds.

The commander has the target in his gunsight this time. He estimates the range and fires. Despite the smoke of the first shoot he has to observe the point that has been hit to correct the range if needed. This is more difficult for French tankers because of the absence of tracer shells (only available for the machineguns and for the 25mm gun). That's why the first shot, if not a direct hit, was often short, it was easier to spot the impact on the ground.

In the time frame of 15-30 seconds the commander/gunner would be able to fire 1-2 47mm APC shells against the target before being fired upon. This is after it has been discovered, which would most likely not be until the first round had hit (in the case of multiple incoming targets). Any German tank taking 1-2 hits from a 47mm L/32 SA35 gun in a range of 0 to 1000m, at least one of which is carefully aimed at, has a very high probability to be penetrated and destroyed.

The French tank guns are semi-automatic, the shell case is automatically ejected, the introduction of a new shell closes the breech.

The German tanks have an advantage in the sense that :
• in Panzer III and Panzer IV one crew member can continue to observe and spot while the gunner fires
• the Panzer II also have a 1-man turret but it has tracer shells and a 150 rpm rate of fire (magazine feed)
• German tanks are faster and more mobile, and thanks to the radio sets they are able to better coordinate and concentrate their attack, changing more easily the attack axis.

The Somua S35 crew could use the advantage of its powerful 47mm SA35 L/32 gun coupled to the 4x sight to engage safely the German tanks already at 800-1000m while the enemy has generally to get closer to about 400-500m to have a good chance of destroying the Somua. The Somua has a good cast armor (47mm/round and 20° front hull armor and 42mm/0° front turret armor + (42mm) round gun mantlet on about 30% of the front turret surface). If a German tank engaged at 1000m is driving straight forward to be at 500m of the Somua, at a speed of 25 km/h he will need about 60 seconds. But he will probably not behave that way and of course this tank is not alone ... but the French tank probably also not.

At 800-1000m the real threats could only be a Panzer IV firing a 7.5cm Gr.38 HL/1 (HEAT) shell (penetration of 52mm/0° and 45mm/30° - but at this range an embossed Somua S35 is offering a small target) or supporting guns (8.8cm FlaK or 10.5cm leFH guns). Nevertheless their tactical regulation and their usual numerical local superiority would probably allow the Germans to outflank the Somua S35 tank if it doesn't move (supposing the French tank is alone), perhaps even without that the crew of the French tank could notice the manoeuvre, being too busy engaging the frontal targets). In the battle of Hannut / Gembloux for example, the Somua S35 tanks could spread havoc among the German tanks, which often had to face a second Somua S35 squadron while trying to outflank the first squadron. In this battle, the French tactical regulation proved to be at level, the German tank formations being often attacked on their flanks or rear.

More numerous German tanks as it was generally the case (often 1 vs 4 or more) could nevertheless be able to get close enough to the French tank to destroy it. In the 400m to 100m range, a Panzer III firing a 3.7cm APCR shell had a good to very good probability to penetrate the frontal armor of a Somua S35 (penetration of 48mm/0° at 500m, 71mm/0° at 250m and 90mm/0° at 100m) and to knock it out. The Panzer II gun could penetrate 63mm/0° at 100m with APCR shells but the Pzgr.40 were not available in France in 1940 and with the standard AP shell the penetration was reduced to 45mm/0° at 100m. The Panzer II can be deadly for a Somua but at point blank, in an ambush in a town for example. A somewhat higher German rate of fire (the Somua has a 1 ½ man turret) and combined suppressive fire of multiple (tracer) shells (especially the 2.0cm shells of the Panzer II at 150 rpm which could damage the episcopes, binoculars and gunsights) or the use of smoke shells (both tracer and smoke shells were not available in the Somua S35) to hide German moves increased the chance for the German tanks to get closer to the French ones and to overrun the French position. That would probably force the French tanks to move. In a pure movement battle the French squadron will probably loose tactical cohesion more rapidly than the German formation because of the lack of radio sets (often only radios for the platoon commander who will have to communicate with the other tanks of his platoons with flags ... which is very difficult during a combat). Therefore once in a melee style battle each French tank will often act rather on its own or with the tanks of its platoon which are directly next to its position. This is the main drawback of all the French tanks. Generally very courageous tankers doing their best but being not enough aware of the general tactical situation while the German tanks were more mobile and could find the weak points of the French deployments.


