Lieutenant-General Adachi Hatazo

Discussions on all aspects of the Japanese Empire, from the capture of Taiwan until the end of the Second World War.
Post Reply
User avatar
Peter H
Member
Posts: 28628
Joined: 30 Dec 2002, 14:18
Location: Australia

Lieutenant-General Adachi Hatazo

#1

Post by Peter H » 22 May 2005, 15:11

From In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army,Edward Drea:
A fascinating character, Adachi had long perplexed me. As commander of Eighteenth Army on New Guinea, he lost at least 110,000 of the 130,000 soldiers and sailors under his command. Yet today's Ground Self Defense Forces regard Adachi with awe and reverence....

Why talk about a general who is relatively obscure in Japan and virtually unknown elsewhere? ... Perhaps by discussing a general officer who was neither a genius, such as Napoleon or MacArthur, nor a fool, such as McClellan or Mutaguchi, we gain a keener sense of what it meant to be an officer, a commander, and a leader in a major army. Moreover a preeminent Japanese military historian [Hata Ikuhiko] regards Adachi as one of only three general officers commanding troops who upheld Japan's military tradition by not disgracing the uniform.... (The others were Lieutenant General Kuribayashi Tadamichi, defender of Iwo Jima, and Lieutenant General Ushijima Mitsuru, defender of Okinawa).

Born into a large family of samurai stock, but unable to afford middle school (as required for a naval career), Adachi instead tested into the army's fiercely competitive Tokyo Cadet Academy, which aimed to produce graduates who were both tough officers and refined gentlemen. Adachi "became a skilled writer of short verse (tanka) and indeed would spend some of his darkest moments in the New Guinea jungles writing poetry". He then entered the Military Academy, where the subject matter was all military and the discipline was harsh, especially since many of the faculty were veterans of the recent, extraordinarily brutal Russo-Japanese War.

As one of the top graduates, he was posted to the First Guards Regiment, Imperial Guards Division, in Tokyo, and then went on to the Army War College, a sure sign he was destined for high rank. "Tokyo in the 1930s was a hotbed of Army factionalism" , but Adachi steered clear of domestic politics, and "unlike many Japanese officers at that time, was monogamous.... He was deeply devoted to his wife and family despite the enforced separations that were a soldier's lot".

Also unusual for officers in his day, Adachi was devoted to the welfare of his troops. "Adachi led by example and understood his officers and men at an emotional level" After being posted to the Kwantung Army headquarters in Manchuria as the railway control officer, he "ordered all heating in the headquarters' building turned off" whenever troops had to be transported in unheated trains . He was famous for drinking large quantities of sake with his subordinates, creating an atmosphere where they could speak frankly and he could correct their errors without embarrassing them unduly.
Then war erupted with China in July 1937, and Adachi discovered his calling--he was a combat commander who led from the front, always appearing where the bullets were thickest. In the street-fighting meat grinder of Shanghai where head-on assaults into fortified positions became the accepted tactics, this was no small feat.

He was severely wounded in a mortar barrage that September, but was back in command of his regiment in December. His right leg was permanently weakened and bent, but he refused to use a cane. In recognition of his courage and leadership, he was promoted to major general in 1938, then lieutenant general in 1940, assigned to north China, where he conducted a series of bloody but successful pacification campaigns.

In 6 November 1942, on the same day that he heard of his wife's death after a long illness, he received orders for New Guinea.
In January 1943 Adachi flew from Rabaul to Lae, Northeast New Guinea, a major Japanese stronghold, air base, and port, where he met the survivors of Buna. For the first time in his career he saw Japanese soldiers in defeat, uniforms in tatters, some propping themselves upright on crudely fashioned bamboo crutches, others being carried by exhausted comrades. Shocked by the sight, Adachi discarded his inspection schedule and instead talked to each man, encouraging and praising them for their efforts and telling them they looked like soldiers....

Tokyo ordered Adachi to buy time for the Army to consolidate an in-depth defense in western New Guinea and the Philippines.... As the pace of the Allied offensive intensified, Adachi confronted a classic dilemma. If he garrisoned every possible landing site with small numbers of troops, he risked them being overwhelmed piecemeal. If he concentrated his forces, he risked them being bypassed.

