Shanghai 1932

[Peter H]

Any OOBs on this conflict in 1932 would be appreciated.

http://www.talesofoldchina.com/shanghai ... -war01.htm

http://hkuhist2.hku.hk/studentprojects/ ... b/jap4.htm


And the story of Robert Short:

http://www.talesofoldchina.com/shanghai ... -short.htm


Regards,
Peter

[Leonard]

OB of the KMT units on the Shanghai Front:
19th route army
-60th division
-61th division
-78th division

5th Army
-87th division
-88th division
- Teaching Unit

[Peter H]

Thanks Leonard.

Regards,
Peter

[Larry D.]

Peter -

Here are some jumbled notes of mine that in part concern Shanghai in 1932 and that may be of some use toward answering your question.

Rikusentai -Naval Landing Force

"Sailors under Navy officers trained by the Japanese Army as infantry." (Hayashi-Kogun:203). Kaigun Tokubetsu Rikusentai: Naval Special Landing Force. (JM #99).

The entire concept of “marines” aboard IJN ships dates from the very inception of the IJN in 1868, or more accurately from the beginning of Japan's naval alliance with the British Royal Navy in 1870. From the date the IJN was established along the lines
of the RN, had RN instructors for its naval academy and other officer training schools, sent its best junior officers to Britain for advanced instruction and had most of its warships built in Britain. It was only natural that armed naval infantry, or “marines”, be part of the service since the British Royal Marines had served aboard RN ships of the line for centuries. Virtually all navies have them, our own dating from 1798. So the SNLF was simply a natural evolution in response to changing needs and more modern concepts of war. (Marder-v.l, pp.3-6).

SNLFs were first organized as such in the late 1920s and committed to combat for the first time in 1932 in China. This occurred in January 1932 during the first “Shanghai Incident” when a Japanese naval infantry brigade was landed there and subsequently chewed up in fierce street fighting. (Ienaga-The Pacific War, p.65). Edgerton (op.cit. p.242) refers to these as “Imperial Special Naval Landing Forces.” Its proper name was the Kurume Naval Infantry Brigade. {Stanley-Prelude to Pearl Harbor, p.18 ). The earlier SNLFs of 1941-42, which were intended mainly for offensive operations, had a TO&E prescribing a HQ element with section or platoon-size communications, engineer, medical, supply and transportation components, two rifle companies and a heavy weapons company with a total strength of 11 officers, 25 warrant officers and 1,033 men (summing to 1,069). The SNLFs of 1943 and after were reorganized for defensive assignments with a HQ and HQ section, communications, construction, medical, supply, transportation and ordnance equipment sections, an unnumbered rifle company, 1st Co. (coast defense gun), 2d Co. (coast defense gun), 3d Co. (mortars), unnumbered mobile AA gun company (4x75mm) and an unnumbered AA machine gun company (2x40mm and 10x13mm) with a total strength of 20 officers, 41 warrant officers and 1,377 men (summing to 1,438). There was also a reinforced variation of the latter that called for an additional rifle company, raising the total strength to 1,820. (TM-E 30-480 Handbook, pp.76-79).

The SNLF brigade landed at Shanghai in Jan 32 numbered about 2,000 and was equipped with armored cars and field guns. It opposed a force of some 30,000 Chinese until the IJA's 9th Divivision arrived in Shanghai from Kanazawa in February and two more divisions in the weeks that followed. The entire Shanghai “Incident” was an aggressive attempt by the IJN to regain “face” that had been lost to the Kwantung Army during the “Manchuria Incident” in 1931. The League of Nations imposed an armistice and the fighting ended in May 32. (Carl Boyd, “Japanese Military Effectiveness: The Interwar Period” in: Military Effectiveness, vol. II, Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (eds.), Boston, Allen & Unwin, 1988). One of the components of the naval infantry brigade sent to Shanghai in Jan 1932 was the Yokosuka 1st SNLF, which was at Yokosuka in Nov 1931 according to a veteran who was assigned to it there. (POW Interrogation Rpt No.137 in JICPOA 140-45).

HTH,

--Larry

[Peter H]

Thankyou Larry.