7. Notes from a document of the 2e DCR

This note is dealing with tank vs tank warfare gives also some elements and intelligence of the time about the German tanks before the campaign.

The German tanks are listed as :
• K.W. 4 with 25mm armor and 75mm gun = Panzer IV (that would be close to Ausf. A/B/C)
• S.2. A and S.2. B with 25mm armor and 37mm gun = Panzer 35(t) and Panzer 38(t) probably
• K.W. 3 with 20mm armor and 37mm gun = Panzer III (that would be close to Ausf. A/B/C/D but E/F are better armored)
• K.W. 2 with 12-14mm armor and 20mm HMG
• K.W. 1 with 8-13mm armor and no anti-tank weapons

Estimation of the capabilities of the German armament (admitting as basis that they are superior to the French ones of same caliber) :
• the 20mm gun cannot do something against the French tanks. The Hotchkiss H39 and the Renault B1bis are immune against it, even at close range (< 100m)
• the 37mm guns have a practical range of 200m against French 40mm armor but are inefficient against 50mm or more armor. The B1bis is rather immune and the H39 is in danger at short range (< 300m)
• the 75mm gun has a practical range of about 500m against French 40mm armor and is very poorly efficient against 50mm or more armor. It is therefore poorly efficient against the B1bis but very efficient against the H39.

One can see that the French apparently didn't know about the HEAT shells of the Panzer IV and the new APCR shells of the Panzer III but this one appeared only later in June/July and in very small quantities for the battle of France. They probably also take into account only the Panzer III Ausf.A-D, the Ausf.E/F having a far better armor.

Note about French tank warfare :
• fire when stopped
• fire ideally from a cover and behind a protection (ambushed, hull down – except the B1bis if he wants to use its 75mm SA35 gun)

Tactics : try to impose combat to the enemy tanks
• open a fire barrage from a given position against the flanks or the rears of the enemy tank formation
• engage the meeting combat on an advantageous axis

The company commander organizes :
• the deployment : generally 2 echelons, 1 manoeuvre echelon and 1 protection echelon. The protection echelon can be composed of part of the tanks, of infantry with AT guns or better both of them.
• the manoeuvre
• the rules of engagement, range and areas of fire controlled by each tank platoon
• the conditions of the pursuit or the pull-back and the successive targets
The company commander gives orders thanks to the radio to each platoon commander.

The platoon commander applies the orders on the ground, during the battle. He has liberty of action to operate and achieve the goal.

The tank commander :
• He must have good skills to recognize the different types of enemy tanks, to identify the most dangerous threats (first due to the armament and second due to the armor) and to engage it.
• He must have adaptability, flexibility and initiative to apply the orders of the platoon commander.
• If isolated he had to return as quickly as possible in the field (of view) of his platoon commander.

1) Renault B1bis

Security range (where the tank is safe) :
Panzer IV < 100m
immune to the others

The B1bis engages the enemy tanks at 800-1000m with the 47mm SA35 and the 75mm SA35 guns.
The 75mm SA35 gun with the L.710 sights has an adjustable drum up to 1600m for the HE shells and 1560m for the APHE shells. The 75mm APHE shells are used against tanks. The 75mm HE shells are able to destroy the armored cars, Panzer I and Panzer II and are very efficient at short range against the tracks and lower parts of the heavier tanks. The HE shell has a penetration of 17mm/30° even at 800m.
The B1bis is superior to all the German tanks (armament and armor being here considered). The single threat is the Panzer IV if closer than 100m.