So in June 1943, Adachi decided to fight the main battle at Salamaua, because loss of that base would render Lae untenable. His decision played into the Allied plan to fix the Japanese at Salamaua while executing an air-sea envelopement at Lae.... Yet what alternatives did Adachi have open to him?
By 22 April 1944, MacArthur had circled around the north coast of New Guinea and taken the Eighteenth Army's largest rear area bases at Hollandia and Aitape. Adachi was cut off in eastern New Guinea, but "managed to move his 60,000 troops overland through terrible jungle and swamp terrain" and mount a surprise counterattack on Aitape on 10 July 1944.

His defeat at Aitape cost 10,000 Japanese lives. Now Adachi had to hold together a broken, isolated force, thousands of miles from home, and without any hope of relief. His impartiality and common sense became the glue of the defeated army. So too did his October 1944 Emergency Punishment Order that gave his officers the power of summary field execution....

Again Adachi led by example. He shared the hardships and short rations, losing nearly 80 pounds and all his teeth. Disdaining a painful hernia, he insisted on making daily visits to his front-line, no matter how far distant from headquarters.

By August 1945, he could muster only 10,000 men, illustrating the then current saying that "Heaven is Java; hell is Burma; but no one returns alive from New Guinea" . "Preparations for a final suicide attack were underway when Japan surrendered".

After the war, Adachi was sentenced to life imprisonment for war crimes, including the summary executions he had authorized, although he was not personally involved in any such executions himself. After also testifying at the defense of every one of his indicted subordinates, "in the early morning hours of 10 September 1947 ... Adachi used a paring knife to commit suicide".


His Final Testament
"To the officers and staff of the former 18th Army in the compound:

I have decided today to make a final farewell to those whom I love most.

I felt it a great honour to have been appointed the commander in chief in November 1942, at a time when the issue of the day was to be settled, and posted to the point of strategic importance in order to ensure that the tide of war moved in our favour. I was thankful for that appointment. However, notwithstanding the fact that my officers and men did their best in the exceptional circumstances, surmounting all difficulties, and that my superiors gave the utmost assistance, the hoped-for end was not attained, because of my inability. Thus I paved the way for my country to be driven into the present predicament. The crime deserves death.

During the past three years of operations more than 100,000 youthful and promising officers and men were lost and most of them died of malnutrition. When I think of this, I know not what apologies to make to His Majesty the Emperor and I feel that I myself am overwhelmed with shame.

Our Imperial country totters on the brink of disaster. I believe it is the natural path for our citizens and soldiers alike to continue fighting until the last drop of our blood is shed. I have demanded perseverance far exceeding the limit of man’s endurance of my officers and men, who were exhausted and emaciated as a result of successive campaigns and for want of supplies. However, my officers and men all followed my orders in silence without grumbling, and, when exhausted, they succumbed to death just like flowers falling in the winds. God knows how I felt when I saw them dying, my bosom being filled with pity for them, though it was solely to their country that they dedicated their lives. At that time I made up my mind not to set foot on my country’s soil again but to remain as a clod of earth in the Southern Seas with the 100,000 officers and men, even if a time should come when I would be able to return to my country in triumph".

An excellent link on Adachi:

http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/remember.ns ... NT000026D2


Photos from the AWM website:

Adachi,in litter,at the time of the ceasefire near Wewak.

Adachi(1890-1947) hands over his family sword to Major-General Robertson,Aust 6th Division,Wewak 1945.The sword has been dated to 1511,was carried everywhere by Adachi on military service,and is now on display at the Australian War Memorial.
Attachments
adachi_CapeWorn.jpg
adachi_CapeWorn.jpg (54.28 KiB) Viewed 3092 times
Adachi.jpg
Adachi.jpg (64 KiB) Viewed 3097 times

Goldfish
Member
Posts: 410
Joined: 31 May 2004, 14:51
Location: Atlanta, USA

#2

Post by Goldfish » 22 May 2005, 16:57

Then war erupted with China in July 1937, and Adachi discovered his calling--he was a combat commander who led from the front, always appearing where the bullets were thickest. In the street-fighting meat grinder of Shanghai where head-on assaults into fortified positions became the accepted tactics, this was no small feat.