Regards,
Peter

[Delta Tank]

Larry D,

The entire concept of “marines” aboard IJN ships dates from the very inception of the IJN in 1868, or more accurately from the beginning of Japan's naval alliance with the British Royal Navy in 1870. From the date the IJN was established along the lines
of the RN, had RN instructors for its naval academy and other officer training schools, sent its best junior officers to Britain for advanced instruction and had most of its warships built in Britain. It was only natural that armed naval infantry, or “marines”, be part of the service since the British Royal Marines had served aboard RN ships of the line for centuries. Virtually all navies have them, our own dating from 1798. So the SNLF was simply a natural evolution in response to changing needs and more modern concepts of war. (Marder-v.l, pp.3-6).

Larry D, I am not familiar with the book cited, but when he states "Virtually all navies have them, our own dating from 1798." Which Marines is he referring to? The United States Marine Corps (USMC) was started on 10 November 1775, in a tavern in Philadelphia, IIRC. Or is he refering to another naval infantry?

Mike

[Larry D.]

Mike -

Marder, Arthur J., Old Friends New Enemies: [i]The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy. [/i] Volume I: Strategic Illusions, 1936-1941. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. (Hereafter, Marder).
Marder, Arthur J., Mark Jacobsen and John Horsfield, Old Friends New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy. Volume II: The Pacific War, 1942-1945. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. (Hereafter, Marder-Vol.II).


Marder is a Brit. Perhaps he was confused.

--Larry

[asiaticus]

From: Handbook on Japanese Military Forces Naval Land Force

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/I ... B-5-1.html

SPECIAL NAVAL LANDING FORCES.
a. Use in China. Special naval landing forces were used extensively in landing operations on the China coast beginning with 1932, and often performed garrison duty upon capturing their objective. Their performance was excellent when unopposed, but when determined resistance was encountered they exhibited a surprising lack of ability in infantry combat. These early special naval landing forces were organized as battalions, each estimated to comprise about 2,000 men divided into 4 companies. Three companies each consisted of 6 rifle platoons and 1 heavy machine gun platoon; the fourth company, of 3 rifle platoons and a heavy-weapons platoon of four 3-inch naval guns, or two 75-mm regimental guns and two 70-mm battalion guns. Tank and armored car units were employed in garrison duty and, where the terrain and situation favored their use, in assault operations.

[tigre]

Hello to all, with regards to this topic I would like to add this excerpt taken from "The Japanese attacks at Shangai and the defense by the Chinese. 1931-1932" And ORIGINAL MILITARY STUDY By Major E.D. Cooke, Infantry. Military Review, dec 1937.

NARRATIVE OF THE SINO-JAPANESE AFFAIR OF 1931-1932.

In September 1931, the Anti-Japanese boycott, in existence since July as result of the Korean affair, intensified by occupation of Manchuria and stringently enforced, caused enormous damage to Japanese trade. In Shanghai the Japanese held mass meetings and passed resolutions demanding that their Government take "direct action” against the Chinese. They paraded through the Hongkew district, smashed window panes and assaulted Chinese shopkeepers. Their attitude was that of demanding subservience from an inferior race.
The Chinese then held a mass meeting of their own and among other things they resolved:
That war be declared against Japan.
That economic boycott be strictly enforced against Japan.
That absolutely no foodstuffs be sold to Japan.
That Chinese workers in the Japanese cotton factories go on strike.

The news of these affairs soon reached Japan and early in October the Imperial Government addressed a note to the Nationalist Government, pointing out that anti-Japanese agitations ‘now seen in all parts of China constituted nothing less than an instrument of national policy. The Chinese, still attempting to obtain redress for the Manchurian affair through the League of Nations, treated this latest Japanese remark as superfluous.

On 18 January 1932, five Japanese monks were attacked by Chinese workmen and so severely beaten that two of them died. This overt act was all that Japan needed as a basis for stringent demands upon the Chinese Government. When it is seen that the five monks deliberately went into the Chinese section of Shanghai and attracted public attention by playing Buddhist musical instruments in front of the Chinese towel factory of “San Yu,” It is not difficult to imagine that Japanese religion is no small instrument in the hands of oriental diplomats.

This same day a Chinese newspaper, the Min Kuo Jih Pao, gavethe Japanese further grounds for protest when it expressed, regret that an assassin’s bomb had missed the life of Japan’s Emperor. The following day, 19 January, some 500 Japanese paraded through shanghai, breaking window glasses in Chinese shops displaying anti-Japanese posters. Also, Mr. K. Murai, the Japanese Consul General, called at the Mayor’s office and lodged a verbal protest in connection with the assault upon the Japanese monks. This had hardly been accomplished when some fifty Japanese proceeded into the Chinese area and set fire to the “San Yu” towel factory, in front of which the monks had been attacked. On their way back they were stopped by the Shanghai municipal police. A fight ensued in which three Chinese and three Japanese were wounded, one of each mortally.