2) Hotchkiss H39

Security range (where the tank is safe) :
Panzer IV = 500m
Panzer III, Pz35(t) and Pz(38t) = 200m
immune to the others

 with 37mm SA18 gun
engages the Panzer IV, Panzer III, Pz35(t) and Pz(38t) at < 100m
engages the other tanks at 400m

 with 37mm SA38 gun
engages the enemy tanks at 400-700m

A crude estimation of the capabilities (not the max penetration) of the French tank guns (this is not a ballistics study, it is just to give an estimation of part of the capabilities to inform the crews) gives an advice at which range engage the enemy tanks with good kill probability. Against German medium/heavy tanks :
37mm SA18 at 100m
37mm SA38 at 400-600m
47mm SA35 at 600-800m
75mm SA35 at 700-800m

Lighter tanks and armored cars could be engaged at longer range.

The huge majority of the French tanks were armed with the 37mm SA18 gun. They had to go closer to the German tanks. A H39 with a 37mm SA18 will try to reach the 10-100m range but a Panzer III could engage it already at 200m and a Panzer IV at 500m according to French intelligence.


8. Quotes from the German general Halder

General Franz Halder considered on 18th February 1940 that :
"the Panzer I was mostly useful against a weak and demoralized enemy, the Panzer II was not able to face enemy tanks. The heavy Panzer IV was efficient against enemy tanks and infantry but the Panzer III, Panzer 35(t) and Panzer 38(t) were not adapted to fight enemy infantry".

Nevertheless, the statement on the Panzer II seems harsh since it was efficient against all the British tanks except the Matilda II. When used massively and attacking by surprise from many directions it obtained good results against the French tanks thanks to their number, speed and mobility. There are several French testimonies of Somua S35 or Hotchkiss tanks being penetrated at point blank range on the side


9. According to the German colonel Kühne

The single efficient German gun against the French Renault D2 and Somua S35 tanks is the 7.5cm KwK L/24 of the Panzer IV - firing an APCBC shell - (and the 8.8cm FlaK which penetrates all the enemy armor up to 2000m). The shell (3.7cm Pzgr.) from our 3.7cm KwK/PaK L/45 are inefficient against all these tanks at standard combat range and bounce even at a very favourable impact angle. At close range our 3.7cm gun can nevertheless penetrate the lighter French tanks. Generally speaking the 3.7cm shell can penetrate the French tanks at an angle of 0° if closer than 300m. The 3.7cm AP shell did not fulfil its mission and is not adapted to warfare against modern tanks.
Direct hits with the 7.5cm HE shell have no effect against the Somua S35 or the Renault B1bis at 600 to 800m.
The 2.0cm AP shell cannot penetrate the French tanks, its single effect is on the morale. The British tanks were penetrated at all ranges by the 2.0cm AP shells, except the Matilda II heavy tank, luckily in very small number. The armor of the Matilda II resists even sometimes to our 7.5cm guns.
Huge quantities of ammunition were used during the battles against French tanks because of the lack of power of the 2.0cm and 3.7cm guns. In our brigade, all the 3.7cm and 7.5cm shells were used during a single battle on 13th May. Our unit had to wait for ammunition supply to continue to fight.
The equipment of the German turret is completely efficient and it is superior to the French one. This gives an advantage to the German tanks.
The French 47mm SA35 tank gun proved to be remarkable. This gun penetrates all the German tanks independently from the impact angle up to 600-800m and sometimes more. [Several Somua S35 and Renault B1bis destroyed German tanks at a range of 1000m !]
The French 37mm SA18 proved to be inefficient.
The French rate of fire is slower because of the conception of the French turrets.
Concerning the AT guns, the accuracy is good for the 47mm SA37, very good for the 25mm SA34/37 and excellent for the British 40mm. The front hull armor of the Panzer III has been easily penetrated by the excellent French 25mm SA34/37 gun. Trials with booty guns proved that the French 25mm AT gun is superior to the German 3.7cm PaK. This 25mm AT gun is very hard to spot because the flash is invisible (flash hider). The armor of the Panzer III and even more of the Panzer IV is insufficient.
The speed of our tanks proved to be very good. In the future we should maintain a capacity of 30-40 km/h in easy offroad. The French tankers or AT gunners who were captured said all that the speed of our tanks constituted the main difficulty to hit them.



