Hello,
After the action in Luxembourg and in the Ardennes I have tried to detail in this thread :
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=84561
here is the next part about the battles on the Meuse River from 13th to 15th May 1940. The next part will include the battles in the Mont Dieu area (Mont Dieu, Mont Damion, Stonne, Le Chesne, Tannay etc.), 15 km south of Sedan, from 15th to 25th May 1940.
2. The combats on the Meuse River (13th – 15th May 1940)
On the Meuse River, 7 French infantry divisions (5e DIM, 18e DI, 22e DI, 61e DI, 102e DIF, 55e DI and 71e DI) largely incomplete and lacking armament and equipments have to defend an overstretched front, from Houx to Sedan. Each French division has to defend a 15-30 km front, whereas an infantry division should theoretically defend a 5-7 km front only. On 13th May, they will have to face 7 Panzerdivisionen (1762 tanks), 3 motorized infantry division and the elite "Grossdeutschland" regiment. These 10 German divisions are followed by 26 infantry divisions and 1 mountain infantry division. The German assault is supported by more than 1500 aircrafts concentrated on a small area during hours. These two concentrations (tanks and aircrafts) are a first time in History. The French troops can only rely on very insufficient and largely unachieved fortifications. The Maginot Line by itself is indeed stopping at the border with the Luxembourg.
-- SEDAN AREA --
The main German attack will be sustained at Sedan by the incomplete 55e DI, a reserve division, which has to face the "Grossdeutschland" regiment, the 1.PzD, the 2.PzD and the 10.PzD.
The 55e DI is composed of :
- 213e RI (not on the frontline)
- 295e RI (incomplete – the 1st battalion was destroyed in Bouillon)
- 331e RI
The 71e DI on its right is composed of :
- 120e RI
- 205e RI (not on the frontline)
- 246e RI
These divisions have no AA guns (only MGs used in AA role) and have respectively only 12 and 8 AT guns (instead of 62) to defend a front of about 25-30 km per division. There is also a big lack of ammunition hand grenades. The men are 29-40 years old and they lack training. Since 1939 these men were rather used for labor/pioneer tasks. The 213e RI and 205e RI are far on the rears (the 213e RI is in La Neuville-a-Maire and the 205e RI is next to Yoncq). The 295e RI has been reduced, one battalion having roughly been lost in Bouillon. Therefore only 4 reduced regiments are on the front to defend the Meuse River. The 71e DI is also roughly devoid of divisional artillery, which has been included in the 9th Army corps.
The area of Sedan itself is only defended by 6 companies of the 147e RIF (fortress infantry regiment), 3 companies of the 295e RI (55e DI) and 6 companies of the 331e RI (55e DI). The 1st company of the 11e BM (11th MG battalion) is reinforcing the position south of Donchéry. These 16 French companies, roughly the equivalent of 1 strong regiment and weak fortifications will have to face the concentrated assaults of the 1.PzD reinforced by the "Grossdeutschland" elite infantry regiment, the 2.PzD and the 10.PzD. The German superiority in Sedan is simply astonishing.
On the south-western bank of the Meuse River there are several fortifications but most of them are not achieved, they often lack armament, doors or adequate crenels which have to be completed by sand bags. The fortifications are armed only with FM 24/29 LMGs, Mle1914 Hotchkiss HMGs, very few 25mm Mle1934 guns and 37mm TR16 infantry guns. There are also several dismountable Mle1935 turrets armed with a Mle1914 Hotchkiss MG and generally equipped with a camouflage/anti grenade nest around the turret (the MG barrel itself is protected by armor). There are also several open emplacements for Mle1914 Hotchkiss MGs, a few 81mm Stokes-Brandt and Brandt Mle1927/1931 mortars, several former Navy 65mm guns and a few 75mm Mle1897 guns more on the rear.
There are also AT mines but far less than expected. The French doctrine plans the deployment of 1370 mines/km on 1 row or 2740 mines/km on 2 staggered rows. The mines are placed in linear groups of 5 on a length of 2.50m, the groups being separated by 1.40m gaps. At Sedan thousands of AT mines had been laid months before the campaign. Unfortunately they were reported to have been adversely affected by damp (or removed because of the rain) and so were dug up to be fixed or preserved for later use. Sadly, time did not permit them to be laid again, which was kind of unfortunate. Only about 2000 AT mines and an unknown number of AP mines were deployed on a total of only about 70 km all along the frontline. As a comparison, Rommel used about 500,000 AT mines on 70 km in El Alamein in 1942. The 55e DI for example had still 422 AT mines stored in a dump but they were not used. The officers were concentrated on trying to improve the unachieved fortifications, trenches and foxholes for the troops.
On 12th May 1940, the French HQ is still convinced that the main German attack is located in Belgium and in the Netherlands. The Germans are also thought to need about 1 week to concentrate enough artillery and to prepare the crossing of the Meuse River. But, the Germans will initially replace the lack of artillery by the biggest air support concentration of History at this time.
On 13th May, the Luftwaffe placed 61% of its total operational air assets at the disposal of Gruppe Kleist for the assault on the Meuse River. The following numbers are given by Rothbrust :
- 420 Messerschmitt Me109
- 180 Messerschmitt Me110
- 270 Junkers Ju87
- 900 Heinkel He111, Dornier Do17 and Junkers Ju88 bombers
= 1770 aircrafts (1170 bombers and 600 fighters)
Never before were so many bombers concentrated on such a small area. Concentrated over the small Sedan sector alone there are 51% of these aircrafts :
- 280 Messerschmitt Me109
- 90 Messerschmitt Me110
- 180 Junkers Ju87
- 360 Heinkel He111, Dornier Do17 and Junkers Ju88 bombers
= 910 aircrafts (540 bombers and 370 fighters)
These 540 bombers escorted by 370 fighters are concentrated during 4 hours over the single 55e DI. The Luftwaffe targets systematically the unachieved bunkers, the artillery positions, the communication and command posts. It is therefore roughly without artillery support that the weak French first line will have to stop the German assault. Each French battery entering in action is silenced by the Luftwaffe.
During 4 hours, the French troops are heavily bombed. The psychological shock of this air attack is even stronger than for the first use of combat gas during WW1 according to several testimonies. Heavy bombings occur every 20 minutes on the men hidden in their trenches. The 55e DI is devoid of AA weapons and unable to return fire. All the communication by telephone lines between the first lines and the rear are cut. Battalions, companies and platoons are roughly isolated.
During these 4 hours of bombing, no allied fighter appeared to stop the German aircrafts despite support had been asked from the beginning, adding to the bad effect on the morale. All the allied fighters are too busy in other areas.
The French gunners remain hidden in their foxholes and trenches during the bombings. The French infantry is also pinned down, cut from the others, roughly deaf but also blind. The banks of the Meuse River have disappeared in the dust of the explosions and later in the German smoke screen just before the German assaults.
During the bombings the German troops deploy for the attack, without being worried about the French artillery. Ther German assault is launched on 13th May at 15h00 (French time) :
- 2.PzD (general Veiel) at Donchéry
- 1.PzD (general Kirchner) + "Grossdeutschland" regiment for the main effort at Gaulier
- 10.PzD (general Schaal) at Wadelincourt
The available German artillery, the German AA artillery (including 8.8cm FlaK), AT artillery and the German tanks fire from the opposite bank and replace the Luftwaffe to support the crossing. The Luftwaffe targets then the rear lines (HQ, artillery positions, dumps, cross-roads, rail-roads etc.), which will be bombed all day long while the first lines will face the German assault troops crossing the Meuse River on inflatable boats.
The crossing of the 2.PzD is an immediate failure. The Germans in front of Donchéry sustain at first heavy losses and the crossing is defeated because of the intense French MG fire. At 17h30, one group (12 guns) of the 45e RA opens fire on the 2.PzD, which is really unlucky : unable to cross the river and then shelled rather intensively. The 2.PzD will only begin to cross the Meuse River around 22h00, after the successes of the 1.PzD at Sedan itself.
Concerning the 10.PzD, only 2 platoons (86.IR) and several engineers manage to cross the river. They seize by surprise 2 French fore-posts (bunker 220 and fore-post next to the destroyed railroad bridge). The French crews (including WIA) are captured and half of them are executed. Nonetheless, these German platoons are roughly blocked along the bank. They are pinned down and quickly out of ammunition. The crossing point of the 10.PzD has been spotted by a French forward observer ordering a well adjusted artillery fire. The French artillery manages to block the German at 300m from the bank on their side and destroys the river crossing equipments of the 69.IR. Only at the end of the afternoon more German troops will reinforce the 2 first platoons. The elements of the 10.PzD will then benefit from the breakthrough of the 1.PzD and advance about 2 km in the French lines. They meet the "Grossdeutschland" regiment around 18h00 at Wadelincourt.
The 1.PzD and the "Grossdeutschland" regiment are concentrated on a front of less than 2 km around Gaulier, between Glaire and Torcy (eastern part of Sedan). Just before the assault, a Nebelwerfer / artillery unit attached to the 1.PzD creates and maintains 2 smoke screens : one at the level of the Glaire-Sedan road and one more on the rear, along the railroad.
The first assault wave consists in 2 battalions of the 1.Schützen Regiment and 2 battalions of the "Grossdeutschland" regiment for a total of about 2,400 men. To face them on the "French" bank there are only 2 rifle platoons and between them only 4 men with 2 LMGs, for a total of 64 men.
There 64 men are part of the 2 French companies (7th company of the II/147e RIF, capitaine Cordier and 6th company of the II/295e RI, capitaine Auzas) defending alone the area between the Meuse River and the Bellevue-Wadelincourt line. About 300 French soldiers in the first lines have to face the 2,400 Germans of the first assault wave.
The "German" bank is also higher than the "French" bank. The German tanks and guns on the opposite bank can fire directly on the French troops and rare bunkers. Just before the assault, a bunker at Torcy and a blockhouse at Glaire are neutralized, as well as the 2 LMGs between the 2 French platoons. Only the bunker at Torcy will fire several MG bursts. The German crossing is not hampered by the French artillery. To conquer the French positions defended by these 300 French soldiers, the German assault troops will nonetheless need 2h30 (until 17h30).
Many little infiltrations occur, benefiting from the shock and the destruction resulting from the air attacks. Each time a resistance is met the German troops avoid it and go on. Many French positions, cut from the others, are attacked from the rear.
At 17h30, the 1.PzD reinforced by the "Grossdeutschland" regiment is the single division achieving a significant breakthrough. The 4 battalions of the first German wave are reinforced by 3 extra battalions (1 of the 1.PzD and 2 of the "Grossdeutschland" regiment).
After the neutralization of the 2 French companies, these 7 German infantry battalions will face 3 French companies around Fresnois, in front of hill 247 and south of Wadelincourt. The German troops at Wadelincourt are also reinforced by the first elements of the 10.PzD. The French troops are moving back to the northern edge of the hilly woods of La Marfée. Frenois itself is taken around 19h00.
The German remains very cautious in front of the La Marfée woods. A French 25mm AT gun platoon whose guns are towed by Renault UE tractor are reinforcing the French troops but immediately sent back to the rear since there are no German tanks. The only other tanks present in these woods are 4 disarmed Renault FT17 tanks used as pioneer tractors. The Germans may have thought that there are French tanks and it could explain the extreme and amazing caution in front of a position held by only 100 French soldiers.
The infantry of the 1.PzD reaches the south of Donchéry at 22h00 and enables the crossing of the first light elements of the 2.PzD. At 23h00, 2 German companies of the 1.PzD reach Cheveuges and advance on the road next to Chéhéry, reaching the most advanced positions of the German breakthrough.
During the same time, at 18h30 capitaine Fouques commanding artillery batteries from the 169e RAF north of Chaumont (south of the La Marfée woods), phones to the commander of the regiment (lieutenant-colonel Dourzal) and reports gunfire at 500m of his position and the possibility of the presence of French tanks. It remains possible that he thought that there were French tanks because of the same reason than the Germans (Renault UE or Renault FT17 tractors in the woods) or simply because he was too nervous. K.H. Frieser does not think that the presence of the Renault UE tractors of the AT platoon corresponds with the time frame but he seems not aware of the presence of the Renault FT17 in these woods. At 18h45, lieutenant-colonel Dourzal phones to colonel Poncelet, commanding all the artillery of the area. Poncelet asks for extra information but Dourzal keeps saying that he would be encircled in the next 5 minutes and confirms the presence of German tanks. Poncelet orders then the retreat of the French artillery units.
On the first lines the companies of the 55e DI and of the 147e RIF are still fighting desperately but the artillery units (especially the artillery from the Army Corps but also from the 55e DI and 71e DI) will flee away. The rumours of the presence of German tanks near Bulson (despite the fact that no single German tank has actually crossed the Meuse River) will cause what is known as the "Bulson panic".
While the first lines are still fighting courageously in a desperate situation, the rear troops are abandoning their position in panic. The HQ of the 55e DI follows the movement, without being able to check the information. The panic spreads in the rear lines, many men abandoning their weapons. 2 artillery groups of the 55e DI and 5 heavy artillery groups of the Army Corps abandon and/or scuttle their gun before retreating.
This event is often generalized to caricature the whole 1940 French army. Colonel Poncelet will commit suicide a few hours later. This courageous officer had fought during WW1 and felt responsible for the mess, but the actual responsible officers are capitaine Fouques and lieutenant-colonel Dourzal.
All the retreating artillery units with many horse-drawn wagons, ammunition trailers, guns etc. will congest the trails, lanes and the single national road from Sedan to Vouziers. Added to the civilian refugees, these men will considerably hamper the movement of other French units moving to counter-attack the German breakthrough.
General Gamelin in the French high-command at Vincennes receives only at 23h45 the first message indicating that the Germans have crossed the Meuse River !
Guderian is satisfied of having crossed the Meuse River but the German high command is a bit angry. The crossing happened indeed east of the Ardennes canal instead of west of the canal as ordered. Guderian has refused to follow the orders because the planned area contained more open terrain and the German troops would have been easily spotted and more endangered. Von Kleist later recognized that Guderian made the good choice.
On 13th May evening, except very few still resisting French platoons in the first lines, the 55e DI has been pushed back at the level of the La Marfée heights.
The Germans have established a 6 km wide and 3 km deep bridgehead. It is an important German success, but most of the infantry, all the vehicles and the heavy armament of the XIX.Panzerkorps are still on the north-eastern bank of the Meuse River :
- 787 tanks
- 168 armored cars
- 18 15cm sIG.33 auf PzI
- 6 8.8cm FlaK (Sfl) Sd.Kfz.8
- all the attached StuG III (at least 6 of Sturmgeschütz-Batterie 640 included in the "Grossdeutschland" IR)
- all the attached Panzerjäger I (at least Panzerjäger Abteilung 521 with 18 Panzerjäger I, attached to 10.PzD)
- all the artillery and 8.8cm FlaK
More than 1000 AFVs are in front of Sedan itself but have not yet crossed the river. Despite the omnipresent Luftwaffe, a quick and strong French counter-attack would still be able to close the door to the German army.
-- DINANT AND HOUX AREA --
The 7.PzD and 5.PzD (540 tanks, 112 armored cars and 12 15cm sIG.33 auf PzI) have to cross the Meuse River in the area of Dinant (7.PzD) and Houx (5.PzD). Elements of the 1e DLC and of the 4e DLC are retreating behind the French lines in that area.
The 5e DIM has to defend a front of 16 km from Cave to Anhée :
- From Cave to Hun : 3e RI supported by 2 artillery groups (24 field guns)
- From Hun to Anhée : 129e RI supported by 2 artillery groups (24 field guns)
- Reserves : incomplete 39e RI (the second battalion is attached to the 18e DI)
- Reinforcements : 2 artillery groups (24 field guns) of the 77e RATTT (4e DLC)
66% of the automatic weapons are on the heights and 33% directly on the banks. Because of the many blind spots the artillery forward observers are all deployed along the bank.