On the 20th the Japanese Consul-General made the following demands upon the Mayor of Shanghai:
A formal apology by the Mayor.
The immediate arrest of the assailants of the monks.
Payment of solatium and hospital expenses.
Suppression of all anti-Japanese movements and immediate dissolution of all anti-Japanese boycott
associations.

The fourth demand, of course, was what really counted. The anti-Japanese boycott associations were now accused of being the root of all the trouble and had been definitely defined as a national issue. Mayor Wu at once countered with demands for similar reparations for the conduct of the Japanese in destroying Chinese property. This was brushed aside by the Japanese as unworthy of consideration until their own demands had been met. Japanese residents held a meeting in the Japanese Club and adopted a resolution asking the Japanese Government to send vessels and military units for the complete suppression of the anti-Japanese movements.

On the 21st the Japanese naval commander in the harbor of Shanghai, Admiral Shiosawa, issued a declaration to the effect that in the event of Mayor Wu’s failure to give a satisfactory reply to the Japanese Consul-General and carry out the terms as demanded, the Admiral would take the necessary action to protect the rights and interests of the Japanese Empire.
When this announcement became public, the Shanghai Defense Council, composed of the commanding officers of all forces in Shanghai, including the Shanghai Volunteers, inquired of the Japanese when they would take action, in order that the other troops could be prepared to occupy their defensive areas. The Japanese replied that they did not know when they would take positive action, but certainly not until more ships had arrived from Japan.

It is believed that during this conference the Hongkew salient was added to the Japanese defense sector. No record had been made of when the salient was added to the defense areas of Shanghai, and certainly the Chinese were not informed of the decision. No reason has ever been given for the assigment, although, due to the fact that a great deal of foreign capital, mostly Japanese, was invested in the area, its absorption sooner or later was inevitable. The responsibility for the decision must rest upon the shoulders of the British officer commanding the Shanghai Volunteers, the senior member of the Defense Committee.

On 22 January, Japan presented a virtual ultimatum to the Chinese Mayor of Shanghai, demanding immediate suppression of anti-Japanese organizations, agitation, and the boycott. The Mayor’s request for a week’s delay in submitting the Chinese reply was refused. This same day the Japanese Navy in Shanghai demanded anapology from the Min Kuo Jih Pao for its insulting remarks about the Japanese Emperor. This last seemed to be a personal affair,such as could be expected from the old cast of Prussian officers in the German army, but it must be remembered that theJapanese naval officers were extremely jealous of the success of the Japanese army officers in Manchuria and were itching for the opportunity to gather in some of the notoriety and glory.

The Chinese military authorities outside the Settlement now declared that, should the Japanese navy send its men into Chinese quarter , they would be resisted to the utmost. Furthermore, the Chinese proclaimed a state of siege in Woosung and in Lunghua, prohibiting Japanese traffic outside the International Settlement. They also began the erection of sandbag emplacements, wire entanglements and tank traps. These were under the supervision of competent leaders and a few German instructors, and were destined to give the Japanese plenty of grief. Observing this activity, the Japanese Consul-General informed Mayor Wu that if no satisfactory reply was received within a reasonable time, the Japanese Government would take action to enforce the demand.

On 25 January, units of the Chinese 19th Route Army, Occupying the Shanghai area for the Nationalist Government, beganthe erection of defenses in Chapei. It had been reliably reported that this unit had orders from Nanking to retire in case the Japanese attacked. The Japanese therefore looked won their activity as some kind of a bluff, although they” undoubtedly hoped the Chinese would give them enough of a fight to get into official orders.

Will follows ASAP. Cheers. Tigre.