10. Notes from general Jean Perré, commander of the 2e DCR in 1940

"Concerning my 90 light tanks (Hotchkiss H39), only 33% of them had the 37mm SA38 gun, 66% had the 37mm SA18 gun, which was generally inefficient against armor thicker than 15mm. It had only an initial velocity of about 400 m/s against about 700 m/s for the 37mm SA38 gun (personal note : in this case he doesn’t take into consideration the Mle1935 and Mle1937 AP shells). My mechanized infantry battalion (BCP = Bataillon de Chasseurs Portées) had no armoured car platoon as planned and the 12 25mm AT guns of the divisional AT company were towed by unarmored tractors. My units were composed of natives of Lorraine, Alsatians and Britons. 33% of the men were from the active army and all the men were very proud to belong to a DCR. I recognized among the officers, NCOs and men the same faith, that general Estienne, father of the French tanks, had inspired during World War 1 to the first tanks crews. The torch had been passed to the crews of 1940 and well maintained by the active army but also by many officers of the reserve like commandant Cornic, fallen for France on 17th May 1940 in my division. The officers and the men had one single aim : to serve their arm and the army.
On 10th May 1940, the 2e DCR is a beautiful war tool, with high morale and sure of is strength : 6,500 men including 340 officers, 160 tanks, 1,400 vehicles, 400 motorcycles, 25 105mm C field guns, 12 25mm AT guns and 8 47mm AT guns. On the other hand the AA guns were lacking and we had only our Hotchkiss Mle1914 MGs in AA role.
On 13th May, the 2e DCR starts its movement, part by road and part by railroad. During the transport, the destination is changed twice and the movement is modified due to the action of the enemy air force.
On 15th May, the 2e DCR disembarks and deploys from Nouvion to Rethel, dispersed on a 70 km front. The northern and southern parts of the division are separated by the Panzerdivisionen advancing between the Oise and Aisne Rivers. The units cannot be commanded efficiently but the companies and crews fight where they are. In the bridgehead of Rethel 3 B1bis tanks, led by lieutenant Robert, destroy 23 German tanks.
On 16th May, the "groupement Bourgin" (20 B1bis tanks and 1 infantry company) pulls the advanced elements of a Panzerdivision back on 20 km. When the group is ordered to retreat, the few immobilized tanks remain, fight on the spot and destroy all the appearing enemies. On the night, these crews finally scuttle their tanks and joins again the French lines.
On 17th May, 80 tanks of my division are deployed on a 40 km frontline, from Noisy to Tergnier, along the Oise River : 1-2 tanks defending each bridge. On 18th May morning, they face the assaults of 4 Panzerdivisionen (about 1200 tanks) in 1 vs 15 odds. The 80 French tanks are submerged but they inflict heavy losses to the Germans.
On 17th May, 2 B1bis tanks from the 15e BCC (the "Mistral" and the "Tunisie") surprise advanced German elements in Landrecies. They destroy 100 armored cars and all-terrain vehicles.
On 20th May, I have lost more than 50% of my tanks. I am ordered to regroup and reorganize in the area of Compiègne. I receive reinforcement of 138 tanks including 21 B1bis tanks. 66% of the light tanks are armed with 37mm SA38 guns. Two days later, after a short reorganization period of time, I am attached to the 7th army?
On 24th, 25th and 26th May we take the bridges on the Somme River north of Péronne, during one day attack and two night attacks.
From 26th May to 1st June, we are deployed behind the 7th army to counter-attack if needed.
On 4th June we attack the bridgehead of Abbeville. Hard day for a partial success … hard day also for the enemy. The action of our 309th artillery regiment was outstanding.
On 5th June, my infantry battalion and two light tanks companies support the British troops which are attacked.
On 6th June, we should be resting but we are ordered to move in the area of Beauvais. We are facing the 7.PzD of Rommel. Several days later general Besson confessed that we have saved 2 army corps which were on our left flank.
From 9th to 12th June we are fighting while retreating to the north of Paris. On 13th June we move south of Paris. We continue to fight while moving back.
On 16th June, we are encircled in the Orléans forest. During the night we assault and manage to pierce the German lines and the rear guard combats go on.
On 25th June, we are north-east of Limoges. The division has lost 25% of its strength and only 70 tanks are available. Only 40 tanks out of the 70 are really able to fight. With the dismounted crews I have constituted 2 extra motorized infantry battalions. My artillery has still all its guns. The units are coherent and disciplined. We have had grossly no sleep for the last 45 days and 45 nights. Our tiredness is awful, but the 2e DCR has destroyed more than 500 German AFVs (personal note : this estimation includes tanks, armoured cars, armoured personal carriers, self-propelled guns etc.)"