The 18e DI has only 55% of its infantry on 13th May, 4 battalions out of 9 are still lacking and the whole divisions has only 21 AT guns. The division has to defend a front of 21 km between Houx and Hastière :
- At Houx and around Grange : the II/39e RI (5e DIM) makes liaison with the 5e DIM
- From Grange to Bouvignes : 2 battalions of the 66e RI
- Around Dinant : 2 battalions of the 77e RI
- South of Dinant : 1 battalion of the 125e RI
- Reserves : only 2 infantry companies
- Reinforcements : elements of the 1e DLC (the Hotchkiss H35 tank squadron, 2 artillery groups of the 75e RATTT and parts of the 5e RDP (motorized infantry), 19e RD (horse-mounted cavalry) and 1e RC(horse-mounted cavalry))
Even reinforced by elements of the 1e DLC, the 18e DI is too weak to stop a Panzerdivision.
The 7.PzD is opposed to the 18e DI. The 5.PzD is attacking the 5e DIM and the hinge between the 5e DIM and the 18e DI. All the bridges have been blown away when the first German AFVs where trying to cross them but a small lock on both sides of a small island in middle of the Meuse River is still intact. This lock is slightly south of Houx and just at the hinge of the 2 French divisions. If it had been blown away it would have created fords upstream.
Already during the 12th-13th May night, around 22h00 – 23h00, infantry elements of the Aufklärung Abteilung 8 (5.PzD) have crossed the Meuse River thanks to this lock and its small 1-meter wide footbridge. The 5.PzD is therefore the very first German unit having crossed the Meuse River. At 1h00 on 13th May these German troops are spotted. The French tries to warn general Corap (commander of the 9th Army) but all the attempts remain unsuccessful. A liaison manages to inform the general but at 16h30 only !
During all the night and a big part of the 13th May morning the II/39e RI fights alone against 3 German infantry battalions of the 5.PzD before being destroyed.
At 6h00 the small elements of the Aufklärung Abteilung 8 are reinforced by infantry battalions of the 5.PzD. The French artillery fires on all the accesses and exits of the lock. The footbridge is sprayed with LMG bullets from the few French troops in front of the lock. The German troops move to the house of the ford keeper and on the small islands, which hides their movements, by groups of 5 men separated by 100m gaps. One by one they try then to cross the foorbridge. The French LMGs are neutralized by the fire of the German artillery and tanks. At 10h00 about 1 German infantry company has managed to cross the lock with 10% losses.
The 1e GRDIm (reconnaissance group of the 5e DIM) is sent to the area between Haut-le-Wastia and Grange area to maintain the liaison with the 18e DI (about 13 Panhard 178, 12 Citroën-Kégresse P16 Mle1929, 4 AMR33/35s, 15 side-cars, 2 cars, 2 trucks, 4 light trucks, 24 FM 24/29 LMGs, 12 Hotchkiss Mle1914 MMGs, 2 60mm mortars and 4 25mm AT guns at full strength).
The German bridgehead (5.PzD) is still very weak and contains only infantry troops. The combats around Houx and Anhée involve mainly the 5e DIM. The battle around Haut-le-Wastia lasts all the day. The 5.PzD looses 24 KIA (including 2 officers) and 110 WIA (including 11 officers).
During the same time the 18e DI is mainly facing the 7.PzD. South of this bridgehead (5.PzD), the 66e RI is still holding the Hontoir farm, Sommière and Bouvignes. At the beginning of the afternoon, the 18e DI is ordered to counter-attack but with what ? There are not enough troops to defend the frontline which is attacked everywhere by the Germans of the 7.PzD.
A very violent battle opposes the 77e RI (18e DI) which will block the 7.PzD in front of Dinant and Bouvignes all the day long. The war diary of the 7.PzD gives a better view of the events unlike the memories of Rommel which are always tainted by self-advertisement. All the crossing attempts of the 7.PzD in front of Dinant are at first defeated. Unlike the 1.PzD at Sedan the 7.PzD has no Nebelwerfer unit to create smoke screens. Fire is set to several houses to make smoke. During several hours the crossing remains impossible and finally the motorcycle battalion of the 7.PzD is ordered to use the bridgehead of the 5.PzD at Houx to cross the Meuse River.
At the end of the day, only very small infantry elements of the 7.PzD have managed to cross the Meuse River in front of Dinant and Bouvignes. During the night 15 Panzer I and Panzer II reinforce the small bridgeheads thanks to barges. On 13th May the 7.PzD has lost 60 KIA (including 4 officers) and 222 WIA (including 15 officers). The 4 last infantry battalions of the 18e DI will finally arrive exhausted during the 13-14th May night.
On 14th May, the bridgeheads of both the 5.PzD and the 7.PzD are still very small. The 5.PzD has built 2 engineer bridges but one bridge is lost when a medium tank tries to cross it and ends in the river. The remaining bridge enables only the crossing of light tanks (Panzer I and Panzer II).
A French counter-attack is ordered against Houx with :
- I/39e RI
- III/39e RI
- 3/6e BCC (13 Renault R35 tanks)
- artillery support provided by the 18e DI
The infantry battalions have first to walk 14 km before reaching the departure line and they are immediately attacked by the Luftwaffe. The attack was planned at 18h00 but at 20h00 only several troops of the infantry battalions are ready. Nonetheless, the artillery preparation begins at 19h50 and at 20h00 the Renault R35 tanks begin the attack without infantry support.
The French tanks advance among the German troops and cross the whole bridgehead without losses. As they appear, hundreds of Germans surrender but the infantry is not following to capture them. After nightfall, the French tanks have to move back, pushing only several POWs in front of them. During the night more German tanks cross the Meuse River.
The town of Haut-le-Wastia is a strategic position, dominating the German bridgehead of Houx. A French counter-attack is launched on 14th May at 5h30 to seize the town. The troops involved are :
- The weapons squadron of capitaine Feuillatre (14e RDP, 1e DLC) with 8 Hotchkiss MGs, 4 81mm Brandt mortars and 4 25mm AT guns (if at full strength) provides the fire support protecting the advancing troops. There is no artillery support
- 1 squadron of the II/14e RDP attacks the north-east of the town
- Elements of the 1e GRDIm (3 AMR, 5 AMC P16 Mle1929 and 1 motorcycle platoon as foot infantry) attack on the north of the town
- The Hotchkiss H35 squadron from the 4e RAM (1e DLC) is also mentioned by several sources as taking part to the attack north of the town
- 2 companies of the II/129e RI attack the south of the town
[the H35 tanks are not always mentioned and the number of armored cars is varying from source to source]
The squadron of the II/14e RDP reaches the town and the elements of the 1e GRDIm outflank the German troops by the north but the 2 companies of the II/129e RI doesn't move at all for an unknown reason and seem not to have received the order to attack.
The town is seized by the French troops (roughly 2 infantry companies) after violent house by house combats. The AMC P16 Mle1929 armored cars fire in the windows of the occupied houses with their 37mm SA18 gun. In the twon, 46 men and 1 officer from the 7.PzD are taken POWs (other sources indicate troops from the 5.PzD but the French reports elements of the 7.PzD, which is possible since the motorcycle battalion of the 7.PzD has joined the bridgehead of the 5.PzD). The Germans flee, abandoning many weapons. Several captured MGs are used to fire on the retreating Germans. One 3.7cm PaK is towed by men towards the town but it is neutralized by the fire of the MG and the gun is abandoned. Nonetheless, the successful French troops of the 1e DLC and of 1e GRDIm will not be able to hold the town very long. The increasing intervention of German tanks changes the situation in Haut-le-Wastia. One French 25mm AT gun knocks out 7 German tanks but the numerous German tanks and the omnipresent Luftwaffe defeat the French troops, which are forced to move back.
The strategic situation is becoming worse and worse after the breakthrough at Sedan. On 13th May, the 18e DI managed to defeat the assaults of the 7.PzD but on 14th May the front held by the division is collapsing because of the German tanks which crossed the Meuse River. The 77e RI and 125e RI are dislocated and move back while fighting. On 14th May morning, the 7.PzD achieves a breakthrough in the area defended by the 18e DI. Panzer Regiment 25 (7.PzD) attacks Onhaye (about 5 km south of Haut-Le-Wastia) from the west but the attack stops due to heavy French AT and artillery fire. Several German tanks are destroyed. Rommel is the first line in a Panzer III command tank requests air support to take out the enemy AT and artillery positions. The tank of the commander of the 7.PzD is knocked out by an AT gun and Rommel is WIA. The 13 Renault R35 tanks (3/6e BCC) supporting the 18e DI are dispersed in blockades on the roads instead of being used grouped against the German tank regiment. Anyway with the growing number of German tanks crossing the Meuse River they would probably not have been able to change the situation especially not with their 37mm SA18 guns.
On 14th May, after a strong resistance, the 18e DI is defeated and its front is broken. North of the 18e DI, 5e DIM is still holding its position and the 22e DI. South of the 18e DI, the 22e DI is under heavy German pressure but is still holding its position.
The 9th Army engages the 4e DINA (general Sancelme) and the 1e DCR (general Bruneau), recently detached in a hurry from the 1st Army. The 4e DINA begins to move from Trélon to the Meuse River in Belgium on 12th May. It is not a motorized unit. On 14th May morning the division is still moving to the front. Initially intended to counter-attack on 15th May with the 1e DCR, the 4e DINA is ordered to create a new line at the level of Philippeville and to regroup the retreating elements of the 18e DI and 22e DI. The 4e DINA is the last reserve of the 9th Army and will be engaged in small groups, as they arrive on the planned frontline, without being able to create a continuous front.
Both the 4e DINA and the 1e DCR will have to fulfil a mission of sacrifice in a defensive battle against the 5.PzD and the 7.PzD. On 15th May both divisions are dispersed and just arriving in their planned deployment areas. The 1e DCR is just arriving in the area of Flavion about 15 km west of Dinant. The tanks are out of fuel and the unit is not aware of the position or the type of the enemy units. The 4e DINA has just 1 regiment around Philippeville some 12 km south-west of Flavion to face the tanks of 7.PzD avoiding the 1e DCR.
-- MONTHERME AREA --
On 14th May evening the 1.PzD, 2.PzD and 10.PzD have established a bridgehead in Sedan. The 7.PzD and 5.PzD have created a bridgehead in the area of Dinant and Houx but the spearhead of the 6.PzD (followed by the 8.PzD) is still unable to exploit the small bridgehead it managed to create at Monthermé.
The area of Monthermé, north-west of Sedan, is defended by the 102e DIF (general Portzert), which has to defend a linear front of about 40 km. This fortress infantry division is roughly devoid of fortifications but the river is hemmed in by steep banks and hilly woods ; no tanks or serious attack is seen as possible in the area.
The town of Monthermé itself is located on a small isthmus (500 m wide and 3 km long) and constitute a weaker point. There are possible fords, the front to defend is extended by the peninsula and the terrain itself creates many blind spots. The French position at Monthermé is dominated by the heights of the opposite bank (350-375m high) and difficult to defend. In front of Monthermé itself, on the opposite bank, there is the suburb of La Rova. This area should have been better fortified but it was not due to lack of means.
The 102e DIF is composed of :
- 148e RIF (fortress infantry regiment) [defending 10 km of the front on the right flank, from Mézières to the area hold by the 55e DI around Sedan]
- 52e DBMC (colonial MG half-brigade) [defending the front in the center, from Nouzonville to Mézières]
- 42e DBMC (colonial MG half-brigade) [defending the left flank, from Laifour to Nouzonville, including the isthmus of Monthermé. That makes a total of 25 km of bank to defend]
- The 3e BM (MG battalion) is reinforcing the division and attached to the 42e DBMC
The 42e DBMC (lieutenant-colonel de Pinsun) is composed of 2 colonial MG battalions (I/42e DBMC and II/42e DBMC). It is rather a static unit, but the firepower is good. Each battalion consists in 1 command company, 1 headquarters company, 3 MG companies and 1 weapons and rifle company for a theoretical strength of 1112 men (29 officers, 109 NCOs, 130 corporals and 844 men). In each battalion there are 36 Hotchkiss Mle1914 MGs, 6 25mm AT guns and 4 81mm mortars. Except the AT guns, the single available AT means are blockades.
The 42e DBMC contains French troops (whites) from the reserve, originating from south western France (Gers, Ariège, Landes and Pyrénées). In April 1940 many men had to leave the unit (specialists etc. needed in the factories). This lack of men was solved by the arrival of 465 Malagasy tirailleurs and NCOs from the active troops. Nonetheless, 33% of the Malagasies had been in the service since one year only. They lacked also proper NCOs and were completed by NCOs coming from the reserve and even from mobile guards. These men slightly over strengthened the half brigade by about 300 men. Actually, the Malagasies at their arrival completed the depleted companies and those in excess were gathered in workers platoons, one per company. These platoons were dissolved on 10th May. There are therefore about 3000 men in the whole half-brigade, including about 400 Malagasies (13%).
According to lieutenant-colonel de Pinsun, 40% of the officers, 30% of the NCOs and 10% of the soldiers of the 42e DBMC are from the active army. Most of the men are in their late 20's or early 30's. For 2 battalions of 1112 men these percentages would lead to 24 officers, 66 NCOs and 194 corporals and men = 284 men from the active army, only 13% of the total men strength. According to battalion commander Verdier, commanding the II/42e DBMC, the spirit of the men is good but they lack military instruction.
The 42e DBMC is reinforced by the 3e BM. The II/42e DBMC is deployed in the center with the I/42e DBMC on its right flank and the 3e BM on its left flank (wrongly labelled as III/42e DBMC by Karl-Heinz Frieser). The II/42e DBMC is defending the isthmus and the town of Monthermé itself (about 25 km front) and will face the assaults of the 6.PzD (general Kempf). The MG battalion is only a defensive unit and it is thought to control a front of 3-4 km with its firepower. With about 25 km to defend the battalion is clearly overstretched.
There are 11-12 small bunkers (8-9 type Barbeyrac and 3 type A) and 4 dismountable MG turrets Mle1935 / Mle1937 in the area defended by the II/42e DBMC. The dismountable MG turrets are armed with a Mle1914 Hotchkiss MG and generally equipped with a camouflage/anti-grenade nest around the turret. The MG itself is protected by armor. The turret is theoretically equipped with a type K periscope for observation (4x magnification) and is protected by 30mm armor on the top and 40mm armor on the sides. The turret is built in a concrete basis and the main entrance is located underground. In the isthmus of Monthermé the MG turrets have no periscope and several of them have defects (the MG is not well fastened and sometimes the turret cannot be rotated from inside).
The Barbeyrac type bunkers are basic concrete bunkers which are not part of the Maginot Line itself. They were built according to the will of general Barbeyrac to reinforce the area in the 2nd military region. The roof is 0.80-1.50m thick, the rear walls are 0.60-1.00m thick and the front walls are 1.00-1.20m thick.
These bunkers have roughly no own armament, but crenels for the LMGs and MGs of the MG companies deployed in the isthmus. Nonetheless the armament of the defensive sector adds a total of 4 LMGs and 4 MGs in these bunkers, that can be manned by the II/42e DBMC. The main drawback is that there are many blind spots due to the nature of the terrain and the bunkers have often crenels only on one side.
The French defensive positions are completed by very well camouflaged field emplacements, foxholes, trenches and barbed wire networks. The bridges have been blown on 12th May.