[Akira Takizawa]

3rd Fleet (Vice Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura)
.. 1st Expeditionary Fleet
.. Shanghai SNLF (Captain Samejima)
...... 1st Battalion (Including Sasebo 1st SNLF)
...... 2nd Battalion (Former Kure 1st SNLF)
...... 3rd Battalion (Former Sasebo 2nd SNLF)
...... 4th Battalion (Former Sasebo 3rd SNLF)
...... 5th Battalion (Former Yokosuka 1st SNLF)
...... 7th Battalion (Former Yokosuka 2nd SNLF)

* SNLF units were sent after the incident happened

Shanghai Expeditionary Army (General Yoshinori Shirakawa)
.. 9th Division
.. 24th Mixed Brigade
.. 11th Division
.. 14th Division


Taki

[tigre]

Hello gents, here goes the second part

On the 26th, the Executive Committee of the International Settlement caused the Min Kuo Jih Pao to be closed, perhaps hoping to avert hostilities. The following day the Anti Japanese Boycott Association was closed by the Mayor and their various offices sealed by Chinese police.
Nevertheless, the Japanese Consul-General remained unsatisfied and sent the Mayor a 22-hour ultimatum requiring unqualified agreement with all Japanese demands, the ultimatum to expire at 6:00 PM, 28 January.
On the 28th came the “pay off’ and the Japanese methods of jockeying others into pulling the chestnuts out of the fire is well worthy of consideration.
Brigadier General Fleming, head of the Defense Committee, was informed by Mr. Toda (Japanese liaison officer) at 7:30 AM, 28 January, that the Japanese had decided to take the necessary action on 29 January if the Chinese did not meet their demands. General Fleming called a meeting of the Defense Committee at 9:30 AM. The Japanese members did not attend.
The Committee decided to declare a State of Emergency to go into effect at 4:00 PM, 28 January, at which time all
troops would man their defense sectors.
At 2:00 PM the Japanese Consul-General received the Chinese reply to his ultimatum and at 3:00 PM he blandly informed the Shanghai consular body that the reply was satisfactory and that if the Chinese promises were kept a clash would be avoided.
As all the other foreign troops were now occupying their defense sectors, while the Japanese stood fast, it gave the appearante of a premature move by the Defense Committee. But once having placed the onus on others, the Japanese stated that they would comply with the Defense Scheme and occupy their own area.
Under cover of darkness a landing force of 2,000 Japanese bluejackets, with armored cars, trucks, and light artillery formed in the streets of Shanghai. At 11:00 PM the Naval Commander notified the Mayor that he intended to occupy Chapei and demanded that the Chinese troops there be withdrawn.
This, the Chinese declare, was the first intimation they had of the new Japanese defense area. Furthermore, the Japanese indicated that they intended to go even farther into Chinese territory for the defense of Japanese nationals residing in Chapei.
As the Japanese moved forward thirty minutes after their commander had sent notice of his intentions to the Chinese, it must have been known that the Chinese could not have cleared the area, even if they had intended to do so. Relying on information that the Chinese had orders to withdraw in the face of a Japanese attack, it appears obvious that the Japanese naval officers hoped to surprise and overwhelm large bodies of Chinese troops, thus bringing great credit to the Japanese Navy.
With the landing force were many Japanese civiljans, or “ronins” (Japanese assassin, or one who kills by surprise or secret assault). The Japanese ronin enters an area in civilian clothes, starts some kind of a riot in order that Japanese troops may have a pretext for taking a hand, and then remains to loot and terrorize. This particular activity is a recognized agent wherever Japanese forces operate.
So contemptuous of Chinese fighting ability were the Japanese that they made no attempt at reconnaissance.
The first Japanese advance into the Hongkew Salient, west of the railroad, was unopposed, except for a few Chinese policemen who were caught by surprise and disarmed. Soon, however, firing broke out. Both sides claim the other fired first, but that particular area was not occupied by regular Chinese troops, only gendarmes and civilians. Certain it is that Chinese started sniping at about midnight and at this resistance the Japanese unleashed their full force. They at once dispatched planes which began dropping incendiary bombs in the darkness.
While the bombing was going on, the Japanese attempted to push west from the Szechuen Road. They were fired upon by Chinese gendarmes and then came in contact with the Chinese 5th and 6th Regiments, 156th Brigade, 78th Division.
The Japanese advance was halted.
Several Japanese attempts to outflank the Chinese from the south by going through defensive sectors of the Shanghai volunteers were prevented after much argument.
A Chinese armored train began patrolling the Woosung Railroad line, firing on any Japanese seen. Chinese mufti-Soldiers continued to snipe in the Japanese rear.
By daylight on the 29th, the Japanese had succeeded in occupying their defensive sector, but there is little doubt that this could have been accomplished anyhow under proper procedure. They had succeeded, by aerial bombing, in setting fire to the cotton mills and most of Chapei besides, even destroying The Commercial Press, the largest of its kind in China, with 600,000 volumes in its Oriental Library. But the Japanese Navy had not performed to its satisfaction. With 34 warships and 2,000 marines they had been unable to advance against the Chinese’ 19th Route Army.
The American and British civil and military officials attempted to arrange a truce between the belligerents. The Japanese stated that if the Chinese would stop firing the Japanese marines would remain on the east side of the Shanghai-Woosung railway. The Chinese replied that the Japanese Marines, were already in Chinese territory and that the only way to avoid further conflict would be for the Japanese forces to withdraw.
In view of that statement the Japanese Commander now gave it to be understood that there was no war with China,
but only one with the 19th Route Army, which they claimed was acting contrary to the orders of the Nanking Government.
On 30 January the Nanking Government publicly announced its commitment to a policy of resisting Japanese demands with military force, and that it stood whole-heartedly behind the 19th Route Army in the Shanghai struggle. It also announced the temporary transference of the capitol from Nanking to Loyang in Honan Province; this because of the accessibility of Nanking to the Japanese battleships. But the Japanese Government’s theory of a restricted war did not permit Japanese warships to proceed up the Yangtze and threaten the Chinese capitol with bombardment. So at Shanghai might be seen the queer spectacle of war vessels of both nations lying near each other at anchor in Chinese waters.
The Chinese protested the Japanese withdrawing into the International Settlement and further using it as a base for military operations. Both sides used the Settlement as a base for their wounded, although on the whole, it might be assumed as barred to the Chinese Army, but not to the Japanese.
The rival forces maneuvered around the Settlement; partly hindered by the necessity of avoiding it, partly helped by its use as a screen, as a pivot, or as actual battle position. An up-to-date umpire staff would probably have described the entire situation as “unreal” and condemned both sides for violating accepted principles of war.
During the 30th there had been continual sniping and desultory firing which dontinued on the 31st, when a meeting was held between the Japanese Consul-General, the Admiral, Mayor Wu, a division commander of the 19th Route Army, the British and American Consul-Generals and Commanders of the Settlement Defense forces. Both sides agreed not to fire unless fired upon until peace proposals could be presented to their Governments. This was a waste of time. However, both sides accepted the proposals for transmittal to their Governments.