General Perré also judges the value of the French equipment :
"Our equipment is generally excellent. The 40mm armor for the light tanks and 60mm armor for the B1bis tanks constitute a very efficient protection. From 3rd June to 25th June only 21 tanks were lost due to enemy fire. One of my B1bis tanks had more than 20 3.7cm hits and still worked perfectly. Even several Hotchkiss H39 remained undamaged after having been fired at by 3.7cm AT gun at less than 200 meters !
The Hotchkiss H39 armed with the 37mm SA38 gun could face efficiently all the German tanks except the heavier version of the Panzer IV. The B1bis crews engaged in tank vs tank combat preferred to use the 47mm turret gun with 360° traverse instead of the 75mm hull gun, which was located very low. The 47mm SA35 gun was at least as powerful as the 7.5cm gun of the Panzer IV in terms of penetration. The MAC31 'Reibel' MG gave entire satisfaction.
I never suffered from the speed discrepancy with the Panzerdivisionen. I had the feeling of lacking mobility only when I had no reconnaissance group. In that case I was forced to use my tanks for that task, resulting in the core of the division being slowed down at half of its speed ! Our range/autonomy was generally insufficient.
Concerning the rusticity of our tanks, the B1bis tanks went beyond our hopes. Several of them had crossed 1600 km without more maintenance than a quick oiling on the evening. The Hotchkiss H39 tanks proved to be more fragile. The Renault R35 tanks received in reinforcement were exceptionally rustic. Therefore, except the radio equipment which was too diverse and which sometimes lacked range, all our equipments gave complete satisfaction. I have the duty to say that these equipments had a soul …
The crews, mechanics, soldiers etc., from the active or reserve army, made there duty until the end ! I never had deserters or men leaving their position without orders. My men have got a dozen 'Légion d'honneur" medals, about 15 military medals and 2000 ratified citations.
Despite the retreat, despite the defeat, having seen everything collapsing around us, the men were grouped around their officers and their tanks until the end. They had, I think, the same feeling than the first tank crews … the feeling to be part of an elite, the feeling to be among the men discovering new things and facing new dangers. They gave me the powerful but bitter joy to feel that they were more and more faithful when facing increasing adversity, tragic fates and awful sufferings. They were worthy of the tank crews of 1914-1918, who fought in Malmaison, Méry, Belloy and Villers-Cotterêts."