The defense is organized as following :
* Monthermé itself and the isthmus are defended by the 5th MG company (lieutenant Barbaste) organized in 4 strong points and a strong point for the company HQ, each with 1 rifle or MG platoon :
- Sergent-chef Lacoste in the town with 2 25mm AT guns and probably 1 bunker (n°56 ?)
- Sous-lieutenant Mancini on the left bank with 2 bunkers (n°54 and 55)
- Sous-lieutenant Guilbaert on the right bank with 2 dismountable MG turrets firing over the town and 2 bunkers (n°57 and 58)
- Lieutenant Dequick with 1 25mm AT gun and 1 bunker (n°59) also on the right bank but south of sous-lieutenant Guilbaert and defending the rail-road bridge coming from Château-Régnault
The company HQ of lieutenant Barbaste is in the middle of the isthmus, at the level of the rail-road bridge with 1 81mm mortar
* The basis of the isthmus is defended by the 4th MG company (lieutenant Lebreton) organized in 4 strong points :
- Sous-lieutenant Bosredon, adjudant Bourget and sous-lieutenant Syriès around the 325m high hill of Roche-aux-Sept-Villages and in the Roma woods with 2 dismountable MG turrets, 1 25mm AT gun and 1 81mm mortar.
- Sous-lieutenant Brisbarre with 1 bunker (n°53 bis) on the left bank of the basis of the isthmus.
* The right bank of the basis of the isthmus and the area more east, around Bogny, facing Château-Régnault on the other bank is defended by the 6th MG company (lieutenant Gravil)organized in 3 strong points :
- Lieutenant Bonneman, at the left bank of basis of the isthmus and south of the rail-road bridge with 1 bunker (n°59bis)
- Lieutenant Apercé in Bogny, defending the bridge between Bogny and Château-Régnault with 1 25mm AT gun, 1 81mm mortar and 4 bunkers (n°60, 7A, 8A and 10A).
- Lieutenant Massard is deployed south west of the 2 other strong points with 1 81mm mortar.
* Behind the 4th MG company there is the 3rd battery of the 391e RAT and behind the 6th MG company there is the 3rd battery of the 391e RAT.
* More on the rear in the Hutin woods and covering the road to Charleville, there are the battalion HQ (commandant Verdier) and 2 rifle platoons of the weapons and rifle company (sous-lieutenant Gleizes and sous-lieutenant Colonna) with 1 25mm AT gun.
Each MG company is therefore reinforced with a few 25mm AT guns and 81mm mortars (for a total of 4 mortars abd 6 AT guns) but there are also extra support weapons provided by the sector. There are numerous barbed wire networks along the banks, but also around and inside the strong points. This battalion will face roughly alone the German attack and block the spearhead of the 6.PzD during 2 days.
The French HQ is well aware that the isthmus is being dominated by the cliffs of the opposite bank. No day movement can really be hidden to the Germans. The 5th MG company is therefore ordered to defend the peninsula against a German crossing but it cannot expect reinforcement in case of an attack, the defense will be anchored at the basis of the isthmus. Roughly they are ordered to stop or delay the Germans alone.
The defense of the bridges is reinforced by 40 AT mines (12 kg AT mines placed in linear groups of 5), which are deployed at both accesses of the bridges to prevent any surprise breakthrough from motorized elements. The mines can be deployed inside the French lines (on roads etc.) once the bridges are destroyed but their deployment is not well documented for Monthermé.
The direct artillery support detached to the II/42e DBMC is provided by 2 trench mortars batteries :
- 3rd battery of the 391e RAT (lieutenant Denis): 6x 150mm T Mle1917 Fabry trench mortars. It supports the French troops on the isthmus on 14th May.
- 6th battery of the 391e RAT (lieutenant Schloesing): 6x 150mm T Mle1917 Fabry trench mortars. It is focused on Château-Régnault (the right flank of the area defended by the II/42e DBMC) and not the isthmus.
These 2 batteries are located between the Bois Hutin (HQ of the II/42e DBMC) and the defensive line at the basis of the isthmus. The 150mm T mortars fire a 17 kg projectile (5.4 kg explosive content) but they have a maximum range of 2000m. They can therefore only fire on the isthmus but not against the German crossing or concentration son the northern bank.
Additional artillery support is provided by the "sous-secteur de Sécheval" (Sécheval where is also the HQ of lieutenant-colonel de Pinsun) which is divided in 3 "sous-groupements". The one we are interested in is the "sous-groupement centre". The others are on both sides and didn't intervene in this battle :
- 15th battery of the 160e RAP : 4x 155mm C Mle1915 Saint-Chamond howitzers (but only 3 of them in firing state). It has almost fired on the 14th 2800 shells, all against the German assaults in the isthmus.
- There is also the 7th battery of the 160e RAP with 2x 155mm L Mle1877 De Bange guns at Bois Hutin, which fired 400 shells and 2x 155mm L Mle1877 De Bange guns at the Sorel farm, which fired 200 shells.
There were also 18 older Brandt-Stokes 81mm mortars available as sector armament for Sécheval, 6 per battalion (I/42e DBMC, II/42e DBMC and 3e BM). These 6 extra mortars for the II/42e DBMC where issued by pairs in each of the MG companies.
This firepower was added to the 4 organic 81mm mortars for a total of 10 81mm mortars, 6 150mm T mortars, 3 155mm C howitzers and 4 old but accurate 155mm L field guns supporting the II/42e DBMC.
According to lieutenant-colonel de Pinsun, a group of 75mm Mle1897 guns from the 51e RAD (61e DI) targeted also efficiently the crest and western slopes of Monthermé, one group of 155mm C howitzers from the same regiment fired also on Monthermé (results unknown).
On 13th May morning, the observers of the II/42e DBMC deployed in the Roma woods spot 176 various vehicles from the 6.PzD around La Rova. They ask for an artillery bombardment of this area, which begins at 8h30. But the Luftwaffe and later the artillery of the 6.PzD enters also in action against the French troops in the isthmus.
The first German assault is entrusted to the III/4th Schützen regiment (Oberstleutnant Rudolf Höfer) of the 6.PzD supported by elements from the motorcycle company of the Aufklärung Abteilung 57. One German battalion is therefore opposed to one French battalion (II/42e DBMC) in Monthermé, in reality it is only opposed to the 5th company of lieutenant Barbaste. The planned German attack of the 2.ID (mot.) on Nouzonville (south of Monthermé, at the hinge of the 42e DBMC and 52e DBMC) does not take place since the troops are still stuck in the Ardennes. In fact many troops from the 6.PzD, 2.ID (mot.), 2.PzD and 3.ID are completely mixed in the Ardennes and belated. The 8.PzD is following the 6.PzD. On 13th May, the 6.PzD is therefore forced to attack alone.
The French are behind a river, but in a position dominated by the other bank. The German battalion is supported by the engineer battalion of the 6.PzD for its crossing. It is also supported by the direct fire provided by the I/11th tank regiment, as well as all kinds of available AA guns, AT guns and MGs. The German troops are also supported by an artillery Abteilung consisting in about half of the divisional artillery (probably about 36 guns). The Germans infantry units have also far more mortars and infantry guns than what is available on the French side.
There is also the Luftwaffe support. It is not as important as over the small area of Sedan (910 aircrafts) but that leaves nevertheless 860 aircrafts (630 bombers and 230 fighter) available for the other areas of the Meuse crossing (Houx, Dinant and Monthermé). Such a support is not negligible and in comparison the French have no air support at all. Nonetheless, the Luftwaffe bombed also their own troops, destroying 2 field guns and making 14 KIAs and 16 WIAs in the 6.PzD. The German superiority is rather obvious but the French artillery will be active and accurate as usual and the French infantry will hold the ground.
The odds were not even at Monthermé but the Germans had not their optimal firepower mostly on 13th May when they lacked artillery and the air support was weaker than expected. The situation was critical for the French but it was not satisfying for the Germans.
The III/4th Schützen regiment benefits from the dust and smoke created by the French shelling to move to its starting positions for the crossing. The first attempts are defeated since the exits of La Rova are under the fire of the French MGs. The German tanks are then engaged to support the crossing. They fire on the French MG nests and houses of the opposite bank, many houses are put on fire. The German engineers discover a blind spot along the destroyed bridge, which allows the troops to cross safely on an improvised footbridge. Two German companies infiltrate in the town of Monthermé and neutralize the French strong point defended by 1 platoon. After that, they can attack the other French strong points (each with 1 platoon) along the bank from behind.
At 14h30, lieutenant Barbaste (commander of the 5th MG company) informs the battalion HQ that the German troops have crossed the Meuse River and that all communications are cut with 3 of the 4 strong points. At 15h00, he asks for ammunition supply. His company HQ is encircled, as well as the 4 platoons in the 4 strong points. In a last stand he chooses to counter attack with the 2 rifle squads he had kept in reserve. Lieutenant Barbaste is leading the attack with a FM 24/29 LMG in hand and is killed.
After 2 hours of combat, the Germans have won a toehold over the Meuse at Monthermé. The French defense is now anchored on the second line, at the basis of the isthmus (Roma woods and Roche-aux-Sept-Villages). Commandant Verdier engages 2 rifle platoons (Gleizes and Colonna) from the weapons and rifle company (II/42e DBMC) to reinforce the position of the 4th MG company. This should add 81 men to the 4th MG company.
At 16h00, German troops pursue retreating elements of the 5th MG company and attack the new defense line. All the German attempts are defeated. The 150mm T trench mortars enter in action very efficiently and the French artillery can shell the occupied town of Monthermé.
Lieutenant-colonel de Pinsun urges also rifle platoons from the neighbouring battalions to reinforce this line : 2 rifle platoons from the I/42e DBMC (sous-lieutenant Roux and adjudant-chef Surreau) and 1 rifle platoon from the 3e BM (lieutenant Guilmart), which are called at 18h00 on 13th May. This adds also 123 men to the 4th MG company and on 13th May evening there are therefore about 410 men to defend the basis of the isthmus (1 command platoon, 3 MG platoons and 6 rifle platoons).
In fact, Lieutenant-colonel de Pinsun lacked mobile infantry for the most threatened areas of the front. In consequence, the I/42e DBMC which had sent troops to reinforce the II/42e DBMC had to use the AT gunners who had no guns and every available men to fulfil the task of the removed rifle platoons. They had to fill the gaps between the strong points, repel German infiltrations, patrol along the banks at night (they lacked ammunition for the flare guns). On 15th May, those unhurt were completely exhausted after 3 sleepless nights and the constant German shelling. Therefore even the battalion, which was not directly engaged at Monthermé, was in a pitiful state on 15th May.
On 13th May at 22h30, the III/4th Schützen regiment is deployed in the middle of the isthmus. The men are exhausted by the combats of the day. The Germans will nonetheless have to wait until 15th May morning to defeat the French defense, unable to enlarge their tiny bridgehead despite their superior firepower.
During the 13th-14th May night, elements of the platoon of lieutenant Mancini (5th MG company), which was encircled, manage to slip past the German troops and to join the 4th MG company. Elements of the platoon of lieutenant Dequick (5th MG company) manage also to join the French lines in the area of Château-Régnault. Sergent Parent and 5 men (5th MG company) were prisoners but they managed to escape and to join the French lines too. Except these troops the 3 other platoons of the 5th MG company (1 command platoon and 2 rifle or MG platoons) are destroyed or captured. Lieutenant-colonel De Pinsun estimates the losses of the 5th MG company at 75% on 13th May evening and the Germans menion 50 POWs, including one officer. The officer may be sous-lieutenant Guilbaert who manned himself a FM 24/29 LMG during the battle, when he saw that the Germans were encircling his strong point. He was wounded on the face and on the leg.
Two French battalions from the 248e RI (II/248e RI and III/248e RI) are coming from Revin (north-west of the area hold by the 42e DBMC) to reinforce the French troops. One battalion is intended to be deployed 200 m behind the French line at the basis of the isthmus.
They add theoretically 2x 867 men at full strength but they are seriously reduced and each of them has only 1 37mm TR16 infantry guns as AT means instead of the 2 25mm SA34 AT guns.
Battalion commander Le Coroller (III/248e RI) indicates that his unit is around 400 men (instead of 867 men, only 46 of the strength). 3 rifle platoons had been removed : one to keep an ammunition dump, an other to guard a bridge, a third one reinforced by a MG squad was sent to guard the HQ of the 102e DIF HQ. There were also many soldiers on permission who had no yet joined the battalion. It is not known if the II/248e RI II/248 is reduced in such serious proportions. These reduced battalions are only partially engaged on 14th May (counter-attack led by 1 company) and destroyed with the other troops on 15th May.
The French artillery fires all night long. The I/4th Schützen regiment (Major Zollenkopf) reinforces the III/4th Schützen regiment in the isthmus.
On 14th May at 6h00, the Germans launch a renewed attack with their 2 battalions. The attack is supported by artillery fire and by the Luftwaffe. The Germans are defeated and at 13h30 capitaine Villard launches a counter-attack with 2 rifle platoons (reduced to 60 men in all) of the 1st weapons and rifle company of the 42e DBMC. It is a bloody fight and both platoon commanders are WIA.
At 14h30, another German assault is launched by the 2 battalions. It is defeated at 16h00 by a French counter-attack. The counter-attack was led by 3 rifle platoons (reduced to 8-10 men per squad) of the 2nd company of the 248e RI, reinforced by all the spare men from a mortar squad and by the command platoon of the 4th MG company (II/42e DBMC). That makes 150 men at best.
Each time the French troops loose ground, a counter attack enables to pull the Germans back again. Heinz Maassen (in "Über die Maase") describes a fierce French counter-attack in the early afternoon that even forced the Germans to send their threatened infantry guns to the rear. In the German perspective it looks like a desperate situation where they have to fight to the last man if they want to keep the bridgehead. In reality the small French counter-attacks had not the purpose to send back 2 German battalions across the river but just to reoccupy some key positions.
On 14th May, the 2.ID (mot.) has still not reached Nouzonville and will be attached to Guderian's Korps. The attack is launched with the 8th infantry regiment of the 3.ID (originally belonging to the 12.Armee) but the weak French troops, posted there in few casemates and covered by artillery fire, stopped the crossing cold. Reinhardt was checked again, leaving the riflemen of his 6.PzD, as he later wrote, in a "bad spot" (ernsten Lage) (source : Gunsburg, referring to General Hans Reinhardt's "Im Schattens Guderian"). Indeed the riflemen from 6.PzD almost collapsed before a weak French counter-attack and were barely able to hold their positions in Monthermé. The 8.PzD will join the IR8 in Nouzonville but they will be only able to cross the Meuse River on 15th May after the breakthrough in Monthermé and the French defenses being attacked form behind.
The French rears are attacked by the Luftwaffe. The 3rd battery of the 391e RAT (lieutenant Le Méner) has fired all its 580 available shells on 14th May at 15h00 and joins the infantry in the battle. The 150mm T mortars were useless against the German crossings or concentrations on the northern bank of the Meuse River. This was the task of the 7 field guns / howitzers. The 150T were nonetheless dreadful for the Germans in Bois de Roma. In all the artillery support was rather ridiculous for the task. It is to the credit of the French artillerymen that it made such an impression on the Germans. One can note that for different battles of 1940, the testimonies and battle reports reveal that the French artillery is very efficient : fast responding, high rate of fire and very accurate.
At 16h00, general Kempf orders a new all-out assault supported by the Luftwaffe but the attack is finally postponed.
The exhausted III/4th Schützen regiment is withdrawn and replaced by the II/4th Schützen regiment.