More follows ASAP. Cheers. Tigre.

[tigre]

Hello to all, the third part.


During 1 february the truce was more or less observed; but the Chinese positions were daily being strengthened on all sides. At North Station an armored train with field pieces was now stationed.
From the beginning the Chinese had put several hundred of their best shots in civilian coolie dress. These men crept around or through the Japanese lines at night. They would lieconcealed, Iire on any Japanese in sight and run immediately.
They caused considerable nervousness in the Japanese rear and kept many men, who otherwise could have been resting, busy patrolling. They delivered a very telling blow at Japanese morale, especially when they got close to the Japanese headquarters and forced it to move. The Japanese burned many houses in an effort to dislodge these men.

The Japanese themselves, who seem to have had insufficient regular force for the defense of their area, had mobilized and
armed all their so-called reservists, who wore civilian clothes distinguished by a brassard.
The Japanese naval authorities now took complete control of the Hongkew district inside the Settlement, barricading streets, disarming police and paralyzing all municipal activities.

It is alleged that actuated by a spirit of revenge against the Chinese for earlier anti-Japanese activitities, numerous excesses, including summary executions, were committed by marines, reservists, and ronins.
On 2 February the Chinese accepted the peace proposals submitted by the Powers, The Japanese Comniander was quite well aware that his country would not accept the proposals, so about noon he declared that the Chinese were massing troops with a view to surrounding the Japanese and that he would have to send Up planes for reconnaissance. The Chinese
promptly op&ed fire on the planes, whereupon the planes started bombing Chapei and the fighting started again.

During the lull in the fighting the Japanese had been considering the isolated position of the Woosung Forts at the mouth of the Wangpoo River.
On 3 February the Japanese; Consul-General informed the Consular authorities that three Japanese destroyers had been fired upon from the Woosung Forts and that the Japanese therefore intended to occupy them.
Through lack of reconnaissance, the Japanese again failed.
The effectiveness of their naval guns was materially reduced by the fact that they were firing at point blank range with resultant flat trajectory and as they used armor-piercing shells, most of them failed to burst in the soft earthworks. The Chinese replied with inaccurate gunfire, but frequently harassed vessels with machine-gun tire as they passed into the Whangpoo channel a few hundred yards from the forts. The Japanese attempted to land bluejackets and occupy the forts, but were repulsed with considerable loss.