Sources :
• "France 1940 – l'armement terrestre" (Stéphane Ferrard)
• "Les matériels de l'armée de terre française 1940" (2 volumes, Stéphane Ferrard)
• "L'automobile sous l'uniforme" (François Vauvillier)
• "Les véhicules blindés français 1900-1940" (Pierre Touzin)
• "Les engins blindés français 1920-1945" (Pierre Touzin)
• Direction Générale de l'Armement, various official technical documents from 1939-1940
• Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre
• "Kennbläter fremden Geräts" (Heft 8a und Heft 8b) (Berlin 1941)
• "Chars B au combat - Hommes et matériels du 15e BCC" (Stéphane Bonnaud)
• Trackstory n°1 : Somua S35
• Trackstory n°2 : Panhard 178
• Trackstory n°3 : Renault B1bis
• "The French army 1939-1940 – organisation, order of battle, operational history" (4 volumes, Lee Sharp)
• "Le mythe de la guerre-éclair – la campagne de l'Ouest de 1940" (Karl-Heinz Frieser)
• "Mai - Juin 1940 : les combattants de l'honneur" (Jean Delmas, Paul Devautour and Eric Lefèvre)
• "Mai - Juin 1940 : défaite française, victoire allemande, sous l'oeil des historiens étrangers" (Maurice Vaïsse)
• "La campagne de 1940" (Christine Levisse-Touzé)
• "L'Arme Blindée Française (Tome 1) : Mai-juin 1940 ! Les blindés français dans la tourmente" (Gérard Saint-Martin)
• "Comme des lions – mai/juin 1940 – le sacrifice de l'armée française" (Dominique Lormier)
• "Weygand, De Gaulle et quelques autres – La Somme 16-28 mai 1940" (Henri de Wailly)
• "Historique du 7e bataillon de chars légers F.C.M"
• "Blitzkrieg à l’Ouest, Mai-Juin 40" (Jean-Paul Pallud)
• "L'escadron de Segonzac" (Olivier d'Ormesson)
• "Divided and Conquered : The French High Command and the Defeat of the West, 1940." (Jeffery A. Gunsburg, 1979)
• "The battle of the Belgian plain, 12-14 May 1940 : the first great tank battle" (Jeffery A. Gunsburg, the journal of military history 56 (April 1992), 207-244)
• "The battle of Gembloux, 14-15 May 1940 : the 'Blitzkrieg' checked" (Jeffery A. Gunsburg, the journal of military history 64 (January 2000), 97-140)
Last edited by David Lehmann on 06 Jul 2005, 10:19, edited 1 time in total.

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Christoph Awender
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#4

Post by Christoph Awender » 01 May 2005, 00:24

Very interesting David. Thanks for posting.

\Christoph

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asiaticus
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Should make this a sticky.

#5

Post by asiaticus » 05 May 2005, 06:32

This is a veritable referance work.

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I agree

#6

Post by junk2drive » 05 May 2005, 07:37

Along with the other posts in this thread and the posts in Equipment thread.
David, where can we get the pdf version?

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#7

Post by David Lehmann » 05 May 2005, 10:31

Just drop me a PM with your e-mail ;)

David

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#8

Post by zhongguoren » 05 May 2005, 17:28

David,I also want to get the article of PDF,Maybe you could post me one? My E-mail is :
[email protected] Thank you! :)

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#9

Post by Karri » 05 May 2005, 20:04

Excellent! more of these ;)

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#10

Post by Lt.-Colonel » 06 May 2005, 09:51

Truly great work sir!

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#11

Post by Richard Hedlund » 06 May 2005, 11:29

yes just great. Thank you for this.

/Richard

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David Lehmann
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#12

Post by David Lehmann » 19 May 2005, 00:50

Hello,

Concerning the intercom system in the French tanks.
A complete drawing of an intercom system for the Renault B1bis can be seen in a document dated from March 1940. It seems that this system was not only tested but issued to active units, therefore not all French tanks were devoid of intercom system.
On a photo of the B1bis Ulm (47e BCC) the tank commander seems to speak in a device while the tank is moving. On a photo of the B1bis Tahure (49e BCC) all the crew members have headphones instead of only the radio operator.
According to testimonies from veterans, the Somua S35 tanks from the 18e RD (Régiment de Dragons) had also an intercom system in May 1940. On a photo from a Somua S35 of this precise unit the commander seems indeed to have a helmet with headphones.