At 18h15, a German assault is launched against 2 French platoons (Gleizes and Colonna). They are ordered to move back under the repeated German attacks to prevent encirclement. Lieutenant Bosredon is isolated at the left and fights on the spot with his men deployed in hedgehog.
There is a period of confusion and panic in the French line between 18h15 and 19h30. The elements of the 248e RI which counter-attacked previously are not ordered to remain along the front with the colonials, so they decide to leave. Soon they are spotted and attacked by German aircrafts and artillery, suffering heavy losses they withdraw in disorder melting with the troops behind and disappearing in the woods.
The diminished and exhausted colonials are demoralized having seen their comrades abandoning them. Despite the energy of their officers, having lost many NCOs and facing Germans infiltrations, more and more soldiers move back without order. Capitaine Villard and lieutenant Lebreton try first in vain to regroup their men but once the troops back in hand the line is fully reoccupied. To be fair, lieutenant-colonel de Pinsun blamed the 248e RI and the officers of the 248e RI blamed the colonials.
The Germans could have taken advantage of the retreat of these 2 French platoons and of the overall confusion to definitely pierce the French lines but apparently they were too exhausted or they didn't notice the movement. The continuous front is later re-established thanks to elements of the III/248e RI. The II/42e DBMC will still hold until 15th May morning and it is reinforced by 16 engineers coming from Arreux.
On 14th May, at Dinant and Sedan the bridgeheads are being enlarged, but at Monthermé the advance of 2 Panzerdivisionen is still blocked and belated by the resistance of roughly 1 French infantry regiment.
On 14th May evening, the defenders of Monthermé could expect the reinforcement from a group of 75mm Mle1897 guns from the 22e RAD but the crew fled, leaving the guns behind when the commander of the regiment was killed and false rumours spread about the imminent arrival of German troops (a little Bulson).
On 15th May, the German all-out assault is launched at 4h00 with :
- I/4th Schützen regiment
- II/4th Schützen regiment
- tanks from the I/11th tank regiment
- assault engineers who attacked the French positions with flamethrowers and satchels charges
- Ju87 dive bombers
The spearhead of the 6.PzD, having been blocked by French troops on the Monthermé peninsula for 2 days, burst through in the first hours of the day. Around 7h30 or 8h00, a French truck carrying 500 AT mines is arriving at the front line. The crew has just the time to bail out before the truck is destroyed by a German tank.
At 9h15, the strong points of the colonial troops are being attacked from behind by German tanks. The 9th and 10th companies of the III/248e RI move back at 5h00 and can't be regrouped. The II/248e RI is ordered to counter-attack but seeing the panic of the 10th company the men and officers fled too. The battalion commander of the III/248e RI (Le Coroller) asked in his report for an inquiry on 3 officers of the II/248e RI who had left their unit.
At 9h30 the German tanks clear the thin French defenses which had so long stymied them and start to move towards Charleville. They also open the way to the 8.PzD, which was still stuck in front of Nouzonville.
During the morning, there are still skirmishes in the woods of Roma and Hutin, but nothing that can stop the German tanks. The II/42e DBMC fought very valiantly but since the battlefield was roughly empty behind this unit, the Germans could advance rapidly after having been belated. The Kampfgruppe von Esebeck from the 6.PzD made a 60 km advance during the day. Most of the remaining French troops, which are still fighting are finally encircled and later captured or killed.
According to Dominique Lormier, referring to German military archives, General Reinhardt said : "at Monthermé, the French troops offered a resistance worthy of the 'Poilus' of Verdun in 1916. They defended their position and even counter-attacked despite our superiority in number and armament. During my military career I rarely met so courageous soldiers".
Lieutenant-colonel de Pinsun didn't praise his soldiers like general Reinhardt did. But he is mainly proud of his men although he doesn't hide that they flinched on 14th May evening and at the final stage on 15th May morning against the German all-out assault supported by tanks which attacked them from behind.
Lieutenant-colonel de Pinsun is more severe with the 2 battalions of the 248e RI. Of course they were not initially under his command. He ends his report with the sentence "the fight could have been more glorious and less vain" but he added that the colonials didn't fail the tradition and followed the path shown by their elders during WW1.
According to the British historian John Keegan, the resistance at Monthermé would mostly be due to the numerous Indochinese troops and not the French ones. This is wrong, first there are no Indochinese troops at all in this unit and about 87% of the men are Europeans, and mainly from the reserve troops.
Battalion commander Verdier states that the Malagasies suffered many casualties on 13th May from the German bombings and shelling, because they didn't use properly the ground as a cover. The Malagasies weren't exactly elite troops but some behaved superbly like for example sergent-chef Railavo. Verdier proposed him for the "médaille militaire" award with citation "à l'ordre de l'armée" and recommended that he becomes an officer. Railavo was attached to the HQ of the II/42e DBMC. When the HQ was threatened by enemy infiltrations (13th May evening) he grabbed an abandoned FM 24/29 LMG and forced the Germans to withdraw. He volunteered and took part to the counter-attacks on 14th May. He used his until exhaustion of ammunition on 15th May.
As can be seen, the morale of the troops was not always at the top in the different units. This does not diminish the sacrifice of the men engaged at Monthermé, every author has insisted on their resistance and it is not to be denied. The 2 rifle platoons of Roux and Surreau (I/42e DBMC) had in all both their leaders wounded, 5 NCOs and 30 men WIA or KIA during the battle (46% losses). The rifle platoon of lieutenant Gleizes (II/42e DBMC) holding the center of the position at the basis of the isthmus had already 8 KIA and 12 WIA on 14th May afternoon (50% losses). In the evening, outflanked by the Germans and more than half his men down he kept asking for ammunition supplies. Lieutenant Pavy from the staff of the III/248e RI commanded a strong point which was overrun at 8h30 on 15th May by German infantry supported by 3 tanks. He is captured severely injured and is congratulated by a German officer for his heroic resistance. One could give many more such examples but it wouldn't be the whole truth.
The German morale was probably also not always very high under the French artillery shelling, the repeated defeated assault and the French counter-attacks. The high command threatened to replace the 6.PzD, unable to advance, by an infantry division. The Germans were at first upset and hurt in their pride but it probably boosted their will to fulfil the mission.
Where are the French tanks to counter-attack on the front of the Meuse River ? From Houx to Sedan, there are only 6 French tank battalions available in the rear lines :
- 3e BCC with 45 Renault R35 (2nd army)
- 4e BCC with 45 FCM36 (2nd army)
- 6e BCC with 45 Renault R35 (9th army)
- 7e BCC with 45 FCM36 (9th army)
- 32e BCC with 45 Renault R35 (9th army)
- 33e BCC with 63 Renault FT17 (9th army)
Only 288 tanks including 63 obsolete Renault FT17 tanks, 90 FCM36 tanks and 135 Renault R35 tanks to face about 2000 German tanks strongly supported by the Luftwaffe, which are currently breaking the French lines. The single French tanks available in Sedan are 4 unarmed Renault FT17 used as artillery tractors.
The tank battalions are sacrificed to delay the Germans like the 33e BCC with its 63 Renault FT17 tanks : 39 FT17c with a 37mm SA18 gun and 24 FT17m (with a 8mm Mle1914 Hotchkiss MG) or FT31 (with a 7.5mm Mle1931 MAC MG). Only the 39 FT17c have a gun able to engage a Panzer I or a Panzer II but they have to be generally closer than 25m to have a chance to knock out a Panzer III or a Panzer IV (if they have the appropriate AP shells). This 37mm SA18 is the same in the FCM36, Renault R35 and most of the Hotchkiss H35 and H39 tanks. Conscious of the suicidal mission, these crews nonetheless went into the battle and 55 out of 63 FT17 tanks are destroyed. 110 out of the 132 men of the battalion are KIA on 15th May.
MEUSE 1940
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David Lehmann
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MEUSE 1940
Last edited by David Lehmann on 16 Sep 2005, 19:44, edited 1 time in total.
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David Lehmann
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3. The limited counter-attack on 14th May 1940
-- THE AIR STRIKES --
On 14th May 1940, only one big engineer bridge in front of Gaulier (a small town very close to Sedan, see map) is available for the crossing of the German tanks and heavy weapons. This bridge was built with the last available crossing elements. If this bridge is destroyed, the German troops would be in a difficult situation.
The French air force had about 1,400 frontline aircrafts available in 1940 (650 fighters, 240 bombers and 490 reconnaissance and observation aircrafts). From these 1,400 aircrafts only 879 frontline aircrafts are operational on 10th May 1940 on the western front. Only 120 out of the 240 bomber/assault aircrafts were modern ones (10 Amiot 354, 55 Lioré et Olivier 451, 45 Bréguet 691 or 693, 10 Potez 633) with 85 being operational. The others were older ones : 75 Bloch 200 or 210, 10 Farman 221 or 222 and 35 Amiot 143 with about 100 considered operational. Therefore only 185 French bombers (100 obsolete and 85 moderns) are operational ones in May 1940 but they are dispersed and not all available in the north-eastern theatre of operation.
In the north-eastern area, the French army can only rely on a maximum of 65 operational bombers ! All the other bombers are deployed in southern France or in North Africa where the bomber groups are under transformation and training with new aircrafts (Martin 167, Douglas DB7, Amiot 351/354, LeO 451, Bréguet 693).
Available French bombers in the north-east on 10th May :
Day bombing :
- 14 LeO 451 (GB I/12 and GB II/12)
- 25 Bréguet 693 (GBA I/54 and GBA II/54)
Night bombing :
- 29 Amiot 143 (GB I/34, GB II/34, GB I/38 and GB II/38 )
- 6 Farman 222 (GB I/15 and GB II/15)
Total = 74 available bombers including 65 operational ones (88%).
The Bréguet 693 and LeO 451 for example were previously hardly engaged in the Netherlands from 11th to 13th May. On 13th May, after reinforcements, only 13 LeO 451 and 12 Bréguet 693 are available = 25 modern bombers in the north-east (you can compare that with the 1170 German bombers engaged on over the Meuse River on 13th May).
The RAF has a total of 416 aircrafts in France : 100 fighters (Hurricane + Gladiator) and 316 attack/bomber aircrafts (Fairey Battle + Blenheim), of which 384 are operational on 10th May.
On 14th May, the allies could only engage 31 French bombers and 109 British bombers to try to stop the flood of the German tanks crossing the Meuse River in the area of Sedan. The allied fighters, mainly French fighters in that case, made 250 sorties to protect the bombers and attack the German fighters. These German fighters made 814 sorties to protect the Gaulier bridge (3.3 times more sorties than the allied fighters) and the bridge is also directly protected by 303 AA guns (2.0cm, 3.7cm and 8.8cm) !
The allied bombing missions on the area of Sedan were followings on 14th May 1940 :
1) 5h00 (British bombers)
- Aircrafts : 6 Fairey Battles (n°103 squadron - 1 emergency landing)
2) 8h30 (British bombers)
- Aircrafts : 4 Fairey Battles (n°150 squadron)
These 2 first missions target possible bridges in Villers, Mairy and Remilly. These objectives are in an area 10 km around Sedan.
3) 9h30 (French bombers)
- Aircrafts : 9 Bréguet 693 (6 from GBA II/54 and 3 from GBA I/54)
They are protected by 11 Bloch MB.152 from GC I/8. The bombers attack German columns and tanks at Bazeilles (south-east of Sedan) each with 8x50 kg bombs (and their 20mm gun + MGs).
During this mission, the bombers are also indirectly protected by patrols from the GC I/3 (Dewoitine D.520) which is also involved in the area in air superiority missions. During the whole day, the GC I/3 looses 2 pilots and 4 Dewoitine D.520s. They destroy 9-11 German aircrafts on 14th May :
- 2 Dornier 17
- 2 Messerschmitt 109 (JG 2)
- 1 Heinkel 111 (I/KG 55) in cooperation with 2 Hurricanes (n°501 squadron)
- 1 Heinkel 111 (III/KG 51)
- 4 Messerschmitt 110 + 1 probable Messerschmitt 110
4) 12h30 (French bombers)
- Aircrafts : 5 LeO 451 (from GB I/12 and GB II/12)
They target the German troops in Bazeilles and on the crossroads south-east of Sedan. There are clouds at the altitude of 1000 m. They bomb the targets at an altitude of 900m with 10kg, 50kg and 100kg bombs. The formation is attacked by Messerschmitt 110 fighters. One LeO 451 is shot down by the FlaK and the 4 other aircrafts returned damaged to their base.
- Aircrafts : 6 Amiot 143 (from GB I/34, GB II/34) + 12 Amiot 143 (from GB I/38 ) each with 16x50 kg and 2x100kg bombs. Despite being slow night bombers, these aircrafts are engaged in day mission against strongly defended targets.
6 aircrafts from GB I/38 missed the meeting with the fighters and did not take part to the attack and 1 aircraft returns to base after engine problems. Therefore only 11 Amiot 143 arrived on their targets, covered by clouds at 1000-1100m. They attack at the altitude of 900-950m. 2 Amiot 143s are destroyed by the FlaK and 1 Amiot 143 is shot down by 1 Messershmitt 109 and Messerschmitt 110. All the other bombers are damaged.
About 30-40 French fighters are protecting these bombers. The immediate escort is provided by 14 Bloch MB.152 from GC I/8 but they have difficulties to remain with the old bombers, which fly at only 150 km/h. 1 Messerschmitt 109 is shot down and 1 MB.152 is out of use after landing but the pilot is safe and alive.
At higher altitude, the fighter protection is provided by Morane-Saulnier MS.406s from the GC III/7 (12h45 – 14h00) and by Dewoitine D.520s from the GC I/3 (12h50 – 13h30). From 12h54 to 13h26, the GC III/7 destroys 4 Henschel 126 observation aircrafts.
5) 15h00 - 15h45 (British bombers)
a) Group 76 (15h00)
- Aircrafts : 4 Fairey Battles (n°12 squadron) – targets : enemy columns – losses : 4 aircrafts
- Aircrafts : 8 Fairey Battles (n°142 squadron) – targets : bridges – losses : 3 aircrafts
- Aircrafts : 6 Fairey Battles (n°226 squadron) – targets : bridges – losses : 3 aircrafts
b) Group 71 (15h20 – 15h30)
- Aircrafts : 11 Fairey Battles (n°105 squadron) – targets : bridges – losses : 6 aircrafts
- Aircrafts : 4 Fairey Battles (n°150 squadron) – targets : bridges – losses : 4 aircrafts
- Aircrafts : 2 Blenheims (n°114 squadron) – targets : enemy columns – losses : 1 aircrafts
- Aircrafts : 6 Blenheims (n°139 squadron) – targets : enemy columns – losses : 4 aircrafts
c) Group 75 (15h35 – 15h45)
- Aircrafts : 4 Fairey Battles (n°88 squadron) – targets : bridges …
- Aircrafts : 8 Fairey Battles (n°88 squadron) – targets : enemy columns – losses : 8 aircrafts
- Aircrafts : 8 Fairey Battles (n°103 squadron) – targets : bridges
- Aircrafts : 7 Fairey Battles (n°218 squadron) – targets : enemy columns …
- Aircrafts : 4 Fairey Battles (n°218 squadron) – targets : bridges – losses : 10 aircrafts
6) 17h00 - 18h00 (British bombers)
- Aircrafts : 28 Blenheims (n°21, n°107 and n°110 squadron) are sent against 3 targets : the Bouillon-Sedan road, the woods west of Givonne and the bridges in the Sedan area. 5 aircrafts are shot down and 2 have to proceed to an emergency landing. These bombers are from the bomber command and took off from Great Britain. All the other bombers were from the AASF (Advanced Air Striking Force) based in France.