On 4 February the expected Japanese reply to the peace proposals arrived, i.e., “. . . it is a settled policy of the Japanese Government not to accept assistance of neutral observers or participants in the settlement of questions . . . For these reasons the conditions embodied in paragraph five of the Powers’ note is not acceptable to the Japanese Government.” To emphasize their refusal to submit to arbitration, the Japanese Navy made their last attack through 4 and 5 February. With a force brought up to a strength of about 5,000 and assisted by artillery and bombing planes, they went in frontally against Chapei, while the ships again bombarded the Woosung Forts. One Japanese destroyer ran aground on the shoals and the 19th Route Army held its ground in Chapei in spite of heavy casualties. Japanese bombs fell on a refugee camp full of men, women, and children, situated well behind the Chinese lines.

The Municipal Council, in an effort to prevent the continuance of summary executions and other excesses, forced the Japanese, through the Consular Body, to agree to turn over all suspected persons arrested in the Japanese area to the Municipal police.
On the 6th the Japanese G&ernment decided to dispatch military forces to Shanghai on board men-of-war.
The following day the Japanese 24th Mixed Brigade, about 3,000 strong, landed at Chang Wah Pang, south of Woosung Creek (Woosung Creek has a strong tidal cuyrent and is about 300 feet wide), under cover of naval gunfire on Woosung, ‘Navy detachments from Shanghai with armored cars also participated in covering the landing. The Chinese had defensively organized the north bank of the creek, also the village and factories between the creek and the forts.

On the night of the 7th and during the 8th, the Japanese attempted to cross Woosung Creek on pontoon bridges, under supporting fire from naval guns, land artillery, and aerial bombing.
The attack broke down in the face of strong Chinese resistance.

On 8 February, Foreign Minister Yoshizawa at Tokyo informed a group of foreign ambassadors that it would be useless to negotiate with the Nanking Government regarding Shanghai because the troops there were controlled by Cantonese insurgents who wished to embarrass Chiang Kai-shek, head of the Nanking Government.

On the 11th, Japanese aeroplanes dropped two bombs and destroyed the Wing on cotton mill situated within the International Settlement itself, killing six and wounding ten. The bombing was explained as “accidental,” but the British thought it a gentle hint from the Japanese for foreigners to quit meddling.

On 14 February, a company of Japanese infantry from the 24th Brigade, crossed to the north bank of Woosung Creek some distance up stream, by means of a floating cork bridge. A Chinese counterattack forced the Japanese back with severe losses. This same day Lieutenant General Uyeda, with the advance contingent of the Japanese 9th Division, with mountain artillery, air service, tanks and auxiliary troops, began disembarkation at Shanghai. By the 15th they had landed their full strength, 14,300, and were in billets in Yangtzepoo (that part of the International Settlement occupied by the Japanese).

The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs emphatically protested against the landing of Japanese army troops in the Settlement and requested the American and British officials to take steps to end the Japanese violations of the Settlement neutrality. The Shanghai Municipal Council stated that Japan was one of the several powers having political and other inter- ests in the Settlement; that the Settlement’s neutrality could only be maintained and guaranteed by these same powers; :
and that the Japanese Government and not the Council was solely responsible for the acts of the Japanese armed forces in the Settlement.

The Chinese now began reinforcing both their Woosung and Kiangwan (just north of Chapei) lines, bringing in the 87th and 88th Divisions of the 5th Route Army.
The Japanese completed concentration of its 9th Division.
By 18 February the Japanese had assembled a force of about 16,000 troops, with howitzers, guns, tanks, and aviation, With the bulk of the force southeast of Kiangwan Race Course (about half-way between Shanghai and the Woosung Forts).

More follows. Regards. Tigre

[tigre]

4º part.

The Japanese planned to contain the Woosung Forts garrison north of Woosung Creek with a small force of the 24th Brigade, hold the Chapei line with the naval landing force, and break through the Chinese center at Kiangwan, then to turn southwest toward Chenzu. The main effort to be made by the 9th Division, assisted on the right by the remainder of the 24th Brigade.

The British made one last effort to avert further hostilities.
The Chiefs of Staff of the two military leaders met in the presence of Sir Miles Lampson, to discuss terms. The Japanese terms, namely that the Chinese must remove the boycott from all Japanese goods, was found unacceptable by the Chinese representative. Plans for the attack and defense continued. In this respect the Chinese had all the advantages, whereas the Chinese inhabitants of Shanghai kept the Chinese leaders fully informed of every move the Japanese made.
Furthermore, the continual sniping by Chinese sharpshooters in the Japanese rear areas was extremely disconcerting to the Japanese officers.