He was severely wounded in a mortar barrage that September, but was back in command of his regiment in December. His right leg was permanently weakened and bent, but he refused to use a cane. In recognition of his courage and leadership, he was promoted to major general in 1938, then lieutenant general in 1940, assigned to north China, where he conducted a series of bloody but successful pacification campaigns.
If he fought with his unit in Shanghai and then rejoined them in December, he would have been in command of his regiment when they were raping Nanking (Nanking fell on December 13th, the Rape of Nanking lasted about three months) and given his later penchant for summary execution, it is likely that he was a willing participant.

The "pacification campaigns" referred to are the Sanko or "Three Alls" (kill all, burn all, loot all) campaigns to disrupt Communist control by annihilating any village that supported them. The campaigns were highly effective, shattering Communist control and forcing them on the defensive, but very bloody-an estimated one and a half to three million Chinese (mostly civilians) were butchered.
a preeminent Japanese military historian [Hata Ikuhiko] regards Adachi as one of only three general officers commanding troops who upheld Japan's military tradition by not disgracing the uniform.... (The others were Lieutenant General Kuribayashi Tadamichi, defender of Iwo Jima, and Lieutenant General Ushijima Mitsuru, defender of Okinawa).
I don't know what Hata's standards were. Maybe by the standards of other China generals, Adachi was a saint. However, considering that Hata has claimed that the Japanese killed no more than 42,000 Chinese (most of them POWs) in the Rape of Nanking (as opposed to an internationally accepted estimate of around 250,000), it is possible that he simply did not consider murdering Chinese a disgrace to the Japanese uniform.


Larry D.
Member
Posts: 4102
Joined: 05 Aug 2004, 00:03
Location: Winter Springs, FL (USA)

#3

Post by Larry D. » 22 May 2005, 18:43

Excellent points, Goldfish!

That thumbnail sketch of Adachi "The Choir Boy" by Edward Drea is the dangedest "whitewash" I've ever read (and I've been around for a few years). Coincidentally, I've read most of Drea's numerous books and articles, and I've also spoken with him on the phone. He knows better than to pen something like this, so it came as a big surprise to me when I first read it a few years ago. Drea was the Japanese language expert in the Center for Military History/Department of the Army, Washington, for a number of years. Perhaps he got "too far" into the Japanese thing and forgot to check some non-Japanese sources.

--Larry

Goldfish
Member
Posts: 410
Joined: 31 May 2004, 14:51
Location: Atlanta, USA

#4

Post by Goldfish » 23 May 2005, 00:11

I think the point that I am trying to make is that most Japanese sources tend to treat that war as having started in 1941, with China only some kind of prelude (like the Spanish Civil War in Europe). This might because the Japanese Defense Agency keeps a pretty tight lid on the archives related to the "China Incident". A lot of Western historians tend to also give the war in China short shrift as well, both due to a lack of information (from both sides) and from a lack of interest.

The fact is, however, that most of Japan's senior combat officers (major and above) earned their rank in China. While not all participated in atrocities, enough did to double-check their records and see where they were when the major massacres (Nanjing 1937, Wuhan 1938, "Three Alls" 1940-45, Zhejiang 1942, etc.) took place. Drea, for example, simply mentions that Adachi rejoined his unit in December without even mentioning the word "Nanking" and treats the "pacification campaigns" as simply another military campaign. This may be because his Japanese sources do this, but he still should have looked into it a bit more.

User avatar
Peter H
Member
Posts: 28628
Joined: 30 Dec 2002, 14:18
Location: Australia

#5

Post by Peter H » 23 May 2005, 11:30

Adachi received a life imprisonment term for his warcrimes.

Has anyone details on the charges?