French fighters from GC II/7 (Morane-Saulnier MS.406) and GC I/3 (Dewoitine D.520) are in the Flize-Sedan area respectively at 17h30 – 18h00 and 18h00 – 18h30. 9 MS.406s from GC II/7 meet 12 Bf.109 but no one engages the fight. At 18h15, the D.520s from GC I/7 disperse a formation of Junkers 87 dive bombers and shot down 4-5 Bf.110 (the Bf.110s previously mentioned in the text).
7) During the night (French bombers)
- Aircrafts : 4 Farman 222s (GB I/15) and 2 Farman 222s (GB II/15). These are heavy night bomber, able to carry up to 2.5 tons of bombs. They attack the accesses/exits of Sedan without losses.
- Aircrafts : 6 Amiot 143 (from GB I/38 ) and 1 Amiot 143 (from GB II/38 ) which had to cancel their attack at 12h30 are engaged during the night against Sedan.
On 14th May the crucial bridge of Gaulier has not been destroyed. During this time and the following days more than 60,000 German soldiers, 800 tanks and 22,000 vehicles crossed the Meuse on this single bridge at Gaulier.
The main issue is that the allied bombers were engaged in about 25 attacks of 2-12 planes and against scattered targets : various bridges (sometimes already blown or only supposed engineer bridges) and German columns, instead of one concerted attack of more 140 bombers concentrated on the Gaulier bridge. The bridge of Gaulier should have been the primary target but the allied bombers were generally not even assigned with specific and well defined targets. Most of the lost aircrafts were shot down by the dense FlaK.
On 14th May, 48 British and 3 French bombers are shot down in the area of Sedan and 65 other allied aircrafts are damaged.
On 14th May the French air force was also very active more north in the area around Dinant with many fighters and reconnaissance aircrafts but only the bombing mission against the Sedan area has been developed in this article. Of course the RAF was also involved in many areas.
On the western front this day, the allied fighters claim 58 confirmed victories (46 for the French air force and 12 for the RAF fighters based in France) according to Patrick Facon.
The magazine "Batailles aériennes n°7" indicates for the whole 14th May :
- French fighters : 46 confirmed (including 10 Bf 109 and 26 Bf 110) and 16 probable victories for 20 French fighters lost
- RAF fighters : 60 confirmed and 23 probable victories for 28 British fighters lost
That would make 106 confirmed victories. The German data are incomplete for the losses but Patrick Facon gives the number of 52 German aircrafts lost that day (inaccuracies, shared victories which are counted as one victory for each of the pilots etc.). The Luftwaffe (fighters and AA units) claims about 100 allied aircrafts, which seems very close to the reality since if we add the 51 bombers around Sedan and the 49 fighters we reach 99 losses.
Between 10th and 18th May, about 180 German aircrafts are shot down over the Meuse River area. The 14th May was therefore rather intense.
About 500 French POWs are parked directly at the immediate southern exit of the Gaulier bridge, a primary military target. Several of these POWs (lieutenant Devie, soldier Pichonnat, sergent Léger) witnessed the allied air attacks and testified that several aircrafts aborted the attack, probably after having recognized the French POWs. One can really ask about the reason why the Germans placed the French POWs just next to the bridge.
-- THE GROUND OPERATIONS --
On 13th May afternoon, during the German assaults, the 4e BCC (FCM36 tanks) and the 7e BCC (FCM36 tanks) are ordered to prepare to move, not yet to counter-attack. The 4e BCC will have to operate with elements of the 205e RI (71e DI) and the 7e BCC with elements of the 213e RI (55e DI), which were left on the rear by these 2 reserve and under-equipped infantry divisions.
The FCM36 tanks was built by the "société des Forges et Chantiers de la Mediterranée", designed to be an infantry support tank. It was somewhat unique for the time because of its rakish angled armor and its diesel engine. The hull as a very well sloped armor and the turret is an octagonal shaped FCM turret. There are also sloped protective skirting plates to protect the wheels. The FCM36 has a bigger autonomy and mobility (smaller turning circle) compared to the Renault R35 for example. The armament consists in a 37mm SA18 L/21 gun and a coaxial MG. The gun could engage the German light tanks at about 300m but had to go very close to have a minimal chance of penetrating the armor of a Panzer III Ausf.F.
Weight : 12.35t
Length : 4.51m
Width : 2.14m
Height : 2.20m
Crew : 2 men
Maximum armor : 40mm (turret is RHA+cast welded armor and hull is RHA welded armor)
Maximum speed : 24 km/h (Berliet-Ricardo engine, 4 cylinders, diesel, 91 hp, 8400 cm3, water cooled)
Transmission : 5 forward, 1 reverse
Autonomy : 225 km
Armament : a 37mm SA18 L/21 gun and a 7.5mm MAC1931 CMG (102 shells and 3000 cartridges)
In the French light tanks, intended for infantry support as primary task there were generally about 40% AP shells but in the 7e BCC the tanks had only 12 AP shells, at least in the 3rd company, as indicated by the war diary of the battalion. That does not say if they were 1892/24, 1935 or 1937 shells whose penetration performances are significantly different.
At 5h30, Panzer Regiment 2 (Oberstleutnant Breusing - 1.PzD) starts to move from Gaulier towards Bulson and Chémery. This regiment at full strength consists in :
- 4 Befehlspanzer
- 26 Panzer I
- 49 Panzer II
- 30 Panzer III
- 20 Panzer IV
The 1./s.Pz.Jg.Abt.8 (1.PzD) with its 8.8cm FlaK (Sfl) auf Sd.Kfz.8 is also engaged (and possibly the Sturmgeschütz-Batterie 640 from the "Grossdeutschland" regiment).
The last defenders of Sedan were still deployed in front of the German troops but will be quickly defeated by the German tanks. Several will manage to flee towards the west (Omicourt and cross the Bar River) or the east. But the soldiers who were in the Marfée woods and retreated to Chaumont realize at 8h00 that German troops are already behind them at Bulson. They are encircled. Hundreds of French soldiers are captured. Several of them will nonetheless manage to escape to the east and join the 3e DINA for the combats around Yonck on 15th May.
General Lafontaine, commander of the 55e DI, is in charge of leading the future counter-attack from his HQ in Maisoncelle. He is simply not aware of all these events during the beginning of the morning !
All the French movements are hampered by thousands of refugees and by soldiers fleeing the field after the "Bulson panic" among the artillery units of the French rears on the front of Sedan. The Luftwaffe is also very present, spotting and/or attacking all French movements. The communications are generally cut, the units are isolated. General Lafontaine will have huge problems in trying to coordinate this attack; he is even unaware of the location of the units placed under his command.
The 4e BCC (commandant de Saint-Sernin) is deployed around Beaumont-en-Argonne and the Sommauthe woods. The 7e BCC (commandant Giordani) is deployed south of Le Chesne, next to Les Alleux. On 10th and 11th May the area is bombed by the Luftwaffe 3 times per day. The 2 tank battalions would have about 20 km to cross, in about 1-2 hours in good conditions. The two infantry regiments would need about 3 hours by foot to reach the departure line on the Chémery-Maisoncelle line.
Except the 213e RI, which is not far away from general Lafontaine, the 3 other units meant for the attack cannot yet be reached by their new commander. The 7e BCC begins its movement only at 20h30 on 13th May, on the national road n°77 (Le Chesne – Tannay – Chémery) mainly because of the intense activity of the Luftwaffe. The very first elements of the tank battalion reach Chémery at 3h30 only but the tanks arrive only at 6h30. The 205e RI is around Raucourt during the night. The 4e BCC will only reach the 205e RI on 14th May during the morning. There is no cohesion between the 4 units.
On 14th morning the planned attack is very late. The 4e BCC and 205e RI did not arrive in time. There is no artillery preparation available. The French movements were heavily hampered on the road full of refugees and retreating troops. The 7e BCC will need all the night to reach the departure line and will nonetheless be engaged immediately with minimal intelligence about the enemy.
On 14th May morning, general Lafontaine is only in contact with the western wing of the planned attack (213e RI and 7e BCC) but nonetheless launches the attack at 6h15. Each infantry battalion is supported by 1 tank company (13 FCM36 tanks). The infantry regiment is much reduced compared to its theoretical men strength. There are no hand grenades available, no AT guns and no AA guns. Most of the LMG have only 2 magazines. It is rather a mission of sacrifice. When the first tanks of the 7e BCC finally reach the departure line, it is around 6h30.
On the left : the 3/7e BCC (13 FCM36 tanks - capitaine Mignotte) attacks on the Chémery-Connage axis. They are supported by the reduced II/213e RI battalion (commandant Couturier).
On the right : the 1/7e BCC (13 FCM36 tanks - capitaine Waitzenegger) and the 2/7e BCC (13 FCM36 tanks – lieutenant Join Lambert) attack from Chémery and Maisoncelle towards Bulson. They are supported by elements of the I/213e RI (commandant Desgranges) and III/213e RI (commandant Gauvain) battalions.
The French troops are constantly spotted by German aircrafts.
1) ON THE RIGHT (towards Bulson)
The French advancing troops reaches their first objectives. The 2/7e BCC and I/213e RI move to Font Dagot. The 1/7e BCC and III/213e RI move to hill 304 despite German infantry fire coming from the woods. 3 German MGs are destroyed. The progression goes on to the heights next to Bulson : hill 322 for the 2/7e BCC and hill 303 for the 1/7e BCC. But about 100 German tanks supported by 3 infantry battalions reach Bulson at 8h00 and will clash with the only 26 FCM36 tanks supported by 2 reduced infantry battalions.
** 1/7e BCC
The 1st platoon of aspirant Crémieux-Bach is frontally engaged by the German core force : light and heavy tanks supported by AT guns. 2 ennemy tanks are immobilized but the 3 FCM36 are knocked out.
The 2nd platoon of adjudant-chef Pierre engages the German tanks near the woods of La Réserve. 2 German tanks are damaged but 1 FCM36 is hit several times including two penetrating projectiles. The commander (caporal Bruneval) is KIA and the driver (Trouillod) is WIA, but manages to drive the tank in safety in the French rear lines. The 2 other tanks of the 2nd platoon move back to the woods of Blanche Maison where they fight along the 3rd and 4th platoons until 10h30.
From the initial 13 tanks, 9 have been abandoned or destroyed. Only 4 tanks are remaining, including one whose turret is damaged and blocked. The infantry of the III/213e RI retreats to the ditch of La Nacelle, 2 company commanders have been killed.
** 2/7e BCC
The 3 tanks of the 1st platoon move to hill 261 and cover the right flank towards Bulson.
The 9 tanks from the 2nd, 3rd and 4th platoons move to hill 322.
At the exit of Bulson, 6 Panzer IIIs are spotted by two 75mm Mle1897 field guns batteries (from the I/78e RA, 5e DLC) deployed in Maisoncelle. From long range they engage the German tanks in direct fire and 2 tanks are rapidly burning, the others take cover behind hill 322.
The FCM36 of the lieutenant Leclair (commander of the 3rd platoon) crosses hill 322 but is seen burning a few seconds later after having been hit by 4 shells. The 8 remaining FCM36 are engaged by numerous German tanks and AT guns. They engage a duel with the German tanks.
They locate the enemy tanks (while remaining hidden) thanks to the protruding radio antenna mast from the German tanks. Then they just advance, hull down, and fire on the located target at close range before moving back and repeating the process : advance, fire, move back behind the hill. The German tanks are hit numerous times, several are immobilized and others move back but they are not seriously damaged. Unfortunately the FCM36 is only armed with the 37mm SA18 gun and each tank of the 7e BCC has only few AP shells.
Several FCM36 tanks are also hit. On one of them the turret is first hit by projectiles which don't penetrate but finally a projectile unsolders the top of the turret (copula).
After 2 hours of combat, 10 FCM36 tanks are knocked out. The 3 remaining tanks retreat to Artaise-le-Vivier. On the way they skirmish again with Germans tanks around Maisoncelle..
Concerning the I/213e RI : 2 out of 3 company commanders are killed and the last one is WIA and captured by the Germans. The infantry battalion is heavily shelled by enemy mortars and also bombed. The I/213e RI retreats under the protection of the last French tanks. General Lafontaine leaves his HQ 500m north east of Maisoncelle amongst the last men.
2) ON THE LEFT (3 km on the west, towards Chéhery)
** 3/7e BCC
The II/213e RI starts the attack on the Chémery-Chéhery road at 6h15, without the tanks. Chémery is only occupied by the 7th company as well as by one 25mm AT gun from the 506th AT company (the divisional AT company from the 55e DI – capitaine Nicolle). These AT guns have probably retreated to Chémery on 13th May.
After having been on the move all night long, the 13 FCM36 have still about 10 hours autonomy with their diesel engine. The ammunition racks are full but there are only 12 AP shells per tank. No enemy tank has in fact been reported to the battalion as having crossed the Meuse River.
1200 meters north of Chémery, there is a bottleneck in the valley in which the tanks will have to advance : on the left the Bar River and on the right a woody hill where only infantry units could progress. The company commander, capitaine Mignotte, wants to reach this bottleneck before being eventually outflanked.
The platoon from sous-lieutenant Pagès is in front, on the Chémery-Chéhery road. Capitaine Mignotte is on the rear left, between the road and the Bar River. The 3 other platoons are still in Chémery (sous-lieutenant Lacroix, aspirant Loiseau, sous-lieutenant Levitte).
After an advance of several hundred meters the tanks are ambushed by German troops including an AT gun, which fires on the Pagès platoon. The French tanks fire back and the other platoons are deploying. The FCM36 of Pagès is hit several times without penetration but a damaged track immobilizes the tank.
A 2nd German AT gun opens fire but both German guns are quickly destroyed by the French tank company supported by a few 25mm AT guns. Many shells have hit the FCM36 tanks but none has penetrated the sloped armor. German troops are stormed and are killed or fleeing in the woods. The German troops present at the western and southern edges of the woods of Naumont are eliminated by the French tanks and infantry. The French advance can be carried on.
The 3/7e BCC reaches the bottleneck but the infantry did not follow the tanks and would be useful to control this position. Capitaine Mignotte moves back, sitting outside the turret on the turret hatch to show the infantry that the area is safe. He brings an infantry squad with him to the bottleneck.
The 2 tanks of platoon Pagès remain on the rear with the immobilized tank of the platoon commander.
The platoon of Levitte has been delayed during the combats against the German troops and 1-2 tanks are stuck in a marsh close to the Bar River.
7 FCM36 tanks move on towards Connage, the next town at 600 meters (Capitaine Mignotte, platoon Loiseau and platoon Lacroix). Connage is reached without problem; the German troops evacuated the town. The French tanks move on towards Chéhery. During the movement a German AT gun battery fired from a hill east of Connage but without damaging the tanks. The tank of Loiseau is at his turn stuck in a marsh next to Connage. The tanks of platoon Levitte will later tow the tank of Loiseau under enemy fire.
The 6 other tanks moves on :
- Platoon Lacroix (3 tanks commanded by Lacroix, Corbeil and Tirache)
- Platoon Loiseau, now under command of sergent Le Tallec (2 tanks commanded by Le Tallec and Boitard)
- The tank of capitaine Mignotte.
Platoon Lacroix is advancing on the forefront. The tanks of Le Tallec and Boitard are on the left and slightly on the rear. Capitaine Mignotte is in the centre of the deployment.
Suddenly, about 100m in front of Lacroix a Panzer III (or a Panzer IV according to the testimonies). Lacroix moves at full speed, stops at only 15 meters of the German tanks and opens fire. He has been followed by Corbeil and Le Tallec. Boitard and Tirache remains about 300m on the rear and provide fire support to the advancing French tanks. Mignotte joins the 3 tanks of the first echelon and engages the combat.