It is therefore more than probable that several French tanks or even a few whole French tank units had a complete intercom system like the Germans.

Regards,

David

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#13

Post by M.Rausch » 26 May 2007, 23:47

Apparently if 5.0cm shells were already in production in June 1940 it was because the 5.0cm PaK38 were slowly being produced at this time, not because of Panzer III with 5.0cm guns used in France in 1940.
Sorry, but this information is wrong. Pz-III with the 5 cm Kw.K. L/42 were already in service in June 1940. They were not new built tanks but Pz-III coming from factory repairs in Germany, where some of them received during the repairs also an armament upgrade. The only produced 5 cm HE and APHE rounds from 1.6. till 10.6.1940 were clearly for the Kw.K. not any Paks. Till the end of June 1940 more than 10.000 APHE rounds were produced for both, anti-tank gun and tank gun versions. It is simply shown by the original document you find under the following link on my website:

http://www.beim-zeugmeister.de/zeugmeis ... ?id=43&L=1

On the other hand till now not any documentation of a battle with participation of Pz-III with 5 cm Kw.K. L/42 armament is known to me, but in June 1940 the big tank battles were also already over for this campaign.

When I have more time I will look for other mistakes and ,if there are more, correct them with original sources.

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#14

Post by David Lehmann » 27 May 2007, 16:38

Hello,

It has been a very long time since the last time I visited the forum but the thread you resurected in nonetheless older. I wrote that in May 2005 and many information have been updated in my files.

What I kept so far in mind was following (as modified in the latest version of the text considered here):

The 5.0cm L/60 PaK 38 was developed for the infantry as a towed weapon. The 5.0cm L/42 KwK was developed by the armored branch as a tank weapon.
The first 5.0cm PaK 38 left the factory in March 1940 (4 of them), and the inventory in the German Army was 0 in March, 2 in April, 2 in May, 20 in June and 29 in July. According to Werner Haupt's book about the German AT guns, the first 5.0cm Pak 38 L/60 reached the units only at the end of 1940.
The first 5.0cm KwK left the factory in June 1940 (10 of them). Thus, at the start of the French campaign in 1940, the German Army had two 5.0cm PaK and no 5.0cm KwK on hand. By the 1st of June 1940, the numbers had risen to 20 5.0cm PaK but still no additional 5.0cm KwK. A very limited number (about 10 then) of repaired Panzer III Ausf.E/Fs, rearmed with the new 5.0cm KwK seem to have been deployed in the very last stage of the battle of France. Nonetheless the very small number and the actions in which there might have been involved are completely negligible.
According to Blatt G112 of 15 December 15, 1940 "Überblick über den Rüstungstand des Heeres": the first 5.0cm Panzer III Ausf.G left the production line in July 1940. During that month 21 were built and 17 of these accepted by the Army. According to the history of the Panzer Regiment 2 given on the "Lexikon der Wehrmacht" website for example, this regiment from 1.PzD received its first Panzer III with 5.0cm only in October 1940.

Best regards,

David

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#15

Post by M.Rausch » 27 May 2007, 22:15

Hi David, sometimes the older threads are the better ones :) They need only some updates with newer research results.

Regarding the 5 cm Pak 38 there are many original sources not fitting together well.

For example I have an original document telling that the Heer got 12 and not 4 5 cm Pak 38 in March 1940, but only for trials. These trials were also done in the field on captured French tanks including the Char 1 bis, but all of these 12 initial guns were removed from the official lists, since the mass production variants had improvements or changes due to the experiences made with these guns. The official list tells 17 guns accepted on 1.7.1940, so these were all produced and accepted during June 1940.

There is also a document telling the official introduction date of the 5 cm Pak 38 ammunition in later 1940 (out of mind November 1940), while the production started in June 1940 and already ten thousands of rounds were accepted according to the official production and acceptance listings.

But it would be too easy if all sources would fit ;)

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