This link mentions the following:

http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/remember.ns ... NT00002ADA
We should examine what "execution" means in a cause of death. The death penalty of personnel was based on the Emergency Punishment Order issued at the end of October 1944 by ADACHI Hatazô Commander in Chief 18th Army. In his explanation regarding the issue to the Australian investigating officer, ADACHI referred to an instruction by the Army Ministry issued in April 1943, "You may treat Indian soldiers dispatched to New Guinea as a component part of the Japanese forces. The Japanese Army Criminal code can be applied to the crimes committed by them." This order was based on the principle of the Article 22 of the Japanese Army Criminal Code and also a part of the Army Criminal Code. The order provides that the death penalty can be executed without trial.

The occasion for this order arose after the Aitape campaign in Aug 1944, when hunger and starvation forced men to cannibalism, and for desertion or running away in the face of the enemy and also for those who disobeyed and even killed their officers and NCOs. The General Commander of 18th Army gave the power to award this penalty to commander of any Regiment but only in respect of personnel within his regiment. Major Generals and Lieutenant Generalss were given the power to punish anyone, whether within or without their forces, by the death penalty. However, the lower the orders went down, the more elasticity arose in the interpretation. Lieutenant MITSUBA, platoon commander of 19th Special Sea Service Company, said "general order of ADACHI was that if any Indian POW refused to comply with an order he could be killed without trial by any officer". For example, the situation for carrying out this order was applied to anyone stealing garden produce such as potato leaves, pumpkins, and lemons. Captain IZUMI, commander of 19th Special Sea Company, explained the situation in his interrogation. "To maintain the lives of all, strict discipline was necessary. In case this discipline was broken, such as someone stealing, whether it be Japanese or Indians, I had the legal authority from the General Commander under the Emergency Punishment Law to shoot to kill and this was conveyed to all my subordinates". [21] It is true that both Indian and Japanese soldiers were executed without trial under this order, [22] however this decision later brought many Japanese to the criminal court.

Aside from the cases stealing food, especially after the Aitape operation, desertion of Indians from unit could not be prevented. At this time, Indian personnel became a kind of encumbrance. YOSHIHARA Kane, Chief of Staff of 18th Army, held discussion with 18th Army HQ on Indian issue: "We even considered freeing all Indian troops. We had this in mind after the Aitape operation as from then onwards, we considered our position desperate and we considered that we would free them when we finally made our last stand as we thought it too much for them to die with us. So towards the close of the campaign I was sent to the Sepik area to tell the commanders there and that when they made their last stand, they were to free all the Indians." [23]

However, in this respect, the commander of each Indian company thought differently. Freeing them could have meant giving the Allies information of Japanese positions, and thus the question of whether to hold or release them was a grave and vital issue. 2nd Lieutenant SAITO, a Warrant Officer of 18th Special Sea Company confessed he actually shot an Indian officer in his memoir, when he found Indian officer Hanawar waving a white flag to an Australian aircraft. [24] SAITO always chose to walk to the rear in the march, and so no one could witness the incident except for hearing a gunshot, he wrote. In his trial in Rabaul, Indian survivors, who returned to India after the war, were called as witness. However, because of anair crash on their way to Rabaul, all witnesses were lost and the trial of SAITO was discarded on the ground of insufficient evidence. He was released shortly after that.

Senior officers in 8th Area Army interpreted the point regarding the act of Prisoners of War in Geneva Convention "in case of acts hostile or of scheming to desert, they shall be considered our enemy", as that "when worse comes to worse they will have to be considered enemies and we may even have to kill them." The order would entitle certain officers to carry out an execution without reference to higher authority and that the order did not lay down any procedure to be followed prior to carrying out the execution. Concerning the final treatment of Indians, Major KUDO, in August 1945, gave an order that Indians should be executed for crimes of rebellion and resisting orders at Sepik. As criminal acts of Indians were confirmed and such acts, in view of the pressing war situation, were acknowledged to correspond to the death penalty, but it was impossible to convene a court-martial.

The death rate and the number of survivors are not clear. Press accounts state that only 3,250 Indian POW out of 8,000 dispatched to New Guinea and New Britain returned home. More than 2,500 died through ill-treatment. After the arrival of POWs on New Britain they suffered months of slave labour, disease and brutal treatment.

Post Reply

Return to “Japan at War 1895-1945”