The German tank is reinforced by 2 other Panzer III/IVs. These 3 Panzers are 15-20 meters in front of the 4 French tanks. Behind these 3 German tanks there is a swarm of incoming Panzers. The combat is engaged on the road.
Each French tank rapidly fires its 12 AP shells. The HE shells are then fired to blind the enemy tanks. In the war diary of the company the German tanks are described as firing back extremely slowly. Apparently the German rate of fire was not always the theoretical one.
Many German shells are bouncing on the armor of the FCM36 tanks, even at this very close range, but those who arrive directly frontally penetrate the armor.
In Corbeil's FCM36 the driver (Lintanff) is WIA. Despite being wounded he continues to pass ammunitions to his commander in the turret.
In Lacroix's FCM36 the commander is WIA and bails out. The driver (Rochelle) replaces him I the turret and continues to fire until being hit at his turn.
One German tank is nonetheless burning. But at this moment new German units are involved and their shells are more efficient. They are described as having 75mm (Panzer IV) and 105mm guns. These "105mm guns" could very well be the 8.8cm self-propelled AT guns which are involved in this area. In Abbeville too the 8.8cm FlaK or often described as 105mm guns (although 105mm guns were really used as AT guns).
Corbeil's tank is hit by a heavy shell on the front hull and Lintanff is this time KIA. In the turret Corbeil continues t fire. A second shell damages his 37mm SA18 gun. Corbeil exits the tank and hides in a ditch beside the road.
Le Tallec's tank receives a projectile in the engine and starts to burn. During several minutes the crew nonetheless continues to fire. The heat becomes unbearable and the crew bails out. Le Tallec and Audoire manage to reach the French troops in Chémery.
At this stage, 2 French tanks have been destroyed (Corbeil and Le Tallec) and the tank of Lacroix is immobilized but still firing. At least one German tank has been destroyed. The tank of Mignotte is still fully operational despite the fact that 2 projectiles have penetrated the turret. These projectiles caused no real damage inside and the crew remains untouched.
Capitaine Mignotte orders to his driver (Heinrich) to execute a 180° turn, in order to expose the rear of the tank to the enemy. The mass and thickness of the engine are directed towards the threat. A German heavy shell (described as being a 105mm … 75mm or 88mm in fact ?) destroys the left track and moves the tank on several meters.
Mignotte orders Heinrich to leave the tank while he fires to cover his escape. Heintich is also ordered to tell the 2 last tanks (Boitard and Tirache) 300 meters on the rear to retreat to Chémery.
The 37mm SA18 gun of Mignotte fires HE shell after HE shell but jams. The Germans stop to fire at his tank, thinking probably that he is out of combat.
The breech is unblocked and about 30 HE shells are remaining (out of a total of 102 shells initially).
A German tank starts to move slowly on several meters. Mignotte fires again. The FCM36 from Le Tallec is still burning and hides partially Mignotte's tank to the Germans.
Many German shells are bouncing on the armor of the FCM36. Mignotte fires all his 30 HE shells and bails out, expecting to be fired at. Surprisingly the German tanks stop their fire. Did they just save their ammunition or di they want to show respect to the French officer who fought courageously ?
Sergent Corbeil, who was hiding beside the road, helps Mignotte. They manage to escape and 1 hour later they reach Chémery.
The 2 remaining platoons (Pagès and Levitte) are engaged later by many AT guns and 8.8 self-propelled AT guns.
At Connagen, Levitte's tank is immobilized by a 105mm shell (88mm ?). They try to tow the tank but a second shell hits the tank. While trying to move in a safer place the FCM36 from sergent Froussard remains stuck in the same marsh than the tank of Loiseau.
Only 3 tanks are recovered from the whole company. A few men from the repair unit and several motorcyclists defeat German soldiers trying to reach Chémery from the west of the Bar River. The 3/7e BCC has lost 14 men and 10 tanks after more than 2 hours of combat.
Between the bottleneck and Chémery the II/213e RI retreats while fighting and manages to avoid being encircled by Balck's soldiers supported by the German tanks. The men received ammunition supplies and successively each platoon covers the retreat of one other platoon. Despite being only a reserve unit the battalion shows discipline. The 7th company which remained in Chémery covers the retreat and fire at the Germans when they are at 200 meters. But the first German tanks enter in Chémery and the French troops have no means to stop them. The very few 25mm AT guns are not sufficient against the waves of German tanks. The battalion commander is WIA, his staff officer and 2 company commanders are KIA.
Surprisingly the Panzer Regiment 2 indicates having faced Renault B1bis tanks during the 14th May morning. This is not possible. The 3e DCR will arrive more south around Le Chesne only between 16h00 and 18h00. There are no B1bis tanks in the area. The French troops counter-attacking would certainly have like to have several ones with them instead of fighting tanks with the 37mm SA18 gun.
The Luftwaffe has also been very active against the French troops during all the morning. An attack led by Ju87 dive bombers is launched against Chémery, which is occupied by their own troops at the moment of the attack.
The HQ of the Panzerbrigade, the HQ of the Panzer Regiment and the HQ of the II.Abteilung are hit among other troops. Oberleutnant Graf Harrach, Oberleutnant von Fürstenberg, Leutnant Fritschen and 8 men are killed. Many other men are WIA, including Oberst Keltsch (commander of the Panzerbrigade 1). Several German vehicles are destroyed including at least one 8.8cm self-propelled AT gun, which has been photographed many times. The same day the commander of the Sturmpionier Battalion 43 (Mahler) is killed in Chéhery by Ju87 dive bombers.
At 12h00, the core of the "Grossdeutschland" infantry regiment reaches also Bulson. The last men of the 55e DI have roughly disappeared in these fights.
The orders given to the German troops on 14th May at 14h00 are followings :
- "Grossdeutschland" regiment with 2 heavy artillery groups : take the heights of Stonne and cover the southern flank.
- 1.PzD : attack to the west, cross the Ardennes canal at Malmy and Omicourt.
- 2.PzD : attack to the west, cross the Ardennes canal at Hannogne
- 10.PzD : this division is belated and still around Sedan
The small French counter-attack launched on 14th May was of course insufficient and improvised. From the 39 engaged FCM36 tanks 29 have been lost. This sacrifice enabled French reinforcements to deploy 15km south of Sedan, next to the Mont-Dieu hilly woods :
- At 4h00 : the 6e GRDI is at Stonne and in the Mont-Dieu woods
- Between 10h00 and 16h00 : the 3e DIM arrived in the area
- Between 16h00 and 18h00 : the 3e DCR is deployed
The situation could have been very dangerous for the Germans at that moment if the French had immediately launched a concentrated attack with these 2 divisions against Sedan. Only the "Grossdeutschland" regiment was covering the southern flank during this afternoon. The 10.PzD is belated, the 1.PzD and the 2.PzD would have been eventually cut from their rears and attacked on their left flank. But general Flavigny (21st Army Corps) wants to wait for the 15th May and the attack will not happen. The French high command in May had always the obsession of a continuous front. In the Mont-Dieu the German losses will be really very high but 2 very good French divisions are stuck in a battle of defense and counter-attacks while the German Panzerdivisionen are heading west.
TO BE CONTINUED WITH : the combats 15km south of Sedan (15th – 25th May 1940) (under construction)
Sources :
- "1939-1940, batailles pour la France" (Patrick de Gmeline)
- "Batailles aériennes n°7" magazine
- "Blitzkrieg à l’Ouest, Mai-Juin 40" (Jean-Paul Pallud)
- "Comme des lions – mai/juin 1940 – le sacrifice de l'armée française" (Dominique Lormier)
- "Divided and Conquered : The French High Command and the Defeat of the West, 1940." (Jeffery A. Gunsburg, 1979)
- "Fallait-il sauver le char Bayard ?" (René Boly)
- "Guderian's XIXth Panzer Corps and the Battle of France : Breakthrough in the Ardennes, May 1940." (Florian K. Rothbrust)
- "Hommes et ouvrages de la Ligne Maginot" (Jean-Yves Mary et Alain Hohnadel) – 3 volumes
- "J'étais médecin avec les chars" (André Soubiran)
- "La 3e division d'infanterie motorisée 1939-1940" (General Bertin-Boussu)
- "La Panzers passent la Meuse" (Paul Berben and Bernard Iselin)
- "L'Arme Blindée Française (volume 1) : Mai-juin 1940 ! Les blindés français dans la tourmente" (Gérard Saint-Martin)
- "L'armée de l'air dans la tourmente – la bataille de France 1939-1940" (Patrick Facon)
- "Le mythe de la guerre-éclair – la campagne de l'Ouest de 1940" (Karl-Heinz Frieser)
- "Les combats du Mont-Dieu – Mai 1940" (Gérard Giuliano)
- "Les Spahis au feu, la 1e Brigade de Spahis pendant la campagne 1939-1940" (Général P. Jouffrault)
- "Mai - Juin 1940 : les combattants de l'honneur" (Jean Delmas, Paul Devautour and Eric Lefèvre)
- "Une bataille 'oubliée' de la seconde guerre mondiale : Stonne, Le Mont Dieu, Tannay. 14-25 mai 1940" (Bernard Horen)
- War diaries of the 41e BCC and of the 7e BCC
Acknowledgements to Rémi BEBIN who provided detailed information about the battle in the area of Monthermé.
Regards,
David
-- THE AIR STRIKES --
On 14th May 1940, only one big engineer bridge in front of Gaulier (a small town very close to Sedan, see map) is available for the crossing of the German tanks and heavy weapons. This bridge was built with the last available crossing elements. If this bridge is destroyed, the German troops would be in a difficult situation.
The French air force had about 1,400 frontline aircrafts available in 1940 (650 fighters, 240 bombers and 490 reconnaissance and observation aircrafts). From these 1,400 aircrafts only 879 frontline aircrafts are operational on 10th May 1940 on the western front. Only 120 out of the 240 bomber/assault aircrafts were modern ones (10 Amiot 354, 55 Lioré et Olivier 451, 45 Bréguet 691 or 693, 10 Potez 633) with 85 being operational. The others were older ones : 75 Bloch 200 or 210, 10 Farman 221 or 222 and 35 Amiot 143 with about 100 considered operational. Therefore only 185 French bombers (100 obsolete and 85 moderns) are operational ones in May 1940 but they are dispersed and not all available in the north-eastern theatre of operation.
In the north-eastern area, the French army can only rely on a maximum of 65 operational bombers ! All the other bombers are deployed in southern France or in North Africa where the bomber groups are under transformation and training with new aircrafts (Martin 167, Douglas DB7, Amiot 351/354, LeO 451, Bréguet 693).
Available French bombers in the north-east on 10th May :
Day bombing :
- 14 LeO 451 (GB I/12 and GB II/12)
- 25 Bréguet 693 (GBA I/54 and GBA II/54)
Night bombing :
- 29 Amiot 143 (GB I/34, GB II/34, GB I/38 and GB II/38 )
- 6 Farman 222 (GB I/15 and GB II/15)
Total = 74 available bombers including 65 operational ones (88%).
The Bréguet 693 and LeO 451 for example were previously hardly engaged in the Netherlands from 11th to 13th May. On 13th May, after reinforcements, only 13 LeO 451 and 12 Bréguet 693 are available = 25 modern bombers in the north-east (you can compare that with the 1170 German bombers engaged on over the Meuse River on 13th May).
The RAF has a total of 416 aircrafts in France : 100 fighters (Hurricane + Gladiator) and 316 attack/bomber aircrafts (Fairey Battle + Blenheim), of which 384 are operational on 10th May.
On 14th May, the allies could only engage 31 French bombers and 109 British bombers to try to stop the flood of the German tanks crossing the Meuse River in the area of Sedan. The allied fighters, mainly French fighters in that case, made 250 sorties to protect the bombers and attack the German fighters. These German fighters made 814 sorties to protect the Gaulier bridge (3.3 times more sorties than the allied fighters) and the bridge is also directly protected by 303 AA guns (2.0cm, 3.7cm and 8.8cm) !
The allied bombing missions on the area of Sedan were followings on 14th May 1940 :
1) 5h00 (British bombers)
- Aircrafts : 6 Fairey Battles (n°103 squadron - 1 emergency landing)
2) 8h30 (British bombers)
- Aircrafts : 4 Fairey Battles (n°150 squadron)
These 2 first missions target possible bridges in Villers, Mairy and Remilly. These objectives are in an area 10 km around Sedan.
3) 9h30 (French bombers)
- Aircrafts : 9 Bréguet 693 (6 from GBA II/54 and 3 from GBA I/54)
They are protected by 11 Bloch MB.152 from GC I/8. The bombers attack German columns and tanks at Bazeilles (south-east of Sedan) each with 8x50 kg bombs (and their 20mm gun + MGs).
During this mission, the bombers are also indirectly protected by patrols from the GC I/3 (Dewoitine D.520) which is also involved in the area in air superiority missions. During the whole day, the GC I/3 looses 2 pilots and 4 Dewoitine D.520s. They destroy 9-11 German aircrafts on 14th May :
- 2 Dornier 17
- 2 Messerschmitt 109 (JG 2)
- 1 Heinkel 111 (I/KG 55) in cooperation with 2 Hurricanes (n°501 squadron)
- 1 Heinkel 111 (III/KG 51)
- 4 Messerschmitt 110 + 1 probable Messerschmitt 110
4) 12h30 (French bombers)
- Aircrafts : 5 LeO 451 (from GB I/12 and GB II/12)
They target the German troops in Bazeilles and on the crossroads south-east of Sedan. There are clouds at the altitude of 1000 m. They bomb the targets at an altitude of 900m with 10kg, 50kg and 100kg bombs. The formation is attacked by Messerschmitt 110 fighters. One LeO 451 is shot down by the FlaK and the 4 other aircrafts returned damaged to their base.
- Aircrafts : 6 Amiot 143 (from GB I/34, GB II/34) + 12 Amiot 143 (from GB I/38 ) each with 16x50 kg and 2x100kg bombs. Despite being slow night bombers, these aircrafts are engaged in day mission against strongly defended targets.
6 aircrafts from GB I/38 missed the meeting with the fighters and did not take part to the attack and 1 aircraft returns to base after engine problems. Therefore only 11 Amiot 143 arrived on their targets, covered by clouds at 1000-1100m. They attack at the altitude of 900-950m. 2 Amiot 143s are destroyed by the FlaK and 1 Amiot 143 is shot down by 1 Messershmitt 109 and Messerschmitt 110. All the other bombers are damaged.
About 30-40 French fighters are protecting these bombers. The immediate escort is provided by 14 Bloch MB.152 from GC I/8 but they have difficulties to remain with the old bombers, which fly at only 150 km/h. 1 Messerschmitt 109 is shot down and 1 MB.152 is out of use after landing but the pilot is safe and alive.
At higher altitude, the fighter protection is provided by Morane-Saulnier MS.406s from the GC III/7 (12h45 – 14h00) and by Dewoitine D.520s from the GC I/3 (12h50 – 13h30). From 12h54 to 13h26, the GC III/7 destroys 4 Henschel 126 observation aircrafts.