To make it a little more difficult for the Japanese diplomats, General Tsai Ting-kai stated that the troops under his command were an integral part of the army of the National Government of the Republic of China, by whose orders alone his activities were directed and therefore could not withdraw 12 miles as demanded by the Japanese.

On 20 February the Japanese attacked behind a screen of tanks. The Chinese put up little resistance east of the railway, but the strength of their position”at Kiangwan soon developed. With the aid of their tanks, the Japanese gained a footing in the eastern end of Kiangwan, but during the next seven days the entire 9th Division became deeply involved with stubborn Chinese resistance in and around the village. The Japanese repeatedly attempted to get into Kiangwan With their tanks but were unsuccessful for several days. The Chinese tank defenseand the deep, well defined creeks, impossible for tanks to ford, prevented their effective use later in the operation. The Japanese right had relatively easy going until they camein contact with the entrenched positions of the Chinese 60th Division, when their advance was halted.

By the 22d ‘all Japanese troops had been committed and their line was stretched thinly, The Chinese counterattacked at the junction of the 9th Division and 24th Brigade with some little local success.

During the 23d the Japanese troops remained in position while airplanes and artillery concentrated on Chinese strategic points until destroyed. They also bombed the Chinese airdromes at Hungjao and Soochow, causing considerable damage, While the Japanese bombed Lunghua and Chenzu on the 24th, their attack had spent itself. Again the Japanese had miscalculated the size of the force required to clear the Chinese from Shanghai and environs, but the Tokyo Government promptly decided to remedy the difficulty by dispatching additional reinforcements.

A second general offensive was launched at 6:30 AM on the 25th. This was a direct frontal attack and by 4:00 PM the Japanese had gained a foothold in the Chinese front lines. The attack continued on the 26th and further positions on the Chinese front lines were captured. Fifteen Japanese bombers, prbtected by pursuit, paid a surprise visit to Hangchow and bombed the two airfields there, destroying about ten Chinese planes. By the 27th the Japanese had cleared the Chinese from Klangwan and started preparations for an offensive against the Chinese second line in front of Tazang. The 11th and 14th Divisions with General Yoshinori Shirahawa in command, sailed from Japan that day.

On the 28th the 22d Regiment of the Japanese 11th Division was landed at Chang Wah Pang and sent up to reinforce General Uyeda’s forces. At the request of Vice Admiral Nomura, Commander-in- chief of the Japanese naval forces at Shanghai, Japanese and Chinese representatives met aboard H.M.S. “Kent,” in the presence of Admiral Sir Howard Kelly and another British officer, and conferred amicably for two hours and a half. The principle of mutual and simultaneous evacuation was agreed upon, together with a provision that neutrals should assist the Japanese and Chinese in controlling the evacuated area. Both sides submitted the truce proposals to their respective Governments.

This move by the Japanese commander was only actuated by public sentiment in Japan. It is fairly certain that the Japanese had never envisaged the extent to which outside interests would be concerned, nor realized their unpopularity abroad because of the Manchuria and Shanghai operations. Hence the peace gesture.

Having made the gesture, the Japanese attacked next morning (29th), with small local successes.
The remainder of the 11th and the 14th Divisions arrived at the mouth of the Yangtze River and prepared for an offensive on 1 March.

More follows. Regards. Tigre.

[asiaticus]

Am wondering if this 24th Mixed Brigade was actually a "mixed" Brigade or just an independant Infantry Brigade?

12th Division had a 24th Infantry Brigade made up of 46th Infantry Regiment and a 48th Infantry Regiment.

[asiaticus]

With the outbreak of the first phase of the Shanghai Incident in January 1932, the 1st Koku-sentai (Carrier Division) (of which Kaga was the flagship) was posted to the 3rd Fleet and operated off Shanghai. [ As was the carrier Hosho. Both of these flew the Nakajima A1N2 fighters and Mitsubishi B1M torpedo bombers.]

A Hikokitai (a detachment of a carrier group) under the command of division officer Tai-i (Lieutenant) Yoshitane Yanagimura established its base in Shanghai at Kunda airfield and was used primarily in support of land operations.



This info from:

http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/index.html

http://avia.russian.ee/air/japan/mitsubishi_b1m.html