5) 15h00 - 15h45 (British bombers)
a) Group 76 (15h00)
- Aircrafts : 4 Fairey Battles (n°12 squadron) – targets : enemy columns – losses : 4 aircrafts
- Aircrafts : 8 Fairey Battles (n°142 squadron) – targets : bridges – losses : 3 aircrafts
- Aircrafts : 6 Fairey Battles (n°226 squadron) – targets : bridges – losses : 3 aircrafts
b) Group 71 (15h20 – 15h30)
- Aircrafts : 11 Fairey Battles (n°105 squadron) – targets : bridges – losses : 6 aircrafts
- Aircrafts : 4 Fairey Battles (n°150 squadron) – targets : bridges – losses : 4 aircrafts
- Aircrafts : 2 Blenheims (n°114 squadron) – targets : enemy columns – losses : 1 aircrafts
- Aircrafts : 6 Blenheims (n°139 squadron) – targets : enemy columns – losses : 4 aircrafts
c) Group 75 (15h35 – 15h45)
- Aircrafts : 4 Fairey Battles (n°88 squadron) – targets : bridges …
- Aircrafts : 8 Fairey Battles (n°88 squadron) – targets : enemy columns – losses : 8 aircrafts
- Aircrafts : 8 Fairey Battles (n°103 squadron) – targets : bridges
- Aircrafts : 7 Fairey Battles (n°218 squadron) – targets : enemy columns …
- Aircrafts : 4 Fairey Battles (n°218 squadron) – targets : bridges – losses : 10 aircrafts
6) 17h00 - 18h00 (British bombers)
- Aircrafts : 28 Blenheims (n°21, n°107 and n°110 squadron) are sent against 3 targets : the Bouillon-Sedan road, the woods west of Givonne and the bridges in the Sedan area. 5 aircrafts are shot down and 2 have to proceed to an emergency landing. These bombers are from the bomber command and took off from Great Britain. All the other bombers were from the AASF (Advanced Air Striking Force) based in France.
French fighters from GC II/7 (Morane-Saulnier MS.406) and GC I/3 (Dewoitine D.520) are in the Flize-Sedan area respectively at 17h30 – 18h00 and 18h00 – 18h30. 9 MS.406s from GC II/7 meet 12 Bf.109 but no one engages the fight. At 18h15, the D.520s from GC I/7 disperse a formation of Junkers 87 dive bombers and shot down 4-5 Bf.110 (the Bf.110s previously mentioned in the text).
7) During the night (French bombers)
- Aircrafts : 4 Farman 222s (GB I/15) and 2 Farman 222s (GB II/15). These are heavy night bomber, able to carry up to 2.5 tons of bombs. They attack the accesses/exits of Sedan without losses.
- Aircrafts : 6 Amiot 143 (from GB I/38 ) and 1 Amiot 143 (from GB II/38 ) which had to cancel their attack at 12h30 are engaged during the night against Sedan.
On 14th May the crucial bridge of Gaulier has not been destroyed. During this time and the following days more than 60,000 German soldiers, 800 tanks and 22,000 vehicles crossed the Meuse on this single bridge at Gaulier.
The main issue is that the allied bombers were engaged in about 25 attacks of 2-12 planes and against scattered targets : various bridges (sometimes already blown or only supposed engineer bridges) and German columns, instead of one concerted attack of more 140 bombers concentrated on the Gaulier bridge. The bridge of Gaulier should have been the primary target but the allied bombers were generally not even assigned with specific and well defined targets. Most of the lost aircrafts were shot down by the dense FlaK.
On 14th May, 48 British and 3 French bombers are shot down in the area of Sedan and 65 other allied aircrafts are damaged.
On 14th May the French air force was also very active more north in the area around Dinant with many fighters and reconnaissance aircrafts but only the bombing mission against the Sedan area has been developed in this article. Of course the RAF was also involved in many areas.
On the western front this day, the allied fighters claim 58 confirmed victories (46 for the French air force and 12 for the RAF fighters based in France) according to Patrick Facon.
The magazine "Batailles aériennes n°7" indicates for the whole 14th May :
- French fighters : 46 confirmed (including 10 Bf 109 and 26 Bf 110) and 16 probable victories for 20 French fighters lost
- RAF fighters : 60 confirmed and 23 probable victories for 28 British fighters lost
That would make 106 confirmed victories. The German data are incomplete for the losses but Patrick Facon gives the number of 52 German aircrafts lost that day (inaccuracies, shared victories which are counted as one victory for each of the pilots etc.). The Luftwaffe (fighters and AA units) claims about 100 allied aircrafts, which seems very close to the reality since if we add the 51 bombers around Sedan and the 49 fighters we reach 99 losses.
Between 10th and 18th May, about 180 German aircrafts are shot down over the Meuse River area. The 14th May was therefore rather intense.
About 500 French POWs are parked directly at the immediate southern exit of the Gaulier bridge, a primary military target. Several of these POWs (lieutenant Devie, soldier Pichonnat, sergent Léger) witnessed the allied air attacks and testified that several aircrafts aborted the attack, probably after having recognized the French POWs. One can really ask about the reason why the Germans placed the French POWs just next to the bridge.
-- THE GROUND OPERATIONS --
On 13th May afternoon, during the German assaults, the 4e BCC (FCM36 tanks) and the 7e BCC (FCM36 tanks) are ordered to prepare to move, not yet to counter-attack. The 4e BCC will have to operate with elements of the 205e RI (71e DI) and the 7e BCC with elements of the 213e RI (55e DI), which were left on the rear by these 2 reserve and under-equipped infantry divisions.
The FCM36 tanks was built by the "société des Forges et Chantiers de la Mediterranée", designed to be an infantry support tank. It was somewhat unique for the time because of its rakish angled armor and its diesel engine. The hull as a very well sloped armor and the turret is an octagonal shaped FCM turret. There are also sloped protective skirting plates to protect the wheels. The FCM36 has a bigger autonomy and mobility (smaller turning circle) compared to the Renault R35 for example. The armament consists in a 37mm SA18 L/21 gun and a coaxial MG. The gun could engage the German light tanks at about 300m but had to go very close to have a minimal chance of penetrating the armor of a Panzer III Ausf.F.
Weight : 12.35t
Length : 4.51m
Width : 2.14m
Height : 2.20m
Crew : 2 men
Maximum armor : 40mm (turret is RHA+cast welded armor and hull is RHA welded armor)
Maximum speed : 24 km/h (Berliet-Ricardo engine, 4 cylinders, diesel, 91 hp, 8400 cm3, water cooled)
Transmission : 5 forward, 1 reverse
Autonomy : 225 km
Armament : a 37mm SA18 L/21 gun and a 7.5mm MAC1931 CMG (102 shells and 3000 cartridges)
In the French light tanks, intended for infantry support as primary task there were generally about 40% AP shells but in the 7e BCC the tanks had only 12 AP shells, at least in the 3rd company, as indicated by the war diary of the battalion. That does not say if they were 1892/24, 1935 or 1937 shells whose penetration performances are significantly different.
Two German infantry companies from 1.Schützen Regiment (Balck) are already deployed between Chéhery and the Saint-Quentin farm on 13th May evening. On 14th May morning they are reinforced by various troops and AT guns, including the 14th AT company from "Grossdeutschland" regiment.7e BCC
The 7e BCC had been formed in Versailles on 25th August 1939 and garrisoned in Loges-en-Joses beginning September 1939. On 10th September 1939 the battalion is at Milly-sur-Bradon and Murvaux where the trainind goes on. The 7e BCC leaves for Verdun on 19th November 1939. The practrical and tactical level is improved on the training range of Le Chaume and on the firing range of Douaumont.
On 28th March 1940, the 7e BCC is sent to the Mourmelon camp to take part to different intense trainings and activities :
- Infantry / tank cooperation trainings with successive infantry regiments (1 different each week – e.g. the 3e RTM from colonel Desré on 18th April 1940 during a training in front of general Touchon)
- Courses for infantry battalion commanders about the tanks
- Manoeuvres with the DCRs (French armoured divisions of the French infantry)
On 14th May the tank battalion is engaged in a sacrifice mission to delay the German tanks and counter-attack to the Meuse River. The 7e BCC is engaged on a 5 km large front (divisional front usually) and advanced on 2 km. It resists during 4 hours to German tank waves. The remaining tanks retreated, out of ammunition and exhausted. The battalion had lost 50% of the crews and 75% of the tanks but delayed the Germans enough to allow the 3e DIM and the 3e DCR to deploy south of the Mont-Dieu woody hills.
On 15th May the battalion is reorganizing and on 16th May it joins the 36e DI on the Aisne River near Attigny. At first only 5 tanks are fully operational. After repairs 11 tanks are available and on 27th May 16 tanks are operational. Until beginning June, the reduced battalion launches several successful counter-attacks to defeat German assaults.
On 9-10th June, the French 36e DI is opposed to 3 infantry divisions (26.ID, 10.ID and SS-Polizei), which open the way to the 6.PzD and 8.PzD supported by the 20.ID(mot). The French division has to defend a front of 20 km whereas such a division should normally defend a front of 5-7 km. On the front of the 36e DI only 2 regiments (18e RI and 57e RI) defend the frontline (the 14e RI is on a second line) but they defeat the 26.ID and the 10.ID, which are replaced on 10th June by the SS-Polizei division and elements of the 6.PzD. The French stopped first all the German assaults in part thanks to very precise artillery support and counter-attacks from tanks of the 7e BCC and 4e BCC (FCM36 tanks). The French 36e DI captured 714 German POWs during these 2 days. The French 2e DI is deployed more west and faces 3 infantry divisions (17.ID, 21.ID and 52.ID) and the assaults of the 1.PzD as well as later the 2. PzD supported by the 29.ID(mot). The collapse of the 2e DI near Château-Porcien will force the 36e DI to retreat.
On 10th June, after a move of 20 km under German artillery fire, the 16 tanks of the 7e BCC assault the enemy north of Vouziers in support of the 36e DI. After 2 hours of combat and a progression of 7 km, all the assigned objectives are taken despite the German strong resistance and the attacks of 62 German aircrafts. The FCM36 tanks delay the Germans at Vouziers during 24 hours, but on 11th June only 4 tanks are remaining.
Two companies of the 4e BCC (also FCM36 tanks) intervene also for the benefit of the 36e DI. The 1/4e BCC are engaged with infantry elements from the 57e RI and the 14e RI (the groupe franc of the regiment) against the 78.IR (26.ID) next to Voncq and Les Alleux, north of Vouziers. The 26.ID looses 1,100 men, mainly in the 78.IR.
The remnants of the 7e BCC will retreat and the battalion is officially dissolved on 31st July 1940.
At 5h30, Panzer Regiment 2 (Oberstleutnant Breusing - 1.PzD) starts to move from Gaulier towards Bulson and Chémery. This regiment at full strength consists in :
- 4 Befehlspanzer
- 26 Panzer I
- 49 Panzer II
- 30 Panzer III
- 20 Panzer IV
The 1./s.Pz.Jg.Abt.8 (1.PzD) with its 8.8cm FlaK (Sfl) auf Sd.Kfz.8 is also engaged (and possibly the Sturmgeschütz-Batterie 640 from the "Grossdeutschland" regiment).
The last defenders of Sedan were still deployed in front of the German troops but will be quickly defeated by the German tanks. Several will manage to flee towards the west (Omicourt and cross the Bar River) or the east. But the soldiers who were in the Marfée woods and retreated to Chaumont realize at 8h00 that German troops are already behind them at Bulson. They are encircled. Hundreds of French soldiers are captured. Several of them will nonetheless manage to escape to the east and join the 3e DINA for the combats around Yonck on 15th May.
General Lafontaine, commander of the 55e DI, is in charge of leading the future counter-attack from his HQ in Maisoncelle. He is simply not aware of all these events during the beginning of the morning !
All the French movements are hampered by thousands of refugees and by soldiers fleeing the field after the "Bulson panic" among the artillery units of the French rears on the front of Sedan. The Luftwaffe is also very present, spotting and/or attacking all French movements. The communications are generally cut, the units are isolated. General Lafontaine will have huge problems in trying to coordinate this attack; he is even unaware of the location of the units placed under his command.
The 4e BCC (commandant de Saint-Sernin) is deployed around Beaumont-en-Argonne and the Sommauthe woods. The 7e BCC (commandant Giordani) is deployed south of Le Chesne, next to Les Alleux. On 10th and 11th May the area is bombed by the Luftwaffe 3 times per day. The 2 tank battalions would have about 20 km to cross, in about 1-2 hours in good conditions. The two infantry regiments would need about 3 hours by foot to reach the departure line on the Chémery-Maisoncelle line.
Except the 213e RI, which is not far away from general Lafontaine, the 3 other units meant for the attack cannot yet be reached by their new commander. The 7e BCC begins its movement only at 20h30 on 13th May, on the national road n°77 (Le Chesne – Tannay – Chémery) mainly because of the intense activity of the Luftwaffe. The very first elements of the tank battalion reach Chémery at 3h30 only but the tanks arrive only at 6h30. The 205e RI is around Raucourt during the night. The 4e BCC will only reach the 205e RI on 14th May during the morning. There is no cohesion between the 4 units.
On 14th morning the planned attack is very late. The 4e BCC and 205e RI did not arrive in time. There is no artillery preparation available. The French movements were heavily hampered on the road full of refugees and retreating troops. The 7e BCC will need all the night to reach the departure line and will nonetheless be engaged immediately with minimal intelligence about the enemy.
On 14th May morning, general Lafontaine is only in contact with the western wing of the planned attack (213e RI and 7e BCC) but nonetheless launches the attack at 6h15. Each infantry battalion is supported by 1 tank company (13 FCM36 tanks). The infantry regiment is much reduced compared to its theoretical men strength. There are no hand grenades available, no AT guns and no AA guns. Most of the LMG have only 2 magazines. It is rather a mission of sacrifice. When the first tanks of the 7e BCC finally reach the departure line, it is around 6h30.
On the left : the 3/7e BCC (13 FCM36 tanks - capitaine Mignotte) attacks on the Chémery-Connage axis. They are supported by the reduced II/213e RI battalion (commandant Couturier).
On the right : the 1/7e BCC (13 FCM36 tanks - capitaine Waitzenegger) and the 2/7e BCC (13 FCM36 tanks – lieutenant Join Lambert) attack from Chémery and Maisoncelle towards Bulson. They are supported by elements of the I/213e RI (commandant Desgranges) and III/213e RI (commandant Gauvain) battalions.
The French troops are constantly spotted by German aircrafts.
1) ON THE RIGHT (towards Bulson)
The French advancing troops reaches their first objectives. The 2/7e BCC and I/213e RI move to Font Dagot. The 1/7e BCC and III/213e RI move to hill 304 despite German infantry fire coming from the woods. 3 German MGs are destroyed. The progression goes on to the heights next to Bulson : hill 322 for the 2/7e BCC and hill 303 for the 1/7e BCC. But about 100 German tanks supported by 3 infantry battalions reach Bulson at 8h00 and will clash with the only 26 FCM36 tanks supported by 2 reduced infantry battalions.
** 1/7e BCC
The 1st platoon of aspirant Crémieux-Bach is frontally engaged by the German core force : light and heavy tanks supported by AT guns. 2 ennemy tanks are immobilized but the 3 FCM36 are knocked out.
The 2nd platoon of adjudant-chef Pierre engages the German tanks near the woods of La Réserve. 2 German tanks are damaged but 1 FCM36 is hit several times including two penetrating projectiles. The commander (caporal Bruneval) is KIA and the driver (Trouillod) is WIA, but manages to drive the tank in safety in the French rear lines. The 2 other tanks of the 2nd platoon move back to the woods of Blanche Maison where they fight along the 3rd and 4th platoons until 10h30.
From the initial 13 tanks, 9 have been abandoned or destroyed. Only 4 tanks are remaining, including one whose turret is damaged and blocked. The infantry of the III/213e RI retreats to the ditch of La Nacelle, 2 company commanders have been killed.
** 2/7e BCC
The 3 tanks of the 1st platoon move to hill 261 and cover the right flank towards Bulson.
The 9 tanks from the 2nd, 3rd and 4th platoons move to hill 322.
At the exit of Bulson, 6 Panzer IIIs are spotted by two 75mm Mle1897 field guns batteries (from the I/78e RA, 5e DLC) deployed in Maisoncelle. From long range they engage the German tanks in direct fire and 2 tanks are rapidly burning, the others take cover behind hill 322.
The FCM36 of the lieutenant Leclair (commander of the 3rd platoon) crosses hill 322 but is seen burning a few seconds later after having been hit by 4 shells. The 8 remaining FCM36 are engaged by numerous German tanks and AT guns. They engage a duel with the German tanks.
They locate the enemy tanks (while remaining hidden) thanks to the protruding radio antenna mast from the German tanks. Then they just advance, hull down, and fire on the located target at close range before moving back and repeating the process : advance, fire, move back behind the hill. The German tanks are hit numerous times, several are immobilized and others move back but they are not seriously damaged. Unfortunately the FCM36 is only armed with the 37mm SA18 gun and each tank of the 7e BCC has only few AP shells.
Several FCM36 tanks are also hit. On one of them the turret is first hit by projectiles which don't penetrate but finally a projectile unsolders the top of the turret (copula).
After 2 hours of combat, 10 FCM36 tanks are knocked out. The 3 remaining tanks retreat to Artaise-le-Vivier. On the way they skirmish again with Germans tanks around Maisoncelle..
Concerning the I/213e RI : 2 out of 3 company commanders are killed and the last one is WIA and captured by the Germans. The infantry battalion is heavily shelled by enemy mortars and also bombed. The I/213e RI retreats under the protection of the last French tanks. General Lafontaine leaves his HQ 500m north east of Maisoncelle amongst the last men.
2) ON THE LEFT (3 km on the west, towards Chéhery)
** 3/7e BCC
The II/213e RI starts the attack on the Chémery-Chéhery road at 6h15, without the tanks. Chémery is only occupied by the 7th company as well as by one 25mm AT gun from the 506th AT company (the divisional AT company from the 55e DI – capitaine Nicolle). These AT guns have probably retreated to Chémery on 13th May.
After having been on the move all night long, the 13 FCM36 have still about 10 hours autonomy with their diesel engine. The ammunition racks are full but there are only 12 AP shells per tank. No enemy tank has in fact been reported to the battalion as having crossed the Meuse River.
1200 meters north of Chémery, there is a bottleneck in the valley in which the tanks will have to advance : on the left the Bar River and on the right a woody hill where only infantry units could progress. The company commander, capitaine Mignotte, wants to reach this bottleneck before being eventually outflanked.
The platoon from sous-lieutenant Pagès is in front, on the Chémery-Chéhery road. Capitaine Mignotte is on the rear left, between the road and the Bar River. The 3 other platoons are still in Chémery (sous-lieutenant Lacroix, aspirant Loiseau, sous-lieutenant Levitte).
After an advance of several hundred meters the tanks are ambushed by German troops including an AT gun, which fires on the Pagès platoon. The French tanks fire back and the other platoons are deploying. The FCM36 of Pagès is hit several times without penetration but a damaged track immobilizes the tank.
A 2nd German AT gun opens fire but both German guns are quickly destroyed by the French tank company supported by a few 25mm AT guns. Many shells have hit the FCM36 tanks but none has penetrated the sloped armor. German troops are stormed and are killed or fleeing in the woods. The German troops present at the western and southern edges of the woods of Naumont are eliminated by the French tanks and infantry. The French advance can be carried on.
The 3/7e BCC reaches the bottleneck but the infantry did not follow the tanks and would be useful to control this position. Capitaine Mignotte moves back, sitting outside the turret on the turret hatch to show the infantry that the area is safe. He brings an infantry squad with him to the bottleneck.
The 2 tanks of platoon Pagès remain on the rear with the immobilized tank of the platoon commander.
The platoon of Levitte has been delayed during the combats against the German troops and 1-2 tanks are stuck in a marsh close to the Bar River.
7 FCM36 tanks move on towards Connage, the next town at 600 meters (Capitaine Mignotte, platoon Loiseau and platoon Lacroix). Connage is reached without problem; the German troops evacuated the town. The French tanks move on towards Chéhery. During the movement a German AT gun battery fired from a hill east of Connage but without damaging the tanks. The tank of Loiseau is at his turn stuck in a marsh next to Connage. The tanks of platoon Levitte will later tow the tank of Loiseau under enemy fire.
The 6 other tanks moves on :
- Platoon Lacroix (3 tanks commanded by Lacroix, Corbeil and Tirache)
- Platoon Loiseau, now under command of sergent Le Tallec (2 tanks commanded by Le Tallec and Boitard)
- The tank of capitaine Mignotte.
Platoon Lacroix is advancing on the forefront. The tanks of Le Tallec and Boitard are on the left and slightly on the rear. Capitaine Mignotte is in the centre of the deployment.
Suddenly, about 100m in front of Lacroix a Panzer III (or a Panzer IV according to the testimonies). Lacroix moves at full speed, stops at only 15 meters of the German tanks and opens fire. He has been followed by Corbeil and Le Tallec. Boitard and Tirache remains about 300m on the rear and provide fire support to the advancing French tanks. Mignotte joins the 3 tanks of the first echelon and engages the combat.
The German tank is reinforced by 2 other Panzer III/IVs. These 3 Panzers are 15-20 meters in front of the 4 French tanks. Behind these 3 German tanks there is a swarm of incoming Panzers. The combat is engaged on the road.
Each French tank rapidly fires its 12 AP shells. The HE shells are then fired to blind the enemy tanks. In the war diary of the company the German tanks are described as firing back extremely slowly. Apparently the German rate of fire was not always the theoretical one.
Many German shells are bouncing on the armor of the FCM36 tanks, even at this very close range, but those who arrive directly frontally penetrate the armor.
In Corbeil's FCM36 the driver (Lintanff) is WIA. Despite being wounded he continues to pass ammunitions to his commander in the turret.
In Lacroix's FCM36 the commander is WIA and bails out. The driver (Rochelle) replaces him I the turret and continues to fire until being hit at his turn.
One German tank is nonetheless burning. But at this moment new German units are involved and their shells are more efficient. They are described as having 75mm (Panzer IV) and 105mm guns. These "105mm guns" could very well be the 8.8cm self-propelled AT guns which are involved in this area. In Abbeville too the 8.8cm FlaK or often described as 105mm guns (although 105mm guns were really used as AT guns).
Corbeil's tank is hit by a heavy shell on the front hull and Lintanff is this time KIA. In the turret Corbeil continues t fire. A second shell damages his 37mm SA18 gun. Corbeil exits the tank and hides in a ditch beside the road.
Le Tallec's tank receives a projectile in the engine and starts to burn. During several minutes the crew nonetheless continues to fire. The heat becomes unbearable and the crew bails out. Le Tallec and Audoire manage to reach the French troops in Chémery.
At this stage, 2 French tanks have been destroyed (Corbeil and Le Tallec) and the tank of Lacroix is immobilized but still firing. At least one German tank has been destroyed. The tank of Mignotte is still fully operational despite the fact that 2 projectiles have penetrated the turret. These projectiles caused no real damage inside and the crew remains untouched.
Capitaine Mignotte orders to his driver (Heinrich) to execute a 180° turn, in order to expose the rear of the tank to the enemy. The mass and thickness of the engine are directed towards the threat. A German heavy shell (described as being a 105mm … 75mm or 88mm in fact ?) destroys the left track and moves the tank on several meters.
Mignotte orders Heinrich to leave the tank while he fires to cover his escape. Heintich is also ordered to tell the 2 last tanks (Boitard and Tirache) 300 meters on the rear to retreat to Chémery.
The 37mm SA18 gun of Mignotte fires HE shell after HE shell but jams. The Germans stop to fire at his tank, thinking probably that he is out of combat.
The breech is unblocked and about 30 HE shells are remaining (out of a total of 102 shells initially).
A German tank starts to move slowly on several meters. Mignotte fires again. The FCM36 from Le Tallec is still burning and hides partially Mignotte's tank to the Germans.
Many German shells are bouncing on the armor of the FCM36. Mignotte fires all his 30 HE shells and bails out, expecting to be fired at. Surprisingly the German tanks stop their fire. Did they just save their ammunition or di they want to show respect to the French officer who fought courageously ?
Sergent Corbeil, who was hiding beside the road, helps Mignotte. They manage to escape and 1 hour later they reach Chémery.
The 2 remaining platoons (Pagès and Levitte) are engaged later by many AT guns and 8.8 self-propelled AT guns.
At Connagen, Levitte's tank is immobilized by a 105mm shell (88mm ?). They try to tow the tank but a second shell hits the tank. While trying to move in a safer place the FCM36 from sergent Froussard remains stuck in the same marsh than the tank of Loiseau.
Only 3 tanks are recovered from the whole company. A few men from the repair unit and several motorcyclists defeat German soldiers trying to reach Chémery from the west of the Bar River. The 3/7e BCC has lost 14 men and 10 tanks after more than 2 hours of combat.
Between the bottleneck and Chémery the II/213e RI retreats while fighting and manages to avoid being encircled by Balck's soldiers supported by the German tanks. The men received ammunition supplies and successively each platoon covers the retreat of one other platoon. Despite being only a reserve unit the battalion shows discipline. The 7th company which remained in Chémery covers the retreat and fire at the Germans when they are at 200 meters. But the first German tanks enter in Chémery and the French troops have no means to stop them. The very few 25mm AT guns are not sufficient against the waves of German tanks. The battalion commander is WIA, his staff officer and 2 company commanders are KIA.
Surprisingly the Panzer Regiment 2 indicates having faced Renault B1bis tanks during the 14th May morning. This is not possible. The 3e DCR will arrive more south around Le Chesne only between 16h00 and 18h00. There are no B1bis tanks in the area. The French troops counter-attacking would certainly have like to have several ones with them instead of fighting tanks with the 37mm SA18 gun.
The Luftwaffe has also been very active against the French troops during all the morning. An attack led by Ju87 dive bombers is launched against Chémery, which is occupied by their own troops at the moment of the attack.
The HQ of the Panzerbrigade, the HQ of the Panzer Regiment and the HQ of the II.Abteilung are hit among other troops. Oberleutnant Graf Harrach, Oberleutnant von Fürstenberg, Leutnant Fritschen and 8 men are killed. Many other men are WIA, including Oberst Keltsch (commander of the Panzerbrigade 1). Several German vehicles are destroyed including at least one 8.8cm self-propelled AT gun, which has been photographed many times. The same day the commander of the Sturmpionier Battalion 43 (Mahler) is killed in Chéhery by Ju87 dive bombers.
At 12h00, the core of the "Grossdeutschland" infantry regiment reaches also Bulson. The last men of the 55e DI have roughly disappeared in these fights.
The orders given to the German troops on 14th May at 14h00 are followings :
- "Grossdeutschland" regiment with 2 heavy artillery groups : take the heights of Stonne and cover the southern flank.
- 1.PzD : attack to the west, cross the Ardennes canal at Malmy and Omicourt.
- 2.PzD : attack to the west, cross the Ardennes canal at Hannogne
- 10.PzD : this division is belated and still around Sedan
The small French counter-attack launched on 14th May was of course insufficient and improvised. From the 39 engaged FCM36 tanks 29 have been lost. This sacrifice enabled French reinforcements to deploy 15km south of Sedan, next to the Mont-Dieu hilly woods :
- At 4h00 : the 6e GRDI is at Stonne and in the Mont-Dieu woods
- Between 10h00 and 16h00 : the 3e DIM arrived in the area
- Between 16h00 and 18h00 : the 3e DCR is deployed
The situation could have been very dangerous for the Germans at that moment if the French had immediately launched a concentrated attack with these 2 divisions against Sedan. Only the "Grossdeutschland" regiment was covering the southern flank during this afternoon. The 10.PzD is belated, the 1.PzD and the 2.PzD would have been eventually cut from their rears and attacked on their left flank. But general Flavigny (21st Army Corps) wants to wait for the 15th May and the attack will not happen. The French high command in May had always the obsession of a continuous front. In the Mont-Dieu the German losses will be really very high but 2 very good French divisions are stuck in a battle of defense and counter-attacks while the German Panzerdivisionen are heading west.
TO BE CONTINUED WITH : the combats 15km south of Sedan (15th – 25th May 1940) (under construction)
Sources :
- "1939-1940, batailles pour la France" (Patrick de Gmeline)
- "Batailles aériennes n°7" magazine
- "Blitzkrieg à l’Ouest, Mai-Juin 40" (Jean-Paul Pallud)
- "Comme des lions – mai/juin 1940 – le sacrifice de l'armée française" (Dominique Lormier)
- "Divided and Conquered : The French High Command and the Defeat of the West, 1940." (Jeffery A. Gunsburg, 1979)
- "Fallait-il sauver le char Bayard ?" (René Boly)
- "Guderian's XIXth Panzer Corps and the Battle of France : Breakthrough in the Ardennes, May 1940." (Florian K. Rothbrust)
- "Hommes et ouvrages de la Ligne Maginot" (Jean-Yves Mary et Alain Hohnadel) – 3 volumes
- "J'étais médecin avec les chars" (André Soubiran)
- "La 3e division d'infanterie motorisée 1939-1940" (General Bertin-Boussu)
- "La Panzers passent la Meuse" (Paul Berben and Bernard Iselin)
- "L'Arme Blindée Française (volume 1) : Mai-juin 1940 ! Les blindés français dans la tourmente" (Gérard Saint-Martin)
- "L'armée de l'air dans la tourmente – la bataille de France 1939-1940" (Patrick Facon)
- "Le mythe de la guerre-éclair – la campagne de l'Ouest de 1940" (Karl-Heinz Frieser)
- "Les combats du Mont-Dieu – Mai 1940" (Gérard Giuliano)
- "Les Spahis au feu, la 1e Brigade de Spahis pendant la campagne 1939-1940" (Général P. Jouffrault)
- "Mai - Juin 1940 : les combattants de l'honneur" (Jean Delmas, Paul Devautour and Eric Lefèvre)
- "Une bataille 'oubliée' de la seconde guerre mondiale : Stonne, Le Mont Dieu, Tannay. 14-25 mai 1940" (Bernard Horen)
- War diaries of the 41e BCC and of the 7e BCC
Acknowledgements to Rémi BEBIN who provided detailed information about the battle in the area of Monthermé.
Regards,
David
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David Lehmann
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Meuse 1940
Hello David, now you can put your fingers in icy water; out of joke, very useful post for me. Regards. Tigre 
PD: by the way do you have something about the battle at Peronne's bridgehead on 24 may 1940? (I think that the 62 ID smelt powder for the first time there)
PD: by the way do you have something about the battle at Peronne's bridgehead on 24 may 1940? (I think that the 62 ID smelt powder for the first time there)
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David Lehmann
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- Joined: 01 Apr 2002, 11:50
- Location: France
Re: Meuse 1940
Hello,tigre wrote:PD: by the way do you have something about the battle at Peronne's bridgehead on 24 may 1940? (I think that the 62 ID smelt powder for the first time there)
Just from memory, the bridges in the area are at first only defended by elements of the 28th and 24th regional regiments (local defense regiments composed by local reservists of the series C). They are reinforced by a few MGs and armored rear security platoons equiped with very few FT17 tanks.
Each bridge is therefore defended by about 30 men reinforced either by 1 MG, 1 25mm AT gun, 1 75mm field gun or 1 FT17 tank.
On 23rd / 24th May I think that the German bridghead is attacked by the French 19th infantry division. The heaviest combats are nonetheless against Amiens.
Regards,
David
Peronne 1940
Thank you David. Cheers. Tigre.
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David Lehmann
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